

## Review Article

# The Non-Jewish Question and Other “Jewish Questions” in Modern Germany (and Austria)\*

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For scholars of Jewish/non-Jewish relations in the modern German (and Austrian) context these are truly exciting times. Until quite recently, the body of scholarship of genuine substance focusing on this topic could be quite easily surveyed. Each new monograph in the field was long awaited and treated as though it could reasonably be expected to resolve once and for all the perennial controversy between those who assume Jewish/non-Jewish relations in modern Germany and Austria, on balance, to have been either predominantly productive or consistently dysfunctional—between those, in other words, whom for brevity’s sake we might call “optimists” and “pessimists.” As demonstrated not least by the rich crop of publications under review here, the last decade or so has seen a veritable explosion of scholarship in this field, so much so that it is becoming increasingly difficult even for specialists to keep track. We are finally moving from a literature of individual stepping stones, as it were, toward a genuine critical mass of scholarship, and this process is facilitating a far-reaching refinement and differentiation in both methodology and content.

\* The following books are under review: Abraham Ascher, *A Community under Siege: The Jews of Breslau under Nazism* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. x+324, \$55.00; Steven E. Aschheim, *Beyond the Border: The German-Jewish Legacy Abroad* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. xi+194, \$31.95; Fritz Backhaus, Raphael Gross, and Michael Lenarz, eds., *Ignatz Bubis: Ein jüdisches Leben in Deutschland* (Frankfurt: Jüdischer Verlag im Suhrkamp Verlag, 2007), pp. 200, €25.00; Nicholas Cook, *The Schenker Project: Culture, Race, and Music Theory in Fin-de-Siècle Vienna* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. xi+355, \$75.00; Martin Dean, Constantin Goschler, and Philipp Ther, eds., *Robbery and Restitution: The Conflict over Jewish Property in Europe* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2007), pp. xi+295, \$90.00; Emil Fackenheim, *An Epitaph for German Judaism: From Halle to Jerusalem* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), pp. xxxiv+327, \$39.95; Jay Geller, *On Freud’s Jewish Body: Mitigating Circumcisions* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), pp. xii+355, \$80.00; Hermann Levin Goldschmidt, *The Legacy of German Jewry* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), pp. 265, \$50.00; Atina Grossmann, *Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. xvii+393, \$55.00; Barnett Hartston, *Sensationalizing the Jewish Question: Anti-*

Perhaps most remarkably of all, for the most part peace seems to have broken out between optimists and pessimists. How unlikely it is that this peace will hold is perhaps best illustrated by the increasingly popular focus on “entanglements” between German-speaking Jews and non-Jews. The term “entanglements” allows optimists and pessimists alike to acknowledge and draw attention to what has gone on between Jews and non-Jews without touching on the question of how significant and representative any of these goings-on were for Jewish/non-Jewish relations as a whole. It is surely no secret that optimists continue to think “dialogue” or “symbiosis” when they use (or hear) the word “entanglement,” while for pessimists the term is entirely compatible with the notion of a Jewish “cry into the void.” Yet while the peace lasts we should make the most of the term’s ability to facilitate reasoned debate and careful mutual scrutiny.

When Celan famously cited Moritz Heimann’s defiant aphorism that “a ‘Jewish Question’ is only what a Jew stranded on the loneliest, most remote island still acknowledges as such,” he was entirely right.<sup>1</sup> What, to this day, is frequently referred to as “the Jewish Question” is in fact fundamentally a Non-Jewish Question, and if there is a problem it springs not from what Jews are or do or want but from non-Jewish perceptions of, and projections onto, “the Jew(s).” Since these perceptions/projections constitute a crucial prerequisite for non-Jewish self-understanding, they become palpable not only when “the Jewish Question” is explicitly at stake but also in connection with a variety of issues that have no immediately obvious “Jewish connection,” or only a tenuous one; these might be described as “other Jewish Questions.” The exploration of these “other Jewish Questions” allows for a much fuller understanding of the complexity of non-Jewish perceptions/projections and their potential to promote or subvert (and in some cases, indeed, to promote

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*Semitic Trials and the Press in the Early German Empire* (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. xiii+335, €99.00; Robin Judd, *Contested Rituals: Circumcision, Kosher Butchering, and Jewish Political Life in Germany, 1843–1933* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), pp. xii+283, \$45.00; Mark R. Lindsay, *Barth, Israel, and Jesus: Karl Barth’s Theology of Israel* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. xx+124, £50.00; Jacob Rosenthal, “Die Ehre des jüdischen Soldaten.” *Die Judenzählung im Ersten Weltkrieg und ihre Folgen* (Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 2007), pp. 227, €29.90; Kevin Spicer, ed., *Antisemitism, Christian Ambivalence, and the Holocaust* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC, 2007), pp. xxi+329, \$29.95; Daniel M. Vyleta, *Crime, Jews and News: Vienna 1895–1914* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2007), pp. xi+254, \$80.00.

<sup>1</sup> See Wolfgang Adam, “Bibliothek als Organismus,” *Magdeburger Wissenschaftsjournal*, no. 2 (2004): 55–65, 60; Paul Celan and Peter Szondi, *Briefwechsel* (Frankfurt, 2005), 142 n. 3.

and subvert) specific anti-Jewish stereotypes. Yet at the same time Heimann's neat formulation only tells half of the story: for better or for worse, Jews have in fact felt compelled to respond to the Non-Jewish Question and to varying degrees have made it a Jewish Question after all. It is where it explores, or at least keeps in mind, the intricacies of these dynamics that the recent literature on Jewish/non-Jewish relations in the modern German (and Austrian) context is at its strongest.

Predominantly antiquarian publications, such as Jacob Rosenthal's book on the *Judenzählung*—the military census precipitated in 1916 by the accusation that Jews were failing to pull their weight in support of the German war effort—are now few and far between. That this census came as a profound shock to large numbers of German Jews who had welcomed the war with as much fervor and enthusiasm as most of their non-Jewish compatriots, hoping that the joint effort and experience of the war would finally break down all remaining barriers between Jews and non-Jews, can hardly come as a surprise even to those who have only a fleeting acquaintance with the history of German Jewry. It is therefore hard to see why we needed another book to tell us this. To be sure, Rosenthal's book, based on the dissertation he wrote after retiring from a distinguished career as a maritime engineer, offers a useful compilation of relevant material and adds a dimension to the story by identifying some of the long-term effects of the *Judenzählung*. As it turns out, his determination to grapple with the topic stemmed not least from the fact that the rabbi speaking at the funeral of Rosenthal's father in 1924 caused a minor scandal when he explicitly referred to the bravery of Rosenthal Sr. during the First World War. While some will doubtless benefit from the book's documentary core, its lack of conceptual aspiration makes it very much the odd one out among the volumes under review.

Intellectual history at its best is notoriously difficult to review because its true quality is revealed more in its nuances than in its clear-cut contours. This certainly holds true of the two volumes of outstanding intellectual history under review here, Jay Geller's book on Freud and Nicholas Cook's study of Heinrich Schenker (1868–1935) who, “by turns bombastic, sarcastic, pernickety, and paranoid” (Cook, 19), is now widely regarded as one of the twentieth century's foremost theorists of tonal music. Now that the corporeal, spatial, and various other turns are well under way, music is arguably emerging as one of the historical profession's most spectacular remaining blind spots. Surely few phenomena are so integral to everyday life and yet feature so fleetingly on the conceptual radar of contemporaries and subsequent historians alike. Cook's book goes a long way toward demonstrating why this ought to change and what can be achieved in the process.

Cook sets out to “resituate Schenker's theory in its historical and geographical context” by focusing “on the pastry rather than the analytical plums

contained within it” and identifying “the deep-seated beliefs—or prejudices—about music and society that fueled not only his polemics but also, if I am right, his theoretical development” (4–5). “I mean,” Cook clarifies, “not that Schenker’s theory was determined in any direct, cause-and-effect manner by the social and political circumstances within which he found himself . . . but that Schenker’s theory may be profitably understood as a discourse on the social and political at the same time that it is a discourse on the musical, and that in order to understand this discourse we need to place it in context” (9).

