When in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel marks his transcendence of the Kantian and post-Kantian traditions and initiates his new understanding of the self as a historical and social being, he immediately invokes sexual opposition and woman. Since women receive a minimal and usually derogatory representation in Hegel's corpus, it is often assumed that they have a marginal value in his system; his discussions of them are taken for mere unreflected, ideological assertions bereft of the philosophical rigor that marks his analyses of Spirit, the state, religion, and the (male) individual. Yet a concern with gender intervenes.
as Spirit finally erupts into history. Further complicating the familiar assessment is the series of contrasting depictions of woman that appear at this crux of his presentation. As the Ethical Order section unfolds, Hegel introduces one of his most famous characterizations, the reverent portrayal of Antigone as the epitome of intuitive, desire-free, ethical womanhood. Then he makes one of his most infamous remarks, depicting evil, pleasure-seeking womankind as "the everlasting irony [in the life] of the community." This apothegm itself embodies a strange juxtaposition; it pairs woman, to whom Hegel denies self-consciousness, with irony, which epitomizes for him the apotheosis of self-reflexive subjectivity.

Several earlier studies have also recognized Hegel’s representation of woman as the linchpin of the *Phenomenology*. Patricia Jagentowicz Mills, for example, argues that Hegel’s general exclusion of women from the life of Spirit, from self-consciousness, undercut his claims to universalization; Jacques Derrida holds that Hegel’s focus upon familial and genealogical relations contaminated his claim for the immaculate conception of Absolute Knowledge with the mess of everyday life. Rather than demonstrating how the aporias and anomalies that pervade Hegel’s representation of women subvert his philosophical intentions, this examination of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* argues that they are symptoms of a historical crisis. By attending to the critical moment of Spirit’s emergence in the Ethical Order and the multiple representations of women that ensue, this article situates Hegel’s discourse on woman at a specific conjuncture of competing class and gender identities. It argues that the constructions of the desire-free sister, on the one hand, and the (for Hegel) oxymoronic and perilous figure of the self-conscious woman, on the other, mark his attempt to resolve the manifold contradictions besetting the formation of the German bourgeoisie. In particular, this analysis locates in both Antigone and the ascription of woman as the everlasting irony a reinscription of an earlier reaction to that crisis. Hegel is responding to the novel *Lucinde*, published seven years earlier by the leading figure of the German early

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Romantics, the man he would later call the "father of irony," Friedrich Schlegel. In his analysis of the Ethical Order and his construction of gender paradigms, Hegel attempts to counter Lucinde's seeming subversion of the social and ethical underpinnings of German bourgeois society.

The representation of Antigone serves as both a foil to woman's potential for amorality and a substitute for Lucinde. She functions as an apotropaic monument; like a gravestone or gargoyle, she stands in place of and thereby staves off the dangerous other that threatens the existent order. Hegel's Antigone, like Schlegel's Lucinde before her, was generated as part of the ongoing male exchange of apotropaic representations of women that helped ground the autonomous male subject and maintain a bourgeois society defined in terms of the sexual division of labor, roles, and character. Further, Antigone is paired with the divine Man, who, reenacting Spirit's externalization from and rec-
conciliation with its essence, exemplifies the life of the self-realizing male individual. Together they provided the necessary basis for the fulfillment of Hegel's own social-ontological agenda: the ideal state in which man finds his full self-expression.

This study begins by examining the anomalous character of both Antigone and woman as the irony in the life of the community. Uncovering possible sources for their construction, it next traces their genealogy through several trends that mark the development of the bourgeoisie and that converge in the uproar surrounding Schlegel's Lucinde. Then, following the principle that in analyzing a work of systematic intentions like the *Phenomenology* it is bad method to isolate particular representations of women and to ignore their connections with others that appear unrelated, it returns to the moment at which irony is superseded. Two additional anomalous women—the girl with the self-conscious gleam and the mother of the first Holy Family—and the divine Man of the Revealed Religion section confirm the thesis that gender and sexual opposition are the necessary presuppositions for the dynamics and actuality of both Hegel's society and his social-ontological agenda.

**ANTIGONE'S CONFINEMENT**

Leading up to his presentation of Spirit—the *Phenomenology*'s protagonist and the protean embodiment of humankind's dialectically unfolding knowledge of its self and world—as the Ethical Order, Hegel had traced its development from sense-certainty to the truth of self-certainty to the certainty and truth of Reason. Immediately prior to its emergence into history, Spirit had unconsciously sought its truth in individual abstract and subjective laws that in the form of Reason it had imposed upon the world. The Ethical Order arises when Spirit becomes conscious of itself and realizes that its truth is found in the law of objective social structures. And coeval with this emergence of society in the *Phenomenology* is the appearance of sex-coded social roles.

