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Not a *Geist* of a Chance: Laying to Rest an “Unlaid Ghost”?  

**JAY GELLER**

**ABSTRACT:** As Sigmund Freud’s last completed work and only extended treatment of Judentum, *Moses and Monotheism* has generated extensive commentary and controversy since its publication. Most readers have attempted to divine Freud’s relationship to his own Jewish identification from this “last testament.” Recently, scholars from a variety of disciplines have focused their attention on Freud’s discussion of Geistigkeit (translated as intellectuality or spirituality) and Judentum in Moses’s concluding section. The author analyzes the performative dimensions of Freud’s entire text—its four-year production and rhetorical construction—to argue that Freud and his recent critics may have erected Geistigkeit as a fetish that supplements Freud’s other strategies to disavow the traumatic knowledge of Judentum’s identification in the European imaginary with the dispositive circumcision. Like the circumcision it would spirit away, Moses enacts rather than signifies the disavowal of the “unlaid ghost” of Jewish racial, gender, and sexual difference.

**Keywords:** circumcision, fetish, Sigmund Freud, Judentum, Geistigkeit, gender, Moses and Monotheism, performativity

Perhaps no text of Sigmund Freud has been receiving as much recent, critical attention beyond psychoanalysis as his last completed work, *Moses and Monotheism*, the only extended treatment of Judentum written by the “Godless Jew.”¹ This scholarly engagement with a work that the great Jewish thinker Martin Buber curtly dismissed as not “deserv[ing] scholarly mention” (5)² is not a new phenomenon; however, the primary focus of most of the commentators has been less Freud’s truth claims in Moses than the attempt to assay the motives behind its composition.³ These scholars usually called attention
to Freud’s longtime identification with Moses; for example, in his 17 January 1909 letter to Carl Jung, Freud prophesied, “[I]f I am Moses, then you are Joshua and will take possession of the promised land of psychiatry, which I shall only be able to glimpse from afar” (Freud/Jung Letters 196–97). Then they would read Moses, because it was written when Freud was, if not on his “mattress grave,” then at least at the close of his time on the couch, as an autobiographical testament. In particular, triangulating Moses with the other primal scene that Freud described in Interpretation of Dreams—his father’s shameful submission to an antisemitic lout—these analysts saw Freud playing out his relationship to his Jewish identity: understood as apologetic (for example, Van Herik), ambivalent (for example, Robert), or negative (for example, Oring). Others, picking up on Freud’s discussion of the “family romance” (Familienroman) in the first essay of Moses, placed more emphasis on Freud’s working through his relationship with his father (for example, Krüll) or his failing to work through his relationship with his mother (for example, Roith). Many (for example, Grubrich-Simitis; Schäfer) also moved beyond Freud’s personal issues in the text to his broader concern not only with the sources of the “new persecutions” but also with possible means to combat them—whether negatively, by debunking their rationales, or positively, by, in the words of the racial anthropologist and fellow Viennese Jew Ignaz Zollschan, “employ[ing] the same weapons as our opponents—that is to say, the weapons of anthropology, sociology, and natural science [Freud would add, of course, psychoanalysis]—to investigate the social value of the Jews” (Jewish Questions 4–5; qtd. in Efron 153).

Yet what the interpretations had “scarcely considered” (cf. Freud, Moses 26)—what they were still sidestepping in 1987 when I began writing “A Paleontological View of Freud's Study of Religion”—was not Jewish identity per se, but its stumbling block: namely, circumcision (cf. Gal. 5:11), what Freud refers to in Moses as the Leitfossil (39). In the interim, circumcision did gain the attention of such readers as Sander Gilman, Daniel Boyarin, and Jacques Derrida; however, more recently, the attention afforded circumcision has yielded to other prominent topics: Geistigkeit, on the one hand (Assman, “Fortschritt”; DiCenso; Santner; Schäfer), and the nexus of memory, tradition, and Lamarckism, on the other (Assman; Bernstein; Derrida; Yerushalmi).