Schenker’s theory, in other words, “is not just a theory of music but a theory of society—or to put it another way, not just a theory but a project” (14)—hence the title of the book. Cook’s approach is a highly sophisticated one. “Social meaning,” he explains, “is not inherent in music but constructed through the interpretation of music. Or to put it another way, to understand music’s social meaning we need to understand the means of its interpretation at a given time and place” (15). Consequently, “any attempt to read direct from music to society, or vice versa, is problematic in two ways: first, it involves an illegitimate distinction between music and society, in that music is one of the dimensions within which social relations are performed; and secondly, it attempts to short-circuit the interface between music and the rest of society, which is precisely the process of critical reflection on what music is—or might be—that we call analysis” (317).

Among the perspectives required to facilitate the sort of contextualization that Cook wants to achieve is a focus on Schenker’s situation as “a Galician Jewish immigrant to the city [i.e., Vienna] in which fully racialised anti-Semitism—and its mirror image, Zionism”—not perhaps the most fortunate of formulations on Cook’s part—“developed during precisely the period when Schenker lived there” (6). Yet Cook is intensely aware of the dangers inherent in drawing connections that ultimately rely on “pocket characterisations of Jewish traits that can come uncomfortably close to essentialism” (214). “In short,” he explains, “any attempt to determine the extent to which Schenker’s thinking drew on Jewish tradition can be no more than speculative, though we can say with confidence that important aspects of his thought—wherever he may have drawn them from—resonate strongly with that tradition. We are, however, on firmer ground when we try to relate his identity as an immigrant Jew to the conditions and perceptions of *fin-de-siècle* Vienna” and these, he argues, “are crucial to an understanding of the basic motivation of the Schenker project” (217).

Intellectually, Jay Geller’s *On Freud’s Jewish Body: Mitigating Circumcisions* is undoubtedly the most exciting of the volumes under review. The fruit of a quarter century’s worth of careful research and (self-)reflection, it offers a wealth of unusually perceptive and ingenious close readings of Freud texts and easily the most sophisticated discussion of Freud’s “Jewish identity” to

date. By showing “how Jewish identity is thoroughly interwoven with sexual, gender, corporeal, ethnic, and racial identities,” Geller not only helps “bring our understanding of Freud the Jew more in line with other contemporary understandings of identity construction” (42) but also makes an extremely important contribution to our general understanding of Jewish identity formation and the complex dynamics at play between the Non-Jewish Question and various other “Jewish Questions.”

Alas, its many virtues also make this book virtually impossible to review by any conventional means. As is so often the case with books built principally on close textual readings, any attempt to formulate a concise summary of its chief findings is prone to produce statements that sound oddly crude and improbable. This problem is aggravated yet further by the nature of Geller’s task. “I, like other contemporary scholarly detectives,” Geller explains, “am investigating the corpus of Freud’s writing in search of an underlying body of *Judentum*. We look for clues, traces of the concerns (not always conscious or intentional) on the margins of his text; we keep our eyes open for the various *Entstellungen*—wrenching distortions of both form and content. We also attempt to discern what is avoided, omitted, de-emphasized. We ask ourselves: what doesn’t seem to fit? what sticks out as strange? what seems not to jibe with what appeared earlier in the text?” (13).

Geller’s book thus offers “symptomatic readings of the distortions and displacements, loud silences and quiet asides, effected by Freud’s everyday engagement with *Judentum*, for he was immersed in a world in which recognition of his own Jewishness was unavoidable, if not necessarily consciously registered” (13). Geller presents a Freud who is “immersed in webs of discourses, buffeted by often separated strands of the cultural imaginary, who, like every individual, Jew or Gentile, incarnated numerous often contradictory, usually overlapping subject (and subjected or abject) positions with divergent desires, values, and interests, each of which makes different demands” (16–17).

Hence, to complicate matters further, Geller’s Freud is also one who changes over time, who by no means invariably responds, whether consciously or unconsciously, to similar challenges in the same way and whose seemingly similar responses by no means always mean the same thing. That “sometimes a nose is not just a nose,” for instance, is now little more than a truism; it is the observation that it is not necessarily “just any penis” either (37) that not only reveals Geller’s ingenuity but also illustrates the difficulty of giving any genuinely accurate summary of the book’s content that would not in fact end up being longer than the book itself.

The red thread running through the book is its “focus on the value of ‘circumcision’ as a dispositive for the Central European imagination between Emancipation and Shoah—whether the would-be-hidden circumcised penis or

its displacement upward into visibility, the Jewish nose. The ascription of this ritual inscription more than signified Jewish difference, it established it for the non-Jews—even when the practice did not take place” (31).

One of the fixed points in Geller’s account is Freud’s contention that, in Geller’s words, “hatred of Jews arises as a reaction against ‘the dreaded castration’ evoked by ‘its symbolic substitute,’” circumcision. “This correlation of castration and circumcision,” Geller explains, “not only undergirds Freud’s later elaboration of the causes of antisemitism in *Moses and Monotheism*, but it informs both some of the earlier psychoanalytic explorations of religious development as well as the most recent psychoanalytic investigations of antisemitism” (112). Yet, as Geller points out, Freud made his remarks about the nexus between circumcision and Jew hatred in the context of the case of “Little Hans” who, it turns out, “had not been circumcised—at least not ritually—thereby rendering the anomalous invocation of circumcision all the more curious” (38) and making it a potent piece of evidence demonstrating just how close the connection actually was between Jewish representation and the dispositive of circumcision—circumcision not primarily as a perceptible reality, in other words, but as “a rumor about the Jews,” as Geller rather ingeniously puts it (127).

Given the extent to which at the time “individual identity and social cohesion [were] principally (but by no means exclusively) determined by the sexual division of labor and its gender-coded spheres, ‘circumcised’ male Jews [were] identified *with* (not *as*) men without penises, that is, *with* (not *as*) women” (199). Yet Freud’s Jews, on Geller’s reading, are “not the effeminate race (*Geschlecht*) that Central Europeans imagine they see when they view *Judentum* through the dispositive of . . . circumcision.” Geller’s Freud is a “‘manly’ postcolonial Jewish subject” (179) who, for better or for worse, himself remains no less haunted by “circumcision” than the Central European cultural imagination more generally.

Yet Geller insists, and this is perhaps where his most original contribution lies, that Freud’s grappling with these issues, as it is reflected in his writings, should not be read merely “as an elaborate and elaborated ‘masculine protest’ against circumcision-induced inferiority” (214). His “Afterword” begins with two epigraphs. In both of them Freud explains that he finds himself engaged in forms of opposition related to his Jewishness. Yet in the first instance, this opposition “renders Freud divided against himself” while in the second “that position splits him from the ‘compact majority.’” Geller explains that without wanting to deny “Freud’s ambivalence—such is *la condition humaine* . . . I would rather follow the other allusion in the second epigraph” (214).

To give at least some idea of the flavor of Geller’s discussion, I want to touch on some aspects of the three concluding chapters. Chapter 5 focuses on Freud’s treatment of Daniel Paul Schreber’s *Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nerven-*

*kranken* by taking “Freud’s advice quite literally” and reading “the markings and marginalia he [i.e., Freud] made in his own copy of the *Denkwürdigkeiten*.” From these markings and marginalia Geller reconstructs a second narrative, alongside that of the case study that Freud based on Schreber’s account, that he then relates to the rhetorical strategies Freud deployed in constructing that case study. This allows him to draw attention to “the conflicts between those two narratives” (139). Against this backdrop Geller ultimately suggests that “Freud ignores the site” within Schreber’s account “where castration and a Jewish referent converge” (161) because any discussion of this theme “would have contributed to the regnant associations of Jews with effeminacy and deviant sexuality, on the one hand, and with mental illness, on the other” (159–60).

In the following chapter, Geller argues that “the warp and woof that structures Freud’s tapestry of human history is less the confluence of British imperialism, French theory-production, and Austrian bourgeois social norms than the entanglement of the gendered, sexed, and ethnic position of this son of *Ostjuden* living and writing in the metropole with a particular strand of argument that emerged out of the enthusiasm and *Männerphantasien* (male fantasies) surrounding Germany’s late-nineteenth-century colonial adventures: Hans Blüher’s sexualizing of the ethnographer Heinrich Schurtz’s theories about the foundation and governance of the state by male associations” (162).

