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Whither *pogromshchina* – historiographical synthesis or deconstruction?¹

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This historiographical discussion piece on the implication of Simon Petliura and the Directory in the pogroms during the ill-fated struggle for Ukrainian independence between 1917 and 1920 focuses on four core issues. Firstly, it suggests that those committed to the current Ukrainian nation-building agenda face a crucial paradox: for the Directory's endeavours to qualify as a precedent in nation building, one has to talk up its ability to influence the developments in the territory under its control. Yet to get Petliura and the Directory off the hook as far as the pogroms are concerned, one has to talk down their ability to influence those same developments. Secondly, it fundamentally questions the juxtaposition of "Ukrainian" and "Jewish" approaches on which Henry Abramson's claim to have achieved a new synthesis between these two positions hinges. Thirdly, it demonstrates just how crucial conceptual transparency is for any useful debate on the significance of antisemitism in this context. Finally, it revisits the contention that it is *a priori* implausible to hold Petliura and his colleagues responsible because their attitudes towards Jews were generally positive as demonstrated not least by their commitment to Jewish autonomy rights.

Keywords: pogroms; pogromshchina; antisemitism; Petliura; Directory; Ukraine; nation building; historiography

It is somewhat disconcerting that it should have taken an Orange Revolution and the accession of a "pro-Western" government in Ukraine to complete the rehabilitation of Simon Petliura (1879–1926), the most prominent leader of the ill-fated struggle for Ukrainian independence between 1917 and 1920. Uncritical reverence for Petliura as a national hero has become official state policy in Ukraine and is proudly flaunted on the international stage too. During a visit to France in November 2005, for instance, President Yushchenko and his wife, along with other members of the delegation accompanying him, "laid flowers at the grave of Ukraine's outstanding statesman and political figure Simon Petliura" and "held a minute of silence to pay the tribute of homage to the outstanding Ukrainian statesman."² In May 2006, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Borys Tarasyuk, while in Paris to attend the plenary session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, "kicked off the colloquium 'Symon Petliura personality's modern perception,' which was dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the Ukrainian People's Republic Chairperson's assassination." On this occasion he "drew the attendants' attention to the Ukrainian President's decree, in accordance with which Symon Petliura will be commemorated on the national level for the first time."³ To be sure, the 1990s already saw a far-reaching rehabilitation of Petliura and the short-lived Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) at whose helm he stood, as was illustrated dramatically by the commemoration of the seventieth anniversary of Petliura's assassination in Kiev in 1996.⁴

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Even so, the uncritical appropriation of Petliura's legacy has clearly gathered pace under the new regime and it is certainly no longer the preserve of most of the organised Ukrainian diaspora.⁵

Petliura's rehabilitation is, of course, inextricably linked to the ongoing project of Ukrainian nation building. And nation building is a process that follows its own rules. It inevitably privileges certain options over others and places conceptual constraints on its proponents. This is not a matter of arbitrary or wilful choice. To function as cohesive and dynamic entities, nation states need national identities. The nation state is not a mere vessel. It is not just an organisational form without specific content. It can occasionally be established without a clearly defined national identity already being in existence, but it certainly cannot persist without one. Crucially, nationalism, as John Breuilly has put it, "perhaps more than any other ideological politics, requires historical legitimation."⁶ Hence the response of a Ukrainian scholar that Mark von Hagen paraphrased at the beginning of his much-cited discussion piece "Does Ukraine Have a History?": "if Ukraine has a future, then Ukraine will have a history."⁷ From the academic historian's point of view, this may seem like something of a misnomer, of course, since the prevalent sense of national history is often strongly mythical in character and may well be radically at odds with the actual historical track record, but this is a point I will return to later.

The more firmly established a nation state is, the more the central tenets of the sense of national identity on which it draws tend to go without saying. A relatively stable consensus on the core of that identity allows for some degree of continuous gradual adaptation to changing circumstances. This consensus will even accommodate a smattering of diversity around the edges and tends to be resilient enough to take on and integrate occasional critical challenges to some of the myths on which the established sense of national history relies. Yet "for the inhabitants of polities which have had repeated interruptions and transformations in their existence, both territorially and politically, where ethnicity only partially corresponds to nationality or territorial boundaries, even the luxury of an apparently neutral attitude to the remote past is a rather expensive one."⁸ None too surprisingly, then, in newly established nation states and even more so among national movements who (as yet only) aspire to the constitution of a nation state of their own, issues of national identity and challenges to the evolving sense of historical legitimacy that underpin it tend to be dealt with in an altogether more obsessive and defensive manner.⁹

In this context it is hard to imagine a historical issue more integral and sacrosanct (and therefore neuralgic) than (ostensible) previous attempts at practical nation building. That historical accounts of nation building are often largely mythical in nature does not mean that they do not require the occasional hook on which to hang those myths. Some nation states and national movements have easier recourse to such hooks than others. Needless to say, how choosy one can be in one's identification with historical episodes that might be suited to serve as precedents in the field of nation building depends not least on how many such episodes there actually are.

Which brings us back to contemporary Ukraine which, as von Hagen pointed out, "is a very modern creation, with little firmly established precedent in the national past."¹⁰ One might well argue, Andreas Kappeler has indeed suggested, that today's Ukraine in fact owes its statehood to Lenin and Stalin and is best understood not in terms of earlier nation building attempts but as a successor state to the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic.¹¹ Serhii Plokhyy, in his contribution to the 1995 debate initiated by von Hagen, similarly emphasised that "the majority of the population who voted for independence clearly associate themselves not with the nationalist movement or the independent Ukrainian governments of 1917–1920, but with the heritage of Soviet Ukraine. To integrate these two histories ... appears to be a difficult

but probably not an impossible task.”¹² Yet these remarks were, of course, all made before the Orange Revolution which, as Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, among others, has emphasised, “triggered the awakening of the nation” and “fostered the birth of a new self-awareness of nationhood ... the ramifications of which [it] is difficult to overestimate.”¹³ In any case, whatever the nuances and emphases, the fact remains that prior to 1991, “with the exception of the short-lived Ukrainian People’s Republic (1917–1920), a Ukrainian state has not existed in European history.”¹⁴ This obviously places an immense burden of legitimacy on this short-lived and ill-fated exercise in practical nation building.