This article focuses on the turn to Geistigkeit and how Freud and these recent critics may have erected Geistigkeit as a fetish, supplementing Freud’s other strategies to disavow the traumatic knowledge
of Judentum’s identification with the dispositive \(^\text{14}\) “circumcision.” \(^\text{15}\) Through this process, the feminized male Jew (and perhaps the masculinized female Jew too [cf. Hauser]) of questionable sexuality—as well as the opposing virile masculine norm—was constructed. Nevertheless, a few words on Eric Santner’s contribution to the latter literature on memory are in order because he too provides a traumatic reading of Moses. In “Freud’s Moses and the Ethics of Nomotropic Desire,” Santner provides a phenomenologically satisfying, but still history-begging traumatic spin on the role of memory in Freud’s text by viewing the unconscious memory trace (here, specifically, of primal parricides) as a generative, structural phenomenon rather than the bearer of a particular content. Traumatic events, Santner writes, are “‘events’ that do not properly take place” (35). Because they are not experienced “within the normative field of object relations” (36) (or given meaning and integrated narratively into consciousness, or memory, or self), they persist as ongoing, unsuccessful attempts to describe or make fit what does not seem to need description or fitting. “The ‘phylogenetic inheritance,’ persists not as this or that set of ‘propositional attitudes’ or thoughts in deep memory, but rather as the content of the form” (Santner 40; emphasis in original). Such acting out is like the space that is “naturally” perceived as straight but is from another perspective (a perspective not yet attainable by the observer) recognized as continuously distorted by (unseen) forces. Santner seems to be pointing to some mediative performance in the face of ontological difference: acting out the incommensurable desires both to incorporate difference (therefore rendering it no longer different—parricide) and to have that difference retain its otherness (and yet be knowable—incest). Santner’s argument still leaves the question of why the content of the form is described in terms of “oedipal crimes” or “castration.” I address the relationship between that question (of Jewish difference) and Geistigkeit by demonstrating the performative dimension of Freud’s text. Like the circumcision it would spirit away, \(^\text{16}\) Moses enacts rather than signifies this disavowal of Jewish racial, gender, and sexual difference

THE (RE)CONSTRUCTION OF MOSES

Before analyzing the haunted screen of Geistigkeit, it is necessary to demonstrate the other primary strategy Freud employs in Moses to disavow the traumatic knowledge of the hegemonic identification
of Jew and woman that underlies his work: distortion, specifically the compositional distortions that the final version of Moses betrays. The construction of Freud’s published text appears to be motivated by a repetition compulsion—a repetition of the original that would create a new origin (cf. 75–76). Consider the genre transformations in the four divisions of that work. The first essay is an example of armchair theorizing that, while suppressing “any further implications,” concludes with the “view that Moses was an Egyptian” (16). The second essay begins “If Moses was an Egyptian,” but Freud is being neither inconsistent nor contradictory; rather, he is rewriting the first essay in a historical-critical mode. His purpose here is to draw forth some of those implications. Part 1 of the third essay is yet another rewrite; the history of a group becomes a case history of group psychology that seeks less to reveal what Judentum—and Freud’s argument—have resisted than to analogize this process to the return of the repressed.

However, once Freud switched from a historical to a psychoanalytical register, from a happenstance (particular to Judentum) to the inevitabilities of interaction within individual and group development, the threatened return of the disavowed connection of Jew with woman necessitated the continuous rewriting of the text. Because the sign of Judentum’s “hidden sources,” circumcision, referred to this identification as much as it did to the identity and death of Moses, the sign itself needed to be repressed, split off, or disavowed.