Geller makes his case by reconstructing the relationship between Freud and Blüher—a prominent ideologue of the *Wandervogel* youth movement—in which the conceptualization of homosexuality played a crucial role. Blüher’s initial interest in Freud resulted from Freud’s argument, in Geller’s paraphrase, “that neither perverts nor inverts form a degenerate group of individuals separated from the rest of humanity, but rather represent a variant of sexual aim or object that all human beings at some point in their development, consciously or unconsciously, desire.” Moreover, “by distinguishing inversion from perversion Freud relieved homosexuality from the medico-moral onus that still clung to the term ‘perversion’” (166).

Blüher for his part differentiated between “latent” and “feminine” homosexuality, on the one hand, which he considered pathological, and “inversion,” on the other, by which he meant “normal” homosexuality “in the ancient sense.” The latter he considered “thoroughly healthy.” For Blüher, “effeminacy” reflected not “an inborn possibility” but was rather “an effect of decadence.” Not so “inversion.” It was the “manifestation of men’s sexual-social talent for socializing and state building.” The “invert” was a “virile agent” and “the space of his activity . . . the only ‘productive social form’: masculine society (*männliche Gesellschaft*) or the male band (*Männerbund*)” (169). Not the family but homosexual drives formed “the basis for state formation” (173–74).

It was soon after Blüher had fully formulated this stance in his "Three Fundamental Forms of Homosexuality" that Freud discontinued his correspondence with Blüher, and he became increasingly concerned as "the anti-Jewish implications of Blüher's theories . . . became manifest" (Geller, 174). Blüher now identified as "the inverse of the inverted type . . . neither the heterosexual nor the effeminate male, but the Jew." The Jews, so Blüher claimed, "suffer at one and the same time from a weakness in male-bonding and a hypertrophy of the family" (176).

It is against this backdrop that Geller reads not only Freud's attempt "to sever the connection between homosexuality and male Jewry" (179) but also the fact that "homosexuality becomes more and more marginal to Freud's theory of social origins" (180). He picks up on Diana Fuss's observation that Freud subsequently "conceptualizes 'homosexuality and homosociality as absolutely distinct categories.'" This reconceptualization involved a "distancing or recharacterizing of the *Männerbund*" in which "homosexuality among brothers shifted its locus from sociality to rivalry." In short, in sharp contrast to Blüher, Freud proceeded to emphasize "the importance of renouncing homosexuality for cultural and technological progress to take place" (181).

On Geller's reading, then, "the diminution of the role of homosexuality and the shift in its tenor suggest that Freud may well [have been] motivated by the specific threat that *Männerbund* theory and practice" presented "to him and his fellow Jews." That his approach "sustained the internalized heterosexual norm," in other words, is only one part of the story. At the same time he was engaging in "postcolonial mimicry and in the process reversed the stereotypical roles of the nonvirile, homosexual Jews and the virile, heterosexual non-Jews." Yet, as Geller adds, "all was for naught as the *Männerbund* drove the father of psychoanalysis from his home" (182).

The "new persecutions" (184) play a central role in Geller's discussion, in his final chapter, of "the series of distortions that is the text *Moses and Monotheism*" (35), the text most frequently cited in discussions regarding Freud's Jewishness. "At the crux of his peripatetic reflections" in *Moses and Monotheism* "was how the Jews 'have been able to retain their individuality till the present day.'" This was "a problem, he concedes, that he was unable to solve" (186). His (in)famous attempt to do so by appealing to the "inheritance of memory traces" has drawn an enormous amount of discussion.<sup>2</sup>

There was, of course, an "ever-present, never-acknowledged solution . . . to his problem of how the Jews 'have been able to retain their individuality'"—namely, circumcision. Yet as the Non-Jewish Question shifted increasingly "from a neurotic to a psychotic register," the need to repress this "traumatic knowledge" that was "a primary deep source of that antisemitism that so

<sup>2</sup> See Richard J. Bernstein, *Freud and the Legacy of Moses* (Cambridge, 1998).

problematized his situation as a Jew" (35) became more overwhelming than ever before. In *Moses and Monotheism*, therefore, "Freud characterizes *Judentum* as masculine . . . throughout" (Geller, 195). "This hypermasculinization is accompanied by the omission of any explicit association of the Jew with the feminine" (196) and an "increasing marginalization" of circumcision (188). Ultimately, "the role of circumcision as an agent of *Judentum's* development is expropriated by the repressed, unconscious memory-trace" (201) and "circumcision, the 'visible mark,' becomes immaterial" (203).

While his account is by no means merely descriptive and certainly develops powerful arguments, Geller is a soft-spoken and tentative commentator who for the most part prefers to let readers form their own judgments. The manner in which he lays out before his readers the material they need to take into consideration is exemplary, hence the thickness of the account. Consequently, this book will hardly appeal to readers who prefer to pick off the neat sound bites and check the evidence only if something fails to chime with their preconceptions. Evidently distrustful of the power that the all too explicit might wield over his readers, Geller makes those likely to agree with him work at least as hard as those who might take issue with his interpretations. If my own experience is anything to go by, few readers will genuinely benefit from this book without reading much of what Geller has to say at least twice. This is not a criticism but an observation—for the additional effort is richly rewarded. Geller's is one of those rare books that makes a slightly different impression and turns out to be even cleverer and richer and more thought provoking each time one returns to it. What greater compliment could one pay a book?

In a rather different way, circumcision also plays a crucial role in Robin Judd's *Contested Rituals: Circumcision, Kosher Butchering, and Jewish Political Life in Germany, 1843–1933*. As long as the secularization paradigm held sway, the contestation of ritual practices at the heart of Judd's account would have seemed to signify little more than a curious and ultimately negligible form of rearguard action on the part of these practices' detractors and defenders alike. Judd is to be commended for placing these disputes center stage. Her emphasis, above all, is on "the messy nature of these disputes" (122), a decision that accounts for both the book's greatest strengths and its partial weaknesses. Once she hits her stride, Judd presents a wealth of extraordinarily interesting material illustrating the range of positions taken by critics and defenders of circumcision and kosher butchering. She is at her best when identifying ambivalences. Take her observation that relevant medical writings "impossibly categoriz[ed] the Jewish man as both undersexed and supersexual and his penis as both unresponsive and hyperactive," thus cementing the notion "that there was indeed something abnormal about the Jewish man" quite regardless of the specific emphases (116).

Less convincing are her attempts to enlist the messiness of her material to illustrate not the often self-contradictory or at least mutually attenuating coexistence of multiple motives and motifs but the predominance of one to the detriment of another (or others). Her conclusion that between 1880 and 1916 it was "understandings of toleration . . . and not antisemitism" that "became translated directly into policy within the national disputes" (128) is a case in point. Of course Judd is entirely right in emphasizing that "the presence of ideologies alone does not necessarily impact everyday life" and that it is therefore "imperative to understand the relationship between thought and action and to chart the disconnects that often exist between an ideology and its consequences" (123). Yet this, in and of itself, would of course apply to ideas of toleration as much as to antisemitism. More important, though, could one seriously suggest that prevalent (negative) attitudes toward "the Jews," on the one hand, and religious toleration, on the other, are not in any case inextricably linked in various ways? Or take her argument that "much of the egregiously antisemitic language and imagery remained in the printed realm, while local participants were more likely to invoke economic or political concerns than they were the rituals' supposed affinity with blood libel" (121). Again Judd makes a case that sounds, and most likely is, eminently plausible on its own terms. And yet in fact she seems to be construing a clear-cut alternative here that bears no resemblance to the very messiness so central to her analysis: namely, an alternative between literal belief in the blood libel, on the one hand, and "economic or political concerns" about kosher butchering and circumcision apparently disconnected from prevalent attitudes toward "the Jews" on the other. There is surely a significant middle ground between these two extremes, and it is precisely on this middle ground that the messiness so central to her account resides. In any case, as Judd herself points out, whether the participants in these debates "endorsed a ban on kosher butchering or a policy that exempted Jews from extant laws," either way they kept the "ritual questions" alive and thus allowed "discourses concerning Jewish difference to remain active within the public sphere" (150; repeated almost verbatim, 153).

