In his final study of religion, *Moses and Monotheism*, Freud writes: "Moses did not only give the Jews a new religion; it can be stated with equal certainty that he introduced the custom of circumcision to them. The fact is of decisive importance for our problem and has scarcely ever been considered" (ist kaum je gewürdigt worden). But before this paper considers both Freud’s attempt to remedy that deficit and the effects of his treatment of circumcision upon his analysis of *Judentum* (Judaism, the Jewish people, Jewishness) in *Moses and Monotheism*, the problem is, what is Freud’s problem?

In a letter to Arnold Zweig, Freud clearly states that his purpose is to understand the development of both the Jewish people and anti-Semitism. Readers of *Moses and Monotheism* have a more difficult task of answering that question. They are confronted by a text which consists of three essays (the third in two parts), three embedded prefaces, and a mixture of genres; it is filled with "ifs" and "let us suppose", false starts, deferred conclusions, repetitions, rationalizations, defensive self-justifications, questionable methods, and weak arguments that are readily acknowledged as such by Freud (cf. p. 27 n. 2). And even if the readers were to pick their way through this stylistic chaff and isolate "the kernel of my hypothesis—the dependence of Jewish monotheism on the monotheist episode in Egyptian history" (p. 31), they would discover in the first two essays of *Moses and Monotheism* what biblical scholars consider manifestly problematic propositions:

1. Moses was an Egyptian, probably a member of the nobility and a follower of Pharaoh Amenhotep IV, a.k.a. Akhenaten, and his monotheistic cult of Aten.
2. Moses, following the death of the pharaoh and the overthrow of his cult, led the Jews out of Egypt, converted them to the Aten cult, and obliged them to accept the Egyptian practice of circumcision.
3. Burdened by the demands of Moses and his religion, the people murdered him.

4. Two generations after this traumatic event, the followers of the Mosaic religion merged with the Midianite followers of the volcano god-demon Yahweh and their leader, whom Freud calls the second Moses. The nonmonotheistic Yahwistic religion was retained by the people, but Yahweh was identified with the god of the exodus, and the allegedly Egyptian custom of circumcision was also kept. This “compromise at Kadesh” helped the Jews to deal with the trauma of Moses’ murder: it aided and abetted the repression of virtually all traces both of the murder and of Moses’ Egyptian origins.

5. Many centuries later Jewish prophets drew upon the oral tradition of the Mosaic religion kept by the priests and engineered the return of its god.

Although Freud repeats this account in the third essay, the problem shifts. He supplements his historical reconstruction of Jewish monotheism’s origin by drawing an analogy with psychopathology. He compares the development of religious phenomena with that of neurotic symptoms: “Early trauma—defense—latency—outbreak of neurotic illness—partial return of the repressed” (p. 80). During the course of this essay the original “kernel of our hypothesis” becomes the “kernel of historical truth” (p. 16, cf. pp. 58, 85). The latter, which unleashes psychopathological development in the individual, initiates on the collective level cultural development, in general, and religious phenomena, in particular. However, whereas for an individual the original trauma is actually experienced, for a group the original trauma is secreted by memory traces of the archaic heritage of humanity—which includes the actual murder of the primal father by his sons.3

When Moses and Monotheism concludes, however, it appears that the text had been addressing yet another problem.4 Apparently, the ultimate focus of Freud’s work was neither the Egyptian origin of Moses and his religion nor the origin of religion and its relation to neurotic development; rather his crucial problem was how the Jews “have been able to retain their individuality till the present day” (pp. 136–137)—a problem, he concedes, that he was unable to solve. He is very defensive about his failure: “But exhaustive answers to such riddles cannot in fairness be either demanded or expected.” That an inquiry into the persistence of the Jews is at stake is only first mentioned in the second part of the concluding essay. And when the topic does arise it is tucked within the “problem of how the special character of the Jewish people arose” (p. 102) and cloaked in psychoanalytic terminology: the Jewish people “has met misfortunes and ill-treatment with an unexampled capacity for resistance [Widerstand]. . . . We should
be glad to understand this . . .” (p. 105, emphasis added). Freud himself appears to be resisting the solution to this problem.

In the “Summary and Recapitulation” which begins part two of the third essay Freud confesses that there is something about this project which is galvanizing his resistance: “Actually [Moses and Monotheism] has been written twice: For the first time a few years ago in Vienna, where I did not think it would be possible to publish it. I determined to give it up; but it tormented me like an unlaid ghost, and I found a way out by making two pieces of it independent and publishing them . . .” (p. 103).\(^5\) Freud continues, “I had scarcely arrived in England before I found the temptation irresistible to make the knowledge I had held back accessible to the world” (p. 103).

Further, the work’s “irresistible claim” (p. 85) upon him is adduced by his admission that he published the work although the text exceeded his attempted revising; in his prefaces Freud himself refers to the repetitions and contradictions (cf. pp. 69, 103–104) of his text and confesses that he was “unable to wipe out the traces of the history of the work’s origin” (p. 103). Freud’s explanation that stylistic problems like these as well as the encrypted language, self-censorship, and abundant references to untold “secrets” were all a part of a strategy to avoid the hostility of the Catholic Church appears insufficient (cf. pp. 55–57). Indeed, Freud confesses that “the work proceeds as it can, and often presents itself to the author as something independent or even alien” (p. 104). Rather, these passages and their accompanying explanations portray avoidance and compulsive behaviors like those Freud describes as neurotic responses to trauma, as the effects of repression (cf. pp. 75ff.). Further, Freud has taught us to attend to the “noticeable gaps, disturbing repetitions, and obvious contradictions—indications which reveal things to us which [a text] was not intended to communicate” (p. 43)—in other words, to the distortions which, as Freud readily concedes (cf. pp. 54–58, 103–104), obviously mark this text. And such “distortions . . . testify to the influence of the resistance (not entirely overcome) [des nicht ganze überwundenen Widerstandes]” (p. 95, emphasis added).