Freud begins the marginalization of circumcision in the first part of the third essay. First, the Leitfossil is reduced in Freud’s narrative to a mere sign: “the external mark [äußere Zeichen] of the religion of Moses” (62). Its reference is then further delimited to the “visible mark” (sichtbares Anzeichen) of chosenness at the same time as its abandonment by Paul, the “continuer” (Fortsetzer) “destroyer” (Zerstörer) of Judentum, to ensure the success of Christianity is noted. The announcement of the latter coincides with the fossilization of the “Jewish religion” in Freud’s text (88). Then, when inventorying the “disagreeable, uncanny impression” that circumcision makes among the “deeper motives for the hatred of the Jews,” Freud indicates that the practice is but one “among the customs by which the Jews made themselves separate” (91). The first part of the third essay culminates with the discussion of the difficulties of applying his analogy between individual and group psychology; in that discussion, the role of circumcision as an agent in Judentum’s development is expropriated by the repressed, unconscious memory-trace: “[I]f we assume the sur-
vival of these memory-traces in the archaic heritage, we have bridged the gulf between individual and group psychology” (100).

The second part of the third essay proves to be the ultimate rewrite. It reads as a revisionist routinization of the “secret ownership of some precious possession” of the preceding discussions (105).

EXCUSES, EXCUSES

Before the epispasm, his restoration of the severed “Stück”\(^{19}\) that is the second part of the third essay, Freud attempts to suture together the two parts. He offers “extensive explanations and apologies” for the state of his text at the outset of the last part (103). Unlike the two brief eponymous “Prefatory Notes” (Vorbemerkungen) that precede the first part, this prefatory note is titled “Summary and Recapitulation” (Zusammenfassung und Wiederholung). This heading, rather than describing the form of the subsection—offering a summary and repetition\(^{20}\) of what has gone before as background for what is to follow—glosses its content. The “Summary and Recapitulation” subsection announces that what follows is but a summary and a repetition of the part 1 of the third essay.\(^{21}\)

This emblematic doubling (of doubling—both summaries and repetitions represent copies that often substitute for the original) is rife with a discourse of doubles that also characterizes Freud’s reconstruction of the origins of both Moses and monotheism (see especially 52). Freud provides what appear to be two different accounts of the genesis of this second part. He initially describes the subsequent text as “nothing other than a faithful (and often word-for-word) repetition [Wiederholung] of the first part [of the third essay], abbreviated in some of its critical enquiries and augmented by additions relating to the problem of how the special character of the Jewish people arose” (103). Although the reader assumes Freud is describing a process of secondary elaboration (sekundäre Bearbeitung) such that the second part was written after the first, Freud soon apologetically announces that, in fact, the first part was a “second version” (zweite Bearbeitung) written in London of an earlier revision of the third essay that he had written but dared not publish in Vienna, and that the second part is but an “unchanged” addition of “a whole piece [Stück] of the first presentation to the second” (104). Freud then concludes his remarks by repeatedly repeating defenses of and from repetition\(^{22}\) in general and in this work that “actually [. . .] had been written twice” (zweimal;
Not only is he endlessly enacting that of which he writes, but he is also reproducing structurally the supplement to his theory of repression (see 75). This “unchanged” piece of earlier experience that splits off from the ego is reproduced by Freud’s inability to relinquish what becomes the nonintegrated and unworked-through second part of the third essay.

In the “Summary and Recapitulation” subsection, Freud also remarks that he had returned to his manuscript while in Vienna because, as noted, “it haunted [him] like an unlaid ghost” (unerlöster Geist; 103). He tried to break the spell of this spectral visitor by way of a “compromise”: the publication in his house journal Imago of the first two essays that make up Moses. He then describes another haunting compulsion—“I had scarcely arrived in England before I found the temptation irresistible to make the knowledge I had held back accessible to the world” that also is resolved through the “compromise” of adding the “unchanged” second part (103). The excessive apologetics, the compulsive supplementing of his “secondary revising” with text that makes the entire work into an “independent, even an alien creation,” and the spectral sighting all lead readers to ascribe unusual value to the second part of the third essay. Freud’s decisions to have his daughter, Anna, read “The Progress in Geistigkeit”—a subsection of the supplemental unerlösten Geist—at the last International Psychoanalytic Congress during Freud’s lifetime (2 August 1938) and to publish “Geistigkeit” as a self-contained article (“Fortschritt in der Geistigkeit”) further gives the second part in general and that subsection in particular a testamentary quality (Assman, “Fortschritt,” 157; Robertson; Wistrich).