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According to Hegel, once Spirit becomes self-conscious, it “exhibits itself as a world articulated into [separate] spheres” (*PG*, p. 328; *PS*, par. 445): that of the human law (the polis) and that of the divine law (the family). Although divided, this world is initially “an immaculate world, a world unsullied by any internal dissension” (*PG*, p. 341; *PS*, par. 463). Equilibrium is maintained through a natural sexual division of labor: men uphold the human law, and women uphold the divine. “Nature, not the accident of circumstances or choice, assigns one sex to one law, the other to the other law” (*PG*, p. 343; *PS*, par. 465).

When a woman acts in accord with the divine law, she is acting ethically. While the ethical is determined by its universality, which eschews any mixture or impurity, love and desire are directed toward the particular and the contingent. Although desire (*Begierde*) had at an earlier stage in the *Phenomenology* mediated the struggle for self-consciousness (*PG*, pp. 143–44; *PS*, par. 174–76), at this juncture woman’s desire, which is preeminently sexual, is incompatible with both self-consciousness and the ethical. Her desire impedes the performance of ethical duty, which is to fulfill the divine law.

Woman’s relationship to the divine law is defined by her familial relationships to men, as wife, mother, daughter, and sister. When these relationships are determined by desire, they can be multiple and replaceable; in other words, they are particular and contingent. Further, the objective reality of woman’s desire-determined relationships is always separate from and therefore other than herself: the dead parents, the departing son (or daughter), and the newborn. These relationships entail both loss and loss of control. Consequently, they are ethical only to the extent to which each obviates woman’s natural desire (*begierdelos* [*PG*, p. 338; *PS*, par. 457]). Since the truth of the mother or wife is inextricably tied to the consequence of natural desire, reproduction, which unleashes the bad infinity of the generations (*PG*, p. 336; *PS*, par. 456), Hegel gives ethical primacy to the sister and her desire-free relationship to her brother.

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9 While the daughter greets her parents’ death with “ethical resignation,” her relationship with them when they are alive has no positive content. Separation from the parents is the precondition for “that existence of her own of which she is capable” (*PG*, p. 337; *PS*, par. 457); however, that existence is one of becoming a sign of the worth of the youth, through whom “the daughter, freed from her dependence [on the family], obtains the dignity and enjoyment of wifehood” (*PG*, p. 353; *PS*, par. 475).
10 His conclusion finds classical support on an interpretive leap from a passage in Sophocles’ *Antigone*: “One husband gone, I might have found another, / or a child from a new
This ideal relation forms "the limit at which the self-contained life of the Family breaks up and goes beyond itself" (PG, p. 338; PS, par. 458). Family-centered life dissolves when the brother passes over into the public realm, the sphere of human law, and the "sister becomes, or the wife remains, the head of the household and the guardian of the divine law" (PG, p. 338; PS, par. 459).11 Two consequences follow from the characterization of the brother-sister relationship as the limit of the Family and thus as the border between the public and the private. First, their pure and unmixed relation survives the break. An ironic effect of their union (PG, p. 341; PS, par. 463) is that the perduring love and womanly duty of the sister, in the figure of Antigone, leads to the clash of laws and to the eventual collapse of the Ethical Order. Second, the separation of brother and sister institutes sexual opposition within the ethical world: "This moment [i.e., the ethical world] loses the indeterminateness, which it still has [in natural difference], and the contingent diversity of dispositions and capacities. It is now the specific antithesis of the two sexes whose natural existence acquired at the same time the significance of their ethical determination" (PG, p. 338; PS, par. 459). Sexual diversity hardens into a necessary stage of Spirit's self-realization.12

The sexual division of labor is indispensable to the Ethical Order. Woman as the expression of the Family maintains the worship of the Penates and performs the rites for the dead. By performing these rites, woman "supplements" the abstract, natural process of death with the movement of consciousness; thereby the dissolution of the particular individual is transformed into a rational, substantive, and universal act. She takes upon herself "the work of Nature," the "act of destruction" (PG, p. 333; PS, par. 452); rescuing her brother from the natural forces of corruption, the woman installs him as an imperishable, presiding

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11 The addition of "or the wife . . ." indicates Hegel's attempt to justify his own argument for the primacy of the sister by means of this trace of historical actuality. His reasoning, which grounds the ethical world on sexual opposition, finds its objective correlative in the Athenian requirement of marriage for gaining the rights of citizenship in the polis. In the Philosophy of Right, par. 177, the entry of the brother into the public realm is also the entry into marriage.