Finally, by embedding this symptomatic story of the origin of his work within his story of the origin of religion, Freud seems to have let slip the existence of another scene—not Kadesh but Vienna—where Freud, Freud the Jew, substitutes for Moses the non-Jew. Perhaps the inquiry into the “secret intention” (p. 14, cf. p. 27 n2), which according to Freud lay behind the Moses myth, is but a screen\(^6\) (cf. p. 74) for Freud’s true motives.

A number of contemporary commentators have attempted to assay those motives. They call attention to Freud’s long-time identification with Moses and focus upon the other primal scene\(^7\) which
Freud described in *The Interpretation of Dreams.* his father's shameful submission to an anti-Semitic lout. Consequently, they focus upon Freud's apologetic, ambivalent, or negative relationship to his Jewish identity. Others place more emphasis on Freud's working-through his relationship with his father or his failing to work-through his relationship with his mother. Yet, what all of the interpretations still scarcely consider (cf. p. 26), what they trip over is the stumbling block of Jewish identity, namely, circumcision. By initially focussing upon Freud's rhetoric of traces, signs, secrets, which mark his discussion of circumcision, this paper argues that the resisted solution to the problem of Jewish persistence is what Freud himself reveals to be the mark of Jewish repression, namely, circumcision. This study analyzes how circumcision throughout Freud's text, on the one hand, marks the place of the "kernel of historical truth" necessary to legitimate his theories of both religion and gendered-identity construction. On the other hand, it bears the trace of the "shameful fact" (p. 70) no less needed to motivate the processes of repression and the return of the repressed according to his theory—as well as in his life. After the *Leitfossil* circumcision is unearthed, this analysis reconstructs the traumatic knowledge, which Freud seeks to repress, of a source of the anti-Semitism jeopardizing his situation as a Jew: in the Central European cultural imagination, male Jews are identified with men without penises, that is, with women, thereby problematizing sexual difference in a society in which individual identity and social cohesion are determined by the sexual division of labor.

**ON THE TRAIL OF THE LEITFOSSIL**

When discussing the compromise at Kadesh Freud writes: "we may once again call on the evidence afforded by circumcision, which has repeatedly been of help to us, like, as it were, a key-fossil" (*Leitfossil*, p. 39). It is necessary to gather up all the fossil remains in order to reconstruct the function of circumcision within this text. Freud employs a rhetoric of signs (Zeichen, Anzeichen, Abzeichen) to describe it. Circumcision is the "external mark [Zeichen] of the religion of Moses" (p. 62); it is the "visible mark" (Anzeichen) of their chosenness (p. 88). It both identifies the Jewish people and makes them a people apart (cf. p. 30). However, "As a mark [Abzeichen] that is to distinguish one person from others . . . one would choose something that is not to be found in other people" (p. 45). Unfortunately, this sign appears to be overdetermined. Freud draws upon Herodotus (pp. 26–27, cf. p. 30 n. 2) and biblical scholars such as Eduard Meyer (pp. 34–35) to testify that circumcision was indigenous only to Egypt and that "No
Freud's Study of Religion

other people of the Eastern Mediterranean . . . practised this custom” (p. 27) until taught by the Egyptians. Freud discovers that the manifest sign of the Jewish people has latent meaning. This “truth about circumcision” (p. 30) is a fundamental link in his deduction of monotheism's Egyptian roots. Freud questions why Moses, if he were a Jew who had just liberated his “compatriots” in order to help them “develop an independent and self-conscious national existence in another country,” would simultaneously “impose on them a troublesome custom which even, to some extent, made them into Egyptians and which must keep permanently alive their memory of Egypt” (p. 27). Freud finds that the fact of circumcision's Egyptian origin falsifies the hypothesis of Moses' Hebrew origins—and not vice versa, although “no attempts were spared [in the Hebrew Bible] to detach the custom from Egypt” (p. 44). This fact “had to be disavowed at any price” (p. 45). The attempts to backdate circumcision to the patriarchal period (e.g., Genesis 17; 34) and thereby to control the interpretation of this sign are “distortions which should not lead us astray” (p. 26) and “clumsy invention[s]” (p. 45). Freud describes the “quite particularly obscure passage” (p. 26, cf. p. 44) in which God seeks to kill Moses for neglecting the custom (Ex. 4:24–26) as “a deliberate denial of the betraying fact” (p. 44) of its Egyptian origin. All of these efforts to cover up the “truth about circumcision” become the prime examples of the distorting effects of repression. Freud argues how circumcision serves in the biblical text to connect the Jewish people with Yahweh ab origine and thereby to elide both its and its practitioners' Egyptian origin. It is “the token [Zeichen] of the covenant between [Yahweh] and Abraham” (p. 45) and therefore no longer the “most suspicious indication [Anzeichen] of dependence on Egypt” (p. 44). By tracking the distorted trail circumcision cuts through the Hebrew Bible Freud reveals how circumcision betrays the Jewish claim to having originated monotheism.

For Freud “the distortions of a text resemble a murder: [that is,] the difficulty is not in perpetrating the deed, but in getting rid of its traces” (p. 43). As Freud, like some paleontological detective, follows the trail of the Leitfossil circumcision through the biblical text, he discovers that the scene of the crime is not Egypt but Kadesh: “the retention of circumcision [is] evidence for the fact that the founding of the religion at Kadesh involved a compromise” (p. 40). The origin of circumcision alone no longer holds significance for Freud; rather, its meaning lies in its persistence. Like monotheism, circumcision may have originated in Egypt, but it only became significant as a consequence of the compromise at Kadesh and the guilt-ridden necessity for that compromise. The adoption of the custom, this “concession to the followers of Moses” (p. 39), marked the inability of the Jews to
efface totally its origin with the Egyptian Moses, which is to say, the inability to repress completely the memory of Moses’ murder. The Leitfossil becomes the “mausoleum... beneath which, withdrawn from the knowledge of later generations, the true account of those early things... was, as it were, to find its eternal rest” (p. 62).

