The *Pogromshchina* and the Directory: A New Historiographical Synthesis?¹

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National Ukrainian historiography's attempts to place the most extensive mass killings of Jews in modern history prior to the Shoah beyond the national movement's responsibility have traditionally combined the suggestion of an undue involvement of Jewry with Bolshevism and the notion that the autonomy rights granted to Ukrainian Jewry by the Rada (and reinstated by the Directory) would vouchsafe for the movement's ingrained hostility toward antisemitism. An examination of both traditional anglophone National Ukrainian historiography and of Henry Abramson's claim to have achieved a synthesis of 'Ukrainian' and 'Jewish' historiography reveals not only that these exonerative strategies are hardly tenable but also the extent to which Abramson's line of argument continues (albeit, perhaps, unintentionally) to echo numerous aspects fundamental to the conventional 'Ukrainian' approach.

In the course of the revolutionary and civil-war years, the southwest Russian provinces to which the Ukrainian national movement laid claim were the site of a pogromist upsurge that resulted in the most extensive mass killings of Jews in modern history prior to the Shoah.² Anglophone historiography sympathetic to the Ukrainian national movement, emphatic and often inventive as it has been in maximising the movement's crucial importance for developments in the disputed territories between 1917 and 1921 in every other respect, has by and large chosen to declare this particular chapter to be a phenomenon located outside of the movement's influence and responsibility. At least occasionally, indeed, it seems more concerned about the fact that anyone should ever have taken seriously the suggestion of the Ukrainian national movement's implication in these crimes than it is about the *pogromshchina* itself. As is well known, Taras Hunczak landed a major coup in this respect in 1969, when he was able to present an ostensible 'reappraisal' of the issue in *Jewish Social Studies.*³ As was soon
to become evident, the significance of the dispute that subsequently ensued lay not so much in its actual argumentative or polemical to and fro but primarily in the respectability it conferred on Hunczak and his exonerative onslaught.  

Hunczak’s colleague, Yaroslav Bilinsky, reviewing Saul S. Friedman’s *Pogromchik: The Assassination of Simon Petlura* (New York: Hart, 1976), was still confronted with a situation that forced him to criticise Friedman for making ‘nowhere ... a single reference’ to Hunczak’s ‘most noteworthy contributions’ to what he called the ‘somewhat angry scholarly exchange’ between Hunczak and Zosa Szajkowski. His opinion was that this ‘silence is truly deafening!’ Had Bilinsky himself been slightly less prone to the ‘selective lapses of memory’ he so readily ascribed to Friedman, he might have remembered that Szajkowski mentioned having been heavily criticised by Joseph Schechtman for ever entering into this ‘somewhat angry’ exchange in the first place. Szajkowski himself had ‘originally advised against publishing Mr. Hunczak’s paper, but since it was bound to be published anyway’, he had thought it preferable not to leave it uncommented. Moreover, Szajkowski added, he did ‘not regret it. It was worthwhile doing if only in order to elicit Schechtman’s strong reaction against the defenders of Petliura.’ Schechtman qualified Hunczak’s contribution as a ‘highly partisan political pamphlet’ and the debate it unleashed as ‘grotesquely inflated’ – one which ‘only certain Ukrainian nationalist emigre circles ... are eager to revive’. In other words, the ‘truly deafening silence’ on Friedman’s part that Bilinsky criticised, was almost certainly a well-considered and admirably self-confident act of defiance. Unfortunately, however, this defiance has not been able to determine the further course of the debate: it is Hunczak’s ‘reappraisal’ not Szajkowski’s ‘rebuttal’ which has ultimately turned out to be the key to a major historiographical success story. Rudolf Mark, for instance tells us – in what is, according to John-Paul Himka, a ‘fine recent monograph’ on Petliura – that ‘Hunczak has shown convincingly that’ the allegations made against Petliura ‘cannot be proven’ and that he ‘did all he could’ to counter the pogroms ‘from the early summer of 1919 onwards at the latest.’

Rather more worryingly, even Henry Abramson, who for over a decade now has presented his work as part of a ‘trend of synthesizing Ukrainian and Jewish historiography of the revolutionary years’, still conveys some of the enthusiasm generated by Hunczak’s coup, explaining that *Jewish Social Studies* is ‘a respected Jewish journal’ and stating that Hunczak’s ‘important article ... moved the level of debate
to a higher plane'. Abramson himself seeks to defuse the whole issue of the Directory’s implication in the pogroms by differentiating between responsibility and accountability. He concedes that Petliura, while not responsible, ‘as head of state ... must be held accountable for the actions of his army, despite his relative lack of control over them’, but then attempts to soften even this blow. On close examination it transpires that his approach (his surely more benign intentions notwithstanding) in fact echoes many a set piece of National Ukrainian historiography (at least in its anglophone guise) to a disquieting degree. At times this lends an overall trope to his formulations that leaves the reader wondering whether even his current notion that the Directory is at least to be held ‘accountable’ will remain Abramson’s last word on the matter.

That the significance of Hunczak’s contribution should still be affirmed in this way is all the more remarkable given that it was hardly very original in the first place. As Abramson himself concedes, ‘Hunczak did not uncover any important new sources, nor did he advance any radically new arguments.’ Rather, his contribution reflected the argumentative and propagandistic strategies adapted (though, as we shall see, not without the initial hiccup here and there) by the Directory itself at the time of the pogroms and in their immediate aftermath. The main arguments, then, are essentially as old as the events themselves and, for that matter, as old as the disbelief of contemporaries that these arguments would ever be taken seriously. Early in 1920, the Ukrainian Information Bureau in Berlin published a ‘collection of documents’ designed to demonstrate that ‘the Ukrainian National Movement ... is not only in no way responsible for the Jewish persecutions but also sought avidly to live in complete amity with the Jewish population’. In the Introduction to a collection of documents on the pogroms published later that year in Berlin, Leon Chasanowitch, a publicist associated with Leo Motzkin and the Committee of Jewish Delegations, commented that the editors of the Ukrainian collection, Lewitzkyj and Specht, were clearly ‘placing too much trust in the ignorance of the international public regarding the intricate state of affairs in Eastern Europe ... [if they] assume one could persuade the world with documents of this sort that Petliura’s government sincerely sought to tackle the pogroms’. These were the very documents that have been at the heart of National Ukrainian historiography’s exonerative strategies ever since – documents, incidentally, that even Abramson still regards as ‘important material’.

Abramson has predicated his research from the outset on the
assumption that 'the experience of Ukrainian Jewry from 1917 to 1920' represented 'a paradox in modern Jewish history', as the Jews had 'unprecedented civil rights ... extended' to them, on the one hand, while having to confront the activities of 'pogromists operating in the name of ... [the] Ukrainian revolutionary movement', on the other. As he himself notes, the 'dominant experience of Ukrainian Jewry during this period was one of pogroms and anarchy, not the wide-ranging civil rights and privileges accorded by the Law of National-Personal Autonomy'. One might be forgiven, in the light of this, for assuming that what we are looking at is not a paradox at all. Rather, one of those two 'experiences' (that of the pogroms) was materially relevant, while the other (those marvellous 'privileges as a minority that exceeded even those in Western Europe and America') had simply been, to all intents and purposes, irrelevant. Abramson counters, however, that this seemingly rather obvious conclusion would only hold if we failed to make 'the critical distinction between the leaders and the led', a distinction that 'has been lost, for the most part, in the study of this tragic period of Ukrainian-Jewish relations'. His underlying assumption here is that the Ukrainian leadership had a 'liberal program' that it was 'unable effectively to communicate ... to the Ukrainian peasantry'. We will have to come back both to this 'liberal program' and to the issue of leadership. Abramson's initial argument, in any case, seemed to leave us (at best) with a 'paradox' between Ukrainian Jewry's relationship to the Ukrainian leaders, on the one hand, and to the Ukrainian led, on the other; but its actual 'experience' still remained a rather unitary one, determined in a distinctly uncontested fashion by the pogromshchina. This is a suggestion worth following through for a moment, since it at least forces us to ask what exactly we assume the characteristics inherent in 'leading' and 'being led' to be. The assumption that leading is an activity that can be discussed irrespective of its having or not having any practical impact on the behaviour of those who are being led, may fit in well with concepts of 'tragedy', and it hence comes as no surprise that Abramson's Petliura too 'occupies a tragic place in Ukrainian-Jewish historiography'. But such an assumption will hardly explain historical occurrences of a material and factual nature; still less will it allow for judgements concerning responsibility. In the meantime, however, Abramson has gone to considerable lengths to underpin his notion of a 'paradox' by construing a 'critical distinction between the leaders and the led' on both sides of the divide. His contention that 'representatives of mutually antagonistic ethnic groups attempted to
achieve a working political relationship, only to be betrayed by less enlightened attitudes among the general population. Now cuts both ways: ‘The Ukrainian socialist parties could not communicate their liberal program to the peasantry, and the Jewish activists were too far removed from the ordinary Jew to mobilize grassroots support for the Ministry of Jewish Affairs.’25 We will come back to the remarkable inferences drawn from this contention.

Interestingly, for Abramson ‘Ukrainians’ generally seem to be more prone than ‘Jews’ to finding themselves at the mercy of ‘tragic’ developments. When it comes to explaining how ‘the bloody violence of 1919 turned Jewish political opinion in favour of disciplined Soviet power’26 – a choice that has been well described as one between the ‘least evil of the competing evils’27 and that might, therefore, seem to smack of genuinely ‘tragic’ dimensions – Abramson has argued from the outset that ‘Jewish political opinion’ was, in fact, ‘following the Talmudic maxim (Avot 8b): “Pray for the welfare of the state, for were it not for the fear of the government, people would swallow each other alive.”’28 Based on Abramson’s initial (1991) and very stark formulation, one could only conclude that a substantial proportion of the Jewish populace did not turn to the concrete Soviet state that (for all its faults, and for all the antisemitism in its own ranks, and despite the pogroms perpetrated by Red Army units) was the only force with a proven track record of applying energetic measures to prevent and stop pogroms and punish the perpetrators; nor did they make that turn because not the wolf in man but the other concrete contenders for power, the Directory and the Whites (and those on whose mass support they counted) were swallowing them alive, not the wolf in all other men, that is, but specifically the Jewish populace. Rather, Abramson’s 1991 article would have us believe, it was in pursuit of ‘Talmudic maxims’ that the Jews took their ‘choices’.

Abramson’s focus on this issue has since undergone a slightly contradictory transformation. That the issue still plays a prominent role in his argument is witnessed by the fact that this very ‘Talmudic maxim’ has given his recent monograph its title: A Prayer for the Government. In the book, however, he begins his discussion of the issue by explaining that ‘the ruling power is usually the body most able to guarantee minority interests and is therefore likely to command their loyalties’, only then adding that ‘this orientation has a long-hallowed tradition in Talmudic law’.29 Whether he ultimately holds the relevant Talmudic tradition to be the religious reflection of an obvious enough underlying material interest, or would have us take the aspect of self
preservation to be essentially a by-product of traditional Jewish piety, never becomes quite clear. Even so, his whole emphasis has shifted to some extent. He now assumes this religious principle to have been crucial, particularly in explaining Jewish Russocentrism as a factor precluding their identification with Ukrainian nationalism prior to the revolutions of 1917. By contrast, for rather obvious reasons, it now features less prominently as an explanatory factor for the nature of Jewish activism in the post-revolutionary context. The inclination of Jews to take 'loyalty to the ruling powers as, quite literally, a religious concept' depended, after all, on traditions promulgated by 'the traditional Talmudic elite'. Much as this elite may still have been 'respected by the masses of religiously observant Jews', it was nevertheless 'being rapidly eclipsed ... by the increasing popularity of the Maskilim' (that is, the proponents of the Haskalah, the Jewish Enlightenment). That these 'Talmudic maxims' were of no (or only minimal) relevance to the Jewish leadership involved in the attempted Ukrainian–Jewish 'rapprochement' with which Abramson is concerned is in any case obvious enough – and this, ultimately, is precisely his point now, because it supports his notion of the alienation between 'Jewish activists' and 'the ordinary Jew'. To the extent that this notion is designed to underscore the already-cited contention that those working towards this 'rapprochement' were 'betrayed by less enlightened attitudes among the general population' on both sides of the divide, this would, incidentally, seem to imply a harsh criticism of traditional Judaism. Given that its harshness is rather at odds with Abramson's general approach, we are presumably well advised to register this discrepancy as a symptom of the fault lines inherent in his overarching argument that, as we will see, in any case ultimately comes full circle.

Apart from the 'autonomy' issue, the second mainstay of National Ukrainian historiography has been the relentless use of 'the Jew-Bolshevik canard'. As we will see, it has recently returned to the cutting edge of contemporary research in, as far as the academic sphere is concerned, probably its most radical formulation yet, and we will be confronted with it ad nauseam in the course of our discussion.