12 Hence arises a further, more properly philosophical necessity for sexual opposition. Marriage, which is coeval with the separation of brother and sister, is a union that sanctions difference; thus it is similar in content to the speculative dialectic of Spirit. Cf. Lacoue-Labarthe, pp. 68–70, and Derrida, pp. 211ff., on the tie of sexual opposition and the speculative.
member of the community (i.e., one of the Lares). The woman, in performing her ethical duty, co-opts death and Nature for the life of Spirit. Meanwhile, her domestic labor, unlike that of the bondsman who comes to recognize his selfhood in the products of his transformative labor on Nature (PG, pp. 150–55; PS, pars. 189–96), is passed over in silence. The Penates, whom Hegel associates in an offhand and anachronistic fashion with the ancestors (PG, p. 337; PS, par. 452), were in fact the Roman gods of the larder. But in ethical duty there is no space for contingency, and woman, unlike the bondsman, does not objectify herself by her labor. Cooking a meal, cleaning a house, and carrying a child to term lack the permanence necessary for objective truth and self-recognition (cf. PG, pp. 153–54; PS, par. 195). The only activity of woman to which Hegel grants ethical significance is her act of piety.

Thus Hegel posits asymmetrical ethical determinations of man and woman (PG, p. 337; PS, par. 457). By remaining confined within the family household, woman’s ethical activity provides the formal conditions for man to separate and reconcile, in his person, the opposing spheres. While man “exteriorizes” himself and enters the public realm as a self-conscious ethical agent, woman’s work at home preserves his place within the family for his return to private individuality. Since he is capable of expending his desire in the private realm by engaging in contingent social relationships and in acts like making love, he can maintain both the ethical purity of the public realm and the purity of his own ethical life (PG, pp. 339-40; PS, par. 461). Woman thus ensures man the opportunity to participate in, homologize himself with, and ultimately identify himself as the dirempting and reintegrating Spirit.

While the asymmetrical division of labor furthers man’s development, woman’s confinement to the household, the arena of her ethical activity as well as her natural, social relationships, leads to “an admixture of particularity,” because of which “her ethical life is not pure”

13 Furthermore, this process is described as a marriage: she “weds [vermähl] the blood-relation to the bosom of the earth [dem Schoße der Erde]” (PG, p. 333; PS, par. 452). The use of vermähl ironically sustains the emphasis on the woman’s extinction or sacrifice of desire. The sister gives her brother away in marriage. She ensures that he and not she enters the locus of (licit) desire.

14 This representation of woman in the family suggests both a naturalization of the sentimental bourgeois family in which woman’s domestic labor is a labor of love and a retraction of the bourgeois family back to ancient Greece.

15 The necessity for the sexual division of labor is not limited to the ethical order but is implicit in all social forms. The ahistorical nature of woman and the panhistorical determination of her place are rendered explicit in the Philosophy of Right, pars. 165–66.
Woman's confinement may also preclude her attaining self-consciousness. Serving the divine law within the household, woman is unable to recognize a contradiction between herself and nature; she has no occasion for the confrontation with an other by which she could become aware of herself as an independent self. When she does relate to other members of her family, such as her husband, she is incapable of "knowing herself as this particular self in the other partner" (PG, p. 337; PS, par. 457): the perception of self that occurs in the mutual recognition of husband and wife "is a natural and not an ethical one; it is only a representation [Vorstellung], an image of Spirit, not actually Spirit itself" (PG, p. 336; PS, par. 456).

Moreover, unlike man, who is self-conscious in his universal ethical life, woman is by Hegelian fiat innately incapable of becoming self-conscious. Because she is the childbearer, woman represents the amoral principle of life that precedes the struggle toward and risk of self-consciousness; she represents that from which man must distinguish himself in order to articulate himself as an "I" (cf. PG, pp. 141-42, 208-9; PS, pars. 171, 266). Further, she is "intuitive"; rather than attain consciousness of her ethical duty, she is moved by "an inner feeling" (PG, p. 336; PS, par. 457). Hegel's determination of woman's character inverts social cause and psychological effect: her confinement in the family does not determine her psychological development; rather, her inborn nature ordains her for the domestic sphere. By denying woman the possibility of self-consciousness, Hegel's structure of sexual opposition in the Ethical Order presents man with the exclusive rights to the life of Spirit.