Messiness also fares less well when Judd tries to introduce empirical data as evidence. Take her suggestion that many of the ordinances seeking to regulate kosher butchering "originated in cities and towns whose Jewish communities had grown exponentially during the late nineteenth century with the immigration of foreign-born Jews. Antisemitic agitation during this time had been directed against these Jews who had settled in communities with a large Jewish presence." She then proceeds to introduce Dresden, of all places, as a case in point: "By 1910 over 50 percent of the Jews living in Dresden, a city that witnessed several anti-kosher butchering initiatives, were foreign born" (137). Yet while it is indeed true that the Jewish community in Dresden

had grown exponentially and included a large share of foreign-born Jews, this is by no means the whole story. For starters, the share of foreign-born Jews in Dresden was lower than that in neighboring Leipzig (64.8 percent) and, for that matter, lower than the Saxon average (58.5 percent),<sup>3</sup> suggesting that this statistic can hardly be enlisted as an explanation specifically for Dresden's unrivaled status as a hotbed of antisemitism. Perhaps more important, though, the "exponential" growth of Dresden's Jewry had seen it increase from 1,276 in 1871 to 7,334 in 1910, decreasing its share of the city's population from 0.7 percent to 0.6 percent in the process, so there certainly cannot be any suggestion of "a large Jewish presence" in Dresden.<sup>4</sup>

That Dresden posed a challenge to all those who assumed that there was a direct correlation between the number of Jews and the strength of antisemitism in any given locality is something of which contemporaries were already intensely aware. August Bebel, for instance, took up this issue in his famous programmatic speech on antisemitism at the Social Democratic party congress of 1893 in Cologne. The recent election results, he conceded, had led people to observe that "the antisemitic movement found such fertile ground precisely where there are so relatively few Jews," namely, in Saxony. Yet the actual number of Jews present in any given locality was quite irrelevant, Bebel went on to explain, because "given the current organization of society it is not decisive whether the Jew is personally in town; crucial is where, and how, he is perceptible as a competitor. As such, however, he is perceptible everywhere."<sup>5</sup> Ultimately, though, these are all quibbles that concern Judd's interpretation of her material. Her book is a good illustration of the point made at the outset: at its core is an extremely interesting, thick account that allows for detailed engagement and offers an immensely rewarding read, irrespective of the concerns one may have about some of her conclusions.

Daniel Vyleta's engaging and well-written *Crime, Jews and News: Vienna 1895–1914* makes two main arguments. First, it suggests that "the degree to which deterministic models of criminality—and through them, narratives of criminals as 'others'—dominated the discourse has often been exaggerated" (220). In the period under review, "popular thinking about criminals was not overshadowed by biological models" (218), and "biological and racial narratives did not dominate the debate about Jewish crime" (9). The author argues that "the usual historiographic emphasis on criminology as a science that sought to delineate criminal difference needs to be complemented by an account of criminalistics—the science of detection—that emerged in Austria

<sup>3</sup> Jack Wertheimer, *Unwelcome Strangers* (New York, 1987), 190–91.

<sup>4</sup> Monika Richarz, "Die Entwicklung der jüdischen Bevölkerung," in *Deutsch-jüdische Geschichte in der Neuzeit*, 4 vols., ed. Steven M. Lowenstein et al. (Munich, 1997), 3:33.

<sup>5</sup> August Bebel, *Sozialdemokratie und Antisemitismus* (Berlin, 1894), 20.

around the fin-de-siècle and articulated a sweeping critique of criminology’s most fundamental assumptions. Rather than focusing on the essential deviance of criminals, criminalistics stressed the epistemological challenges of bringing offenders to justice and consequently inquired into the physical procedures and psychological dynamics of the investigative and judicial processes. In this narrative, the criminal did not hold any special status as an anthropological, psychological or sociological ‘other,’ but was understood as a rational participant in these processes” (8). On Vyleta’s account, of these two “rival knowledges” (220) the criminalistic prevailed in the relevant coverage of the press, whether antisemitic or otherwise. “The most popular of genres in which narratives of the criminal were articulated . . . followed a logic in which criminal rationalism rather than biological (or sociological) determinism defined the perpetrator” (218).

If the antisemitic and non-antisemitic press alike shared this predilection for the criminalistic over the criminological approach, what did set them apart was the former’s determination to connect criminality to Jewishness (albeit on historical and sociological rather than biological grounds). “Publications that did not have an overtly antisemitic orientation,” on the other hand—and this is Vyleta’s second major claim—“carefully eschewed marking crimes as Jewish” (9). He suggests that “antisemitic discourse was identified as too partisan to be casually employed.” Hence “only those papers that wanted to unambiguously affiliate themselves with antisemitic political goals used it” (129). On this reading, the “occasional use of an antisemitic idiom,” for instance by the socialist *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, reflected “a careful and conscious strategy rather than a blind absorption of popular invective” (223). Vyleta therefore concludes that “antisemitism did not quite acquire the ubiquity and ‘invisibility’ in this period that is often implied, but remained politically charged even in the manifestation of throwaway remarks or jokes” (129). His argument is rather stronger on the first count than on the second. Arguments from silence almost inevitably require a greater measure of substantiation than positive arguments, and in its current form Vyleta’s reasoning is simply not forceful enough in establishing that the silences in question, rather than signifying a taboo, might not equally well have reflected what went without saying.

In any case, while calling into question “whether antisemitism had truly achieved widespread respectability up and down the social ladder” (223) in prewar Vienna, Vyleta states emphatically that it is not his intention “to doubt the fundamental fact that Austrian Jews lived in an antisemitic society.” What he wants to address is “the question of the precise nature of this antisemitism, both in terms of its social base and its precise content” (5). Like Barnet Hartston’s examination of antisemitic trials and the press in the early Imperial German context, *Sensationalizing the Jewish Question*, Vyleta’s study has

much to offer scholars interested in a more sophisticated understanding of the complexities of the Non-Jewish Question.

Inevitably, the fate of German (and European) Jewry under the Nazis continues to draw considerable attention. Here too, “messiness” now features more prominently. Where in the past it has not been uncommon to assume that participation or complicity in anti-Jewish policies initiated or driven by the National Socialist regime could be motivated only either by rabid ideological antisemitism or by other motives, recent scholarship is developing a much more complex notion of the ways in which other motives complemented and became enmeshed with various gradations of outright antisemitism or more low-key anti-Jewish sentiments. Michael Berkowitz’s important discussion of the construct of “Jewish criminality” and its significance for antisemitic propaganda and the normalization of anti-Jewish measures in the Weimar era, the Nazi period, and the immediate aftermath of the Second World War is an interesting case in point.<sup>6</sup>

On a similar note, to the extent that historians are increasingly focusing on the greed of those who benefited (or at least hoped to benefit) from the spoliation of European Jewry prior to and during the Shoah, most now understand this as an additional factor that complemented prevalent anti-Jewish attitudes rather than merely an expression of opportunism that could quite arbitrarily have been directed against any other group if the same spoils had been promised. The most comprehensive account of the wholesale spoliation of European Jewry is that by Martin Dean, now clearly the foremost scholar in this field.<sup>7</sup> It draws on almost a decade’s worth of systematic archival research and will undoubtedly be required reading for all scholars interested in these issues for many years to come. While the first part focuses on economic persecution within Nazi Germany (and Austria), the second part encompasses a survey of both Western and Eastern Europe under German occupation and also analyzes the role of the neutral states. While Dean portrays the plunder of European Jewry as a predominantly state-driven process, he not only emphasizes the “dynamic interaction of local initiatives and bureaucratized state control” but also concludes that “essentially the popular outbursts of racist-inspired greed and its more bureaucratic state manifestation were two sides of the same coin.”<sup>8</sup> Widespread popular implication “spread complicity and therefore also acceptance of German-inspired measures against the Jews.”<sup>9</sup> Not least, the sheer scale of the despoliation and

<sup>6</sup> Michael Berkowitz, *The Crime of My Very Existence: Nazism and the Myth of Jewish Criminality* (Berkeley, 2007).