Yet in a whole variety of ways, the legacy of this episode is tricky, and that is putting it mildly. Not least, this rare exercise in practical Ukrainian nation building also provided the setting for an unprecedented wave of pogroms in which, by Nahum Gergel’s conservative estimates, somewhere between 50,000 and 60,000 Jews were murdered.¹⁵ In short, we are looking here at the most extensive mass killings of Jews in modern history prior to the Shoah. The bulk of these pogroms took place in 1919 and a very substantial share of them were perpetrated by military units that were (at least nominally) under the command of the Ukrainian government of the day, the Directory. Gergel was able to examine relatively detailed data covering more than 1200 pogroms. Of these over 900 took place in 1919, costing the lives of some 31,000 Jews. He concluded that Directory troops were responsible for 40% of these pogroms and 53.7% of these killings.¹⁶ On top of this, a substantial number of pogroms were perpetrated by independent armed groups allied to the Directory. Petliura not only chaired the Directory at the time, he was also the commander-in-chief of the UNR’s army. At the very least, then, these pogroms took place on his watch. None too surprisingly, historians sympathetic to the Ukrainian national cause have had considerable difficulties in integrating these mass killings into their account of the Directory’s endeavours.¹⁷ To what extent Petliura and the Directory should (or should not) be held responsible for these pogroms is an issue that has given rise to much controversy and polemic.

As is well known, Petliura was assassinated in Paris in 1926 by a Jewish activist, Sholom Schwartzbard (1886–1938), who stated that he had killed Petliura to hold him accountable for the pogroms. Schwartzbard remained at the scene to let himself be arrested and was subsequently acquitted.¹⁸ Many supporters of the Ukrainian national cause have found this hard to stomach. For them, Petliura’s assassination made him a martyr for the Ukrainian cause. As for Schwartzbard, he was not only wrong to assume that Petliura was responsible for the pogroms, the issue was in fact never more than a pretext for him in the first place, so the remarkably widespread argument goes. The standard formulations that used to be a preserve of staunchly National Ukrainian authors but are now recurring with increasing frequency in mainstream scholarship suggest that Schwartzbard “claimed” or “alleged” that his motive had been to avenge the pogroms.¹⁹

Given that these pogroms occurred on the Directory’s watch and given the massive implication of Directory troops, one might be forgiven for assuming that uncritical recourse to this particular exercise in practical nation building is out of the question. And yet it is just this sort of uncritical recourse that is now the prevailing trend both in Ukraine itself and throughout the Ukrainian diaspora. The situation is complicated, of course, by the emergence, in Ukraine itself, of what Petrovsky-Shtern has characterised as “revisionist” historiography, in other words, a tendency to “rewrite the entire history of Jews in Ukraine” from a “new, positive perspective” that depicts Ukrainian–Jewish relations as consistently “positive and mutually beneficial.”²⁰ These historians too “tend to acquit Ukraine retroactively of guilt for harm caused to Ukrainian Jews.”²¹ Yet they do so, if I understand it correctly, in an attempt to conjure up historical precedent and thus legitimacy for better Jewish/non-Jewish relations in future. The good intentions do not, of course, make this

strategy any less troubling. It is a strange misapprehension that a group of people who have a fairly sturdy track record of regularly taking choice (a) could somehow be persuaded to take choice (b) instead by telling them that they have actually had a predilection for choice (b) all along and were only ever manipulated by some inexplicable fluke into falsely imagining they preferred choice (a) in the past. In acknowledging the primacy of historical precedent as a source of legitimacy this strategy can only ever cement the status quo. What makes the right thing right is surely that it is right, not that it is what one has always done. The fact that one may have failed to do the right thing in the past not only does not invalidate the goal of doing so in future; it is not least the negative experiences of the past that allow us to recognise the need for change. It is, therefore, an illusion to assume we could do anything other than trip ourselves up by pretending the problems of the past never existed.

The obvious first port of call for Western scholars interested in the *pogromshchina* is Henry Abramson's monograph, *A Prayer for the Government* (1999). It was, for the most part, well received and not least for lack of any genuine alternative it is now very much the standard account of the issues at hand. Abramson has placed his own work in this area squarely within the context of what he identifies as a "trend of synthesizing Ukrainian and Jewish historiography of the revolutionary years."²² In an earlier critique of his work which led to a fairly heated exchange between us, I suggested that the synthesis he claims to have achieved in fact simply replicates much of the approach traditionally taken by those historians sympathetic to the Ukrainian national cause.²³ I obviously do not want to re-visit the issues raised on that occasion in any great detail. Here I want to take a different approach. I will first review (and qualify) several areas of agreement between Abramson and myself. Then, rather than focusing on issues of detail, I want to throw some of the absolutely fundamental conceptual issues more sharply into relief that still set Abramson and myself apart because I think it is they that need to be addressed if we genuinely want to move the debate forward. At the risk of over-simplifying matters slightly, it is perhaps fair to say that I would now be more prepared to acknowledge the extent to which Abramson has indeed succeeded in creating a historiographical synthesis. But I would add that it is precisely the desire to synthesise rather than radically deconstruct the existing paradigms that is in fact the problem.

To begin with a point I may have failed to make sufficiently clear the last time round: to the best of my recollection I did not, and I certainly do not, assume that Petliura instigated or organised the pogroms perpetrated by the troops under his command. To some this may seem a major concession. Yet the very term *pogromshchina* would surely be a misnomer had these pogroms in fact been part of a state-driven campaign of systematic anti-Jewish violence. It is worth recalling at this juncture just how dramatically the scholarly consensus on the nature and dynamics of pogroms has shifted over the last two or three decades, in no small part as a result of John's work in this field. The notion that pogroms are state or authority-driven top-down phenomena has lost all credibility. In many ways, of course, this shift is not least a reflection of the rather more sophisticated understanding of the nature of power relations and the interaction between regimes and societies in general that has evolved in the social and historical sciences in the course of those same two or three decades. As a general rule, then, scholars are now more inclined to think of pogroms as bottom-up initiatives that are predominantly spontaneous in origin and consequently rarely underpinned, at least in the first instance, by a clearly formulated form of fully fledged ideological antisemitism. To put it bluntly: we need to think of the Directory troops implicated in the pogroms not as instruments of the state but as (mainly) peasants in uniform. For our discussion here, this raises two important issues. The first important observation is that it is surely hardly surprising that at a time when scholars were inclined to interpret *all* pogroms

from a top-down perspective this interpretative scheme was *also* applied to the *pogromshchina*. Nor, conversely, is the insight that this paradigm cannot genuinely explain the nature and dynamics of pogroms in any way specific to this particular context. The top-down and bottom-up paradigms, in other words, cannot be juxtaposed as though they corresponded to the “Jewish” vs. “Ukrainian” version of events respectively. (The notion that the crucial controversies regarding the *pogromshchina* can usefully be categorised in terms of a divide between “Ukrainian” and “Jewish” historiography strikes me as being highly problematic anyway, as I will explain in a moment.) The second point worth reiterating is that the fact that these pogroms were not state-driven and not fuelled by some form of fully fledged ideological antisemitism makes them not unlike most other pogroms but just like them.