A good point of departure for an evaluation of Abramson's attempt at a new synthesis is, perhaps, the historiographical survey published in 1994 by John-Paul Himka. He stands at the end of a long line of anglophone National Ukrainian historians who argue that the field of 'Ukrainian–Jewish relations' is a minefield fought over by two competing 'national' historiographies and that, because matters are so
'highly polarized', the resulting 'paradigmatic constraints' lead to a situation where the 'intellectually interesting questions are ignored'.

'Ukrainian national historiography has been uncomfortable about incorporating these incidents [that is, the pogroms] into its narrative,' Himka explains, 'since Jewish scholars generally agree that Ukrainian units under the command of Petljura were responsible for most of the pogroms.' It has to be said that this is not entirely true: there has generally been little hesitation to include 'these incidents' in the narrative, when it was felt that the blame could be laid at others' doors. But more important for our discussion here are Himka's own 'paradigmatic constraints' at this point. What he himself calls 'Ukrainian national historiography' is, in fact, described accurately in just that way because the methodological framework of its proponents is explicitly and intentionally determined by their affirmation of the principle of Ukrainian national independence. Many of these authors identify with the struggle of the Ukrainian nationalists in the years following the Russian Revolution – including, to varying degrees, Petliura's leadership and policies. Among them, the inclination to contemplate seriously even the possibility that the national movement might have been seriously affected by antisemitism and implicated in the pogromshchina, is clearly the extreme exception. One might be forgiven for thinking that that is so because any admission to this effect would represent an unpleasant recollection involving issues of guilt that could, more importantly, question the legitimacy of their national cause and identity. The fact of the matter is, however, as Himka clearly states, that National Ukrainian historians feel discomfort neither because Directory troops actually were responsible for the pogroms, nor because a case (albeit, in their view, a mistaken one) has been made to this effect, but because 'Jewish scholars generally agree' on this question to the detriment of Petliura and his (their) cause.

Himka himself, in fact, recommends Abramson's 'excellent article' because it is 'sensitive to the points of view of both Ukrainian and Jewish national historiography'. Somewhat ironically, though, he adds that it does not actually 'transcend the questions posed by the national historiographies'. We might counter – and more strongly so now that the publication of his book allows for a more comprehensive analysis of his stance – that Abramson has done a rather more sweeping job of 'transcending' what he identifies as 'Jewish' national historiography than he has managed in his dealings with its 'Ukrainian' counterpart. To give a few subtle but telling examples, Abramson warns us, for instance, that those 'memoirs and memoiristic accounts of Jews active
in political life during the civil war ... published before 1926' are, 'relatively speaking, free of ethnic bias'. On the other hand, 'Ukrainian memoir sources' prove to be 'less helpful', as demonstrated by Volodimir Vynnychenko, whose 'diatribes against political opponents ... must be read with extreme caution'. Jews, then, we can take it, are prone to 'ethnic bias', while Ukrainians are prone to politically motivated bias and distortions resulting from personal vanity. Now, Vynnychenko's recollections are indeed to be read with the utmost caution, but that the only leading former participant and widely read memoirist of the Ukrainian national movement ever to acknowledge that a problem with antisemitism as much as existed within that movement (Abramson himself, in fact, calls him a 'philosemite') should be the prime example at this point, would seem to indicate that Abramson's sensitivity for specifically 'ethnic' phenomena is developed in an oddly lopsided fashion.

Abramson is also conscientious in reminding us that Petliura died 'at the hands of a Bessarabian Jew'. Now, for 'Jewish national historiography' one Jew is presumably as good as the other. Not so for its Ukrainian counterpart. 'I am a microbiologist and my knowledge of history and social relationships among nations is limited,' one Professor Ivan Kochan wrote to Saul Friedman after the publication of his Pogromchik, thereby qualifying to have his letter published in the Ukrainian Quarterly. He wanted to know from Friedman what had been his intention in 'stating that Schwartzbart was a Ukrainian Jew. Is this to avoid the question why a Bessarabian Jew should kill a Ukrainian leader for pogroms of Jews on Ukrainian soil?' The 'syndrome generated' by Petliura's assassination 'and probably even more by the subsequent ... unequivocal ... verdict of "not guilty" against his assassin has clearly lost little of its power; and Abramson, too, is clearly perturbed when it comes to this judgement that, as he puts it, 'caused considerable elation in Jewish circles and great consternation in the Ukrainian world.' (We might note, in passing, the very odd overtones of this juxtaposition of Jewish 'circles', on the one side, and the Ukrainian 'world', on the other.) Bilinsky already assumed we would automatically know what to think of the proceedings when told that the jury had not in fact deliberated for thirty-five minutes (or thirty-two, to be precise) but, as Bilinsky posited en passant, for only twenty-five. Here, Abramson goes one better, telling us that the jury took only twenty-four minutes to decide on its verdict. If outright supporters of Petliura had pointed out that the jury 'consisted for the most part of supporters of the popular front'
and 'of socialist liberals', then Abramson offers a variation of sorts on this theme by suggesting that the jury 'was unconsciously influenced by the trials of Alfred Dreyfus'. In Dreyfus's case, he posits, 'an innocent Jew' had been 'shamefully treated by French justice', whereas in the case of Schwartzbard the jury 'sought somehow to right this wrong by acquitting a Jew who was clearly guilty of the crime of which he was accused'. He goes on to note that 'as an added insult, Petliura's widow and brother-in-law were ordered to pay the court costs', without mentioning that they had launched a civil prosecution against Schwartzbard designed to exonerate Petliura, so that this was no mere criminal trial. It is all the more ironic that it was, as we will see, ultimately the civil prosecution that precipitated an early termination of proceedings and Schwartzbard's prompt acquittal.

In Abramson's initial (1991) formulation, the events of 1926 and 1927 marked a 'watershed in Jewish history of the period', but 'Ukrainian' historiography had apparently remained unaffected: 'The issue of Petliura's involvement in the pogroms has dominated the historiography since', Abramson wrote then, but 'unfortunately, much of the debate relies on highly partisan materials published in connection with the Paris trial of his assassin', in which 'documents that may have to a certain degree exculpated Petliura, for example, were not included'. He explicitly mentioned the 'influential English and French publications of the Committee of Jewish Delegations' (but fails to mention the corresponding publication of the Comité Commémoratif Simon Petlura) and concluded by stating that 'Jewish' 'materials published after 1926 are often blemished by extreme bias, fixated with either polemics against Petliura ... or apologies for participation in the Directory'. In the subsequent book, Abramson does initially concede that works on the subject 'published after 1926 have followed, in the main, the arguments presented by either the prosecution or the defense instead of carefully examining the historical record', which would implicate the 'Ukrainian' side, too. Then, however, he again draws a clear contrast between 'Soviet and Western Jewish scholars' and their manifold activities, on the one hand, and the 'Ukrainian researchers' on the other, who 'were slow to defend their cause'.

Now, such a thing as 'Jewish national historiography' clearly exists. It is, however, like Jewish nationalism itself, an altogether more disparate phenomenon than Abramson (and, for that matter, Himka) suggests. This issue cannot be discussed here in any detail, but we at least need to keep in mind the major divide in emerging modern Jewish nationalism between those who saw a national future for Jewry
in the diaspora and those who held that only emigration to Palestine could facilitate such a future. We know, of course, that those forms of Jewish nationalism that apparently promise the departure of indigenous Jewry to Palestine can, for that very reason, be extremely popular with all sorts of people and political circles nurturing a profound hostility towards Jewry. In this context, two parties can, while saying well-nigh identical things, nevertheless be heading for completely different (if not diametrically opposed) implications. It was, to put it bluntly, one thing for Zionists in Eastern Europe after the First World War to speak of a distinct Jewish nation whose future did not lie in the diaspora; but for the Directory, 30 years before Israel was established, publicly to give assurances that the Jewish population living in the territories under its control ‘can consider the Ukraine as *sui generis* their second home (after Palestine)’ and to express its ‘trust’ in the fact that they ‘will show themselves good patriots of their second fatherland’ surely had (and has) a significantly different connotation. Similarly, Simon Dubnov’s classic programmatic formulation, that ‘the Jewish people at all times and in all countries, always and everywhere, was an agent and creator of its history, not only in the spiritual arena but with regard to the entirety of [its] social existence’, sought to assert a historiographical concept on a ‘sociological’ and ‘realistic’ basis that would transcend theological and spiritualist narratives. It can tell us, if anything, something about Jewry. National Ukrainian historiography would have us believe it could also, if not primarily, tell us something about antisemitism. It is no coincidence that, for Hunczak (as much as for Himka, as we shall see), the question of whether antisemitism results from ‘historical, social, economic, and political sources’ or actually consists of ‘deep-seated historical socio-economic animosities’ is neither here nor there.

Himka wants the historiography of the *pogromshchina* ‘to move beyond victimology on the one hand and denial on the other’. *Prima facie* the suggestion would seem to be that ‘Jewish’ historiography should relinquish its ‘victimological’ focus while ‘Ukrainian’ historiography should abandon its tendency to deny any responsibility of the Ukrainian nationalists for the pogroms. In fact, Himka’s suggestion is of a much more comprehensive nature. What we need, Himka states, are ‘studies that concentrate on the pogromists and their motivations’. The ‘pogroms ... were, after all, a mass social movement’, and one of those ‘intellectually interesting questions’ that, as we have heard, have so far been ignored due to ‘paradigmatic constraints’, is: ‘why did the Ukrainian movement turn against the
Jews during the revolution? In Himka’s opinion, the question why ‘the Ukrainian–Jewish political co-existence broke down … has never been studied’. Only ‘generalities can be found here and there: the chaotic conditions unleashed traditional Ukrainian antisemitism (Jewish historiography); the Jews sided with the Bolsheviks (Ukrainian historiography). But these generalities are very problematic and have never been investigated empirically.’ One wonders what the whole controversy was ever about, if ‘Jewish historiography’ never saw anything other than ‘chaotic conditions’ at work. Conversely, why bother to investigate empirically what is, in any case, ‘very problematic’? The infamous ‘Jew-Bolshevik canard’ can surely already be regarded one of the most heavily ‘empirically investigated’ issues that modern history has come up with. Although there are problems with sources at this point, it lies in natura rei that, on this issue, all the empirical investigation of the world will, as far as the pogromshchina is concerned, only ever tell us something about the content of antisemitic perceptions but not about Jewry. The earliest available relevant figures that allow any conclusions about the composition of the Bolshevik party membership in Ukraine are from 1922 and have been regurgitated ad nauseam. They show a proportion of ‘Jewish’ members that was larger than their share of the entire population and decisively smaller than their share of the urban population. Hunczak has tried to replace these figures by more ‘conclusive’ but inevitably also even more irrelevant ones from 1907. But what are these ‘empirical investigations’ supposed to demonstrate anyway? What we do know is that the Bolsheviks had some 16,000 members in Ukraine in the spring of 1919. Would we know anything else about (or understand any better what transpired in the course of) the pogromshchina if we could prove that each and every one of them was ‘Jewish’? (Incidentally, even if this had been the case, it would have amounted to less than one per cent of the Jewish population in Ukraine.)

‘It is by no means our intention’, Elias Tcherikower emphasised repeatedly, ‘to examine the role of Jews in the Bolshevik movement in Ukraine, as it is often done among us, for apologetic purposes. We only want to follow the lines of development of events in Ukraine and make clear the circumstances of the cataclysm.’ But that this has become the tightrope act it is, clearly does not belong to the ‘paradigmatic constraints’ that worry Himka. That we know of ‘not one case of an attack on the peaceful Russian population’ in the cities conquered by Directory or partisan troops is clearly significant; that the Ukrainian garrison in Lizovetgrad went back on the agreement already
concluded to declare their allegiance to the Soviets after the Bolsheviks refused to give in to the demand that Jews be excluded from taking public office, and the garrison then reacted to this refusal by staging a pogrom, on 4 and 5 February 1919, under the slogan 'the Jews prevent the Ukrainians from becoming Bolsheviks' is surely noteworthy; that in the course of the pogrom in Skvire, at that time the seat of the Ukrainian Independent Social Democrats' insurrectionary centre, on 26 June 1919, non-Jewish communist officials and functionaries, including those who had already been arrested, were spared, clearly throws a characteristic light on matters. These and many comparable instances could give us significant insights into the exact nature and dynamics of the pogromist upsurge in Ukraine in 1919. But how to include them in a non-apologetic narrative remains a highly intractable problem. 'In the final analysis', as Poliakov has rightly pointed out, the actual 'revolutionary allegiance of the Jews' is, if anything, 'less surprising than the persistence of an anti-Bolshevik attitude among a great number of them.'