<sup>7</sup> Martin Dean, *Robbing the Jews: The Confiscation of Jewish Property in the Holocaust, 1933–1945* (New York, 2008), 7.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 396.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 395.

the number of institutions and individuals involved dispel “the myth that few people in Europe were aware of the disappearance of the Jews and their likely fate.”<sup>10</sup> On Dean’s account, “at certain key stages, both private and state greed acted as a catalyst in the development of violent ‘solutions’”<sup>11</sup> and the plunder of European Jewry was ultimately “an important catalyst in accelerating the downward spiral across the threshold to genocide.”<sup>12</sup>

Many of these issues are raised in a broad comparative perspective in the volume edited jointly by Dean, Constantin Goschler, and Philipp Ther, *Robbery and Restitution*. This is the extended English-language edition of proceedings that grew out of a conference in early 2002.<sup>13</sup> Inevitably, as the late Gerald Feldman points out in his concluding reflections, “this volume puts more problems on the table than can possibly be solved,” and in part it has been overtaken by the very agenda it sets out. It nevertheless offers an extremely useful survey and an indispensable tool, alongside Dean’s monograph, for anyone seeking to develop a grasp of the issues at stake. Restitution, of course, is in some respects a problematic concept in this particular context. The notion that compensation for immediate material losses, no matter how lavish, could in some way make up for the fate European Jewry suffered between 1933/39 and 1945 is patently absurd. In many cases, an official acknowledgment of wrongdoing has been as important a goal for those claiming restitution as any prospective material restitution, if not more so. As Feldman points out, “whether one wishes to accept the fact or not, much that has been lost will never be recovered and such recovery as is taking place will come to an end in the foreseeable future by sheer force of circumstances.” Yet “what has been gained and can continue to be gained . . . is historical knowledge and understanding” and hence “a much fuller understanding of the criminality of the National Socialist regime and the emptiness of the communist dictatorships” that were subsequently unable to “explain the past . . . and even often instrumentalized antisemitism themselves.”<sup>14</sup>

Abraham Ascher’s *A Community under Siege: The Jews of Breslau under Nazism* similarly seeks to explore the interaction of antisemitism, genuine fanaticism, opportunism, and greed in facilitating “the growing support for, or indifference towards, Nazi policies,” while also doing justice to the “many references to acts of kindness and expressions of disapproval by Germans”

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 391.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 395.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>13</sup> Constantin Goschler and Philipp Ther, eds., *Raub und Restitution: “Arisierung” und Rückerstattung des jüdischen Eigentums* (Frankfurt, 2003).

<sup>14</sup> Gerald D. Feldman, “Reflections on the Restitution and Compensation of Holocaust Theft: Past, Present, and Future,” in *Robbery and Restitution*, ed. Martin Dean, Constantin Goschler, and Philipp Ther (New York, 2007), 260–68, 267.

(22–23) that he came across while exploring the fate of Breslau’s Jewry. Ascher, better known as a historian of the Russian Revolution of 1905, begins with an interesting and moving account of his own family’s experiences in, and flight from, Breslau. The bulk of the book is dedicated to an account of the Jewish community’s persistent attempts to withstand the state’s pressure and maintain the greatest semblance of continuity and normality that could be achieved under the circumstances. Although he does not use this terminology, Ascher’s account is clearly predicated on the notion that steadfastness (*amidah*) in the day-to-day struggle with the constraints and threats posed by the regime constituted a form of resistance,<sup>15</sup> and his ultimate motivation in writing the book has been to help this form of resistance receive the recognition he thinks it is due. The strengths of this book are empirical rather than conceptual, and the way in which Ascher’s account vacillates between observations pertaining specifically to Breslau and suggestions concerning the wider context of Nazi Germany more generally are occasionally a little confusing. Yet overall Ascher has made an important contribution toward a fuller understanding of German Jews’ day-to-day experiences prior to their flight or deportation.

The role of the established churches in Nazi Germany and Nazi-dominated Europe, and their stance vis-à-vis the Nazis’ antisemitism in particular, despite having drawn a relatively significant amount of attention, remains a highly contentious and often misunderstood issue. Critics and apologists of the churches alike are prone to grave oversimplification, and as with most topics that fall within the remit of the study of Jewish-Christian relations, one is all too often confronted in this area with two-thirds well-meaning dilettantism to every one-third of serious professional scholarship. In its unevenness, the collection of essays *Antisemitism, Christian Ambivalence, and the Holocaust* edited by Kevin Spicer indicates not only the rewards that more sophisticated scholarship in this area would render but also how much heavy lifting remains to be done. The contributions by Spicer himself (on one of the “brown priests” he has since treated more comprehensively in his superb monograph *Hitler’s Priests*),<sup>16</sup> Paul Shapiro (on Romania), Matthew Hockenos (on German Protestantism in the immediate postwar years), and Suzanne Brown-Fleming (on the encounters of Rabbi Philip Bernstein, advisor on Jewish affairs to the U.S. occupation troops, with the Roman Catholic hierarchy in postwar Germany) stand out, and there is indeed much else that can be gleaned from this volume.

<sup>15</sup> On the conceptual differentiation between *amidah* and *hitnagdut* as forms of Jewish resistance see Dan Michman, “Jewish Resistance during the Holocaust and Its Significance: Theoretical Observations,” in *Holocaust Historiography: A Jewish Perspective* (London, 2003), 217–48.

<sup>16</sup> Kevin P. Spicer, *Hitler’s Priests: Catholic Clergy and National Socialism* (DeKalb, IL, 2008).

Yet there is also much that remains vague, and there is far too much listing of names, incidents, and titles without sufficient context. Most disconcerting of all, too little attention is paid to the clarification of criteria. As the word “ambivalence” in the volume’s title suggests, many of the contributors argue that good was mellowed by bad or that bad was offset by good, yet it rarely becomes clear why the authors assume that the scales were ultimately tipped (however slightly) in one direction rather than the other. All too often one could use the very same material and simply by swapping a handful of words construe exactly the opposite argument. In short, overall this volume is perhaps more of a stepping stone than a milestone.

Mark Lindsay’s *Barth, Israel, and Jesus: Karl Barth’s Theology of Israel* is his second monograph on Barth’s grappling with ancient Israel, Judaism, and contemporary Jewry, in this instance focusing predominantly on the postwar period. Prima facie this volume would seem to fit in nicely with the prevalent trend to focus not on individual infelicitous utterances but instead on the ways in which assumptions about Judaism and Jewry are woven into the deep structure of (in this case) Barth’s thought. Yet Lindsay seems strangely determined to have his cake and eat it too.

Only a few years ago the suggestion that a study of Barth’s thought could be integral to a review article in this journal might have seemed far from evident. Yet the insight that a sound understanding of theological thought needs to be one of the core concerns of mainstream intellectual history even in the later modern period is increasingly gaining ground. Karl Barth (1886–1968) was in any case “by general consensus the greatest Protestant theologian since Luther” (ix), and “arguably the most important—and most prolific—theologian of the twentieth century.”<sup>17</sup> Indeed, as Rudy Koshar recently pointed out, “Barth was as important in his field as Adorno, Freud, Wittgenstein, Weber, Heidegger, or Saussure were in theirs.” And yet, “whereas these thinkers have garnered much attention outside their specialties, the full compass of Barth’s oeuvre remains relatively unknown to intellectual history.”<sup>18</sup> This clearly needs to change.

One assumes that this volume, like its predecessor, *Covenanted Solidarity*, sets out to reconstruct Barth’s stance by “taking the *theological* element seriously, and assessing it on its own grounds, while keeping it embedded in the actuality of *historical* enquiry.”<sup>19</sup> For the readers of this journal the latter is obviously of particular import. Alas, it has to be said that on this count Lindsay comes seriously unstuck. “Barth’s critics,” we are told, “often with-

<sup>17</sup> Rudy Koshar, “Where Is Karl Barth in Modern European History?” *Modern Intellectual History* 5, no. 2 (2008): 333–62, 333.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 334.