Secondly, as far as Petliura and his colleagues in the Directory are concerned, I agree that Abramson’s distinction between responsibility and accountability is, or at least could be, meaningful. Petliura did not instigate or organise these pogroms but the troops that perpetrated them were under his command and they transpired on his watch. This clearly makes him accountable though not in an immediate sense of the word responsible. I have two reservations, though. My first concern is that we need to be sure that accountability actually means something and is not merely a cop-out or the thin end of the wedge. That Petliura and his colleagues were “merely” accountable but not directly responsible for the pogroms surely cannot mean there is no charge to answer. Yet the uncritical appropriation of Petliura’s legacy that I referred to at the outset would seem to suggest just that.

My second concern in this respect springs from the fact that I am still not entirely convinced that Petliura’s implication in the pogroms lies exclusively in his failure to step in energetically enough. Pogroms are, as a general rule, bottom-up rather than top-down phenomena but they nevertheless function against the backdrop of a complex interaction of bottom-up and top-down dynamics. That Petliura and his colleagues did not initiate the pogroms does not rule out that they may have contributed to the creation of a political climate that led the pogromists to believe they could act with impunity or that the Directory’s opposition to the pogroms was based on a different interpretation of a shared political agenda rather than a different political agenda altogether. Why, if Petliura and the Directory felt as singularly positive about the Jews as much of the National Ukrainian historiography suggests, was it not evident to the pogromists that their actions were fundamentally antagonistic to everything the Directory stood for? Conversely, if they did realise this but just did not care, then what, if any, power-base did the Directory actually have?

This brings me to a third area of agreement with Abramson. Petliura’s attempts to contain the pogroms, such as they were, only gathered pace after the pogromist activities of the troops under his command had already ebbed off anyway.²⁴ To state, as Rudolf Mark does in his well-received²⁵ monograph on Petliura and the Directory, that Petliura “did all he could” to counter the pogroms “from the early summer of 1919 onwards at the latest”²⁶ is thus doubly ambiguous. It not only confirms that Petliura only stepped in when the worst was already over or, to put it slightly differently, when the responsibility for the pogroms that continued to occur no longer lay with the troops under his command and opposition to the pogroms thus ceased to be primarily a matter of self-criticism and instead became a means of denouncing the Directory’s enemies. To suggest that Petliura “did all he could” also begs the question, of course, of what he could reasonably have been expected to do. Whatever Petliura’s subjective motives and sensibilities at this point may have been, the simple truth of the matter is that Petliura did “all he could” without alienating the few troops still at his command and thus precipitating the demise of the UNR. As far as I can see this is fairly uncontroversial. What nobody seems to be willing to spell out, though, is what this actually means. To put it bluntly: Petliura’s course of action was predicated on the

assumption that the survival of the UNR weighed more heavily at this juncture than the lives of the Jews murdered by the troops under his command. For better or for worse, those who want to utilise Petliura's legacy as a precedent in nation building have to live with this choice.

There is, of course, a fundamental paradox lurking in the background here. For the Directory's endeavours to qualify as a proper precedent in practical nation building, one has to talk up its ability to influence the developments in the territory under its control. To get Petliura and the Directory off the hook as far as their responsibility for the pogroms is concerned, one has to talk down their ability to influence those same developments. For Abramson this problem does not arise. Because he is not bound to the nation-building agenda he is at liberty to predicate his argument on the notion of a "critical distinction between the leaders and the led."²⁷ The leaders meant well but were "betrayed by less enlightened attitudes among the general population."²⁸ Yet if that was the case, then who or what exactly was "Ukraine" in 1919? What claim to "national" legitimacy can be made for the Directory's endeavours if its political vision barely held sway beyond the room (or railway carriage) in which it convened? That the Directory's army was in meltdown in the spring of 1919 and that it was often the "worst elements" among the former volunteers who were left and then perpetrated the pogroms may be true and may help to make the Directory look less accountable for the pogroms. Yet turned on to its feet this same claim also means, of course, that in the spring of 1919 the only people the Directory could still get to fight its corner were exactly these "worst elements." At best, one might be able to base on this state of affairs the claim that Petliura's legacy provides a positive precedent *despite* the attempt at practical nation building he led, but certainly not because of it. Short of pretending that the whole thing never happened or was simply not significant, which does seem to be emerging as the preferred stance, the proponents of the nation-building approach really only have two genuinely viable options. They can either minimise the Directory's accountability for the pogroms but in so doing they minimise the grounds on which the Directory's endeavours could reasonably qualify as a precedent in practical nation building. If, on the other hand, they want to salvage the nation-building precedent, they have to genuinely acknowledge and critically confront the actual degree of responsibility and accountability of various parts of Ukrainian society for the *pogromshchina*.

A final area of agreement between Abramson and myself that I would like to highlight concerns the nature of anglophone National Ukrainian historiography. In his rejoinder to my earlier critique, Abramson stated that one of my contentions was "that Ukrainian nationalist historiography in English wants to ignore (or at least minimise) the role of Petliura and the Directory in the pogroms." He then added that this "is an over-generalization, but basically true of older historiography."²⁹ While we continue to disagree on the extent to which this may or may not have changed more recently, then, the fact that the desire to sidestep the *pogromshchina* has been characteristic of much of National Ukrainian historiography is undisputed.

We might note in passing that Petrovsky-Shtern has presented a broadly similar picture. He frames his approach to the issue of "Jews in Ukrainian Thought" by juxtaposing two fundamental paradigms, the "national-chauvinistic" and the "national-democratic."³⁰ The latter is obviously the one more conducive to a constructive approach to the issue of Jewish/non-Jewish relations. According to Petrovsky-Shtern, the "national-democratic" paradigm only became a significant feature of discourse within the Ukrainian diaspora from the 1960s onwards. Rather startlingly, to my mind, among the pioneers of this trend he singles out, *inter alia*, Taras Hunczak and Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky.³¹ I have addressed the work of both these scholars in some detail in my previous discussion of the *pogromshchina*. Without

wanting to tar the two of them with the same brush, I would still argue that as far as our particular issue is concerned they are both clearly part of the problem rather than the solution. Yet while Petrovsky-Shtern's assessment and mine may diverge rather dramatically at this particular juncture, Petrovsky-Shtern's assessment nevertheless confirms a virtual monopoly of the "national-chauvinistic" paradigm prior to the 1960s. Moreover, the suggestion that Hunczak's position should have amounted to a "national-democratic" challenge to the "national-chauvinistic" orthodoxy surely indicates just how chauvinistic that orthodoxy must have been. Petrovsky-Shtern has in any case taken care to point out that "the rapprochement between Ukrainians and Jews in the second half of the 20th century," in Soviet and post-Soviet Ukraine and the diaspora alike, was only ever "the cause of the few, not the many."³²