And yet, for many 'Ukrainians' 'one Trotsky', as Tcherikower has put it, 'weighed more heavily than all statistics'. As Hunczak so admirably summed up the 'empirical investigations' at this point: 'whatever the actual statistics, there can be no doubt that Jewish actions heavily influenced Jewish–Ukrainian relations'. We are, in Himka's formulation, to think of the Ukrainian pogromshchina as a 'violent mass social movement in which the groups in conflict differed in religious, national, political and socio-economic constitution', a 'movement' that 'deserves a more complex treatment in the historiography than it has so far received'. The Jews and their slaughterers, then, were 'groups in conflict' within a common 'movement', and what allows us to differentiate between them is their 'differing religious, national and socio-economic constitution'. What Himka really wants, in other words, is for the historiography of the pogromshchina to move beyond 'Jewish' denial and 'Ukrainian' victimology. 'Jewish' historiography should stop denying that the victims of the pogroms constituted a 'group in conflict' in some manner of their own making (and fault). Then 'Ukrainian' historiography could stop looking at the National Ukrainian struggle of the revolutionary and civil-war years primarily as the victim of the chaos and disintegration that has hitherto had to play so prominent a role in order to provide a sufficient excuse for the Directory's alleged inability to suppress the pogromist upsurge - an excuse that would no longer be needed, one supposes, if 'Jewish' historiography could only be persuaded to remove this 'paradigmatic constraint'.
Shulamit Volkov pointed out a quarter of a century ago, when discussing the development of antisemitism in Imperial Germany, that ‘having provided the historical background for the anti-Jewish feelings endemic in the Christian world, having analysed the particular circumstances ... having disclosed the strains within ... society at the time’, the crucial ‘task of explaining the process’ by which antisemitic perceptions are actually formed and related (not factually, but in terms of interpretative patterns and projections) to these circumstances and how they develop momentum and the ability to mobilise sections of society, still remains to be tackled. ‘There is only one way by which this task can be avoided,’ she added. ‘Only if one assumes that the antisemites’ claims were truthful ... is one exempt from the effort to show how men ... succumbed to the patently false worldview of antisemitism.’ Yet it is precisely on this assumption that the case of National Ukrainian historiography, at least in its anglophone guise, has always rested. The simple truth, however, remains that if Jews are killed because their murderers associate them with all manner of things they despise, then that does not show that motives other than antisemitism motivate the killings but only that the murderers’ worldview in its entirety is, inter alia, antisemitic.

On this point Abramson’s stance remains disquietingly ambiguous. He clearly concedes, in a rather apt formulation, that ‘a small minority of Bolsheviks were Jews and an even smaller minority of Jews were Bolsheviks’, but then adds that ‘history, however, is better understood as the unfolding of events based on perceptions rather than as the linear progression of facts’. If by that he means that the decisive issue at this juncture is not the veracity of the identification of ‘the Jews’ with Bolshevism, but whether the assumption that this was a valid identification contributed to the motivation of the pogromists, then that is a truism that helps define the question but makes no contribution to the answer. If, however, he means that the pogroms actually were a response to the involvement of Jews and Bolsheviks because the pogromists perceived it thus, then his contention can obviously hardly be rejected energetically enough.

With regard to empirical investigations, it is interesting that one question never raised is that of how popular ‘knowledge’ or ‘prejudice’ (in the incorrect sense in which the term is often understood, namely to describe partial knowledge containing the proverbial kernel of truth) is supposed to have been related to concrete experience. ‘Many peasants’, to pick at random a standard formulation by one of the more enlightened and less partisan authors, ‘who had their grain
requisitioned by young Bolshevik commissars of Jewish descent hastily concluded that the movement was a Jewish phenomenon. Now, even if we were to acknowledge for a moment, for argument’s sake, that this whole Jew–Bolshevik nexus did relate to some sort of relevant reality, the question would still remain: how precisely is this supposed to have transpired? How did ‘the peasant’ recognise the commissar’s ‘Jewish descent’ in this and similar instances? Even if we allow for language differentiations, matters remain mysterious. Had our average ‘Ukrainian’ peasant, whose own first language was by no means necessarily Ukrainian, had sufficient contact with people from elsewhere to recognise accents among Ukrainian or Russian speakers that might result from somebody having learnt Yiddish as a first language, as opposed to other possible accents? Moreover, even should that have been the case, we would need to ask why. Would a specific ability to single out such an accent not, in fact, presuppose the very fixation on matters Jewish that it supposedly explains? Or are we to assume that Moscow sent out Yiddish-speaking officials with interpreters or that Jews who joined the Bolsheviks began or continued to dress in accordance with orthodox Jewish traditions? As is well known, the identification of Jews was an issue even during the course of the very pogroms themselves. The traditional means of painting a cross on the door or placing icons in the windows often still sufficed to avert attacks on individual houses. In some accounts of pogroms, witnesses explicitly mention that the units perpetrating the pogrom at some point ceased to ask those they confronted whether they were Jews and began assaulting or killing everyone ‘who looked like a Jew’. The simple explanation is, of course, that antisemites ‘know’ what they ‘know’ about Jews, and their ‘knowledge’ and the ‘inferences’ drawn from it are, as Volkov put it, ‘often all the more powerful for being partially or entirely false’. Apart from ‘looking Jewish’ there was, of course, also their ‘behaviour’. The British spy Paul Dukes, writing in The Times on ‘Bolshevism at Close Quarters’, also could not help ‘noticing’ that under the Soviets ‘the majority of Jews’ (which, if true, would mean that he was referring to several million officials) not only ‘serve in Commissariats in the rear ... particularly in those commissariats which are not employed in fighting’, but that ‘the Jews in minor offices are also ‘exceedingly obtrusive in their manner’. Even within the National Ukrainian scheme of things, at least in its anglophone guise, there was, admittedly, something deeply ‘tragic’ about the Jews tending to be so ‘hyper-sensitive, clannish and often tactless and arrogant’. For what had made them so, allegedly, was ‘the
memory of the massacres ... in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries'. We need to keep in mind – and this is another fundamental assumption underlying National Ukrainian historiography – that ‘Ukrainian–Jewish relations’, in Rudnytsky’s words, were in fact ‘fraught with reciprocal resentments’. For ‘the Ukrainians’, conversely, ‘remembered that the Jews had served as instruments of social and national oppression’. Indeed, the very ‘perpetrators of the massacres were victims and martyrs too’ because they had been ‘avengers of the people’s wrongs and freedom fighters’. Here we are confronted with what, in clinical terms, is called the antisemite’s ‘complete disproportion between “guilt” and punishment’. Even if, once again, for argument’s sake, we were to concede that the underlying assumptions reflected aspects of reality in a non-pathological way, we would still be left in a situation where ‘the Jews’ ‘exploited’ Ukrainians or were ‘agents’ of their exploitation while the Ukrainians’ ‘avengers’ massacred them. That, surely, constitutes a ‘reciprocal’ relationship only in an extremely crude sense of the word, even if we conceded a considerable degree of truth to even the nastiest of anti-Jewish stereotypes. On a similar note, incidentally, to suggest the fact that the Ukrainian populace, too, had an extremely hard time of the revolutionary and civil-war years could somehow help explain the pogromshchina or might mitigate the extent to which Ukrainians could be held accountable for it is hardly helpful. Such an assumption would presuppose that the hardship endured by Ukrainians was of the same nature as that inflicted on the victims of the pogroms – in other words, that they too became the victims of massacres targeting the entire Ukrainian population of various localities for no other reason than because they were ethnically Ukrainian. Moreover, this assumption implies that Jews could somehow have chosen not to be affected by the pogroms in the same way that Ukrainians could have chosen not to perpetrate them in the first place. As for the uprising of 1648, it is in any case clear that the Ukrainian Jews had been not its concomitant or incidental but indeed its ‘principal victims’. That we should be able to think, as Abramson would like to see us do, of the massacres perpetrated against Jews in both the seventeenth and eighteenth century as ‘epiphenomenal to the central aspects of the conflict’ indeed presupposes that we think of history ‘as the unfolding of events based on perceptions rather than as the linear progression of facts’ in exactly the way in which that stipulation represents not a truism but an extremely dangerous form of voluntaristic relativism.

Abramson is, of course, quite right in pointing out that the antisemitism that exploded into the pogromshchina cannot necessarily
be identified as a form of the 'highly developed antisemitic ideology' characteristic of organised political antisemitism. If we focus specifically on the psychological, rather than the strictly speaking ideological, aspects of antisemitism, then, it is evident that antisemitic perceptions hinge on 'the relation between premises and inferences' being 'replaced by a linking-up of ideas resting on mere similarity, often through association by employing the same characteristic word in two propositions which are logically quite unrelated'. Antisemitic arguments, in this light, are obviously 'by no means altogether irrational'; rather, they rely on a form of 'applied rather than spontaneous irrationality'. The sort of destructiveness it mobilises is dependent upon an "object" that, 'far from being a superficial "scapegoat", must have certain characteristics in order to fulfil its role. It must be tangible enough; and yet not too tangible, lest it be exploded by its own realism. It must have a sufficient historical backing and appear as an indisputable element of tradition.' Crucially, 'one cannot "correct" stereotyping by experience', the distortions in question 'are not to be corrected merely by taking a real look'. Rather, in order to overcome stereotyping, one 'has to reconstitute the capacity for having experiences'. It is this hurdle that the tradition established by the bulk of anglophone National Ukrainian historiography on 'Ukrainian-Jewish relations' needs to take and which forms a sine qua non for any genuine historiographical synthesis. To want to refute the established line of argument with 'empirical' evidence is, at best, a futile exercise. Conversely, it is also well known that 'the discrepancy between experience and stereotype' that invariably remains, if the stereotyping is upheld, 'is put into the service of the prejudiced attitude ... transforming the ... stereotype ... into an expression of' one's 'personality and the anti-stereotypical elements into an abstract obligation'. This is precisely the mechanism that is at work when Hunczak declares with such fervour and pathos that 'as a historian ... I shall not sacrifice ... my own intellectual integrity, on the altar of a Jewish–Ukrainian understanding, as Mr. Szajkowski demands.'

Needless to say, 'Jews' are well advised in this context to consider carefully what it is they actually want. As Joseph Schechtman reports, when he was 'an active member of the Defense Committee' for Schwartzbard in 1926 and 1927:

Ukrainian emigré circles ... asked me to arrange for a 'friendly and objective' consultation ... Such discussions ... took place twice. The Ukrainian participants wisely abstained from
‘defending Petliura’. They simply stated that for the Ukrainian people Petliura was a national hero, an embodiment of their national identity and dignity; therefore for the Jews to sacrifice the prospects of Jewish–Ukrainian friendship in order to save or exonerate Schwartzbard and thus exacerbate anti-Semitic feelings among the Ukrainian masses would be not only a ridiculous mistake, but a disastrous one as well. This thinly-veiled threat did not impress the Jewish participants.85

On a similar note, the Jewish Chronicle reported that a former minister in one of Petliura’s cabinets had declared at one of the public prosecutor’s preliminary hearings in Paris in September 1926 that ‘the late General Petlura ... is holy to all Ukrainians, and I must warn the Jews not to defend Schwarzbard, unless they want to incur the anger of the entire Ukrainian nation’.86 That these utterances were not completely down to hot air becomes evident when we consider that ‘priests and political leaders of the Ukrainians’ in the winter of 1926–27 apparently organised a ‘boycott of Jewish traders’ in Galician Poland in protest against ‘the pro-Polish policy of the Galician Jews, the murder of General Petlura, and the Jewish land settlement in Ukraine’.87 In July 1927, one Peretz Stein, a Jewish witness who had just arrived in Paris from Ukraine to give testimony in support of Schwartzbard, was shot and seriously injured, apparently by two Ukrainian-speaking persons who made unmistakable remarks as to their motives before firing.88

This solicitous concern regarding the possible consequences of undue ‘Jewish’ insistence on an alleged imbalance in the ‘tragic reciprocity’ of ‘Ukrainian–Jewish relations’ has by no means been limited to political activists. Bilinsky concluded his paper at the infamous McMaster Conference in 1983 by demanding: ‘Above all, let us be mindful of the reality of some 800,000 Jews still living in Ukraine ... The existence of a large Jewish minority in Ukraine, above all, calls for a great increase in mutual understanding.’89 This demand is all the more remarkable given that Bilinsky made it at the end of a paper, not on the pogromshchina of the revolutionary and civil-war years, but on what he called ‘Methodological Problems and Philosophical Issues in the Study of Jewish–Ukrainian Relations During the Second World War’. As he himself pointed out, this formulation was – not without reason, of course, as we might add straight away – ‘in the minds of some ... but a euphemism for Ukrainian participation in the Holocaust’.90 Bilinsky’s paper in effect consisted of two papers. In the second part he aired his outrage at a ‘judicial and political terror
campaign against the victims of many other tragedies of the twentieth century ... masterminded by Moscow' and unfolding as a result of 'the absolute quest for justice for the victims of the Holocaust', namely, the 'little Nurembergs' that were the denaturalisation proceedings against war crimes suspects that took place in the United States from the late 1970s onwards. His main focus in the historical part of the paper was on the pogroms that followed the German occupation of Galicia in the summer of 1941 – events that even he could not help calling 'semi-spontaneous'.91 His ambitions went further than merely wanting to ascribe these chiefly to 'deliberate incitement ... by the Nazi occupation authorities', thus reducing the responsibility of 'Ukrainian organizations' to 'possible inadequate resistance to those incitements'. After all, he pointed out, although 'under pressure of German agents-provocateurs some Ukrainians' had admittedly 'assaulted innocent Jews more often than guilty ones' in the course of these pogroms, 'a number of serious questions of fact and of moral judgment' remained that 'have to be addressed',92 and to address these was Bilinsky's main concern. Foremost among them was the alleged part played by 'Jews' in the 'particular provocation' preceding the pogroms of 1941 – namely, the 'mass executions of Ukrainian political prisoners by the retreating NKVD'.93 In this connection, mused Bilinsky, one needed to ask: 'is it possible to deny the Jewish background of various NKVD personnel simply by saying that they abdicated their Jewishness upon joining the Soviet Government? ... Or is it morally correct to say that the question of collaboration cuts both ways: Ukrainian extremists on the right worked with Hitler, but Jewish extremists on the left helped to implement the policies of Stalin?' Moreover, these 'Jewish extremists on the left' had borne (at least a share of the) responsibility not only for the 'particular provocation' immediately preceding the Soviet retreat and the subsequent pogroms in 1941, but also for 'Stalin's brutal collectivization drive' and the 'man-made famine' with its 'over seven million ... direct or indirect victims'94 among the 'Ukrainians'. Hence, he later reiterated his stance in the round table discussion:

You are analyzing your Holocaust and as a by-product presenting us with a bill of charges for complicity. Allow us equally to analyze the great famine since its impact on the Ukrainian community has been very grave and as a by-product allow us to present our bill of particulars ... Some Ukrainian extremists were imitating Hitler ... some Jewish radicals were overzealous in furthering the interests of Stalin ... For goodness' sake, let's
courageously admit that certain groupings of both peoples have committed tragic misjudgments.\(^5\)

Appealing to his fellow National Ukrainian historians, he added 'we must finally write a basic history of Ukrainian martyrology, which would at the very least match in quality Hilberg's work on the destruction of the Jews?\(^6\) It was against this background that he appealed to the participants of the conference to be mindful of 'the reality' of 'Jews still living in Ukraine'. He later added in the round table discussion: 'The Ukrainian's question to our Jewish friends is simply, "Do you place your bet on Little Russia or on an eventually independent Ukraine?"\(^7\)

These were by no means the crudest or most unpalatable notions aired by Bilinsky and others in the course of the McMaster Conference and numerous utterances recorded in the proceedings simply beggar belief.\(^8\) Suffice it to say, that the conceptualisation of Ukrainian complicity in the Shoah, on the one hand, and of Ukrainian responsibility for the pogromshchina, on the other, is, of course, invariably closely linked. If the collaboration with the Nazis is to be dismissed as totally out of step with the genuine tradition of Ukrainian-Jewish relations', then the pogromshchina too needs to be portrayed as an event similarly atypical of Ukrainian national history and identity. One could hardly admit a substantial implication of the Ukrainian national movement and those who provided its power base during the revolutionary and civil-war years in the pogromshchina, on the one hand, while seeking to depict Ukrainian complicity in the Shoah as utterly out of character and without substantial precedent in Ukrainian history, on the other. Although other anglophone National Ukrainian historians – Himka among them – formulated more moderate positions than Bilinsky at the McMaster Conference (especially following Shmuel Ettinger's confession that it had taken considerable persuasion to stop him from leaving the conference after Bilinsky's paper), none of them were in a position genuinely to address this conceptual nexus.\(^9\)

Himka's more recent discussion of Ukrainian collaboration with the National Socialists, published in 1997, shows that these constraints remain in place. He, too, uses the concepts 'socioeconomically motivated resentment'\(^10\) and 'socioeconomic antagonism'\(^11\) interchangeably, making it quite clear that, to his mind, 'of the factors facilitating collaboration whose roots can be traced back centuries, the preeminent one was the socioeconomic antagonism between
Ukrainians and Jews'. Although 'the realities that lay behind the antagonism had been considerably reduced,' he reasons, 'it is likely that elements of the old antagonism resurfaced whenever a Ukrainian peasant encountered a Jew entrusted with grain requisition'. On the other hand, 'if a strand of anti-Jewish violence did indeed exist within' Ukrainian 'folk culture', then, for Himka, 'it was quite tangential', indeed 'peripheral'. Consequently, 'it was not religion or the folk culture of the Ukrainians that led to collaboration; it was the collaboration itself that tapped or activated particular, peripheral elements' of that culture. This 'tapping' or 'activation', Himka repeats categorically several times, was a process marked by a 'backward directed dynamic'. The 'direction of the dynamic was back from the 1940s, not forward from the Middle Ages or early modern era'. Thus, he concludes in a most remarkable formulation, 'the Holocaust recalled the antagonism, not a preexisting animus ... then summoned up Ukrainian participation' in the Shoah.

It is the actual 'antagonism' between Ukrainians and Jews, then, that Himka would have us take for the progenitor of Ukrainian complicity in the Shoah, and not the 'resentment' that might have sprung from that supposed 'antagonism'. Thus, we are confronted again with the notion of anti-Jewish violence as, in fact, representing a 'conflict' between parties pitched against one another by a genuine 'socioeconomic antagonism' that we already saw Himka develop in his historiographical survey and that is now applied as a characterisation not only of the pogromshchina but even of 'Ukrainian-Jewish relations' during the Shoah.

Far from there being any sign of the post-Soviet era and the concomitant obsolescence of the cold war mindset heralding in anglophone National Ukrainian historiography's imminent demise and a withering away of its implications, the exact opposite is the case, not least (and precisely) as a result of the radically transformed political landscape that has emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As Himka, who can hardly be accused of an unduly critical attitude towards National Ukrainian historiography, pointed out in 1994, 'in Ukraine' itself 'many historians are writing the exact opposite of what they wrote only a short time ago' and 'have been engaged in a migration from one paradigm to another', from the 'Soviet' to the 'National', that is. As for the 'historians of Ukraine in the West ... the demands of the current political situation have siphoned some of their attention away from pure scholarship'. I am not altogether sure whether the fact that Hunczak, for instance, has been a Visiting Professor at Kiev University and the Kiev Polytechnical Institute

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means that his attention was focused on pure scholarship or siphoned away from it, but it certainly gives us a good indication as to the influences under which this 'paradigm migration' is taking place. On the other hand, an article published in *Revolutionary Russia* in 1997 by Sergei Pavliuchenkov (a lecturer at the Moscow State Social University at the time) demonstrates just how 'internationalist' post-Soviet National historiographies can be when confronting the ubiquitous 'so-called Jewish question'.

'Any serious analysis of the history of communism and in particular of the Russian revolution', Pavliuchenkov explains, 'unavoidably raises the so-called Jewish question. Its significance in the revolution and Civil war was exceptionally great, and there is no major theme which does not touch upon it in some way or another.' What, then, are some of these 'major themes'? 'The moods of the peasantry and the working class, the terror, the struggle within the top communist leadership, the speculative free market and so forth – all these issues attract attention to the Jewish question.' Now, in any moderately enlightened discourse that does not opt to refrain from the use of the phrase altogether in order to avoid possible misunderstandings, the 'so-called Jewish question' has generally been understood to relate to the issue of Jewish emancipation and integration into the surrounding society and polity. Antisemitism, which is obviously what Pavliuchenkov is actually talking about, is clearly a crucial determinant in this context, but an identity between the two issues only exists if we agree with the antisemites' assumption that Jewry's existence, and not its exclusion and discrimination, is the 'question' in need of a solution. Each and every antisemitic outburst clearly demonstrates that antisemites have 'raised' the 'Jewish question' as they see it, and that has obvious implications for the actual 'Jewish question', if we choose to stick to that term, but it does not necessarily 'raise' it in any real sense of the word.

'Hitherto the most widespread method to prove their [the Russian Jews'] exceptional influence on Russia's fate in the twentieth century,' Pavliuchenkov explains, 'has been to indicate the quantity of people of Jewish nationality amongst the Bolshevik leaders and functionaries at all levels. This impressive list has recently seen the addition of Ul'ianov (Lenin) himself recognized as a Jew on his mother's side. However, this issue is by no means exhausted by a listing of the Bolshevik leadership. Other important but virtually unknown testimonies' – we are heading once again for the inestimable gains of those legendary secret archives liberated at last – 'to specific Jewish participation in the all-Russian discord of the twentieth century have also survived.'
Pavliuchenkov’s self-declared aim is to demonstrate how the ‘participation by representatives of the Jewish population in the establishment of Soviet Power in the Ukraine at the beginning of 1919 and its contradictions [sic] with the overwhelming majority of the region’s inhabitants’ led to the Red Army’s initial defeat and the ‘loss of support for Soviet power in the Ukrainian countryside’.106

What happened, according to Pavliuchenkov, was that ‘communist power created favourable conditions at the beginning of 1919 for the emergence in the Ukraine of a close nationality-based’—read: Jewish—‘alliance between the structures of power and circles engaging in speculation’. Moreover, the Jews, by whom ‘the Soviet and Party organs ... were wholly staffed’, tended to be ‘generally young people not worried about going against the opinions of the traditional leaders of their communities’. Little wonder, then, that ‘Jews managed to alienate the Ukrainian muzhik so much in just a couple of months of Soviet power that his revenge was terrible, a wave of horrific Jewish pogroms beginning in May–June 1919.’107 And yet, ‘as a rule ... the literature about them simply notes the fact of these pogroms without going into the reasons why they occurred’. This state of affairs Pavliuchenkov is determined to remedy and he is able to do so with the help of ‘a few extracts from the summary reports of the Soviet military censorship’. As Pavliuchenkov explains, these ‘were compiled from steamed-open private letters’ and are, therefore, he concludes, ‘still capable of making an impression and giving some indication of the character and scale of what took place’. How this miraculous procedure works, he fails to explain. Needless to say, these extracts can at best give us an indication of the perceptions and interpretations of those whose letters were steamed open, and for all the officialdom of those who compiled these reports, the sources on which they depended remain the same completely arbitrary sample of private correspondents whose letters happened to undergo examination. In all, Pavliuchenkov presents ten such extracts. Half of them simply report that pogroms had taken place in a number of localities. Of the remaining five, one consists of the information that ‘in Kiev the Red troops are intending to rout the Jews’. Another one reports that ‘there was a rebel movement in the Usman’ and Zvenigorod uezdy. I hadn’t experienced such a nightmare before.’ Yet another extract tells us that ‘representatives of the authorities are taking bribes and getting rich. All around there is dissatisfaction and peasant unrest.’ No explicit ‘Jewish connection’ in these two at all, then (unless, of course, we follow Pavliuchenkov’s suggestion that ‘representatives of the authorities’
and 'Jews' are synonymous terms). Which leaves us with precisely two extracts that actually purport to tell us something about Jews other than that they have been, are being, or are possibly about to be, massacred. One reports that 'Soviet power is being criticised for the fact that its representatives are in most cases Jews. Even the Jewish bourgeoisie have occupied the warmest places under the communists.' The character of this statement remains ambiguous, given that its first half explicitly reports perceptions articulated by others and does not claim to formulate a description of the state of affairs as such. The final extract bemoans that 'everybody has been reduced to poverty except the Jews.'

This, then, is our promised 'indication of the character and scale of what took place'. What was it Adorno wrote about 'applied irrationality'? It is perhaps worth repeating at this point: 'The relation between premises and inferences is replaced by a linking-up of ideas resting on mere similarity, often through association by employing the same characteristic word in two propositions which are logically quite unrelated.' And Pavliuchenkov continues in just that style. 'The cruelty with which the insurgents dealt with Jewish Soviet and Party functionaries was exceptional even for the civil war.' Does that mean Jewish Soviet and Party functionaries, as opposed to non-Jewish ones? Well, in Pavliuchenkov's logic the answer is obviously 'no', because all of them were allegedly Jewish, as we have heard. But even so he can nevertheless surely not have it both ways. If it was not because they were Jewish that the cruelty meted out to them was 'exceptional', why mention that they were Jewish? If it was because they were Jewish, then that would again tell us a lot about Ukrainian antisemitism but cease to be relevant for the implications Pavliuchenkov is seeking to draw regarding Jewry and the Bolsheviks.