Indeed, “Geistigkeit” is the Geist that haunts many of the most recent readings of Moses, just as it had many nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Jewish apologetics. I am not gainsaying the importance of Geistigkeit, that subsection, or the second part of the third essay; however, readers should be wary about ascribing primacy to the Geistigkeit that is trumpeted by the prohibition against making an image of the divine. The Geistigkeit that is made in the image of Geist may indeed attempt to lay that ghost to rest, but it should not be confused with that spirit (cf. Moses 114).

Rather than anticipating its own redemption (Erlösung), Freud’s phrase (unerlösten Geist) should be seen as yet another double, another repetition. This was actually the second time that Freud had used this uncanny image in his corpus. The first instance was at a
crucial moment in the discussion of the case of Little Hans: immediately following Freud’s parapraxis in a note glossing Hans’s “phantasy of the two giraffes” (“Analysis” 122 n1). That note acknowledged what the body of the text sought so hard to screen: Rather than resolving his castration complex, working through the narcissistic crisis of sexual difference, and continuing with “normal” heterosexual development, Hans had remained fixated at that stage and retained his “homosexual accesses” (17). “Immediately after the giraffe story”—both in Hans’s chronology and Freud’s later discussion—Hans produced two minor phantasies that his father “failed to interpret” (122). At this point, Freud intervenes: “In an analysis, however, a thing which has not been understood inevitably reappears; like an unlaid ghost [unerlöster Geist], it cannot rest until the mystery has been solved and the spell broken” (122). Freud’s ready solution is Oedipal, desire for the mother.

Freud’s apparent ghostbusting—overcoming the crises of gender, sexual, and ethnic difference through the erection of Oedipus—had not been successful, for here in his last completed work, in this sublated Stück of text, the “unlaid ghost” has returned.

SPIRITING AWAY THE LEITFOSSIL

In part 2 of the third essay, circumcision—the “visible mark” (Moses 88)—becomes immaterial. The practice becomes but one among the many burdens of instinctual renunciation of renouncing the satisfaction of drive-motivated urges required by monotheism (see 122). In its place is an overwhelming emphasis on Jewish aniconism. Although Freud’s initial discussion of the monotheistic cult of Aten focused on Akhenaten’s iconoclasm and effacing of the old divine names, its import for Freud’s argument for the Egyptian origins of Judentum are quickly superseded by circumcision; however, after reemerging in the first part of the third essay as a possible second bargaining chip with circumcision at the compromise at Kadesh—“and possibly in establishing certain restrictions on the use of the name of the new god” (62)—the “Mosaic prohibition” is triumphant in the second part (114). More significant, in the second part of the third essay, those feelings of pride, exaltedness, ennoblement, consecration, and contempt for others—for which Freud earlier held the custom of circumcision responsible (29–30)—now find their source: the belief in the Jews as God’s chosen people.
In this final chapter, the superego, which made an earlier cameo appearance to announce its apparent irrelevance (“The fact that later on a special region—the ‘super-ego’—is separated off in the ego lies outside our present interest” [97]), now, like some deus ex machina, materializes, and the historical dynamics of repression or his underdeveloped theory of sublimation become subservient to the law of renunciation and the superego’s chosen telos of ethical and intellectual advancement, Geistigkeit. Less the apologetic, messianic, or redemptive positivism that many commentators ascribe to Freud—as if he were proclaiming “look neither the ethical demands of monotheism nor its Mosaic distinction are inherent to the Jewish race (it is all that gentile Moses’ fault)” or “look, the Jews are as geistig, Protestant, and masculine as the Teutons”—Freud’s “unaltered” paean to Geistigkeit is more a screen of what portended the demise of Judentum. The primacy Freud grants the deity with “neither a name nor a countenance” (113) overshadows the inscription of “the name of God on his organ of generation” (Mann 48) via circumcision, via that Hebrew practice named milah (a homophone of mila, the Hebrew word for “name”) during which Jewish males receive their names. With the elision of circumcision comes the elision of the connection of women and Jews. By according circumcision the “decisive importance” Freud stated it was due, this analysis has generated insight into Moses’s style and rhetoric; its metapsychological concerns and apologetic ploys; and, above all, its Jewish problem.