That the desire to "ignore (or at least minimise)" the implication of Petliura and the Directory in the *pogromshchina*, and the "national-chauvinistic" paradigm more generally of which this approach is part and parcel, have had a dominant formative influence on National Ukrainian historiography in the diaspora, then, is undisputed even by scholars whose assessment of National Ukrainian historiography as a whole is considerably more optimistic than mine. The question therefore arises, how the agenda and paradigms shaped by these dominant formative influences can genuinely be transcended. The second contention Abramson credited me with in his rejoinder to my earlier critique was that I considered him an "apologist for the Ukrainian cause."³³ This was a misunderstanding on Abramson's part. My criticism was (and is) that his approach fairly consistently privileges and perpetuates the paradigms that traditionally constitute the National Ukrainian approach. Just what his motives in doing so might have been was a question I found genuinely perplexing. With hindsight, it seems evident to me that Abramson's work gravitates towards the paradigms of the National Ukrainian approach more by accident than design and primarily for methodological reasons.

To clarify this point I need to explain my understanding of some of the basics of the historian's trade. Arguably, of course, the juxtaposition of national history and scholarly historiography that I suggested at the outset is in some respects rather disingenuous. All historians are profoundly formed by the myths and expectations prevalent in the societies they come from or identify with and it would be patently absurd to suggest that scholars of history, uniquely, come to the historical facts with an innocent and objective mind while everybody around them is only out to pick and mix what suits them best. Historians thus have to reflect upon the ways in which the various formative influences that have made them who they are have the potential, for better or for worse, to shape their portrayal and interpretation of the historical contexts they study. Such influences may skewer the historian's perspective in some respects, but they may also endow historians with particular sensitivities that allow them to tickle out specific nuances to which others are quite oblivious.

That there can be no absolute form of objectivity does not imply that historians cannot establish a compelling degree of plausibility for the superiority of one account over another. Yet this degree of plausibility can only be gauged and judged, of course, if historians make their criteria transparent. No credible historian would seriously question the need to account for the ways in which the agendas and likely biases of the historical protagonists and chroniclers have shaped the available source material. This goes without saying. How, then, could the historians' own agendas and likely biases conceivably be exempt from this critical scrutiny?

Provided this self-scrutiny takes place, there is no reason why the accounts of historians who come to a historical topic with a highly partisan agenda, even when it goes to the heart

of the very issue at hand, should be any less valid than those of historians whom we might consider more “objective” because they have no immediately discernible stake in the matter. Quite the opposite in fact: the plausibility of an account given by a historian who does share her reflections on the way in which her partisanship has influenced the approach she has taken may well be far easier to gauge than that of an account whose author considers her even-handedness to go without saying. Either way, it is lack of critical self-reflection and transparency that creates the real problems with the reliability of any historical account, be it avowedly partisan or seemingly detached.

The bulk of the scholarly literature sympathetic to the Ukrainian national cause in general and the Ukrainian national movement’s endeavours between 1917 and 1920 in particular that deals with the *pogromshchina* or the historical record of Jewish/non-Jewish relations in the relevant region more generally has been partisan without showing any such critical self-reflection. It is this body of literature that I mean when I refer to National Ukrainian historiography. What concerns me is the analytical and interpretative approach that characterises this literature. I am just as interested in, and critical of, this approach when it is taken by historians who are not themselves in any way of Ukrainian extraction or descent. Nor do I assume that all Ukrainians invariably think in the same way about the issues at hand. In the course of our earlier, rather heated exchange, Abramson asked with some exasperation: “why is it wrong to agree, even occasionally or sporadically, with Ukrainians? What is wrong with the Ukrainians?”³⁴ Needless to say, these two questions were predicated on a misunderstanding, a misunderstanding that indicates a fundamental contrast between our methodological approaches that will become clearer as I continue my discussion.

If the term “Ukrainian historiography” thus fails to frame the issue in quite the right way, the notion that this “Ukrainian historiography” finds its self-evident counterpoint in the form of “Jewish historiography” is even more problematic. In this context “Jewish historiography” is really little more than a blanket term tarring all approaches that do not conform to the approach of National Ukrainian historiography with one brush. For rather obvious reasons, a very large proportion of the scholars in question have been Jewish in some sense of the word, mainly because others simply have not cared enough. If they did care, I suspect that the majority of non-Jewish historians would incline spontaneously towards the so-called “Jewish” perspective on the course of events. Now, to be sure, the horrors of the *pogromshchina* resonate well both with the Zionist (or territorialist) notion that Jewry has no viable future in the diaspora and with the sort of lachrymose approach to Jewish history more generally that is still very much dominant outside the realms of academe. In this sense, perceptions of Jewish identity can, of course, exert some influence on the approach Jewish historians might take to the *pogromshchina* and this is worth exploring if and where it occurs. Yet when all is said done, there is surely nothing specifically “Jewish” about the notion that these horrendous mass killings raise some extremely serious questions that ultimately need to be answered before positive recourse of any kind to the Directory’s endeavours can seem legitimate. (My emphasis on this issue is itself, of course, a clear reflection of my own agenda: coming from a non-Jewish German background, probably the single most important factor in making me both the person and the historian I am is a profound sense of unease at the selective and, for the most part, evasive and disingenuous way in which post-war German society has (failed to) confront(ed) the Shoah.)

In short, I would suggest that the very juxtaposition of “Ukrainian” and “Jewish” historiography in the form in which it provides the frame of reference for Abramson’s work is not only an over-simplification; it in fact already presupposes the validity of some of the paradigms that we would need to transcend in order to genuinely move the debate forward.

Abramson's suggestion that I am "writing precisely the kind of 'we say, they say' historiography that we need to move beyond"³⁵ and thus taking the argument "back to the unproductive arena of competing national claims"³⁶ clearly demonstrates his failure to recognise this. In this sense Abramson's decision to opt for synthesis rather than radical deconstruction inevitably generates an inbuilt propensity to privilege the existing paradigms in general and the National Ukrainian one as the more developed and cohesive of the existing paradigms in particular.