Circumcision is the sign of compromise characteristic of all neurotic symptoms. In other words, it is the sign of repression. As circumcision is the “symbolic substitute” for castration (p. 122) and as the threat of castration is the paradigm of all trauma (cf. p. 79), circumcision is the paradigm of all symptomatic signs of and distortions effected by repression. It is the remainder and the reminder—both ontogenetically and phylogenetically. Circumcision makes “a disagreeable, uncanny impression, which is to be explained, no doubt, by its recalling the dreaded castration and along with it a portion of the primaeval past which is gladly forgotten” (p. 91). Thus circumcision is the figure for the effects of trauma upon ego development, since “alterations of the ego, comparable to scars, are left behind” (p. 77, emphasis added, cf. p. 127: “the scar of repression”). Circumcision is the sign which marks the place of the “kernel of historical truth” necessary both to legitimate Freud’s reconstruction and to motivate the processes of repression and the return of the repressed (cf. p. 101).

This discussion of circumcision offers some insight into the displacement of Freud’s alleged aim in writing Moses and Monotheism: from inquiring whether Moses was a Jew to examining why there are still Jews. As in his treatment of the Jewish people, what concerns Freud in his treatment of circumcision is not its origin but its persistence. Moreover, there is another congruency between circumcision and the Jewish people: circumcision is the fossilized sign of a fossil. From the triumph of Christianity on, “the Jewish religion was to some extent a fossil” (Fossil, p. 88). Circumcision is hopelessly intertwined with the fate of the Jews (cf. pp. 47, 63, 88). Thus the relationship between circumcision and the Jewish people is more than one of sign to referent. Indeed, the referent appears to have become a sign. It would seem that Freud is reiterating in a psychoanalytic register the traditional Jewish self-identification as a “sign unto all of the nations.” The “neurotic Jew” becomes the sign of the psychopathological processes which underlie civilization.

OF FOSSILS, FETISHES, AND CULTURAL PSYCHOSES

By designating both circumcision and the Jews as “fossils” Freud may also be indicating that something else is at stake. During the period
in which Moses and Monotheism was written, Freud was supplementing his theories of neurotic compromise and repression in order to address the problems of fetishism and of psychosis. Freud was exploring what he called the “splitting of the ego.” When this occurs two mutually independent mental attitudes coexist in the ego, one of which accepts reality, the other of which both disavows reality and substitutes a representation for it. There is neither compromise nor dialectical relationship between these attitudes. Classic examples are the fetish, a representation generated by the desire to disavow (the mother’s and thereby the fetishist’s own) castration, and the mausoleum, which is an apotropaic monument that both asserts and denies the loss of the loved one as well as protects us from “unlaid ghosts” (p. 103). The figure of the fossil opens upon this entire problematic. A fossil is the animate turned to stone. This process immediately recalls the effects of the Medusa. In “Medusa’s Head” Freud equates the terror of Medusa with the terror of castration aroused by the sight of the mother’s genitals. Yet the head of Medusa doubly mitigates that terror. First, like a fetish Medusa’s head is a representation which substitutes for the penis, the absence of which causes the horror. Second, the effect of viewing the head upon the male spectator, that is, turning to stone with terror—in effect, becoming erect—both asserts the horror of castration and the preservation of the penis (albeit that of the male spectator). Moreover, this symbol of castration is borne to repel threatening enemies; that is, this symbol of death turns away death. In sum, displaying the head of Medusa is an apotropaic act. The implications of the designation “fossil,” like Freud’s brief sketch, anticipate his work on fetishism and psychosis and they suggest a connection between the circumcised Jew and the castrated woman.

Also suggestive of Freud’s consideration of fetishism and psychosis in the context of the splitting of the ego is the text’s pervasive rhetoric of doubles. Freud’s historical reconstruction hinges on dualities:

Jewish history is familiar to us for its dualities: two groups of people who come together to form the nation, two kingdoms into which this nation fell apart, two gods’ names in the documentary sources of the Bible. To these we add two fresh ones: the foundation of two religions—the first repressed by the second but nevertheless later emerging victoriously behind it, and two religious founders, who are both called by the same name of Moses and whose personalities we have to distinguish from each other. All of these dualities are the necessary consequences of the first one: the fact that one portion of the people [i.e., the Hebrews] had an experience which must be regarded as traumatic and which the other portion [i.e., the Midianites] escaped. (p. 52)
More indicative of the influence of this theory upon Freud's considerations in *Moses and Monotheism* is a passage in which he discusses the compulsive quality of neurotic phenomena. They "exhibit a far-reaching independence [and] are insufficiently or not at all influenced by external reality . . . or its psychical representatives, so that they may easily come into active opposition to both of them. They are, one might say, a *State within a State*. . . . which may succeed in overcoming what is known as the normal party and forcing it into its service. If this happens . . . the path to a psychosis lies open" (p. 76, emphasis added). Freud has characterized neurotic phenomena by one of the foremost anti-Semitic accusations, one interestingly initially coined about women, namely that the Jews constitute a "*State within a State*."¹⁸ By implicitly connecting the Jew with the splitting process, Freud has perhaps shed additional light on his own solutions or non-solutions to the problem of anti-Semitism and to that of the persistence of the Jews.