The Soviet authorities in Moscow were clearly, for Pavliuchenkov, afflicted by a 'lack of understanding of the whole seriousness of the situation', as is borne out by the fact that 'they hoped to restrict themselves for the time being to issuing directives about the necessity for strengthening agitational and propaganda work against anti-Semitic feelings'. Moreover, they did so, even though they were repeatedly urged by courageous comrades to withdraw Jewish functionaries as the best means of diffusing the 'tension in inter-ethnic relations in the Ukraine'. Disbelief has made me read the related passages time and again, but there can be no doubt that this is indeed what Pavliuchenkov means. He clearly states that, in the course of the second invasion, the Soviets 'kept the sad experience of the previous
spring in mind and began to act more cautiously and soundly' but that
the new directives from Moscow were apparently still 'generally
ignored by Jewish officials'. To demonstrate this he comes up with a list
of functionaries of which 'to judge by the surnames, 30 out of 47 ...
were clearly of Jewish nationality.'\(^{111}\)

It has been necessary to quote Pavliuchenkov in some detail to
dispel the incredulity one would otherwise invariably arouse by
simply giving a concise summary of his position: Soviet and
Communist Party organs in Ukraine were wholly staffed by Jews who
exploited their power monopoly to establish a mafia-like alliance with
their fellow Jews who were engaging in speculation. They thereby
managed to alienate the Ukrainian peasantry so completely in just a
couple of months that the revenge was terrible. Yet, if the Soviets had
excluded Jews from public and party office, none of this need have
occurred. Ultimately, however, even the Soviets were the Jews' victims.
It was not, as National Ukrainian historiography (at least in its
anglophone guise) has tended to suggest, that the unpopularity of
Soviet policies was associated with 'Jews' and that the pogroms sought
to avenge this, but that the 'Jews' indeed took advantage of the power
they exercised in the Soviets' employ in a way that brought revenge
not only upon themselves but even undermined Soviet power because
it had become associated with the Jews. Subsequently, even when
Moscow finally did intervene, Jews, stubborn as they can be, plotted
themselves back into office. This line of argument surely neither
requires nor deserves any further comment.

THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT'S TRADITIONAL
'LIBERALISM' AND 'MULTICULTURALISM' REVISITED

What, then, of the National movement's 'liberal' traditions and
programme that its leadership was so tragically 'unable effectively to
communicate to the Ukrainian peasantry'? It has become one of
National Ukrainian historiography's favourite legends that, from the
day of its inception, the national movement was not only not
antisemitic but that it was every Jew's best friend - at least as long the
Jew was judicious and self-critical. Space precludes the examination of
this in detail here, so we will have to make do, as an illustration of the
way in which this myth is construed, with Rudnytsky's portrayal of
Mikhail Dragomanov - the most prominent and (at least among
Populists, 'liberals' and those in the socialist camp) the most revered of
the ideologues of the Ukrainian national movement to have emerged
in the second half of the nineteenth century. According to Rudnytsky, he was, in fact, no less than 'the precursor of Jewish socialist and labour movements' and 'a pioneer of the concept which in our time has become known as multiculturalism'. As Rudnytsky explains, 'Drahomanov once observed that the stances he was taking as a political writer usually led him into polemics on two fronts.' This also applied to his 'vigorously refutation of two schools of thought' concerning the 'Jewish question': namely, those who approved of the tsarist discrimination, on the one hand, and 'the advocates of Jewish emancipation', on the other. Dragomanov could not go along with the latter because he 'resented', inter alia, 'the attitude of the Jews who, invariably, regarded themselves as innocent victims and did not want to assume any responsibility for the difficulties of their situation and the hostilities which they encountered'. He also resented the 'failure of the progressive, Westernized Jews to dissociate themselves from the exploitative practices which their small-town co-religionists often used in business dealings with the peasants'. Having analysed matters carefully, our pioneer of multiculturalism, notes Rudnytsky, 'concluded that "the Jewish nation in Ukraine ... forms, to a large extent, a parasitic class". To make things worse, "all Jews in Ukraine look upon themselves as a class superior to the Ukrainian peasants"'. Rudnytsky does concede that Dragomanov's 'inclination to speak in much too sweeping terms about "Jewish parasitism"' represented a certain 'shortcoming', adding that this has even 'caused certain writers to accuse him of anti-Semitism', although this is obviously 'a charge refuted by more judicious Jewish scholars'. 'On the other hand,' Rudnytsky continues, it surely 'cannot be denied that the dominant position taken in certain leading branches of the national economy by the members of a minority group could not be considered a normal and healthy state of affairs.'

John Klier has translated this into plain English and concluded that Dragomanov 'had a strong sense of the Jewish masses as an alien body in the Ukrainian land'. Moreover, 'non-agricultural social groups like the Jews were automatically suspect in [Dragomanov's] eyes', although it is at times 'difficult to ascertain whether' he thought 'the Jews were unproductive simply because they were engaged in mercantile activity or because there were too many of them'. One wonders what fully-fledged antisemitism in the Ukrainian national movement might look like, if this is what it takes to qualify as being a pioneer of multiculturalism. As will have become more than obvious in the course of our discussion, 'in popular imagery, the Jew was an
integral part of the system of exploitation imposed upon the Ukraine', and for the national movement at the time of its inception 'the question was not why Ukrainophiles might be hostile to the Jews – in their own minds there was much justification for that – but why they should go out of their way to be sympathetic to the Jews.'

As for the movement's eminently liberal character, we can catch a glimpse of it from an altogether different perspective in an adulatory pamphlet on Petliura by the prominent publicist, author and veteran of the Ukrainian national movement Vasyl Koroliv-Staryi. The Ukrainian National Association's Concise Encyclopaedia, in giving an indication of this man's stature in the movement, vouches for the relevance of the movement's daily Rada (published between 1906 and 1914) by identifying three of its contributors: Petliura, Dmytro Doroshenko (who later cultivated his Ukrainianism under the auspices of the German National Socialists) and Koroliv-Staryi. His influence clearly went far beyond the literary sphere, as is borne out not only by the fact that he himself states in the pamphlet in question that he 'belonged to the Commission charged with the rather unpleasant task of dictating to the Hetman the text of his capitulation', but also by the fact that he was part of the diplomatic mission the Directory sent to Czechoslovakia in 1919.

In his completely hagiographical characterisation of Petliura, written in April 1919 and published in June of that year by the leading National Ukrainian publishing house Chas (of which he had himself been a co-founder), Koroliv-Staryi points out that:

the historian of the epoch will have, I dare say, much trouble with the person of Petlura; for he will have to write many a page in order to picture truly this legendary image of a man that lived and worked at a time when fairy tales seemed dead. In fact, Petlura made them live again. He resurrected the old lore about heroes and myth-personages.

There was, for instance, Koroliv-Staryi reports, 'the myth of Petlura's liberation from the prison ... which is given full credit to by the Ukrainian village-folk'. According to this myth, Petliura was sent a letter containing a picture of a white horse. Petliura then 'cut the horse out from the paper, stuck it on the wall of his cell and stroked the horse's mane. And look! the wall splits asunder, the white horse beats the ground with his hoof, the "batko" is up in the saddle and flies off to his true sons, the riflemen, ready for battle! That legend,' Koroliv-Staryi continues, 'is not the only example of the kind. In the ranks of
the insurgents many such songs and "doumas" - a 'sort of epic poem with no individual author', as he explains in a footnote - 'about Petlura were rhymed. The soldiers were singing them when entering Kiev in triumph.' Koroliv-Staryi, it is worth repeating, in case any doubt should have arisen, is one of Petliura's biggest admirers - not least because, whereas 'at the head of the Russian people we behold either men foreign by birth as Trotzky-Bronstein or Russians only by name, internationalists as Lenin', Petliura is an 'authentic son of his people'.

It would seem, then, that the movement's essentially liberal programme faced substantial difficulties in making itself heard even among those who were concerned with the leading rather than with being led.

THE EVIDENTIAL VALUE OF 'NATIONAL-PERSONAL AUTONOMY' RECONSIDERED

What we have heard on the nature of multiculturalism 'Ukrainian style' also allows us to take another look at the whole issue of federalism and autonomy in a way that may allow us to transcend the argumentative deadlock in which the Ukrainian majority's 'sincerity' or 'insincerity' is treated (as in a vacuum, where only heartfelt ideals determine the outcome) as the crucial criterion, forcing any ultimate judgement to rely on conjecture. Needless to say, there is an inevitable dialectic inherent in the fundamental issues at stake here and it is obvious enough that the idea of autonomy essentially represented a predominantly 'benevolent' and inclusive (rather than segregationist and exclusive) concept for precisely as long as the loyalty of the Jewish populace was being more or less genuinely contested. It was, of course, by no means a preserve of the Ukrainian national movement to have understood the possible strategic implications of Jewry's allegiance and that alone would hardly merit much of a critique. There was, as we know, a strong awareness among organised 'Russian' Jewry of these issues. 'The non-Zionists,' for instance, as Baron reports, 'belittled' the Balfour declaration 'as a mere political manoeuvre of the British government to secure Russian Jewry's help in persuading its government not to make a separate peace with Germany'.

As Matityahu Minc has pointed out (and Abramson largely follows his take on these issues), 'the Provisional Government strove to create a situation' in the early summer of 1917, 'whereby the question of national minorities would be an obstacle in the path of Ukrainian separatism, on the assumption that the minorities would do their
utmost to hamper such a development'. It can hardly come as much of a surprise that 'the Ukrainian authorities for their part ... desired to blunt the anti-Ukrainian edge' of the Provisional Government's corresponding stipulations 'as much as possible and were prepared to direct their considerations to any plan that would transform the problem of national minorities into an internal Ukrainian matter'.

Moreover, it was clearly in the interest of the Rada 'to form a binding reciprocal relationship between itself and the Jewish national movement'. This found its expression, for instance, in the decision that the minorities' 'deputy secretaries would not be appointed by the General Secretariat ... as were other deputy secretaries but by the Rada in accordance with the regulation binding upon general secretaries'. This meant that 'with every resignation of a general secretariat, these deputy secretaries on national affairs also had to resign and be re-elected together with the new cabinet'. Far from primarily representing the interests of their 'autonomous' communities in the Ukrainian government, they were to take on responsibility for the entirety of that government's policies and stand and fall with them. Yet, on the other hand, the initially construed set up would have allowed them to 'participate in all discussions of the General Secretariat' but would have restricted the right to 'cast a vote and present briefs to the meetings' to 'issues of direct relevance to their nationality'. Moreover, 'the Secretary for Nationality Affairs was to be responsible for the policies of the Vice-Secretaries ... The Secretary thus had veto power, which limited the ability of each nationality to arrange its own affairs.'

From the outset this led to increasingly embittered conflicts within and between the organised Jewish communities, and while the Jewish parties with socialist leanings 'decided to walk the tightrope' that the Rada had laid out for them, the Zionist groups remained highly reluctant to follow suit. Abramson highlights the 'split between the socialists and the Zionists' that was increasingly to develop out of this conflict, arguing that it 'effectively prevented the Jewish political community from acting decisively against the devastating pogrom wave of 1919'. What he totally disregards, however, is that this was not the result of some wilfully stubborn insistence on abstract principles but simply a matter of concrete practical choices between options consciously laid out by the National Ukrainian majority in the Rada. In Abramson's book, this indictment has, in fact, become a crucial mainstay of his argument. Time and again he reiterates the message that 'the Zionist and Jewish socialists bickered over
ideological minutiae', that 'the Jewish political parties wasted precious
time in ideological feuding', that they 'squabbled over issues minor
and major, leaving them ill-prepared' and thus 'their infighting had
serious consequences, since they proved incapable of taking concrete
steps to control the burgeoning pogrom wave that would overwhelm
the region'. He is adamant that 'early intervention might well have
been very effective', but refrains from saying how. In concrete terms,
his argument ultimately hinges exclusively on the much-debated issue
of the Nationality Council's declaration against the formation of Jewish
self-defence units in December 1917.

Now, it is indeed hard to deny Abramson's contention that 'early
anticipation of the coming violence and wide establishment of
organised and authorised Jewish units might have stemmed the flow
of blood in 1919'. With hindsight, there can be no doubt that it was
highly unfortunate that organised Jewry was not in a position to react
to the pogromshchina in a more closely coordinated fashion. Hence,
were Abramson to limit himself to the statement that it would have
been desirable for organised Jewry to somehow anticipate what was to
come and consequently abandon their political differences and stand
in a united front against the pogromist upsurge subsequently
unleashed against them, who would want to argue with him? But his
desire to construe at this point, once again, a reciprocity, forces him to
merge his notion of what he would like organised Jewry to have
anticipated with an evaluation of the way in which it responded to the
challenges it saw itself up against at the time. Here Abramson clearly
oversteps the mark and (albeit, perhaps, inadvertently) ends up by
appearing to mete out more blame to organised Jewry than he does to
the Directory. 'The Directory leadership ... must bear responsibility for
not taking sufficient measures to stop the carnage,' he explains, but
then goes on to add: 'The Jewish political parties, however, must share
some responsibility for the violence, since their quarrelling prevented
them from taking measures early enough to allow adequate self-
defense.' The Directory merely did not step in energetically enough,
then, while organised Jewry shares in the 'responsibility for the
violence' itself.

Ironically, of course, if this argument were to make any practical
sense, the only concrete alternative would have been for all Jewish
organisations to come out unitedly and unhesitatingly against the
Rada and the Directory, from the outset, in order to take the security of
the Jewish populace into their own hands. We need not discuss here
whether or not that might have been a sound or viable alternative;
what we can say is that, if we follow the paradigms both of anglophone National Ukrainian historiography and of Abramson’s variations on the theme, then that would surely only have intensified the carnage and, more importantly, would have added the final piece of ‘evidence’ to the argument that the pogroms actually represented a justified reaction to Jewish betrayal.