In his rejoinder to my critique, Abramson explained very clearly how he had proceeded. He took a careful look at the two dominant historiographical approaches and then went to the archives to check their validity. "On occasion, based on the evidence I was able to uncover, I found the Ukrainian argument more convincing, on occasion the Jewish account was superior; and, on occasion, I offered a new interpretation that would satisfy neither national historiography but seemed best to correspond to the documentation available."³⁷ To be sure, *prima facie* this sounds plausible enough but there is a snare. Needless to say, we are confronted here with the perennial controversy as to what archival material can (and cannot) tell us and how it can (and cannot) do so. Abramson obviously inclines towards the notion that archival material can resolve interpretative controversies by ultimately providing direct and immediate access to historical reality itself. While it would be silly to deny that archival sources can help clear up various questions, I nevertheless consider it self-evident that the process of making sense of archival material is itself one of interpretation. Whether the information (seemingly) provided by particular items of archival material is reliable or representative is something we can only judge based on contextual information external to the material itself. Indeed, without the relevant contextual information, one may misinterpret even what a document actually says at face value (quite irrespective of whether one can take it at face value anyway).

Needless to say, it is by no means my intention to doubt Abramson's expertise in handling the relevant documents on their own terms, let alone am I suggesting that he would ever intentionally manipulate sources to serve a particular agenda. The problem lies elsewhere. Abramson's approach is characterised by an inbuilt bias towards the existing interpretative schemes and a tendency to abandon these only where they absolutely fail to provide a satisfactory means of making sense of a particular phenomenon or development. In terms of the archival evidence, this obviously means that all the documents that one *can* conceivably (but need not necessarily) make sense of in accordance with either of the two existing interpretative schemes automatically will be interpreted in this vein without the possibility of an alternative, perhaps radically different approach ever really being taken into consideration, let alone receiving a fair hearing. Consequently, large parts of the whole exercise turn into something of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Of course new and previously unseen primary source material occasionally rubs our face in something entirely unexpected. For the most part, though, the ability of historians to offer a novel and more plausible reading of a particular historical context hinges on their ability to take a genuinely fresh look at the already familiar. Yet looking at the already familiar they will only ever see something new if they have genuinely scrutinised, as best they can, all the existing conceptual constraints (including their own). Not that they necessarily need to abandon all the existing interpretative schemes, far from it, but they obviously do need to be sure that they have fully understood their dynamics and implications, their strengths and weaknesses, potential and limitations, and that they have made conscious choices to (partially) maintain or abandon them based on this knowledge. It is where established interpretative patterns work their magic (or sorcery) not as a result of conscious choices of this kind but by default that the problems arise. My critique of the

extent to which Abramson perpetuates certain problematic tenets of the National Ukrainian approach to the *pogromshchina* hinges not on some peculiar notion that it is somehow inherently wrong to agree with Ukrainians, a contention that would indeed be absurd and indefensible. What my critique is trying to highlight is the extent to which the perpetuation of these tenets undermines Abramson's attempt to move the debate forward and has the potential to generate problematic implications that may well be unintentional but nevertheless need to be addressed.

I come to this topic primarily as a historian of antisemitism with immediate expertise in the area of Jewish/non-Jewish relations in the later modern German context and I want to use the remainder of this article to discuss some fundamental conceptual implications for our discussion here that arise from the way we approach and understand the phenomenon of antisemitism. My concern here is not whether certain definitions of antisemitism are "right" or "wrong" or better suited than others. Instead I want to illustrate, firstly, just how critically important transparency about criteria is in this respect. I then want to conclude by touching on a line of argument that has been central to the National Ukrainian approach and features prominently in Abramson's account too. This line of argument contends that it is *a priori* implausible to suggest any sort of implication in the *pogromshchina* on the part of Petliura and his colleagues for two closely related reasons. Firstly, their attitudes towards Jews were generally positive. Secondly, this was demonstrated not least by their enthusiasm for autonomism and their willingness to institutionalise the rights of the national minorities, including the Jews.

I mentioned earlier that one of the points Abramson and I agree upon is that fully-fledged ideological antisemitism was not an important factor in driving the *pogromshchina* (nor, of course, is this surprising since pogroms rarely are motivated in this way). As soon as the focus widens to the issue of Jewish/non-Jewish relations in our context more generally, though, matters become rather trickier. For there is more to Abramson's claim that "it would be a mistake ... to regard Ukrainian antagonism to Jews as a form of ... highly developed antisemitic ideology" than meets the eye. Abramson does not discuss this issue at length in the book but refers his readers to an earlier discussion in a journal article.³⁸ On the issue of antisemitism in general he refers the readers of his book to (in this order) Rosemary Ruether, Jacob Katz, and Gavin Langmuir.³⁹ Hence, unless they actually take a look at Abramson's earlier article, it will be in no way obvious to the readers of the book that Abramson's assumptions as to what does and does not constitute antisemitism are predicated on a very specific reading of Langmuir's approach. Yet without knowing this, how are Abramson's readers to make sense of, and judge, his claims regarding the significance (or otherwise) of antisemitism in this context?

Abramson has been emphatic throughout in his assertion that "the Ukrainian–Jewish conflict is in its essence a normal conflict between socio-economic groups."⁴⁰ Antisemitism, in short, does not come into it. As he explains in the earlier article, he has adopted what he calls "the Langmuir model of antisemitism." This model distinguishes between three distinct phenomena. Firstly, there are "'realistic' negative assertions about members of an outgroup" that "are based on well-established empirical criteria." Secondly, there are "'xenophobic' negative assertions" that are based on "an improper generalization from insufficient or faulty data." Thirdly, there are "chimerical negative assertions ... based on absurd premises with absolutely no foundation in reality." One should only speak of antisemitism if the latter (i.e. "chimerical" assertions) are applied to Jews and keep in mind that "Jews are also the victims of realistic and xenophobic assertions." To reiterate the point, Abramson then cites another passage by Langmuir in which he emphasises that Jews have been the object not only of antisemitism but also of "'all the more usual kinds of hostility that have been

directed at other major groups, especially enduring ethnic groups that competed for scarce resources.”⁴¹

To Abramson’s mind, “for the most part, the Ukrainian–Jewish conflict in the modern era is one of the ‘more usual kinds of hostility’”⁴² He goes on to apply this model to the mass killings of Jews during the Cossack and Haidamak uprisings of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the *pogromshchina*, and Ukrainian collaboration in the Shoah. His conclusions are, firstly, that in all these cases Jews were not killed because they were Jews but because they were identified with some other enemy. The anti-Jewish violence, in other words, was “epiphenomenal to the central aspects of the conflict.”⁴³ Secondly, it was xenophobic in nature, not antisemitic.⁴⁴ In other words, this violence was motivated by “an improper generalization from insufficient or faulty data” and not predicated on “absurd premises with absolutely no foundation in reality.” What Abramson does not claim, however, and this is a crucial point, is that any of this violence was motivated by attitudes of the “realistic” kind that originate in “well-established empirical criteria.”