For example, the text seeks to understand the linear development of religious phenomena and particular groups by extrapolating from the pattern of individual neurotic symptoms" (p. 58); the text also seeks to understand the irrational intensity of anti-Semitism (pp. 90–92) or, in general, the relations between divergent groups (Christian-Jew, Man-Woman, White-Black, Heterosexual-Homosexual, etc.). By making reference to the "*State within a State*" Freud suggests a similar extrapolation of splitting phenomena onto the collective level, such that relations between groups may be potentially psychotic. And in the case of the Jewish people, circumcision, which is the custom which makes the Jews separate,¹⁹ is the foremost source for generating such a state of affairs. The reason is not just, as Freud argues, because circumcision is a "symbolic substitute" of castration (cf. p. 91) and thus motivates Christianity's efforts at disavowal; rather both circumcision and the circumcised embody the disavowal because circumcision is apotropaic. It both asserts the possibility of castration—the foreskin has been removed—and yet denies it—the glans is prominent as in an erection. The paradigmatic sign of the religion which Freud identifies with the advance in intellectuality over sensuality and which therefore is identified with the law of paternity (cf. pp. 114, 118) over and against maternity's dependence upon the senses places that "*juridical revolution*" (p. 114, cf. p. 83) in question. Circumcision calls forth the castration complex, which is the crux of sexual difference. It is "the *a priori* condition governing interhuman exchange in the form of exchange of sexual objects."²⁰ Yet even as circumcision asserts the truth of the threat of castration, it disavows it—the circumcised Jew seems to question sexual difference.

Freud had already drawn the connections among circumcision,
the castration complex, women, and Jews in a famous footnote to his 1909 “Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year Old Boy”: 21

The castration complex is the deepest unconscious root of anti-Semitism; for even in the nursery little boys hear that a Jew has something cut off his penis—a piece of his penis, they think—and this gives them a right to despise Jews. And there is no stronger unconscious root for the same sense of superiority over women. Weininger . . . in a chapter [of Sex and Character] that has attracted much attention, treated Jews and women with equal hostility and overwhelmed them with the same insults. Being a neurotic, Weininger was completely under the sway of his infantile complexes; and from that standpoint [that is, when under the sway of infantile complexes] what is common to Jews and women is their relation to the castration complex.

In Moses and Monotheism circumcision binds the (male) Jew to woman all the more closely. This becomes readily apparent with the recognition that Freud’s notion of circumcision bears a most extraordinary relationship to his notion of fetishism. Although both represent absences—the foreskin and the maternal phallus—circumcision is both formally and substantively—even linguistically—an inversion of fetishism. Circumcision is the “symbolic substitute” (p. 122) for castration, for what is no longer there, whereas the fetish is the “substitutive symbol” 22 of the woman’s penis, of what was never there. The circumcised penis both asserts the possible threat of castration—the foreskin has been removed—and denies it—the head of the penis is prominent as in an erection. Obversely, the fetish by definition both disavows the threat of castration (i.e., the mother has a penis) and affirms it (i.e., “the horror of castration has set up a memorial to itself in the creation of this substitute [i.e., the fetish]”). 23 Circumcision (for the uncircumcised) calls forth the castration complex and elicits horror; the fetish (for the fetishist) disavows that complex and generates pleasure. This inverse relationship between circumcision and the fetish can be extended from these metonyms to what they represent: the circumcised Jew can be seen as the inverse of the fetishized woman. But this invert, the Jew, does not become male; rather, he seems to question sexual difference.

And in the Central Europe of the 1930s the notions that the circumcised Jew represents the emasculated man and problematizes sexual difference are more of a threat to Freud’s chosen milieu and to himself. Freud was obviously aware of the events taking place in neighboring Germany. In the 30 September 1934 letter to Arnold Zweig in which Freud announces that he has completed a draft of The Man Moses, A Historical Novel, he writes: “Faced with the new persecutions, one asks oneself again how the Jews have come to be
what they are and why they should have attracted this undying hatred."24

Both the Jewish situation and the answers which the questioner seeks can be located within a more general crisis. With the ongoing dislocations of modernization, the collapse of the world economic system, the delegitimation of the existent political culture, among many contradictory factors, Freud's Central European culture was experiencing an exacerbating instance of the perpetual crisis of individual and social identity to which German bourgeois society had been subjected since its formation. In the late eighteenth century the political culture of bourgeois society may best be characterized as an exclusively masculine order, a Mannerbund, forged preeminently by Christian heterosexual men.25 The masculinist and binary ideology pervading this society privileged sexual difference as the one opposition grounded in nature and hence as universally valid. Upon this foundation individual identities and social institutions were determined, maintained, and legitimated. The opposition between a male-coded public sphere characterized by rationality (i.e., freedom from desire), autonomy, and activity (i.e., aggression) and a female-coded private sphere of emotionality, dependence, and passivity exemplified the economy of sexual difference; their separation enforced it.26 Consequently, in the last instance sexual difference adjudicated the threats to the hegemony of the Mannerbund posed by deviance or otherness: judged unmanly or effeminate, the other was relegated to the private sphere. To question gender identity—to allow the unmanned or unmanly into the public sphere—was in turn to question the legitimacy of the entire order. Further, the biologizing of the notion of the human with the accompanying rhetoric of race biologized/medicalized the Jews and increased their association with the foremost biologized other: women. Even among Jews, such as Max Nordau and Walther Rathenau, references to the need for "muscle Jews" and repudiations of "effeminate Jews" abound.27 At least a year prior to Freud's work on Moses the gender-inverting effects upon Jews of the Egyptian practice of circumcision had been noted in the first volume of a historical novel avidly read and praised by Freud:28 Thomas Mann's Joseph and His Brothers. Mann wrote:29

We must remember that the rite of circumcision, taken over as outward practice from the Egyptians, had in Joseph's family and tribe long ago acquired a peculiar mystic significance. It was the marriage commanded and appointed by God between man and the deity. . . . The bond of faith with God was sexual in its nature, and thus, contracted with a jealous creator and lord, insistent upon sole possession, it inflicted upon the human male a kind of civilizing weakening into the female. The bloody sacrifice of circumcision has
more than a physical connection with emasculation. The sanctifying of the flesh signified both being made chaste and the offering up of chastity as a sacrifice; in other words, a female significance.