As his life and the world he had known were also coming to an end, Freud found himself still haunted by an uncanny, unredeemed Spirit (unerlöster Geist): Judentum. He sought to foreclose its threatened Wagnerian redemption (Erlösung)—its downfall or destruction (der Untergang)—by means of another indeterminate hybrid of the living and the dead, the Leitfossil circumcision. As this fossilized, hybridized, indeterminate figuration of feminizing circumcision converged on the figuration of persisting Judentum, Freud found that once unearthed, this reconstructed device could not lay the ghost to rest without further jeopardizing Judentum. In his earlier work, the persistent encounter with the dispositive circumcision by which the dominant culture constructed both Judentum and itself had led to the transferential phantasy of castration that would come to animate his corpus and render meaningful the life narratives of all. It would also provide “the a priori condition governing interhuman exchange in the form of exchange of sexual objects” (Laplanche and Pontalis...
59). Both the individual and society were founded on difference, but an indeterminable difference is dangerous to the powers that (would) be unless channeled, so lame-footed Oedipus emerged to maintain the norm and neurosis, reinforced by a new topography of the three fates: id, ego, superego. But as the times and Freud’s theory achieved new configurations—the Third Reich and the splitting of the ego—Freud’s engagement with Judentum was working at cross-purposes. The psychic and social conditions mediated by the dispositive circumcision were overflowing the channels and tending toward the psychotic. Freud, despite his efforts at secondary revision and like many faced with such a crisis, generated a supplementary fetish or two, like Geistigkeit. ³⁴

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NOTES

1. Freud’s self-description as a Godless Jew is made in his October 1918 letter to the Swiss pastor and psychoanalyst, Oskar Pfister (Freud and Pfister 63). Also see Geller, “Atheist Jew or Atheist Jew.”

2. As Buber seeks to distinguish his own work from earlier biblical scholars such as Eduard Meyer, Hugo Gressman, and Paul Volz—terming it the “first comprehensive attempt [at] the description of Moses as a concrete individuality and the demonstration of what he created and what his historical work was”—he leaves his prefatory judgment of Freud to a footnote. There, he pronounces it “regrettable [. . . t]hat a scholar of so much importance in his own field [. . . ] issue so unscientific a work, based on groundless hypotheses” (5n1). In the subsequent footnote, he notes that “Ernst Sellin’s interesting works,” which Freud claims had such influence on his own Moses study, “cannot be counted among [the ‘important contributions (. . .) which have certainly helped to display the historical appearance of Moses and his teaching’]” (5n2).

3. One major exception is the work of psychological anthropologist Robert A. Paul.

4. On Freud’s identification with Moses, see Goldstein; Grubrich-Simitis, Early Freud and Freuds Moses-Studie; Rice.

5. Freud’s beloved Heine described his last works as written from his “mattress grave.” After contracting spinal tuberculosis (multiple sclerosis, or tertiary syphilis), Heine spent his last eight years confined to bed; as the Jewish Encyclopedia notes, “it was while on his ‘mattress grave’ that Heine gave utterance to his most penetrating comments on matters Jewish” (6: 329) as well as writing the Hebrew Melodies, Memoirs, and Confessions.