As anybody familiar with Langmuir’s work will know, his definition of antisemitism is an extraordinarily narrow one. Indeed, Langmuir clearly states his contention that we would be better off without the term altogether. For our purposes, whether one is inclined to agree with his approach is ultimately neither here nor there. The point is that Abramson’s readers obviously need to be very much aware of at least two things. Firstly, they need to know that Abramson’s claims regarding the role that antisemitism did and did not play in this context are predicated on the notion that only anti-Jewish sentiments and practices of the “chimerical” kind count as antisemitism. It is surely not unreasonable to assume that quite a few people would consider negative attitudes towards Jews based on “an improper generalization from insufficient or faulty data” to be very much antisemitic, all the more so if these attitudes translate into anti-Jewish violence. In other words, where Abramson uses the term “xenophobic” they would use the term “antisemitic” and from their point of view Abramson’s contention that antisemitism played no role in fact means that antisemitism did play a role, and a crucial one at that.

Secondly, Abramson’s readers need to know that for him xenophobic violence and sentiments and practices born of “an improper generalization from insufficient or faulty data” lie not beyond but within the sphere defined by the categories “normal conflict” and “more usual kinds of hostility.” This holds true even for “Ukrainian participation in the Holocaust” which, as he sees it, “may be understood as a continuation of this xenophobic assertion to genocidal ends.”⁴⁵ To put it differently, when Abramson calls “the Ukrainian–Jewish conflict” a “normal conflict” characterised by “more usual kinds of hostility” he does *not* mean that it hinges on attitudes of the “realistic” kind that originate in “well-established empirical criteria.”

I would be fairly surprised if all that many readers of Abramson’s book picked up on this. This is all the more problematic, given that National Ukrainian historiography has a long-standing tradition of arguing along similar lines with the fine but crucial difference that many of its leading proponents clearly do think that the attitudes that Abramson classifies as xenophobic are in fact of the realistic kind. Neither Hunczak nor Himka, to name but two, draw the slightest distinction in this respect. For Hunczak, the question of whether anti-Jewish sentiment *results from* “historical, social, economic, and political sources”⁴⁶ or actually *consists of* “deep-seated historical socio-economic animosities”⁴⁷ is neither here nor there. Himka, similarly, simply uses the concepts “socioeconomically motivated resentment”⁴⁸ and “socioeconomic antagonism”⁴⁹ interchangeably. Now, there is no doubt that Abramson does draw a distinction where the likes of Hunczak and Himka do not. It seems to me, though, that this distinction needs to be stressed rather more emphatically. I very

much doubt that anybody subscribing to the National Ukrainian scheme of things who reads Abramson's book would register that in calling the motives behind anti-Jewish violence in Ukraine "normal" he means that they were "xenophobic," not that they were "realistic." I am not sure, incidentally, how much comfort it might conceivably offer from the nation-building point of view to have blotted one's copybook "only" with xenophobic rather than antisemitic mass killings on a horrendous scale but this is not, of course, Abramson's concern.

As far as the attitudes of Petliura and his colleagues towards Jews are concerned, it is really quite remarkable just how little we actually know about these attitudes. Arnold Davidovich Margolin (1877–1956), the erstwhile deputy foreign minister of the UNR and one of its leading diplomats, has a controversial track record of putting a positive spin on the Directory's dealings with the *pogromshchina* both at the time and later. Discussing the Directory's initial "indiscretions and hesitations" and the stance of Petliura and his predecessor as chair of the Directory, Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880–1951), Margolin suggested in their defence that "one should judge the whole person, not a single careless phrase."⁵⁰ Margolin's point was not that one should simply disregard occasional anti-Jewish remarks by public figures who displayed admirable qualities in other respects, which would obviously be a rather problematic suggestion. What he meant was that these indiscretions did not match the more positive attitudes towards Jews that these two in particular displayed on other occasions. Yet the argument cuts both ways, of course, and one might equally well point out that "one should judge the whole person, not a single *felicitous* phrase."

To date neither those who claim that Petliura's attitudes towards Jews were beyond reproach (or indeed highly positive) nor those who consider him an antisemite have, as far as I can see, based their contentions on more than in/felicitous "single phrases" plucked from disparate contexts and anecdotal evidence. It would be highly desirable, and certainly an absolute prerequisite for any line of argument that lends substantial weight to the personal attitudes of Petliura and his peers in assessing the Directory's role in the *pogromshchina*, to contextualise these "single phrases" in a manner that would allow us to understand what they really thought about the Jews and their likely future in Ukraine.

This is a complex issue that cannot usefully be reduced to the seemingly straightforward question of whether or not the likes of Vynnychenko and Petliura were antisemites. If, in keeping with the conventions prevalent at the time, we reserve the label "antisemitic" exclusively for those who expressly held "the Jews" responsible for all that was wrong with society and who categorically opposed Jewish emancipation or integration in any shape, size, or form and were determined to put the Jews in their place regardless of the means this might require, then Petliura and his colleagues will almost certainly come out with a clean bill of health. If, on the other hand, we focus on prevalent anti-Jewish stereotypes and susceptibilities to anti-Jewish perceptions and practices more generally and on the complex ways in which group identities are construed by othering various out-groups – and rarely more dramatically so than in the context of nation-building processes – the questions obviously become far more tricky.

We need to deal with the fact that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century many who considered themselves non-antisemites or even anti-antisemites held views regarding "the Jews" that would be considered highly problematic today. Consequently, even those who were subjectively staunch anti-antisemites more often than not helped perpetuate and consolidate anti-Jewish stereotypes and visions of a better future in which the Jews would cease to exist as a distinct group. Opposition to particular forms of organised and ideological antisemitism by no means implied fundamental disagreement with the notion that there

was something wrong with the Jews and that they needed to be put in their place. Antisemites, non-antisemites, and anti-antisemites, much as they might disagree about what should be the answer, often agreed to a startling degree when it came to defining what “the Jewish Question” supposedly was. In this sense it is no foregone conclusion that the non-antisemitism or anti-antisemitism, in the narrower, contemporary sense, of Petliura and his colleagues would invariably have rendered all forms of anti-Jewish activity anathema to them or their supporters. The inbuilt ambivalences of their stance, however well-meaning they may have been subjectively, could well have left leeway for their supporters to consider and opt for a rather more sturdy and sinister approach to “the Jewish Question” than the members of the Directory themselves would have condoned and we cannot assume that it would necessarily have been evident to their supporters that in so doing they were pitting themselves against everything the Directory stood for. I am not saying this was or need necessarily have been case. What I am saying, though, is that the inferences we can draw from the fact that Petliura and his colleagues were not antisemites in the narrower, technical sense of the word are limited. What would or would not have been (considered) compatible with their stance on “the Jewish Question” is an issue that needs to be studied in detail and *in concreto* and cannot be addressed with an *a priori* deduction predicated on the assumption that anyone who was not a card-carrying ideological antisemite can automatically be granted an entirely clean bill of health.