The connection of Jew and woman also had an empirical correlate. The Jews’ presence in professions and the public sphere—but always as others, as non-Germans—became associated with another excluded group endeavoring to enter the public sphere, German feminists. The Jew, above all the male Jew, bound with woman in the cultural imagination, analogized to woman, at times equated with woman, endeavored to enter the Männerrbund, thereby transgressing the male sphere and threatening the underlying structure of that society. The circumcised Jew, who like the castrated (phallic) woman is a “State within a State” threatening the “normal party” (p. 76), sets up a chain of disavowals that threaten the disavowal upon which Central European bourgeois society is founded: that of the necessity of woman for individual (male) development and social cohesion.

A SPINOZAN PROOFTEXT

The trail from the Leitfossil to the “fossil” to woman leads to “My fellow unbeliever Spinoza.” Spinoza, who like Freud entered and dispossessed the biblical text of its manifest inerrancy and who as a consequence was rendered anathema by his fellow Jews, provides a prooftext against which to read Moses and Monotheism. In chapter III of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, entitled: “In what sense the Jews were a chosen people,” Spinoza comments:

As for the fact that [the Jews] have survived their dispersion and the loss of their state for so many years, there is nothing miraculous in that, since they have incurred universal hatred by cutting themselves off completely from all other peoples; and not only by practicing a form of worship opposed to that of the rest, but also by preserving the mark of circumcision with such devoutness. That their survival is largely due to the hatred of the Gentiles has already been shown by experience. . . . The mark of circumcision is also, I think, of great importance in this connexion; so much so that in my view it alone will preserve the Jewish people for all time; indeed, did not the principles of their religion make them effeminate I should be quite convinced that some day when the opportunity arises . . . they will establish their state once more, and that God will chose them afresh.

This passage evokes many of the major themes of Moses and Monotheism: the mark of circumcision, the importance of anti-Semitism,
and the chosenness of the Jews with its associated qualities of self-confidence and aloofness. But there is one factor in Spinoza's passage denied explicit mention in Freud's work: the Jews as "effeminate." More important for this study, the solution to the problem of Jewish persistence which so eluded Freud is given a definitive answer: circumcision. By tying together circumcision, the persistence of the Jews, and effeminacy, Spinoza alerts us to a hidden link in many of the networks of causes which produced Freud's text (cf. p. 108). The traumatic knowledge which Freud seeks to repress and a primary source of the anti-Semitism which so problematizes his situation as a Jew is an identification secreted behind the ever-present, never-acknowledged solution, namely, circumcision, to his problem: in a society, such as that of Central Europe in the 1930s, determined by the sexual division of labor and its gender-coded spheres (male) Jew = man without a penis; that is, Jew = woman. As a consequence of this identification, sexual difference, so necessary to both Freud's theory and to his society, was jeopardized. Thus, to acknowledge this cultural fact, this historical truth that Jew equals woman, would entail the repudiation of psychoanalysis. To acknowledge the solution (i.e., circumcision, which screens the repressed identification) to the problem of Jewish persistence would be to anticipate the Final Solution. Rather than face the implications of circumcision upon the fates of psychoanalysis and of the Jewish people, as Freud says with regard to the Jews and their knowledge of the Egyptian origin of circumcision, "the truth about circumcision must also be contradicted" (p. 30).

THE (RE)CONSTRUCTION OF MOSES

Having followed the lead of the Leitfossil, we can now reconstruct how the distortions in Moses and Monotheism represent the effort to repress the traumatic knowledge of the identification which underlies his work. The construction of Moses and Monotheism appears to be motivated by a repetition compulsion (cf. pp. 75–76), a repetition of the original which would create a new origin. This is what Freud does in the four divisions of the text. The first essay is an example of armchair or belle-littres theorizing which, while suppressing "any further implications" (p. 16), concludes with the "view that Moses was an Egyptian." When the second essay begins "If Moses was an Egyptian," Freud is being neither inconsistent nor contradictory; rather, he is commencing a rewrite, in a historical-critical mode, of the first part. His purpose here is to draw forth some of those implications. Part one of the third essay is yet another rewrite, the history of a group becomes a case history of mass psychology which seeks less to reveal
what Judaism—and Freud’s argument—have suppressed than to analogize this process to the return of the repressed.

However, once Freud switched from a historical to a psychoanalytical register, the threatened return of the repressed connection of Jew with woman necessitated the continuous rewriting of the text. Since the sign of Judaism’s “hidden sources,” circumcision, referred to this identification as much as it did to the identity and death of Moses, the sign itself needed to be repressed.

Freud attempts the suppression of the sign in two steps. First, at the end of the first part of this essay, in the discussion of the difficulties of applying his analogy between individual and mass psychology, the role of circumcision as an agent in Judaism’s development is expropriated by the repressed, unconscious memory-trace (pp. 96ff.): “if we assume the survival of these memory-traces in the archaic heritage, we have bridged the gulf between individual and group psychology” (p. 100). Then in part two of this essay, circumcision, the “visible mark,” becomes immaterial. The practice becomes but one among the many burdens of instinctual renunciation, of renouncing the satisfaction of drive-motivated urges, required by monotheism. This last section is the ultimate rewrite. It is a revisionist routinization of the “secret treasure” (p. 115, cf. p. 105) of the other divisions. In this final chapter the super-ego makes its appearance and the historical dynamics of repression become subservient to the law of renunciation and to the super-ego’s telos of ethical and intellectual advancement.

In addition to a new understanding of the motives and means behind the construction of Moses and Monotheism, the recognition of the repressed identification reveals a text riddled with secret associations and omissions. Connections between woman and Jew are seen to traverse the text. For instance, the textual site upon which Sellin—and following him, Freud—mined his murder (martyrdom) of Moses is in Hosea (12:13–13:1). The initiating trope of Hosea is the prophet’s prostitute-wife Gomer, who is the figure for Israel/the Jewish people; indeed, the image of Israel as (unfaithful) woman permeates the text of Hosea.