After all, even if we look at the ‘period between the third and fourth universal’ that Abramson presents as ‘the apex of Ukrainian–Jewish political co-operation’, it is patently obvious that the Ukrainian majority in the Rada felt it was meting out privileges to minority groups to which these groups were not, as a matter of course, entitled. The proverbial Ukrainian ‘disappointment’ that their benevolence was then not ‘rewarded’ by unconditional patriotic fervour on the part of the minorities for their ‘second’ fatherland and the hostility that this ‘disappointment’ then mobilised is hardly a demonstration of the Ukrainian majority’s passionate belief in the merits of minority rights, autonomy and federalism, as some would have us believe. Tellingly enough, Abramson explains that ‘the atmosphere in the Rada was particularly hostile’ when the Fourth Universal was on the agenda, ‘since the minority parties [emphasis added] had only just succeeded in passing the Law on National-Personal Autonomy.’

Not half as interesting as the fact that the Ukrainian government vowed not actively to suppress Jewish communal self-organisation in the way the previous régime had done, seems to be the question of how, exactly, the rights of the minority were to be conceptually related to the whole. Are we predominantly dealing here with an inclusive or an exclusive concept? I have not had time to examine this issue in detail. There are a few hints, though, which would seem to me to merit a more thorough investigation. Heifetz, for instance, reports that under the Rada ‘all local posts were held by Ukrainians’, except in those areas where the Jewish populace was in the majority anyway. Now, to install Jews in public offices in communities where the Jewish populace is in the majority simply requires democratic elections, not fancy and ambitious concepts of national autonomy. Conversely, that it should prove impossible for Jews to attain such offices in localities where the Jewish populace was not actually in the majority does rather question the Ukrainian populace’s multicultural convictions. The simple truth of the matter would seem to be that the Rada and its General Secretariat, while they generously chose not to intervene to exclude Jews from public office in localities where the Jewish populace formed the majority, also chose not actively to annoy the Ukrainian
populace in localities where there was a Jewish minority by enforcing the implications of the Provisional Government’s abolition of the tsarist exclusion of Jews from public office. That would support the suspicion that what actually ‘alienated’ the Ukrainian peasantry so radically was that the Bolsheviks allowed Jews to hold public office at all in communities where there was a Ukrainian majority, never mind in what numbers or proportions. Moreover, is it not rather probable, that this, in turn, seemed understandable to the Ukrainian political leaders because they could not help being bewildered by the fact that Jews, although granted ‘autonomy’ in ‘their’ localities, should still find cause to alienate Ukrainian peasants with undue demands in ‘Ukrainian’ localities as well? Heifetz – who is, admittedly, not the most reliable of sources – also states that the Rada, while banished to Zhitomir during the first Bolshevik invasion, passed a ‘new law … depriving members of foreign elements … [of] the rights of Ukrainian citizenship’. Now, needless to say, for all the splendour of the right to be listed in an autonomous nationality register, should Heifetz be right in suggesting that this has to be understood as a right which was to be exercised as an alternative to that of full ‘Ukrainian’ citizenship, then that would surely throw a completely different light on the whole issue of national and personal ‘autonomy’. Tcherikower also remarks on the way in which organised Jewry was more or less demonstratively not included in the preparations for the insurrection to overthrow Skoropadskyi, and implies that from this point on, at the latest, ‘autonomy’ served interchangeably as an argument at times to exclude and at other times to emphatically demand Jewish participation, depending on what the case might require.

Abramson touches on this issue explicitly only once. His attempt to assess the relevance of the Ministry for Jewish Affairs leads him to the conclusion that more-or-less ordinary Jews saw it primarily as an institution for traditional forms of Jewish petitioning (with the help of dignitaries respected sufficiently both by Jews and non-Jews) in order to extract favours from those in power. ‘By and large,’ he concludes, ‘Jews regarded themselves as essentially outside the political process, possessing few rights but some fortunate privileges.’ He then adds: ‘This view was fundamentally different from the conception of citizenship espoused by the Central Rada.’ Now, his main point here, I would suggest, is once again to underscore the alienation between Jewish activists (or, in this case, in fact, the political leadership of Jewry and Ukrainians alike), on the one hand, and the ‘ordinary Jew’, on the other. By implication, at least part of the blame for the irrelevance of
the Ministry could be linked to the subjective predisposition of the 'ordinary Jew', thus providing further evidence for the 'betrayal' of the well-meaning leaders in both camps by the 'less enlightened attitudes among the general population' on both sides of the divide. His argument might have been a little more convincing, had we previously been given the slightest indication as to what the 'conception of citizenship espoused by the Central Rada' actually was. What we do, by contrast, know a lot about, though, are the concepts of autonomy that Abramson holds to have been relevant at the time; and it is, indeed, at this point that his argument finally comes full circle. For autonomism, in Abramson's opinion, 'can be seen in many ways as a transitional model directed at societies moving from a medieval hierarchical structure to the modern notion of individual citizenship without regard to religious or ethnic identity'. The principle of autonomism, he explains, was 'in a manner similar to the corporate structure of the medieval government', in that 'the state could deal with its Jewish population not directly but rather through the institutions of the Jewish national autonomy'. After all, 'Minorities are concerned more than anything else with maintaining a Rechtsstaat' — that is, 'a lawful society that could adequately guarantee order and peace'. Such a Rechtsstaat would 'even be acceptable if' its 'laws are moderately discriminatory, just as long as [the minorities'] rights and privileges are clearly defined, and there is some means of legal redress if these limited freedoms are impugned'. In the long run, notes Abramson, Jewish autonomy hardly fared better elsewhere: it 'disappeared from Lithuania in the late twenties and from Latvia and Estonia in the next decade'. In sum, 'It seems that the idea was not in harmony with what were to be the major trends of the twentieth century. The notion of Jewish autonomy was simply too close to medieval corporatism to survive in a changing social climate.'

The explanation offered here for the disappearance of Jewish autonomy is hardly plausible, of course. It may well have succumbed to 'what were to be the major trends of the twentieth century' but that the 'modern notion of individual citizenship' should have been the epitome of these trends and hence the gravedigger of Jewish autonomy in inter-war Eastern Europe is surely a rather far-fetched claim. What we can conclude, though, is that Abramson's concept of Jewish autonomy in no way lays claim to compatibility with the 'modern notion of individual citizenship', and that his praise and defence of the rights meted out to Ukrainian Jewry by the Ukrainian nationalists is in no way predicated on the assumption of such a
compatibility, but moves within the parameters of pre-modern corporatism. This line of argument, however, can vouch for the immunity, let alone hostility, of the Ukrainian leadership toward antisemitism only to the extent (and in the sense) that it might be argued that the pre-emancipatory forms of coexistence between Jews and non-Jews largely precluded violent anti-Jewish outbursts simply due to the fact that segregation usually precludes direct friction – an argument that is, ironically, a central plank of avowedly National Jewish historiography.

**YIDDISHE MESHORSIM**

In publications that seek to exonerate Petliura and the Directory, evidence given in their support by 'Jews' always holds particular pride of place. This is, indeed, a highly unpleasant chapter which, again, for reasons of space, we cannot discuss here in detail. It is perhaps worth pointing out, though, that the denunciation as *yiddishe meshorsim* (Jewish lackeys) is by no means some label later applied to discredit their testimony, as some anglophone National Ukrainian historians would have us believe. Rather, their involvement with the Directory was criticised every bit as harshly at the time as it has been ever since. Desperate attempts were made at the time to counteract the consequences of their behaviour, especially when they manipulated public opinion abroad. For example: ‘The statements made by Advocate Margolin' have been severely commented upon by Jewish delegates from Ukraine, who are present in Warsaw,’ reads a report from Warsaw in the *Jewish Chronicle’s* 17 October 1919 edition. ‘Advocate Goldstein, the Chairman of the Kieff Committee in Aid of the Pogrom Sufferers, says that ... the Jews lost all confidence in him [Margolin], as he showed himself to be more Ukrainian than the Ukrainians themselves ... The massacres were organised by Petloura’s troops.’ The delegates ‘charge Petloura’s Government with direct responsibility for the massacres, and declare that the Ukraine Government affords special facilities to Jews who undertake to go abroad to defend the cause’. Similarly Vishnitzer, for instance, when he told a B’nai B’rith meeting in London in the early summer of 1920 that, ‘had the National Government of Ukrainia been properly supported and strengthened from the quarters able to give the necessary help’, the pogroms ‘would not have taken place’, was taken to task by David Jochelman, who countered that ‘Ukrainia could not be wholly exonerated from the charge of pogrom making’. Moreover,
even in cases where they later changed their stance, as did the former Minister of Jewish Affairs, Pinchas Krasny, this did not restore the trust. Krasny, who had later joined the Bolsheviks, made an almost desperate effort to ensure that he was called by Schwartzbard’s defence team in the Paris trial, but was rejected by Schwartzbard’s supporters ‘because he had shown’ – as Torrès put it – ‘”passive complicity” during the tragic events’.143

Given Margolin’s apparent ability to appear ‘more Ukrainian than the Ukrainians’ anyway, it is all the more astounding that, in the eyes of the Ukrainian Information Bureau in Berlin, his utterances still seemed to be in need of a little editing to fulfil their proper purpose.144 In the 1920 ‘collection of documents’ that we have already mentioned, Lewitzkyj and Specht included an interview that Margolin gave the Jewish Chronicle in May 1919 – not, however, without making its message slightly more conclusive. Thus, Margolin had, for instance, indeed spoken to the Jewish Chronicle of ‘Jewish assimilators’ and their negative attitude towards Ukrainian independence, but he had added that these were ‘numerically ... not important’.145 This qualification Lewitzkyj and Specht elegantly edited away. Obviously picking his words carefully, Margolin had told the Jewish Chronicle that ‘nearly all Jewish parties and organisations’ had been in agreement with the ‘right of the Ukrainian people to determine their ultimate political destiny on popular lines’. Surely, he meant the Ukrainians’ ‘right to independence’, Lewitzkyj and Specht hastened to correct him. The Central Rada, Margolin had said, had ‘showed itself willing to grant more concessions to Jews than had any other constituent assembly in history’. What he had, of course, meant, our conscientious translators clarify, was that the Rada had ‘granted’ the Jews more rights than they had ‘ever had anywhere in Europe’, which is why it is also much more appropriate to translate ‘total autonomy’ where Margolin had spoken simply of ‘autonomy.’ When Margolin told the Jewish Chronicle that the ‘prevalence of pogroms in the Ukraine’ had to be ‘partly attributed’ to the fact that ‘the Ukrainians ... were subject for 300 years to Russia and have acquired as an evil inheritance, what I may call the pogrom habit’, he meant, of course, to lay the blame at the Russian door, but Lewitzkyj and Specht nevertheless thought it preferable to omit this comment altogether. Even more crucially, Margolin also lacked precision in his remarks about Jews and Bolsheviks. ‘The connection of the Jews with the Bolshevist movement is infinitesimal’, he had told the Jewish Chronicle. That obviously needed to be paraphrased and instead we are told that Margolin ‘disputes ... that Jews play that important a role in
the Bolshevik movement as is generally assumed.' Even an Arnold Davidovich Margolin, then, does not qualify as a witness for 'international Jewry's respect' for the Ukrainian government without quite some additional spin.

**A POGROM AND ITS AFTERLIFE: PROSKUROV**

'If a single pogrom stands out in the collective Jewish memory, it is,' as Abramson rightly points out, that perpetrated in Proskurov and the nearby Felshtin between 15 and 18 February 1919. These events were subsequently examined by the Petersburg lawyer A.I. Hillerson, who concluded his findings by stating that 'Proskurov has acquired the sad privilege of having opened a new style of pogrom-making.' Previously, he explained, 'looting was often followed by murders but these were subsidiary'. Now 'the main purpose' of the Ukrainian pogroms had apparently become 'the extermination of the Jewish population'. This assessment is generally reiterated in the literature and was borne out by the subsequent development. 'No previous pogrom – except that in Kishinev in 1903 – and no later pogrom opened the eyes [of Jewry] to the nature of the authorities so dramatically', as did Proskurov, Tcherikower explains: 'It revealed the functioning of the Petliurovshchina in the shine of a flash of lightning, as it were. There were other pogroms in the Ukraine with by no means less victims but not one of them engraved itself so deeply in the collective memory as the one in Proskurov. Proskurov came to epitomise that whole dreadful period."

The course of events itself is well-documented in Abramson's study, so need not be detailed here (even though I do not agree with Abramson's narrative in every aspect). Rather important for our context, however, are the 'circumstances' that go with this pogrom and that we need – if we follow the 'Ukrainian' line – to acknowledge as 'significant': namely, that the pogrom was 'preceded by an uprising organized by the Russian Bolsheviks in collaboration with the Jewish communists of the region'. Whether this means in collaboration with the Jewish communists, as opposed to the non-Jewish communists, of the region, presumably need not concern us. Suffice it to say that apparently not one 'Ukrainian' was involved in this business and that, more importantly, it was the street fighting that resulted from the necessity to put down this uprising that then unfortunately 'degenerated into a pogrom'. This is also one of Hunczak's favourite stories. He does concede that the pogrom began after the uprising had
been put down, but that, for him, cannot change the fact that it was 'provoke by the Bolsheviks'. He compensates this by finding their supporters among 'the Jewish population' as a whole, on the one hand, and by making the highly debatable claim, on the other, that the local commander whose troops perpetrated the pogrom, Semesenko, was executed 'for this crime' only one-and-a-quarter years later, 'in May 1920'.