<sup>19</sup> Mark R. Lindsay, *Covenanted Solidarity: The Theological Basis of Karl Barth’s Opposition to Nazi Antisemitism and the Holocaust* (New York, 2001), 2.

out fully examining his dogmatic theological writings . . . routinely cite two pieces of apparent evidence” that would seem to throw an unfavorable light on Barth. Yet instead of leaving it at that and proceeding to examine the notions of Judaism and Jewishness that emerge from the deep structure of Barth’s thought, Lindsay first sets out to explain “in some detail” (21) why the two “routinely” cited pieces of “apparent evidence” in any case do not bear out what Barth’s critics think they bear out. Yet if the “apparent evidence” can be invalidated on its own terms, why point out that those who misinterpret that evidence do so “often without fully examining his dogmatic theological writings”? Here Lindsay’s argumentative procedure seems to follow that of the thief who claims that he never took the goods in question in the first place and then proceeds to explain why, even if he did take them, this did not really constitute theft: Barth never made those problematic remarks, but if he did then a “full” examination of his dogmatic thought will show that he did not really mean them. Then again, it is a good thing that Lindsay has a backup plan because he comes seriously a cropper in his attempt to dispel the “apparent evidence” on its own terms.

This “apparent evidence” consists of two letters (strictly speaking, three; the third reiterates relevant statements already made in one of the other two) that Barth wrote toward the end of his life. In the first of these letters, written on May 22, 1967, Barth congratulated Eberhard Bethge (1909–2000) on the publication of his Bonhoeffer biography. Barth singled out among the aspects that had particularly struck him while reading the biography Bonhoeffer’s singularly outspoken opposition to Nazi antisemitism. “Especially new to me was the fact that in 1933 and the years following, Bonhoeffer was the first and almost the only one to face and tackle the Jewish question so centrally and energetically. I have long since regarded it as a fault on my part,” Barth continued—and it is this part of Barth’s statement that Lindsay quotes—“that I did not make this question a decisive issue” (Lindsay, Barth, 21).<sup>20</sup> Lindsay then proceeds to demonstrate that while Barth may not have spoken out in public in defense of German Jewry, he did criticize Nazi antisemitism privately and was, for the most part indirectly and by association, involved in various attempts to aid Jews. Consequently, Lindsay argues, “Barth’s confession to Bethge . . . seems . . . to be a self-indictment that is not entirely consistent with the historical record” and “a strong case can be mounted to argue that in his confession to Bethge, Barth is in fact being unduly harsh on himself” (22). It might be noted in passing that Lindsay offers no explanation as to why Barth’s remarks in private letters should be taken at face value when he says the things Lindsay wants to hear but only constitute “apparent

<sup>20</sup> Karl Barth, *Briefe 1961–1968*, ed. Jürgen Fangmeier and Hinrich Stoevesandt (Zurich, 1975), 403; Karl Barth, *Letters, 1961–1968*, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Edinburgh, 1981), 250.

evidence” when Barth makes self-critical remarks that Lindsay finds less agreeable. More important, though, this would all be very well were it not for one small but decisive blemish, namely, the part of Barth’s original statement that Lindsay has chosen to leave out. “I have long since regarded it as a fault on my part,” Barth wrote, “that I did not make this question a decisive issue, *at least publicly in the church conflict*” (my emphasis).<sup>21</sup> Quite how Barth’s various direct and indirect involvements in private initiatives would weaken this particular “self-indictment” (assuming for a moment one had good reason to want to protect him from the courage of his own admission of failure on this score in the first place) must surely remain something of a mystery.

The second piece of “apparent evidence” is a letter Barth wrote, on September 5, 1967, to his former student Friedrich Wilhelm Marquardt (1928–2002), who would soon emerge as one of the foremost radical theologians of his generation and one of the few theologians of stature who genuinely treated the Shoah as integral to his entire theological project. Barth’s letter was a response to Marquardt’s recently published doctoral dissertation, a critical though not unsympathetic assessment of Barth’s stance on (ancient) Israel.<sup>22</sup> In this letter, Barth offered a deeply unsettling admission that must surely rank among the most courageous statements on this matter that we have from any theologian of his generation: “I am,” Barth wrote, “decidedly not a philosemite, in that in personal encounters with living Jews (even Jewish Christians) I have always, so long as I can remember, had to suppress a totally irrational aversion, naturally suppressing it at once on the basis of all my presuppositions, and concealing it totally in my statements, yet still having to suppress and conceal it. Pfui! is all I can say to this in some sense allergic reaction of mine. But this is how it was and is.”<sup>23</sup>

It may seem a little puzzling that Lindsay would introduce this passage as the second piece of evidence enlisted by Barth’s critics “in support of Barth’s *alleged* negative view of ‘real’ Jews” (my emphasis). “This confession to Marquardt,” Lindsay admits, “is far more damning than the letter to Bethge, and cannot be mitigated simply by recourse to history, to what Barth did or did not do for Jews during the Nazi years.” He even concedes that it is “quite natural” that “the response of most commentators to these admissions has . . . been to accept uncritically Barth’s self-reflections” (23). Yet as the term “uncritically” indicates, “natural” as this response may seem, it is, on Lindsay’s reading misguided, and he subsequently proceeds to demonstrate that Barth was in fact much more intimate and at ease with “real Jews” than he himself realized (or perhaps remembered in 1967).

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Friedrich-Wilhelm Marquardt, *Die Entdeckung des Judentums für die christliche Theologie: Israel im Denken Karl Barths* (Munich, 1967).

<sup>23</sup> Barth, *Briefe*, 420–21; *Letters*, 262.

Among the critiques that have portrayed Barth's writings as treating Jews and Judaism schematically and as conceptual putty rather than a living reality, Lindsay identifies Marquardt's as the "most scathing" (26). In some ways it is gratifying to see that Lindsay has finally decided to engage Marquardt's study at all. As screaming silences go, the absence of Marquardt's *Entdeckung des Judentums* from Lindsay's previous monograph must surely be an extreme case. In some 300 pages dedicated to *The Theological Basis of Karl Barth's Opposition to Nazi Antisemitism and the Holocaust* one finds exactly one indirect hint at Marquardt's study, tucked away in a footnote among a list of critics cited by another author as taking issue with Barth's stance.<sup>24</sup> Yet the new volume too fails to engage Marquardt's *Entdeckung des Judentums* in any serious manner. It features only insofar as it supposedly offers the "most scathing" formulation of the accusation that "Jews existed in Barth's mind as 'mere forms of our perception and the stuff of our alienated consciousness,' having no independent reality" (26). Lindsay's footnote at this juncture refers to "316ff." in Marquardt's book. I may have overlooked something, but having gone over Marquardt's book from page 316 onward several times, as well as the entire section of the book in which Marquardt takes issue with Barth's position,<sup>25</sup> I have not been able to find this quotation; Marquardt does repeatedly make remarks in this direction but nowhere quite in this formulation. What weighs more heavily, though, is the fallaciousness of Lindsay's line of argument. What Marquardt and other critics have suggested is that Barth's conceptual treatment of Jews and Judaism in his theological writings remained abstract and schematic and beholden to his theological agenda rather than to empirical realities. This is surely not the same as claiming that Barth never met a Jew and knew nothing about Jews or Judaism. Yet Lindsay proceeds on the assumption that he can invalidate the critique of Barth's conceptual dealings with Jews and Judaism by scraping together evidence demonstrating that Barth did know some Jews and did have some knowledge of Judaism after all.

A case in point is Lindsay's suggestive account of Barth's relationship to Hermann Cohen. A crucial influence on Barth, prior to Barth's departure from liberal theology, was the Marburg theologian Wilhelm Herrmann. Marburg at the time was a bastion of neo-Kantianism whose most prominent representative was Hermann Cohen—who was Jewish. Lindsay cites Bruce McCormack and Simon Fisher (though without giving page references to specific passages in their books) to establish, first, Herrmann's close involvement with neo-Kantianism and, second, by extension, Cohen's influence on Barth. While McCormack, as

<sup>24</sup> Lindsay, *Covenanted Solidarity*, 234 n. 57.