The association of woman and Jew also arises in Freud’s discussion of the patriarch Jacob (cf. pp. 27, 44). This reference recalls Freud’s father, who shares the patriarch’s name. As Freud’s father’s “shameful submission” to an anti-Semitic assault perhaps embodies the emasculated Jew, so the patriarch evokes the repressed identification. In the Hebrew Bible Jacob wove his son Joseph’s coat of many colors, and Freud, in his lecture on “Femininity,” credits women with but one contribution to the history of civilization: the invention of weaving. That lecture also signals another confluence of woman and Jew as it knocks its head against the “riddle” of woman; yet, Freud writes:
"In conformity with its peculiar nature, psychoanalysis does not try to describe what a woman is—that would be a task it could scarcely perform—but sets about enquiring"—however inadequately, "how she comes into being." Similarly, while Moses and Monotheism resolves, inadequately, how the Jew came to be, the enigma of the Jew is the persistence of the Jews, their "isness." Moreover, the relationship described in "Femininity" between "the lack of a penis" and the "configuration of femininity" is both similar and similarly significant to the relationship described in Moses and Monotheism between the lack of a penis tip and the nature of Judaism.

Another trace of the repressed identification of Jew with woman may be found in a reference to Akhenaten's mother seemingly tossed off by Freud. Freud is unable to explain the appearance of monotheism in Egypt other than through a threadbare reflection theory: Egypt's "imperialism was reflected in religion as universalism and monotheism" (p. 21). But finally, in his discussion of "The Great Man": Freud adds, "the great religious idea for which the man Moses stood was . . . not his own; he had taken it over from his king Akhenaten. And the latter—whose greatness as a founder of religion is proved without a doubt" (p. 141), yet whose artistic rendering "with distended skull, protruding abdomen, and almost feminine build" belied the image of the Great Man perhaps followed intimations which through his mother or by other ways had reached him from the Near or the Far East" (p. 141). Perhaps the father of Judaism is a mother.

This feminization of Egyptian monotheism contrasts sharply with the almost hyper-masculinization of Judaism in Freud's portrayal. Judaism is identified with Jewish ethics of instinctual renunciation, which is coeval with monotheism. And monotheism itself represents the culmination of the "religious revolution" (p. 46) against mother goddesses. The belief in one (father) god epitomizes the advance in intellectuality over sensuality, which is founded upon the law of paternity (cf. pp. 114, 118)—the deduction of conception and, hence, of the genitor—over and against maternity's dependence upon the senses. Yet Freud's attempting to tiptoe past the aporia engendered by the feminized Egyptian origins of the genealogy of monotheism suggests that the masculine character of Judaism may be a reaction formation—not by the ancient Hebrews against Egypt, but by Freud against the association of Jews with women made by his contemporaries.

Still another secret reserve of the female can be found in Freud's figuration of doubles. In addition to the dualities cited above, there are two families in the family romance that appears in Freud's discussion of Rank's The Myth of the Birth of the Hero. Curiously, Freud chooses to employ The Myth of Birth rather than, in the face of all these
doubles, Rank's "The Double" (Der Doppelsänder), which appeared in the same volume (3) of Imago (1914) as Freud's "The Moses of Michelangelo." The importance of "The Double" for our analysis is Rank's association of the phenomenon of the double with narcissism: the individual's direction of the libido inward toward the ego and not outward toward objects. Narcissists separate themselves from the outside world, keep themselves aloof, and feel self-important; they are characterized in much the same way as a circumcised Jew is in Moses and Monotheism. For example, "those who have adopted circumcision . . . feel exalted by it, ennobled. . . . [and were] isolated by such a sign [Zeichen] and kept apart from the foreign peoples among whom their wanderings would lead them" (pp. 29–30). Moreover, Freud's "On Narcissism: An Introduction," another work of 1914, describes "the purest and truest feminine type" of object-love as complete narcissistic type. In sum, Freud's rhetoric of doubles leads to narcissism which in turn leads both to Jews and to women.

THE MISSING LINK?

This chain has another link which leads back to Spinoza and thus to the prooftext upon which Moses and Monotheism rests like a palimpsest. Freud's model for the complete narcissistic type was Lou Andreas-Salomé. Just prior to the appearance of Freud's first Moses essay and the narcissism piece, as well as Totem and Taboo, Freud was involved in a triangle with Andreas-Salomé and Viktor Tausk. This relationship may have had a number of consequences for the construction of Moses and Monotheism. First, both Andreas-Salomé and Tausk were Spinozaphiles. Indeed, in the journal she kept when she was, as she puts it, "In Freud's School," Andreas-Salomé wrote in a section headed "Spinoza":

It delights me that the one thinker I approached in my childhood and almost adored now meets me once again, and as the philosopher of psychoanalysis. Think far enough, correctly enough on any point at all and you hit upon him; you meet him waiting for you, standing ready at the side of the road.

Second, the rivalry between Freud and Tausk was not over a common love object, Andreas-Salomé; rather, the "love object" was merely the object of exchange in a relationship between two men. Freud and Tausk were doubles:

Only now do I perceive the whole tragedy of Tausk's relation with Freud: that is, I realize now that he will always tackle the same
problems, the same attempts at solution, that Freud is engaged in. . . . As if by a thought transference he will always be busy with the same thing as Freud, never taking one step aside to make room for himself. . . .

There is no doubt about it that Freud acts with complete conviction when he proceeds so sharply against Tausk. But along with this "psychoanalytic" fact (that is, bearing in mind Tausk's original neurotic disposition), it is also clear that any independence around Freud, especially when it is marked by aggression and display of temperament, worries him and wounds him quite automatically in his noble egoism as investigator. . . .

Their rivalry recapitulated the structure of gender relations of the society at large. In sum, the conglomeration of allusions in *Moses and Monotheism* to texts and events of the period 1912–14 suggests that "deferred action"—perhaps occasioned by the death of Andreas-Salomé during the revision of *Moses and Monotheism*—may have provided the lens by which Freud was able to recognize and repress the identification of Jew with woman.