6. Cuddihy appropriates Freud’s term to highlight the significance of Freud’s Jewishness on the development of psychoanalysis (48–57).
7. I would also situate under this rubric Rice’s and Yerushalmi’s related hermeneutics of recovery and, especially in Yerushalmi’s case, of displacement of what is essential about Judentum on to psychoanalysis.

8. Understanding negative as “in opposition to the ‘compact majority,’” Peter Gay emphasized Freud’s writing of Moses as defiance: “He had conceived his Moses and Monotheism in defiance, written it in defiance, published it in defiance” (648, cf. 603–08).

9. Freud largely draws his conclusion that Moses is an Egyptian from the story of Moses’s birth to Hebrew slaves and later adoption by the pharaoh’s daughter as an anomalous inversion of the traditional family romance—the child of nobility raised by humble proxies—from a Jewish perspective. However, this conclusion is wholly consistent: The child of the chosen people (indeed, of what will become the priestly tribe) is raised by idolatrous gentiles.

10. The first and still more readily available English translation is by Katherine Jones.

11. Their works are analyzed in Geller, “Identifying” and On Freud’s Jewish Body.

12. Assman, “Fortschritt,” marks a repudiation of his earlier understanding of Freud’s Moses in Moses the Egyptian. Geistigkeit held center stage in Yerushalmi’s characterization of Freud’s godless Judentum. The misplaced prominence recently ascribed to Geistigkeit finally struck me while reading Slavet, “Circumcised Supremacy” and “The ‘Special Case’ of Jewish Tradition.”

13. Also see Maciejewski’s efforts to meld this thematic to circumcision. Schäfer argues that any attempt to nuance Freud’s Lamarckism—“there can be no denying of the fact that, in Freud’s view, both an individual and a people or an ethnic group shlep ‘fragments of phylogenetic origin’ around with them”—or even to focus on the question is beside the point (389).

14. A dispositive is a knowledge-producing, identity-authorizing discursive apparatus that, in this case, connected biblical citations, stories, images, phantasies, laws, kosher slaughterers (mohels were also often and at times referred to as Schochets), ethnographic studies, medical diagnoses, and ritual practices in Europe to construct Judentum; see Deleuze.

15. Although a registered male Jew born in Vienna in the first third of the twentieth century was as likely to be uncircumcised as circumcised—circumcision was no longer required for registration since 1871—the assumption remained that all male Jews were circumcised.

16. Non-Jews’ ascription of circumcision to male Jews not only signified their difference, it established that difference—even when the ritual inscription did not take place. On the contrasting performative and signifying functions of circumcision, see Lupton.

17. “Moses, His People and Monotheist Religion”—the third of the three essays that compose Moses—is divided into two parts.

18. In the first part of the third essay, Freud’s appears unable to suture his developing theory of splitting with his extant theory of repression and of trauma with drive theory. As the analogy (subsection C) enters the stage of application (subsection D), repression has returned to dominate Freud’s argumentation.
19. *Stück* is a figure that Freud employs to characterize the association of circumcision with castration and emerges in *Moses* as another remainder and reminder of the disavowal. The cut-off “piece [Stück] of [a Jew’s] penis” from the famous footnote to Freud’s “Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy” (36n1) is replaced by a “gladly forgotten [. . .] portion [Stück] of the primæval past” in *Moses* (91). Moreover, the designation of the person missing a Stück has shifted from the circumcised to the spectator/phantasist.

20. “Repetition” is a more accurate translation of *Wiederholung*.

21. Jones’s translation explicitly makes “Summary” as the title of the subsection and Freud’s *Complete Psychological Works* employ the same font size for “Summary and Recapitulation” and subsection form as the preceding prefatory notes. However, Freud’s preliminary table of contents (Grubrich-Simitis, *Early Freud* 97) ambiguously suggests that it is the title of the entire second part.