<sup>25</sup> Marquardt, *Entdeckung des Judentums*, 266–360.

ever, is on solid ground in establishing the former,<sup>26</sup> Fisher's attempt to demonstrate the latter is rather more tentative. Indeed, Fisher suggests that "it is *likely* [emphasis added] that Barth attended some of Cohen's lectures while a student at Marburg and, moreover, that his private library contained a number of books by Cohen and the other leading philosopher at Marburg, Paul Natorp."<sup>27</sup> Later on he states that "during his studies at Marburg he [Barth] attended lectures delivered by the philosophers and his private library contained books written by both Cohen and Natorp."<sup>28</sup> Barth attended philosophy lectures in Marburg, in other words, but whether he actually attended Cohen's lectures remains a matter of speculation, and while his library certainly contained titles by Cohen and Natorp at the time of his death, it cannot be verified whether he had already acquired (let alone read) these during his time in Marburg. Nor, for that matter, does Fisher distinguish between Barth's interest in Cohen (who was a Jew) and Natorp (who was not). Yet, even though Lindsay himself points out that "it would be disingenuous to suggest that Barth's enthusiasm for Cohen was due to his Jewishness," Cohen, on his account, nevertheless becomes Barth's "former Jewish teacher" and this nexus is enlisted as evidence for the contention "that even in his student years Barth keenly sought out, and was heavily influenced by, Jews"—now in the plural!—"with whom he felt at least an intellectual affinity" (27).

None too surprisingly, Lindsay is indeed able to establish points of contact between Barth and various Jewish scholars, and he concludes that "the charge that he was unfamiliar with modern Judaism and contemporary Jewish philosophy is clearly problematized" by these contacts (29). Barth himself, it has to be said, does not seem to have found Marquardt's critique unduly "scathing." In the already cited letter in which he expressed his lifelong, painfully suppressed unease when dealing with Jews, he expressly acknowledged that Marquardt "had good cause to develop the criticism made in § 5"—that is, the part of Marquardt's book that seriously takes issue with Barth's position. "I can only say two things, not by way of excuse, but by way of explanation," Barth continued. First, "Biblical Israel as such gave me so much to think about and to cope with that I simply did not have the time or intellectual strength to look more closely at Baeck, Buber, Rosenzweig, etc." Barth fully acknowledged, in other words, that he had failed to engage contemporary Jewish thought in a serious manner; but then for Lindsay this is presumably just another point at which "Barth is in fact being unduly harsh on himself" (22). The second point of explanation Barth offered in response to Marquardt's

<sup>26</sup> Bruce L. McCormack, *Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development, 1909–1936* (Oxford, 1995), 42–49.

<sup>27</sup> Simon Fisher, *Revelatory Positivism? Barth's Earliest Theology and the Marburg School* (Oxford, 1988), 2.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 186.

critique was his admission that he was “decidedly not a philosemite.” Barth concludes this admission by stating that much as he had sought to suppress his unease, it nevertheless “could have had a retrogressive effect on my doctrine of Israel.”<sup>29</sup>

It gives me no pleasure to dwell on the shortcomings of Lindsay’s argument, but it has been necessary because they throw all the more sharply into relief the willfulness with which Lindsay has turned the problem on its head. The real issue is not that Barth was one of the bad guys but that an intellectual giant of his stature, scope, and general sensitivity who did make the right political choices when the Nazis came to power and who did offer protection and support to Jewish refugees nevertheless remained this conflicted in his dealings with Jews and Judaism. Ironically, of course, insofar as they both seek to salvage Barth from this ambivalence, Lindsay’s project is in fact much closer to Marquardt’s than he seems to realize. Yet the strongest argument for the legitimacy of this undertaking lies precisely in the occasional expressions of insight and self-criticism that Barth himself was able to formulate. Lindsay’s attempt to dismiss these and fall back from Barth’s own level of insight renders his project as a whole highly dubious.

Few Jewish thinkers are more closely associated with the notion of Auschwitz as a profound and categorical caesura than Emil Fackenheim. At the time of his death in 2002, his memoirs had already advanced sufficiently for his publisher to advertise them, yet another five years passed before they were actually published. While they contain much that is informative, evocative, and touching, they hardly make for a rounded and satisfying read. This is only in part due to the fact that Fackenheim could no longer be drawn upon to improve the text. As the title already indicates, in terms of its aspirations this book is really two books in one. The title, *An Epitaph for German Judaism*, clearly suggests something much broader and paradigmatic, while the subtitle, *From Halle to Jerusalem*, would have been perfectly sufficient for a memoir that could (like Scholem’s *From Berlin to Jerusalem*) still have been much more than a straightforward account of Fackenheim’s life.

It is a common misunderstanding, and one to which we presumably all succumb at times, that scholars should have intensely clever things to say not only about their specialities but also about the world at large. Yet when it comes to issues that lie outside the remit of our specialization there is, a priori, no reason to assume that we should have anything more profound to say about them than the proverbial ordinary person on the street. Fackenheim’s memoirs thus vacillate between highly polished and sophisticated passages clearly written by Fackenheim the scholar, and passages where he speaks with the same profundity (or lack thereof) that any other individual of his age and

<sup>29</sup> Barth, *Briefe*, 420–21; *Letters*, 262.

background might exhibit. As for his relationship to German non-Jews both before and after 1945 he is evidently of two minds. His comments on relevant encounters are characterized by an extraordinary harshness in some instances and an open-mindedness bordering on gullibility in others, but it never really becomes clear why he reacts one way or the other.

All this being said, the manuscript’s weaknesses could in no way have justified not publishing it, nor should anyone interested in Jewish/non-Jewish relations in the modern German context take them as an excuse not to read the book now that it has been published. It has interesting things to tell us about a major Jewish thinker and his experiences and reflections as a (former) German Jew. But neither should we pretend that this is the book Fackenheim set out to write.

The more or less immediate postwar history of German Jewry has been coming in from the cold for the last decade or so and is gradually emerging as an established field of study in its own right. Until the 1990s, few were willing to contemplate the possibility that Jewish life in Germany after the Shoah could be anything more than an accidental and transient phenomenon. Accidental much of it has indeed been, transient it has not. The very suggestion that German Jews were there to stay and might reconstitute a social reality that would again allow for meaningful talk of a German Jewry seemed to relativize the impact of the Shoah and the degree of destruction it wrought on the Jewish life that had existed in Germany up until the 1930s. This was and is a valid concern, and those engaged in the study of postwar German Jewry do well never to lose sight of the brutal and profound rupture of the Shoah. Ultimately, it is above all else the assumption that interaction between Jews and non-Jews remains characterized by a fundamental nonreciprocity that allows us to acknowledge the substance and success of Jewish new beginnings in Germany since 1945 without having to portray the conditions under which Jewish communities have reestablished themselves in the land of the Shoah’s perpetrators as more benign than they actually are.

*Ignatz Bubis: Ein jüdisches Leben in Deutschland* was the companion volume to an exhibition commemorating the life of Ignatz Bubis (1927–99), the leader of Germany’s Jewish community from 1992 until his death. It bears eloquent testimony to the conflicted nature of Jewish life in postwar West Germany. Given that Bubis was long considered by many to be too conciliatory and optimistic in his assessment of Jewish/non-Jewish relations, it came as all the more of a shock when shortly before his death he gave a number of interviews in which he conceded that he had achieved virtually nothing and his hopes had been dashed.

Continuity and discontinuity are also prominent themes in Hermann Levin Goldschmidt’s *The Legacy of German Jewry*. First published in German in 1957, this volume offers a wide-ranging discussion of German Jewry’s de-

velopment—past, present, and future. It undoubtedly has some intriguing and well-formulated insights to offer, and there is no doubt that Goldschmidt was well meaning, well informed, and well connected. Yet by today's standards at least, he was emphatically a journalist and no scholar, certainly no first-rate mind, and his genre is that of sustained rumination; most of what he has to say is posited and sweeping rather than genuinely argued and precise. This is an interesting text insofar as it is part of the story—in other words, insofar as it is an intellectually influential Jew's attempt to grapple with the German-Jewish condition—but it is hardly a credible account of that story itself.