Now, there is no doubt that a 'rather half-hearted and unorganized' uprising took place in Proskurov before the pogrom. But it was 'put down within two hours', as Abramson tells us. There may or may not have been Jews involved in it; what little evidence remains suggests that Jewish activists made considerable efforts to have the insurrection called off because it stood little chance and could not but lead to a pogrom. Why, then, were Semesenko and his associates so sure of their case? Two of the witnesses called by the civil prosecution in connection with the Schwartzbard trial later gave accounts relating to this issue. One Mikhail Shadrin explained that the leaders of the uprising in Proskurov had been 'exclusively' Jews. Among them had been a 'Jewish girl' who was 'a famous Tchekistess, a murdereress in a dress', who had previously 'personally shot ... 600 officers' in another locality. The Jews had had 'substantial sections of the Proskurov garrison' on 'their side' and these, Shadrin purported, had been the ones who had actually staged the pogrom – 'those soldiers', in other words, 'whom the Jews themselves had turned into Bolsheviks'. Ultimately, 'if the insurrection had succeeded,' Shadrin concluded, 'not the Jews but the Christians would have been the victims of these murders'.

The second witness called by the representatives of Petliura's family to help disperse the false allegations against him, one Butakov, had such weighty evidence to confirm how beastly the Jewish threat in Proskurov had been that he concluded by speaking those notorious 'infamous words' that brought the Schwartzbard trial to an early close and precipitated Schwartzbard's acquittal. Given the intensity of the Jewish threat, Butakov explained, the pogrom in Proskurov had been an 'act of divine inspiration'. When this statement, made at one of the public prosecutor's preliminary hearings, was read out in court, 'some of the jurors could hardly hide their emotions' and Torrès declared his willingness to relinquish the witnesses he had called if the other parties did so too. Given that each witness called to vouch for Petliura's reputation apparently invariably only blemished it ever further, both the public and the civil prosecution agreed.
As we have seen, Schwartzbard’s acquittal has outraged National Ukrainian historians in the West ever since. ‘Mr. Szajkowski stated himself,’ Hunczak exclaimed, ‘that the evidence against Petliura was “not sufficient for a criminal court of law.”’ Mr. Szajkowski feels, however’, Hunczak continued, tucked away in a footnote, ‘that the evidence “was sufficient for a political trial.” This double-standard is completely artificial and juridically untenable, for without reliable evidence the question of innocence or guilt cannot possibly be resolved.’ Now, Szajkowski’s terminology may not have been particularly well chosen at this point, but what he meant was, of course, blatantly obvious: the evidence is clearly sufficient to hold Petliura politically responsible. Interestingly enough, the Jewish Chronicle reported at the time that ‘Maître Campinchi, the leading counsel for the Civil Prosecution, said that he recognized Petliura’s moral and political responsibility for the pogroms, but not his criminal responsibility for them.’ The Freiheit (New York) is also quoted in the Literary Digest as stating that ‘his lawyers’, meaning those representing the civil prosecution, ‘were even compelled to admit that he was responsible politically and morally for the massacres of the Jews. They denied only his criminal responsibility.’ I have found this information neither corroborated nor denied anywhere else, but it would seem that the notion underlying Abramson’s attempts to differentiate between responsibility and accountability, too, is almost as old as the events themselves.

As for Proskurov, the material we have examined so far would still admit the possibility that the Bolshevik threat was a private delusion of Semeseenko and his intimates, and that the obviously nonsensical grounds later presented at the trial in Paris are of such a grotesque nature precisely because they were not fabricated until considerably later. There can, however, be no doubt that the Directory backed Semeseenko’s version from the outset – and not just at home, but also abroad. As the Jewish Chronicle reported in its 25 April 1919 issue, Lucien Wolf had received a letter in the previous week from Serge Zarchi, ‘Councillor of the Delegation of the Ukrainian Republic in Paris’, informing him of the ‘following official communiqué concerning’ the pogroms in Zhitomir, Berditchev and Proskurov:

A portion of the Jewish population among the rest suffered during the repression of the revolt of the local anarchist Bolshevik groups, in which, unhappily, many Jews took part. A special commission, of which Mr. Revoutzky, Minister for Jewish
Affairs, formed part, established on the spot the fact that no violence was specially directed against the Jews.\textsuperscript{163}

Now, the Ukrainian representatives in Western Europe could be forgiven for assuming that this line of argument might be suited to dispel the dismay and repulsion gradually mounting as a result of the news of the pogroms that were coming in at the time (with considerable delay). After all, the first 'Jews and Bolshevism' campaign of that year had just taken up in London. 'We notice that the \textit{Times} has been giving figures about the predominance of Jews among the executive officers of Russian Bolshevism,' the \textit{Jewish Chronicle} noted in its 4 April 1919 edition. 'It is not only the \textit{Morning Post}, we observe, which is endeavouring to turn every Bolshevist conventicle into a Jewish gathering.'\textsuperscript{164} More importantly, however, we can conclude from this remarkable statement that, at this time, over two months after the pogrom in Proskurov, which had been the last of the three specifically named, it had as yet by no means been decided in a coordinated fashion that it would be far better to say that one categorically disapproved of the pogroms and simply lacked the means to take appropriate measures to suppress them. We have here, then, another instance that can be added to the multitude of repeatedly quoted statements and documents, all of which raise time and again the question we have confronted throughout our discussion: why should a government as oblivious to antisemitic sentiments, living in so amicable a relationship with the Jewish population of the state it governs, and as innocent of the slightest implication in the \textit{pogromshchina} as has been continuously purported, have gone to such lengths to make its assurances to this effect as laughably implausible as they were and to litter every utterance in its own defence, \textit{ad nauseam}, with antisemitic stereotypes?

Ultimately, then, the issue of the Directory's implication in the \textit{pogromshchina} continues to raise a number of highly significant questions that will need to be addressed in an altogether more fundamental and rigorous form before there can be any talk of a substantive 'synthesis' that genuinely transcends the main tenets of anglophone National Ukrainian historiography. Such a synthesis could, in any case, gain ground only as the result of an open scholarly debate, a process that the \textit{reservatio mentalis} with which individual specialists in the field may well view anglophone National Ukrainian historiography in private and the disdain they perhaps occasionally articulate among one another will not suffice to replace.
NOTES

1. This article is based on a dissertation originally prepared for Jonathan Smele's special subject course 'The Russian Revolution and Civil War, 1917–1921' at (as it then was) Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London. I am greatly indebted to Dr Smele for his generous support, not only in the context of the course. I thank Dr Helen Beer (University College London) for her help with the transcription of Yiddish titles. All translations from sources not listed in English are by myself. I dedicate this article to the memory of the late Karin Maurer, a sorely missed, beloved friend and comrade of the utmost integrity.


6. Ibid., p.257.

7. Ibid., p.255. It is, in fact, entirely possible that Bilinsky never actually read Szajkowski's comments. Ukrainian émigré institutions repeatedly reprinted Hunczak's contributions to the 'somewhat angry exchange' of 1969–70 -- as in the case of the Ukrainian Historical Association's 1985 Toronto edition of these texts or a French translation published under Hunczak's name in 1987 -- without either of Szajkowski's rebuttals. It seems highly probable that similar editions were also circulated at the time. The likelihood of Bilinsky having been completely oblivious to Szajkowski's contributions is underlined, for instance, by the fact that he characterised recent usage of the term *yiddishe meshorsim* (Jewish lackeys) to characterise Jews who had defended the Directory as 'to put it mildly... a somewhat idiosyncratic assessment of persons, who do have a certain standing in Jewish history' (ibid., p.256), although Szajkowski had explained the more or less contemporary (and certainly 'pre-Schwartzbard') origins of the term's application to the figures in question. Szajkowski, 'Communication', p.256.


11. Rudolf A. Mark, 'Symon Petljura und die UNR: Vom Sturz des Hetmans Skoropadskyj bis zum Exil in Polen', Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte, vol.40 (1988), pp.7–228 (here p.53 n.136). The crucial phrase in Mark's statement is, of course, 'from the early summer of 1919 onwards'. The bulk of the pogroms perpetrated by Directory troops took place from the end of 1918 onwards and well into the spring of 1919; hence the period before the early summer of 1919 has always been at the heart of the whole debate.

(1991), pp.542–50. I will be discussing both his earlier essay and the more recent study, focusing on the latter primarily where the emphasis of the book differs from his original statements or the more detailed discussion in the book has clarified his stance.

15. Ibid., p.139.
16. Ibid., p.177.
19. Abramson, *Prayer for the Government*, p.177. On a similar note, Joseph Schechtman quotes the Zionist A. Davidson as saying that the Ukrainian legislation on national and personal 'autonomy is a "historical act"' — that is, an act that exists only for history, which is its entire meaning: the historian will refer to it. See Joseph B. Schechtman, 'Jewish Community Life in the Ukraine (1917–1919)', in Gregor Aronson, Jacob Frumkin, *et al.* (eds.), *Russian Jewry, 1917–1967* (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1969), pp.39–57 (here p.52). That was in January 1918. It is simply baffling just how well this 'historical act' has ultimately come off. That Petliura was not an antisemite, Mark in his 'fine monograph' explains, in an apparently self-evident fashion 'follows from the fact that' the Directory reinstated the Rada's legislation on national and personal autonomy. Mark, 'Symon Petljura', p.52.
21. Ibid., p.550. He also notes, for instance, that 'it does not seem that the Ministry [of Jewish Affairs] had a tremendous impact on the lives of ordinary Jews in Ukraine'. Idem, *Prayer for the Government*, pp.69–70.
25. Ibid., p.xv.
30. Ibid., pp.41, 42. The historiography of the Haskalah has undergone nothing short of a revolution in the last decade or so, signalled most prominently by the startlingly innovative work of Shmuel Feiner, whose path-breaking monographic study has recently been published in an English edition as Haskalah and History: The Emergence of a Modern Jewish Historical Consciousness (Oxford: Littman, 2002). Cf. also Shmuel Feiner and David Sorkin (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Haskalah* (Oxford: Littman, 2001).
31. Yosef Yerushalmi, incidentally, has pointed emphatically at a connotation of the phenomenon at stake here that might ultimately have offered at least as plausible an explanation for the motives guiding Jewish responses to the course of events with which we are dealing; namely, a contention of the fifteenth-century rabbinic scholar Isaac Arama. It was providentially ordained, he had argued in his *Akedat Yitzhak*, that the Jews in their dispersal should be 'the servants of kings and not the servants of servants'. See Yosef H. Yerushalmi, 'Diener von König und nicht Diener von Dienern': Einige Aspekte der politischen Geschichte der Juden (Munich: Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung, 1995). It is not my intention to suggest the application of this paradigm rather than that suggested by Abramson, but rather to indicate that it does seem
profundely debatable just how helpful it really is to want to employ such set pieces taken from religious tradition as guiding paradigms where altogether more sturdy explanations are so readily at hand.

33. Himka, incidentally, was also the (joint) subject editor for History for the three concluding volumes of the Encyclopedia of Ukraine published in 1993: Danylo H. Struk (ed.), Encyclopedia of Ukraine, Vols.3-5 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993). The Encyclopedia contains a number of entries pertaining to matters Jewish. The three concluding volumes are generally rather more even-handed in this respect than the first two, which were published in 1984 and 1988 (ed. Volodymyr Kubijovic), but the care taken to facilitate an academic respectability of sorts without ruffling National Ukrainian sensibilities unduly in the process remains palpable throughout. Crucially, what the Encyclopedia does have to say on matters Jewish is in no way integrated into its general coverage of Ukrainian history. Hence, to point to the two most blatant examples: Zhukovsky’s detailed entry on the ‘Ukrainian–Soviet War, 1917–21’, Encyclopedia, Vol.5, pp.462–4, does not as much as mention the pogromshchina; nor is there any mention of the Jews in Oleksander Ohloblyn’s long entry on Khmelnytsky, Encyclopedia, Vol.2, pp.469–73. (Ohloblyn and Zhukovsky, incidentally, were the subject editors for History for the first two volumes.) Unless one turns specifically to those entries pertaining directly to matters Jewish, one therefore stands a very good chance of perceiving of Ukrainian history as if anti-Jewish violence had played no role in it.