22. He even twice (zweimal) repeats the word “zweimal.”

23. For example, Zollschan wrote, “In *Judentum* the consciousness of ‘Geist’ arose over and against nature. Notions of ethics and law therefore first blossomed in *Judentum*. In this fact lies the actual crux of *Judentum’s signifi-
cance for world history*” (*Rassenproblem* 404; emphasis in original). On this general strategy, see Schäfer.

24. As Assman (“Fortschritt” 169) concludes and Schäfer seconds: “In re-
turning to the prohibition of images Freud shows that this striving for spiritual liberation is both a profoundly Jewish project and a tradition that he himself with his psychoanalysis claims to be heir to and to surpass” (399–400n52).

25. It should be recalled that the “double” is emblematic of the uncanny; see Freud, “The Uncanny.”

26. DiCenso, unlike the other seers of *Geistigkeit*, does not ignore this last mention of circumcision; indeed, he reads it as prophetically evoking a Lacanian understanding of castration (115–17). By reading this last iteration as the textual site where Freud conjoins Geistigkeit and renunciation to “delineate an acculturated [that is, formed in and through a cultural matrix of symbols and ideals and not as a mode of Jewish accommodation with the dominant culture] subjectivity incorporating intellectual, ethical, and representational (symbolic and linguistic) capacities” (145) DiCenso salvages Moses for his genealogy of Kristeva.

27. In *Moses* Freud’s one example of the contempt that the circumcised hold for the uncircumcised is not applied to the Jew but rather to the “Turk [who] will abuse a Christian as an ‘uncircumcised dog’” (30).

28. Although DiCenso (especially 112–14) would bind sublimation to the discussion of *Geistigkeit* through Freud’s discussion of the “elevation” (ge-
hoben) of the ego and the renunciation of instinct, the single mention of “sub-
limations” (*Sublimierungen*; the use of the plural suggesting achieved states rather than ongoing processes) in *Moses* (86)—in what is essentially the pré-
cis of part 2 that includes the first instance of the phrase (although pluralized again) “advance of intellectuality” (“Fortschritt in der Geistigkeit”) and precedes Freud’s account of the emergence of Christianity out of *Judentum*—is not cited anywhere. Beyond the theoretical confusion that the dynamic model
of sublimation may have presented to Freud’s metapsychology, binding sublimation to Jewish Geistigkeit may have generated associations to deviant sexuality that Freud would rather avoid. When the notion of sublimation first made appearances in his corpus, Freud tied it to the transformation of non-normative sexual aims. In his “Civilized’ Sexual Morality,” Freud comments, “The forces that can be employed for cultural activities are thus to a great extent obtained through the suppression of what are known as the perverse elements of sexual excitation” (189), whereas Freud analyzes Leonardo da Vinci’s “intellectual labor” (geistigen Arbeit; Leonardo 74) as an effect of the sublimation of homosexual libido (80–81).

29. This is Assman’s original reading in Moses the Egyptian.

30. See Grubrich-Simitis, Early Freud 77–78. Beyond the nexus of race and religion, Freud may have wished to extend the series of displacements that he proffered as the last of the deep motives for anti-Semitism: If the “misbaptized” have shifted the blame for the renunciations demanded by Christianity onto their purported origin, Judentum, and therefore are bearing a grudge against the source, then, if the source of the source could be shown to be a gentile, this generator of anti-Semitism should lose its force.


32. The 1850 edition of Richard Wagner’s Das Judentum in der Musik concludes with the contested words “die Erlösung Ahasvers—der Untergang!” (34).

33. That is, other than Judentum itself. See Geller, On Freud’s Jewish Body and Persistent Contact for an examination of how the ongoing existence of the presumably superseded and discarded—the undead—Judentum shaped Jewish-gentile relations in the European Moderne.

34. Or, even, monotheism. In his classic “Le Fétichisme dans l’amour,” Binet analogizes sexual fetishism with monotheism (274).

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