It is also a text of considerable equivocation. In his empirical rather than visionary moments, Goldschmidt's metaphorical glass is rarely more than half full or half empty, and frequently both at the same time. How those who have published and endorsed this English-language edition have found such clear-cut messages in the book I find somewhat mystifying, and I am at a total loss to understand how they have managed to credit Goldschmidt with a stance diametrically opposed to that of Gershom Scholem. The so-called dialogue in which not only Goldschmidt's Jews but also those of Willi Goetschel and David Suchoff (in their introduction to this edition) are engaged is emphatically one not with German society but with German culture, and almost exclusively with aspects of German culture that most Germans either already had abandoned or soon would abandon, at that. It is, in other words, precisely Scholem's "cry into the void" that is being described here. Moreover, one cannot help wondering for whom this translation is intended. For all its occasional nuggets of insight and piercing formulations, I find it hard to imagine that anybody willing to muster the measure of obsession (and, quite frankly, masochism) required to persevere with this text would not be capable of reading the German original in the first place.

Goldschmidt is quite explicit that current "ways of carrying on with Jewish life in Germany need to be carefully distinguished from what has in fact come to an end" (227) and that the "catastrophe" wrought by the Shoah "has in no way been compensated for by the so-called process of reconstruction" (232). Indeed, Goldschmidt notes that in many ways the "legacy of German Jewry" is at its most vibrant "beyond the borders of Germany" (228). He thus touches on a theme explored more recently by Steven Aschheim in *Beyond the Border: The German-Jewish Legacy Abroad*, based on the Joseph and Eda Pell Lectures he delivered at Berkeley in October 2004. There can be little doubt that Germany has made its single most substantial contribution to date to the world of international academe and culture in the broadest sense of the word by driving the overwhelming majority of its genuinely outstanding scholars, writers, and artists first out of Germany and then out of German-dominated Europe. This is a story that has become increasingly sexy in recent years, and it is sometimes easy to get a little carried away on this score. The overwhelming majority of Jews fleeing Nazi

Germany were obviously not world-class artists and intellectuals, and of the world-class artists and intellectuals fleeing Nazi Germany a significant proportion was not Jewish by anyone's accounting—not to mention the fact that a very substantial number of refugees from Nazi Germany were neither Jewish nor world-class artists and intellectuals.

Aschheim develops three perspectives on his topic. In the first chapter, he focuses on German-speaking Zionists settled in Palestine prior to the establishment of the state of Israel, notably those active in *Brit Shalom*, who sought to envision a future for Palestine that would be equally agreeable to Arabs and to Jews. Insofar as "their skepticism of political 'ethnonationalism' and a majoritarian state proceeded from *within* a deeply felt nationalist commitment," their aspirations offer "an alternative foundational perspective" on the history of Zionism "when not only was statehood not a certainty but other options did not seem to contradict historical reality and it was possible to envisage alternative future social orders" (9). Aschheim's second chapter focuses on German-Jewish émigré historians, especially Peter Gay, Walter Laqueur, George Mosse, and Fritz Stern, who, in the 1960s, "virtually reinvented German cultural and intellectual history and recast our understanding of it" (46) and who, "both because they were above suspicion and beyond the border, could openly address . . . ideological issues" such as "the putative magnetism of right-wing radicalism and Nazi politics, in a way that would have been taboo for Germans in Germany" (68).

In his final chapter, Aschheim asks "Why Do We Love (Hate) Theodor Adorno, Hannah Arendt, Walter Benjamin, Frank Rosenzweig, Gershom Scholem, and Leo Strauss?" He explains the widespread fascination with these figures first as "a species of 'identity politics' . . . in which Jewishness and critical intellectuality have come to be seen as virtually synonymous" (88) and second by arguing that "they were all suspicious of bourgeois conventions and liberal pieties, and their thought was animated by complex but always radical impulses and heterodox sensitivities" (90). Aschheim suggests that it is in their "cutting through conventional left-right borders" (83) and in "their resistance to simple ideological classification, their turn to heterodoxy, and their amenability to manifold appropriations that much of their appeal may lie" (90). The fact that they "all engaged in essentially postliberal ruminations, posited on the ruins of, and a disbelief in, the old political and conceptual order" (92) makes them eminently attractive to sensitivities molded by "what, for lack of a better word, we call postmodernism" (102). "Their own arcane, dense, portentous, paradoxical, often oracular and (sometimes annoyingly) impenetrable mode of writing demands complex decipherment and creative exegesis, perfect grist to the endless deconstructionist mill" (104). Yet to Aschheim's mind this attraction reflects a fundamental misunderstanding. For "in one way or another" these figures in fact all

“redefined the frontiers and provided us with new moral and intellectual maps that the postmoderns, almost by definition, would or could not” offer (109). On his reading, “their radical-redemptive, jagged, often nervous projects” can ultimately be interpreted “as attempts to rescue rather than merely critique the damaged Enlightenment inheritance and its tradition of free and critical inquiry” (117–18).

One or two blemishes aside—Aschheim delays Scholem’s birth until 1898 and turns the Engels biographer Gustav Mayer into Gustav Meyer (8, 59)—the volume is elegantly presented and offers a dense web of insights, suggestions, and questions, some more intriguing than others. Yet the proof of the pudding, as ever, is in the eating of it—something that a volume as slim as this cannot be expected to offer. It will be interesting to see what emerges as Aschheim follows through on the agenda laid out by these lectures.

The principal problem with Atina Grossmann’s *Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany* is that it leaves the reviewer perplexed as to how best to do justice to its achievements without automatically being suspected of hyperbole. Grossmann’s book has managed to bag both the Fraenkel Prize and the George L. Mosse Prize, which is no mean feat and is entirely justified; it is a genuine triumph. Focusing on the extraordinarily messy and complex dynamics of relations between Jews, Germans, and Allies in the immediate postwar period, it combines a relatively thick account of carefully contextualized social history with a rare measure of sensitivity, subtlety, and judiciousness. The fate and circumstances of the Jewish DPs (displaced persons) in occupied Germany has only very recently become a hot topic, and Grossmann’s book makes a massive contribution to the consolidation and professionalization of this relatively young field of study.

Grossmann’s account categorically dispels the notion that Jewish DPs in occupied Germany were neatly segregated from non-Jewish Germans. She tackles the hardship, real and imagined, faced by the non-Jewish German population head-on but also in full awareness of the need to “avoid the waiting traps of relativization or facile comparison of the incommensurate. Indeed, as the book developed, it became clear that despite my insistent focus on interaction, I am telling an asymmetrical story” (9). In keeping with most recent research on this issue, Grossmann’s account also dismisses the myth of “the silence that never was” (57). As she explains, “the post-1989 relegitimation of putatively tabooed memories of German suffering has not only obfuscated the vast extent to which that suffering was expressed but also—and perhaps even more fully—sidelined the degree to which those stories were both heard *and* vigorously challenged at the time” (31).

Reiterating the emphases of much of her recent work, Grossmann stresses the extent to which “both Germans and Jews . . . turned, in different ways, to narratives and metaphors of fertility and maternity (in terms of both loss and

possibility) to comprehend victimization and survival and to conceptualize and imagine future identities as nation or *Volk*" (9). Her contextualization of the mass rape of German women by Red Army soldiers and its implications is exemplary in its combination of sensitivity and level-headedness. She confronts the "self-preserving sexual cynicism" prevalent at the time and takes seriously the accounts women offered not only of the brutality they had experienced but also of "their own sense of confusion about the fine lines between rape, prostitution, and consensual (albeit generally instrumental) sex" (53–54). The texture of Grossmann's account is rendered richer yet by occasional references to her own family's experiences (90–91, 102, 112–14, 243–46). All in all, she has fascinating things to say about a whole range of existentially important questions.

Perhaps most importantly of all, however, Grossman's account demonstrates how integral Jewish/non-Jewish relations were, in all sorts of ways, to the general development of Germany in those years. She has achieved that most enviable of goals: she has written a book about Jewish/non-Jewish relations that will be required reading for any scholar of German postwar history for many years to come. Indeed, I would go as far as to suggest that Grossmann's *Jews, Germans, and Allies* is one of those few books that appear in each decade that will be read with considerable benefit and enjoyment not only by historians of any specialization but also by any scholar with an arts and humanities or social science background and a smattering of historical sensitivity. The burden of being unable to do Grossmann's book anything approximating justice in this review is rendered bearable by the fact that anyone who does not read this book for herself is really beyond help anyway.