Add to this the fact that Jewish/non-Jewish relations in Eastern Europe were very rarely (in ethnic or nationality terms) just a bilateral affair. Given the size of the Jewish population, securing its allegiance or at the very least ensuring it did not align itself with the “other side” was an important tactical/strategic consideration for all movements and parties with national aspirations. From the point of view of Ukrainian or Polish nationalists, one could have very considerable reservations about “the Jews” yet still consider it preferable for them to maintain a distinct identity if the most likely alternative was their Russification. Hence, for instance, Pilsudski’s well-known decision in the 1890s to offer his party’s practical support to the Yiddish-language activities of the Vilna group. Who would seriously suggest that this was anything other than a decision to opt for the lesser evil?⁵¹ In this context appeals for Jewish support were often combined with portentous remarks (and sometimes outright warnings) about the bleak or dangerous future that the Jews might face if they failed to opt for the right side. Opportunistic flattery, on the one hand, and deep-seated distrust and overt denunciation, on the other, often found their expression more or less in one breath. (Indeed, that one would never really be able to trust the Jews was, of course, one of the few notions shared well-nigh universally across all ethnic and political divides.)

Matityahu Minc has charted some of the implications of this tactical jostling for our particular context. In the summer of 1917 “the Provisional Government,” he explained, “strove to create a situation whereby the question of national minorities would be an obstacle in the path of Ukrainian separatism, on the assumption that the minorities would do their utmost to hamper such a development.” None too surprisingly, “the Ukrainian authorities for their part ... desired to blunt the anti-Ukrainian edge” of the Provisional Government’s approach “as much as possible and were prepared to direct their considerations to any plan that would transform the problem of national minorities into an internal Ukrainian matter.” Consequently, the Ukrainian national movement clearly “wished to form a binding reciprocal relationship between itself and the Jewish national movement.”⁵²

The way in which autonomism was institutionalised at government level in 1917 illustrated this very clearly.⁵³ There was a position at cabinet level for Nationality Affairs and the Russian, Polish, and Jewish minorities were each represented by a junior minister. However, whereas junior ministers were usually appointed by the cabinet, the three junior

ministers for the national minorities were elected by the Rada like the cabinet ministers and bound by the same regulations. Hence, if the cabinet resigned, the junior ministers for the national minorities also had to resign. Their responsibility and accountability, in other words, was by no means limited to their own national minority and the way in which they represented its interests. Instead, they were expected to take full responsibility for governmental policy at all levels. Yet at the same time the institutional arrangements effectively prevented them from actually sharing in this responsibility. While the junior ministers for the national minorities had the right to participate in cabinet discussions on any issue they were only eligible to vote on issues directly concerning their nationality. Moreover, initiatives and decisions taken by the junior ministers for the national minorities could be vetoed by the cabinet minister for Nationality Affairs. To put it bluntly, the national minorities were expected to provide a maximum of commitment to Ukrainian governmental policy in exchange for an actually rather limited degree of autonomy in controlling their own affairs.

Nor did the fact that there were good reasons for wanting the Jews onside against the imperial centre automatically render any less vexing the question what exactly the Jews' status would be in the bright national future, should it ever arrive. The younger Luther (by way of an analogy) found it only too understandable that the Jews would wonder about the merits of converting to the Roman church and thus suggested one should view their proverbial "obstinacy" in a more charitable light. When it subsequently transpired that they did not want to convert to his own newly created church either, the older Luther produced one of the most vicious anti-Jewish rants of the entire (mainstream) Christian tradition. In other words, to return to our context, once Jewishness ceased to be primarily a bulwark against Russification and instead became an alien entity within one's own national community matters obviously looked very different. To my mind, it is primarily in this light that we need to analyse non-Jewish enthusiasm for the concept of Jewish autonomy.

Looked at from within the framework of (post-emancipatory) Jewish identity politics, of course, the matter seems clear enough. The call for Jewish autonomy emanated from within organised Jewry and any regime that responded positively to it must have been well-disposed towards the Jews. From the viewpoint of an emerging regime like the Directory, however, autonomism was surely above all else a means of placating the various ethnic groups and committing them to the new order without genuinely breaking down the barriers between them and exposing them to one another. The guiding principle was that ethnic groups should be allowed to take greater control of what was ring-fenced by the *status quo* as "theirs," not that they would "infringe" on each other. Here too I seem to be in broad agreement with Abramson. He suggests that autonomism "can be seen in many ways as a transitional model directed at societies moving from a medieval hierarchical structure to the modern notion of individual citizenship without regard to religious or ethnic identity."⁵⁴ It is in fact "in a manner similar to the corporate structure of the medieval government"⁵⁵ and ultimately failed because it "was simply too close to medieval corporatism to survive in a changing social climate."⁵⁶

What kept Petliura and his colleagues awake at night was surely not concern that the assimilatory pressures of straightforward emancipation might threaten Jewish identity. Their concerns were fundamentally pre-emancipatory, not post-emancipatory, and their interest in autonomism sprang not from the fact that it allowed them to transcend the limitations of emancipation but from the fact that it allowed them to avoid emancipation while still making concessions to Jewry and thus (hopefully) securing its allegiance. To put it bluntly: the logic of the autonomist model suggests that "they" take greater control over what is "theirs," it also implies that "they" should obviously reward "our" magnanimity by supporting "us," but it does *not* suggest that "they" are an inalienable part of "us."

Take as an illustration of this ambivalence the following passage from a letter addressed to Lucien Wolf on behalf of the Directory by its representative in Lausanne in December 1920. It stated that the Jews “can consider the Ukraine *sui generis* their second home (after Palestine).” One can just about discern the good intentions, of course, but it is hard to see how the assurance that they could consider Ukraine their *second* home could conceivably have seemed overly magnanimous to Jews living in the territories to which the Directory laid claim (especially the best part of three decades before the establishment of the State of Israel provided any sort of serious alternative.) Nor did this assurance come without strings attached. For the letter went on to express its confidence that “in helping actively to restore order in the Ukraine” the Jews would “show themselves good patriots of their second fatherland” and thus “give a smashing *dementi* to the ludicrous accusation of which they are today an object.”⁵⁷

Again, my point is not that the commitment of Petliura and his colleagues to the principle of autonomism is indicative of some sort of sinister conspiracy. I am neither suggesting that its exclusionary elements would *necessarily* have prevailed nor denying that autonomism *might* eventually have proved a stepping stone towards a more comprehensive and satisfactory resolution of the issue of nationality and Jewish/non-Jewish relations. What this commitment definitely does not provide, however, is grounds on which to rule out *a priori* that Petliura and his colleagues could have contributed to the creation of the political climate that helped facilitate the *pogromshchina*. In their defence, of course, one should add that had they managed to develop, formulate and forcefully propagate a stance on these issues that really would allow for the *a priori* assumption that they were free of any such implication, however unintentional or indirect, this would arguably make them the most perceptive and prescient non-Jews of their generation and credit them with an unprecedented sensitivity and sophistication in their approach to matters Jewish. Troubled as I am by the degree of their accountability for the *pogromshchina* and the failure of National Ukrainian historiography to address it adequately, when it comes to determining how Petliura and his colleagues could have responded more appropriately to the pogroms, not even I would hang the hurdle this high.