This preliminary investigation of Freud's last psychoanalytic meditations on religion has unearthed the *Leitfossil* circumcision in order to reconstruct the repressed identification of the male Jew with woman. This reconstruction of the feminized Jew haunting the imagination of the male members of the Central European bourgeoisie, including Freud, provided an algorithm for understanding *Moses and Monotheism*. By according circumcision the "decisive importance" Freud asserted it was due, this analysis has generated insight into Moses' style and rhetoric, its metapsychological concerns and apologetic ploys, and, above all, its Jewish problem.

SWARTHMORE, PENNSYLVANIA

NOTES


3. This last had already been floated twenty-five years earlier in *Totem and Taboo*. It had been assailed to the point of ridicule—as Freud himself mentions in *Moses and Monotheism*. Yet, he adds, “To this day I hold firmly to this construction,” and in a defiant act of denial, he asserts: “A denial [Widerspruch] is not a refutation” (131). On the history of *Totem and Taboo’s* reception see Edwin R. Wallace IV, *Freud and Anthropology: A History and Reappraisal* (New York, 1983). Although, as Wallace recounts, the initial uproar moderated over time, such that even a vociferous early opponent like Alfred L. Kroeber eventually modified his original critique and indeed found Freud to offer significant insight into human culture, anthropologists are all but unanimous in their denial of what Freud found absolutely necessary, namely, his claims for the historicity of the primal horde.

4. Freud even deferred stating the problem in *Moses and Monotheism’s* original introduction recently uncovered by Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi: “My immediate purpose was to gain knowledge of the person of Moses, my more distant goal to contribute thereby to the solution of a problem, still current today, which can only be specified later on.” Cited by Yerushalmi, “Freud on the ‘Historical Novel’: From the Manuscript Draft (1934) of *Moses and Monotheism,*” *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*. Vol. 70 (1989), p. 379. Although in this article Yerushalmi merely notes that the unspecified problem is anti-Semitism (p. 380), Freud’s concern about anti-Semitism is a primary focus of his recent book, *Freud’s Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable* (New Haven, 1991). I also note relative to the question of Freud’s Jewishness more generally that two recent works have offered interpretations of *Moses* by shifting the emphasis of Freud’s self-description as a “godless Jew” (letter to Oskar Pfister, 9 October 1918, in *Psychoanalysis and Faith: The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Oskar Pfister*, ed. H. Meng and E. L. Freud, trans. E. Mosbacher [London, 1963], p. 63) from the adjective, as Peter Gay, *A Godless Jew: Freud, Atheism, and the Making of Psychoanalysis* (New Haven, 1987), would have it, to the noun. Both Emanuel Rice, *Rice and Moses. The Long Journey Home* (Albany, 1990), and Yerushalmi, *Freud’s Moses*, seek to remedy the efforts of Sigmund Freud, his family, and later commentators to downplay Freud’s religious education and later Jewish identification. Rice offers a variant on the reading of *Moses* as Oedipal psychodrama: Freud seeks to resolve his lifelong ambivalent feelings toward a Jewish-identified father and a father-identified Judaism. Yerushalmi, by contrast, eschews psychobiography and rejects any argument that imputes Freud a negative or ambivalent relation to his Jewish identity. In his portrayal of *Moses* as Freud’s “attempt to answer the hitherto unanswerable question of what makes him a Jew” (*Freud’s Moses*, p. 77) Yerushalmi, quite rightly, takes seriously Freud’s questioning of how the Jews came to be who they are.


6. When Freud begins to construct his analogy between the development of neurosis and the history of the Jewish religion by describing the forgotten
traumatic infantile experiences, he incidentally adds that the infantile amnesia "is usually broken into by a few separate mnemic residues, which are known as 'screen memories'" (p. 74). What Freud neglects to add here is that these remarkably clear, yet seemingly innocuous memories are themselves compromise formations, defensive displacements of forgotten, repressed, experiences. Moreover, as his case studies have shown from the very beginning (cf. the case of Lucy R., in Studies on Hysteria, in S.E., Vol. 2, pp. 106–124) even the repressed material which analysis dredges up may itself be a screen for more traumatic experiences.


14. "Identification" is to be understood here, above all, in the sense of The Interpretation of Dreams, S.E., Vol. 4, pp. 319–320: through their relationship of similitude one image is substituted for the threatening other, whereby a partial resemblance becomes a total identity.


19. Freud writes "among the customs," but the other customs which he mentions, such as choosenness and ethical superiority, are all tied into circumcision by him.


21. S.E., Vol. 10, p. 36 n.; cf. Leonardo da Vinci and A Memory of his Childhood, S.E., Vol. 11, pp. 95–96 n. Sarah Kofman, L'émince de la femme (Paris, 1980), pp. 35–37, observes Freud already drawing these connections in The Interpretation of Dreams: "The intimate, shameful secrets that Freud fears to expose to the public, because of the horror they are very likely to arouse, are thus inseparably linked with his Jewishness and with femininity, with castration..."
anxiety. In this sense The Interpretation of Dreams is another Medusa's head" (Eng. trans.: The Enigma of Woman, trans. Catherine Porter [Ithaca, 1985], p. 32).

25. This is not to suggest that the public sphere formed either simultaneously or uniformly among the various populations of Europe; on the public sphere see Joan B. Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution (Ithaca, 1988); following Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft (Neuwied, 1962); and Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago, 1958). On Männerbund, see Alfred Baeumler, Männerbund und Wissenschaft (Berlin, 1934); Hans Blüher, Die Rolle der Erotik in der männlichen Gesellschaft, 2 vols. (Jena, 1917); Rita Thalmann, Étre femme sous le IIIe Reich (Paris, 1982), esp. chap. 2, which draws heavily on Alfred Rosenberg's Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts (Munich, 1930); and the work of George Mosse, e.g., “Friendship and Nationalism: About the Promise and Failure of German Nationalism,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 17 (1982), pp. 351–367, and Nationalism and Sexuality: Nationalism and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe (New York, 1985).
30. A number of studies have appeared in the last several years which have analyzed the significance of sexual difference in the construction and legitimation of bourgeois society; in addition to Poovey, Uneven Developments; see J. Geller, “Contact with Persistent Others: The Representation of Woman in F. Schlegel, G. W. F. Hegel, and K. Gutzkow” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1985); Linda J. Nicholson, Gender and History: The Limits of Social Theory in the