35. Ibid., p.103.
36. This, too, is a tendency as old as the events: Lewitzkyj and Specht included an extra section in their collection on ‘The Pogroms in the Region under Denikinist Occupation’ which consisted of a report that put the number of fatalities in the course of pogroms perpetrated by the Whites at no less than 170,000. Lewitzkyj and Specht, Dokumentensammlung, pp.71–6.
39. Elias Tcherikower characterises Vynnychenko’s recollections as purely ‘apologetic’, ‘polemical’ and aimed at ‘self-justification’, noting that he ‘places the entire responsibility for all the massive crimes on the “atamanschina” and, above all, on Petliura’. For Tcherikower, Vynnychenko’s characterisation of the atamanschina is surely correct, but as far as Vynnychenko’s account of his own behaviour is concerned ‘the insincerity’ is ‘conspicuous’. Elias Tcherikower, Di Ukrainer pogromen i vor 1919 (New York: Yivo, 1965), p.62.
40. Abramson, Prayer for the Government, p.131. The notion that those opposed to, or simply not actively involved in, political antisemitism could aptly be called ‘philosemites’ played a major role in my doctoral research on socialist attitudes to antisemitism and matters Jewish in Imperial Germany. In Germany, at least, the organised political antisemites introduced this term to denounce their opponents and it subsequently became a generally accepted shorthand to denote all those who opposed antisemitism. This usage obviously signifies an equally general acceptance of the assumption that there could, on this matter, be no neutral ground. One could only be either for the Jews or against them. The mechanism by which the Jews were singled out as a distinct group supposedly necessitating this sort of harsh choice in the first place, however, was not debated. Where ‘non-antisemitic’ or ‘anti-antisemitic’ might just as (or, in fact, more) aptly describe the phenomenon in question, the term ‘philosemitism’, should, to my mind, under all circumstances be avoided, and one should keep in mind that where it is used it is more likely than not that this usage is in fact indicative of an attempt to avoid an unambiguous castigation of antisemitism. On this issue see my recent article: Lars Fischer, “Es ist

41. Abramson, ‘Jewish Representation’, p.544 n.10. In the book, Schwartzbard is introduced as ‘a Jew from Bessarabia with a colorful past’. Idem, Prayer for the Government, p.169. Lurking in the background here is not least the issue of Schwartzbard’s association (or not) with mainstream communism and the Soviets. On this matter Abramson chooses his words relatively carefully, stating that ‘research in French archives is confirming the extent of his Communist ties, but Schwartzbard seems to have had a sufficient motive to engineer the murder without any provocation’ (ibid., p.172). Since the suggestion is surely not that Schwartzbard found Petliura’s past insufficiently provocative, ‘provocation’ can in this case presumably be taken to mean orders or instructions issued by a Soviet agency of one sort or another. Apart from the research just mentioned, he then also refers to one of the more fanatical National Ukrainian pronouncements on the issue (cf. below, n.57), slightly distancing himself from it by directing us to Hunczak’s ‘brief mention of the argument’ in his ‘Reappraisal’ as ‘more useful’ (ibid., p.223 n.5). Hunczak’s pronouncements on the matter seem to have varied depending on his audience. Aspiring to the utmost respectability in Jewish Social Studies, he emphasised with great pathos that ‘nowhere in my article did I make the categorical statement that Schwartzbard was a Bolshevik agent’. He had merely stated that Schwartzbard was ‘viewed as an avenger by some, and as a Bolshevik agent or at least a tool of a Communist conspiracy by others’, and presented some of the evidence brought forward in support of the latter claim because it was ‘of such a nature that a historian cannot simply dismiss it’. Hunczak, ‘Communication’, pp.247, 248. Elsewhere, however, he was not so reticent. In a brochure published by the Munich-based Ukrainische Freie Universität to commemorate the centenary of Petliura’s birth, we find a short biographical sketch of Petliura which mentions that he was ‘shot by the Bolshevik agent Schwartzbard, allegedly in revenge for the Jewish pogroms’: see ‘Symon Petliura – Kurzbiographie’, in Symon Petliura: Zum 100. Geburtstag (Munich: Ukrainische Freie Universität, 1979), pp.45-8 (here p.47). Named as the authors of this biographical sketch are ‘Taras Hunczak und R.M.’. None too surprisingly, the relevant contributors to the Encyclopedia (Hunczak among them) also chose their words on the matter relatively carefully. Makuch states that Schwartzbard’s ‘motive, he claimed, was to avenge the Jewish pogroms’, and adds that ‘the prosecution also suggested that Schwartzbard had not acted alone but was part of a conspiracy involving the Soviet authorities,’ without, however, explaining that ‘the prosecution’ was presumably the private prosecution brought by Petliura’s family rather than the official prosecution. A. Makuch, ‘Schwartzbard Trial’, in Encyclopedia, Vol.4, p.556. Hunczak, in his entry on Petliura, speaks of the latter’s ‘assassination by a Bessarabian Jew claiming vengeance for Petliura’s purported responsibility for the pogroms’, Encyclopedia, Vol.3, p.856. Potichnyj, too, incidentally, in his entry on ‘Pogrom’ clarifies that Petliura was ‘assassinated by a Bessarabian Jew’, Encyclopedia, Vol.4, p.69.


44. Abramson, Prayer for the Government, p.172.


47. Abramson, Prayer for the Government, p.172.


52. Ibid., pp.176, 177.


55. Cf. ibid., loc. cit.


57. Ibid., p.164.


60. Ibid., p.129.


63. Ibid., p.241.


75. Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky, ‘The Problem of Ukrainian–Jewish Relations in Nineteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Thought’, in idem, *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, pp.299–313 (here p.299). This article was originally presented as a paper at the McMaster Conference 1983. The only author who, to my knowledge, has ever dared spell out the assumption actually underlying this line of argument and its implications explicitly was Wytwycky, in his entry on ‘Anti-Semitism’, *Encyclopedia*, Vol.2, pp.81–3. One needed to take on board, he argued, the ‘fundamental
distinction ... between hostile acts or sentiments directed at Jews that derive from prejudice ... and such acts or sentiments that derive from other sources (eg, real and significant socio-economic or political conflicts rather than imagined or invented ones). Antisemitism was 'antipathy based on faulty and inflexible generalization'. Hence, 'whereas Nazi attitudes and practices clearly instantiate such antipathy, those of the 17th-century Ukrainian peasant masses do not. Jews were the principal administrators of a system of economic, religious, and national oppression.' The crucial word in this last sentence is, of course, the one that is not there: namely, the definite article at the beginning. Apparently, however, the 'Ukrainian peasant masses' had undertaken a correct and flexible, rather than a 'faulty and inflexible' generalisation. Consequently 'the mass killings of Jews and Poles ... when tens of thousands perished, were prompted by objective conditions of oppression'. The same held true of the Haidamak pogroms in the eighteenth century. As for actual antisemitism, by contrast, 'any attempt to provide an account of A-S in Ukraine must carefully distinguish between genuinely Ukrainian A-S, ie, A-S manifested by Ukrainians, and A-S manifested within Ukraine but either not by Ukrainians or not at their initiative ... One frequently alleged example of Ukrainian A-S,' Wytwycky added, was the pogromshchina. Many seemingly obscure or ambiguous remarks by anglophone National Ukrainian historians tend to take on a perfectly unambiguous and rather disquieting meaning when interpreted in the light of these remarks.

78. Abramson, Prayer for the Government, p.32.
79. Ibid., p.111.
82. Ibid., pp.281–2.
83. Ibid., p.296.
84. Hunczak, 'Communication', p.253
88. Jewish Chronicle, No.2,989 (23 July 1927), pp.19–20; I have found no further corroboration for this report. What clearly speaks for its credibility, however, is the fact that the Jewish Chronicle, despite its highly critical stand vis-à-vis Schwartzbard, reported on this incident in considerable detail and quite obviously nurtured no doubts as to the report being true in this form. It is worth pointing out, in this context, that the critical attitude of the Jewish Chronicle and a number of other Jewish publications and organisations toward Schwartzbard concerned the assassination itself – the means he had resorted to, in other words – and not, as has sometimes been suggested by National Ukrainian historiography and its publicistic sympathisers, the issue of Petliura's responsibility for a substantial share of the pogroms perpetrated in the course of the pogromshchina. The actual edge of this criticism is formulated in an exemplary way in the Jewish Chronicle's 'New Year Supplement' 5686–87, Jewish Chronicle No.2,995 (3 Sept. 1926), p.30: 'The recent assassination of Petlura, the notorious pogrom organiser ... occasioned great interest ... and there has been an unfortunate and ill-advised tendency to glorify the deed as an act of justice.'
89. Yaroslav Bilinsky, 'Methodological Problems and Philosophical Issues in the Study of


91. Ibid., p.376.

92. Ibid., p.376.

93. Ibid., p.375.

94. Ibid., p.386.


99. To suggest parallels between the *pogromshchina* and Ukrainian complicity in the *Shoah* is not, of course, the same as suggesting that the *pogromshchina* and the *Shoah* itself could be considered on a par. One can obviously make the critique directed against anglophone National Ukrainian historiography appear more easily refutable, though, by accusing it of confusing these two notions. Perhaps a particularly interesting instance of this sort of misrepresentation and one that seems to have gone generally unnoticed is Hunczak’s treatment of Hannah Arendt in his infamous ‘Reappraisal’. There he decries as ‘particularly disturbing ... the recent attempt by Hannah Arendt to draw a parallel between the case of Petliura and Adolf Eichmann’. Hunczak, ‘Reappraisal’, p.260. Although ‘usually a fair-minded and careful scholar’, she had ‘grossly overstated the case in an attempt to prove the point’, he notes, ibid., p.260 n.2. Arendt had indeed ‘drawn a parallel’ when discussing the suggestion that it might have been preferable had Eichmann been assassinated in the way Talaat Bey had been for his implication in the genocidal Turkish massacres of Armenians and Petliura had been for his implication in the *pogromshchina*: see Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (London: Penguin, 1994; first edn. 1954), p.265. She had added explicitly, however, that she was outlining these ‘parallels’ precisely in order to emphasise all the more strongly a far more important distinction: ‘I have insisted on the similarities ... because they demonstrate how little Israel, like the Jewish people in general, was prepared to recognize, in the crimes that Eichmann was accused of, an unprecedented crime ... In the eyes of the Jews ... the catastrophe that had befallen them under Hitler ... appeared not as the most recent of crimes, the unprecedented crime of genocide, but, on the contrary, as the oldest crime they knew and remembered’. Ibid., p.267.


102. Ibid., pp.180, 183.


104. Ibid., pp.107–8.


Again, then, our attention is directed to the early summer of 1919, while the mass of pogroms perpetrated by established Directory troops at the end of 1918 and throughout the spring of 1919 do not feature in the argument. See above, n.11.


Adorno, 'Anti-Semitism', p.401.

Pavliuchenkov, 'Jewish Question', p.32. These comrades needed to be 'courageous' because, according to Pavliuchenkov, due to the 'large number of Jewish delegates ... making public discussion of the matter rather awkward' (p.35 n.1), one could not just talk about these things openly, for instance at party congresses.

Ibid., p.34.

Rudnytsky, 'Drahomanov', p.306.

Ibid., pp.283, 284, 287.

Abramson, too, maintains that Dragomanov 'has sometimes been labelled, incorrectly, as an antisemite, but this is clearly the result of a misunderstanding of his thought. A thoroughgoing socialist, Drahomanov deplored the sometimes exploitative economic practices of Ukrainian Jewry, yet as early as 1875 he urged for the preservation and encouragement of their national distinctiveness.' Abramson, Prayer for the Government, p.20.

Rudnytsky, 'Drahomanov', p.290.

Klier, Imperial Russia, pp.214, 215.

Ibid., pp.207, 208.


Koroliv, Simon Petlura, pp.26, 26 n.2, 27.

Ibid., pp.16, 17.


Minc, 'Kiev Zionists', p.256. Abramson more or less dismisses this regulation as 'a matter of parliamentary etiquette', Abramson, Prayer for the Government, p.66.


Minc, 'Kiev Zionists', p.256.

Abramson, 'Jewish Representation', p.547; also p.550: 'The Zionist boycott of the Nationality Council and the later socialist boycott of the Nationalist Secretariat prevented the Jewish political leadership from taking effective measures against the pogroms.'


Ibid., p.85.

Ibid., p.164.

Abramson, 'Jewish Representation', pp.544, 545.


Ibid., p.17.

Cf. Tcherikower, Di ukhainern pogromen, p.42.
139. Ibid., pp.19, 24, 37, 41, 166-7.
140. Arnold Margolin was initially deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs under Petliura and from the spring of 1919 onwards one of the Directory’s most prominent and outspoken representatives abroad, first in Paris, then in London.
144. Lewitzkyj and Specht, *Dokumentensammlung*, pp.64-6.
146. Lewitzkyj and Specht, *Dokumentensammlung*, p.4.
149. One of the *Encyclopedia’s* most remarkable achievements, by the way, is its short entry on Kishinev that does not mention the pogrom. But then, that was, of course, a ‘Russian’ pogrom that had only taken place ‘in Ukraine’. *Encyclopedia*, Vol.2, pp.561-2.
156. Ibid., p.129.
158. Ibid., p.97.