Notes on contributor

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Notes

1. Like so many students and colleagues involved with the Hebrew and Jewish Studies Department at UCL during John Klier's tenure here, I owe more to his kindness and generosity than words can say. I never gave a second's thought to the possibility that there might come a time when I would no longer be able to draw on John's advice, support and good cheer and I miss him intensely. He commissioned this piece in the spring before he died and although I have reason to believe that he read it as soon as I submitted it to him in July 2007 we never got round to talking about it; it is now one of the many items on a constantly growing list of things I wish I could still discuss with him and I can only hope he wouldn't have all too many misgivings about it.
2. Ukrainian National News Agency Ukrinform website <http://ukrinform.com/eng/static/subscription/2006/nova.html#8> (accessed June 25, 2007).

3. Ukrainian government website http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en/publish/printable_article?art_id=38326553 (accessed June 25, 2007).
4. Grimsted, "The Postwar Fate of the Petliura Library," 393.
5. See, for example, the call to commemorate the anniversary of Petliura's assassination in the *Ukrainian World Congress Newsletter* (November 2005) <http://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/newsletters/2005,%20%2311%20%2827%29/index.html> (accessed June 25, 2007).
6. Breuilly, "Nationalism," 107.
7. von Hagen, "Ukraine," 658.
8. Reuter, "Whose races, whose ethnicity?" 106.
9. Incidentally, historians often suggest that nationalism is weak when the precise nature of a particular national identity is contested. It is worth bearing in mind, though, that this very contest keeps the issue of national identity continuously on the agenda and in so doing allots it a high priority. Unless it is underpinned by a fundamental consensus that there ought to be a defined national identity, why would anybody engage in a sustained controversy as to what that national identity should look like?
10. von Hagen, "Ukraine," 667.
11. Kappeler, "Grenzland," 24–5.
12. Plokhy, "History," 713.
13. "A perceptive analysis of the events of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine by Prof. Y. Petrovsky-Shtern of Northwestern University, USA," *Welcome to Ukraine Magazine* (2005), <http://www.wumag.kiev.ua/index2.php?param=pgs20051/22> (accessed 27 June 2007).
14. Kappeler, "Ukrainian History," 691.
15. Gergel, "Pogroms," 249.
16. *Ibid.*, 248.
17. For a critical discussion of some of the strategies deployed by these historians in dealing with the *pogromshchina* see Fischer, "Pogromshchina."
18. For an extremely interesting and thoughtful discussion of Schwartzbard's trial see now Schur, "Shades of Justice." It is perhaps worth pointing out that Jewish public opinion by no means reacted in a uniformly uncritical fashion to Schwartzbard's assassination of Petliura. Take, for instance, the following comments in the New Year Supplement 5686/87 of the *Jewish Chronicle* (London): "The recent assassination of Petlura ... occasioned great interest ... and there has been an unfortunate and ill-advised tendency to glorify the deed as an act of justice" (*Jewish Chronicle* 2995 (3 September 1926): 30). It seems highly likely that it was in fact the extraordinarily uncouth manner in which Petliura's supporters presented their case that eventually rallied many behind Schwartzbard who would otherwise have been reluctant to condone his course of action.
19. See Fischer, "Pogromshchina," 88, n. 41; for examples of the recent use of these formulations in mainstream scholarship see, for instance, Khiterer, "Arnold Davidovich Margolin," 154; Milow, *Die ukrainische Frage*, 516. Germany's foremost liberal weekly, *Die Zeit*, recommended Milow's study to its readers during the Orange Revolution as one of a number of publications suited to throw light on "Ukraine – the unknown country" (*Die Zeit* 50, 2 December 2004). Milow's main emphasis is on international diplomacy, of course, but she does also provide an introductory section of some fifty pages on the domestic situation. At no point are the pogroms even mentioned as a significant factor.
20. Petrovsky-Shtern, "Contextualizing the Mystery," 402.
21. *Idem*, "Academic Studies," 158.
22. Abramson, *Prayer for the Government*, 178.
23. Fischer, "Pogromshchina;" Abramson, "Synthesis."
24. See Abramson, "Synthesis," 98: "We have the various anti-pogrom proclamations that Petliura issued after the spring of 1919 (although, as Fischer correctly points out, the key period is what happened before and during the spring of that terrible year)."
25. Himka, for instance, called Mark's work a "fine recent monograph" on Petliura (Himka, "The National and the Social," 97, n. 6.
26. Mark, "Symon Petljura," 53, n. 136.
27. Abramson, "Jewish Representation," 550.
28. *Idem*, *Prayer for the Government*, xv.
29. Abramson, "Synthesis," 94.
30. Petrovsky-Shtern, "Jews in Ukrainian Thought," 233.
31. *Ibid.*, 244.

32. *Ibid.*, 268.
33. Abramson, "Synthesis," 94.
34. *Ibid.*, 97.
35. *Ibid.*
36. *Ibid.*, 99.
37. *Ibid.*, 95.
38. Abramson, *Prayer for the Government*, 205, n. 12; on this article, see below.
39. *Ibid.*, 205, n. 11.
40. Abramson, "The Scattering of Amalek," 42.
41. *Ibid.*, 42–3.
42. *Ibid.*, 43.
43. *Ibid.*, 44.
44. *Ibid.*, 44–5.
45. *Ibid.*, 45.
46. Hunczak, "Reappraisal," 174.
47. *Ibid.*, 164.
48. Himka, "Ukrainian Collaboration," 178.
49. *Ibid.*, 180.
50. Margolin, *Ukraine*, 232.
51. Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics*, 198–200; Zimmermann, *Poles*, 31; *idem*, "Polish Question."
52. Minc, "Kiev Zionists," 255–6.
53. On the following see *ibid.*, 256; Abramson, *Prayer for the Government*, 58–9.
54. Abramson, *Prayer for the Government*, 19.
55. *Ibid.*, 24.
56. *Ibid.*, 167.
57. Cited in Kadish, *Bolsheviks and British Jews*, 97–8.

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