32. On the Jewish response to Moses and Monotheism, see among others Oring, The Jokes of Sigmund Freud.


34. In his “too literal” 1841 edition of Spinoza’s Sämtliche Werke (Stuttgart), including the Tractatus, Berthold Auerbach translates effeminarent as “weiblich machten” (Vol. 2, p. 114); later translators, including J. H. von Kirchmann’s 1870 Theologisch-politische Abhandlung (Berlin), p. 61; and Carl Gebhardt’s 1907 contribution to the Sämtliche Werke, ed. O. Baensch, A. Buchenau, C. Gebhardt, and L. Schaarschmidt (Leipzig), Vol. 5, p. 75, render effeminarent as verweichlichten/verweichlichen, which in English means “made soft or effeminate”.

35. That is, two factors—the circumcised Jew problematizing the sexual division of labor which undergirds Central European society and the collapse of traditional Jewish-Christian relations—threatened to shift the relationship of the Jews to their host culture from a neurotic to a psychotic register. While traditional relations entailed the repression of the Jews, a remnant was nevertheless required for Christian salvation; that is, the two groups were doubly bound together: Jesus would only return when the Jews converted, yet the Jews would only convert when Jesus returned (on the social-pathological consequences of this double bind see Jeffrey Mehlman’s suggestive “The Suture of an Allusion: Lacan with Léon Bloy,” Sub-Stance, Nos. 33–34 [1982], pp. 99–110). Without this countervailing neurosis, the threat posed by the circumcised Jew portended the psychotic reaction of foreclosure—extinction.

36. Complementing this analysis of Freud’s repression of the feminized Jew, Van Herik, Freud on Femininity and Faith, esp. pp. 183–93, describes how Freud apologetically associates Jewish religion with masculinity, especially in the second part of the third essay.


40. Cf. Van Herik, Freud on Femininity and Faith, esp. chaps. 11 and 12.

41. The young Rank also wrote a Weininger-inspired essay, “The Essence of Judaism,” in which he writes that the Jews “are, so to speak, women among the people and must above all join themselves to the masculine life-source if they are to become ‘productive.’ ” This 1905 essay is reprinted in D. B. Klein, The Jewish Origins of the Psychoanalytic Movement (Chicago, 1985), pp. 170–173, quote from p. 171.


43. Lou Andreas-Salomé, The Freud Journal, trans. S. A. Leavey (New York, 1964), pp. 75–76. The references to Spinoza in Andreas-Salomé’s work far outweigh those in Freud. Indeed, there are only two mentions of Spinoza’s name in the entire Collected Works: in Jokes (p. 77) and in Leonardo da Vinci (p. 75). However, the Spinozan critique of Judaism was well-known in the Jewish intellectual circles of Freud’s youth. Moreover, Siegfried Hessing, “Freud’s Relation with Spinoza,” in Speculum Spinozanum, 1677–1977, ed. S. Hessing (London, 1977), reproduces a letter from Freud to Lothar Bickel, dated 28 June 1931, written in response to an article submitted to him by the latter. Freud writes: “My dependence on the teachings of Spinoza I do admit most willingly. I had no reason to mention his name directly, as I got my presumptions not from studying him, but from the atmosphere he created” (p. 227). Hessing assumes that via his friendship with Andreas-Salomé Freud may have been “quasi-transformed into a follower of Spinoza. . . . establishing a noble link between them” (p. 228). Interestingly, the only reference to either Spinoza or to circumcision which appears in the extant notes to the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society belong to Tausk; cf. H. Nunberg and E. Federn (eds.), Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, 4 vols. (New York., 1962–75), Vol. 2, pp. 328–330, Vol. 4, p. 177.

44. On the import and prevalence of male bonds as well as the role of woman as mediating object of male exchange, see the discussion of homosocial desire in Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire (New York, 1985); and Geller, “Contact with Persistent Others.”

45. Andreas-Salomé, The Freud Journal, pp. 166–167, 97. The relationship among these three has been the object of controversy with P. Roazen, Brother Animal (New York, 1969), on the one hand, suggesting Freud’s romantic and intellectual envy of Tausk as well as complicity in Tausk’s 1919 suicide and K. R. Eissler, Talent and Genius (New York, 1971) and Viktor Tausk’s Suicide (Madison, Conn., 1982), on the other, defending an idealized Freud and denigrating the hopelessly neurotic Tausk. F. Roustang, Dire Mastery, trans. N. Lukacher (Baltimore, 1982), chap. 5, has provided a judicious account of their relationship and calls attention to Tausk’s doubling of Freud.

46. According to Laplanche and Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis, p. 111, in deferred action “experiences, impressions, and memory-traces may be revised at a later date to fit in with fresh experiences or with the attainment
of a new stage of development. They may in that event be endowed not only with a new meaning but also with psychical effectiveness."

47. She died on 5 February 1937. The first essay had just been published, the second would not be completed until August of that year, and the concluding essay would take yet another year before it attained its final form. Cf. "Editor's Note," S.E., Vol. 23, pp. 3–5; and Freud, "Lou Andreas-Salomé," S.E., Vol. 23, pp. 297–298.

48. My *The Nose Job: Freud and the Feminized Jew* (Albany, N.Y., forthcoming) extends this analysis. It explores how the depiction of male Jewish body parts and smells led to the identification of Jewish men with the socially threatening feminine. Specifically it examines the evocations of the circumcised penis, the Jewish nose, and the *foetor judaicus* within the Central European cultural and scientific imagination. Freud's writings which reflect upon and contribute to this physiognomic tradition are employed as a lens to examine the relationship among gender identity, Jewish emancipation, and the representation of the body.