For his representations of both the ethical life of woman and the destruction of the Ethical Order, Hegel adapts Sophocles' Antigone, the ideal sister. Because Antigone is devoid of natural desire in her relationships, particularly with her brother, and because she has "the highest intuitive awareness of what is ethical" (PG, p. 336; PS, par. 457), she is able fully to take upon herself her duty, which "does not suffer any perversion of its content" (PG, p. 345; PS, par. 467). She acts not out of animal passion but out of an all-consuming pathos that is her substance. She is her "character" (Charakter [PG, p. 343; PS, par. 466]), a pure embodiment of the ethical consciousness of women.

Without self-awareness Antigone actualizes the implicit truth of the divine law; she acts with "the simple certainty of immediate truth" (PG, p. 345; PS, par. 468). By asserting the divine law she confronts the human law, whose validity she denies. Antigone commits a crime (PG,
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p. 346; PS, par. 468), and in conceding her guilt she acknowledges the only partial truth of both laws (PG, p. 348; PS, pars. 470–71). Since her acknowledgment simultaneously entails her death, this paragon of womankind's possibility cannot herself realize the truth of her endeavor (PG, p. 348; PS, par. 471): the consciousness of the unity of both laws in Spirit. But, at this stage of Spirit's development, neither does the bearer of the male human law, the community; it mistakenly believes its law universal and triumphant. Consequently, Antigone's crime and punishment destroy the equilibrium of the Ethical Order and initiate a process that leads, with the aid of woman as irony, to the supersession of the nation and the appearance of a universal world where legal status reigns.

Hegel graphically depicts this further development of Spirit by incorporating into his presentation the combat between Polynoeices and Eteocles, Creon's refusal to allow Polynoeices to be buried, and the revenge inflicted upon Thebes by the other communities (PG, pp. 349–52; PS, pars. 473-74). However, in Hegel's version the narrative of Spirit diverges from the chronology of myth; a battle between two nameless brothers and the disdain of the rights and rites of the divine law occur after the death of Antigone. Hegel then raises the fall of the polis to a world-historical dimension and redraws the relations between men and women. In his account the ethical context of their relations is elided. Instead of Antigone, Hegel casts womankind (Weiblichkeit) on the world-historical stage. Maintaining the Family for the sake of her particular contingent interests, woman is the "internal enemy" (PG, p. 352; PS, par. 475) who undermines the community by exploiting the relationships that determine her: mother, sister, daughter, and wife. The generic woman intrigues against the universal by seducing and tempting men, causing them to stray from their ethical duty. She "pervert[s] the universal property of the state [the young men] into a possession and ornament for the Family" (PG, pp. 352–53; PS, par. 475). Yet, because of her reproductive capacity, woman remains necessary to the survival of the community. Young men are needed: "The community only gets an existence through its interference with the happiness of the Family, and by dissolving [individual] self-consciousness [young men] into the universal" (PG, p. 352; PS, par. 475). Since womankind is both subversive and necessary, Hegel characterizes her as "the everlasting irony [in the life] of the community" (PG, p. 352; PS, par. 475). Woman as irony apparently destroys the ethical world and occasions the movement of the dialectic.
Yet Hegel also ironizes his designation of woman as irony. The assumption that he assigns her responsibility for the breakup of the ethical world is not entirely accurate; Hegel displaces the referent of the “suppressed . . . principle of corruption” (PG, p. 354; PS, par. 475) from womankind to the principle of individuality with which she is associated. Woman is to blame, but responsibility for the destruction is placed in the lap of “the brave youth” who is the object and product of her desire. Even her irony is, in and of itself, impotent: woman “would be quite ineffectual if the community did not recognize the power of youth” (PG, p. 353; PS, par. 475). Her merely figurative and merely natural character is exploited by the so-called cunning of Reason; that is, while woman’s desire-driven, nonethical acts cannot in themselves participate positively in Spirit’s self-realization, Spirit appropriates their effects for its continued development. Hegel marginalizes woman by his world-historical determination of her as a trope and as desirebound. Indeed Hegel drops her by the wayside of Spirit’s—and man’s—path to Absolute Knowledge. Consistent with her representation, woman makes her last appearance in the Phenomenology as an object of analysis in a subordinate clause: “The brave youth in whom woman [Weiblichkeit] finds her pleasure” (PG, p. 353; PS, par. 475).

Because the actual effectivity of woman’s ironic position in the community is undercut, the Phenomenology’s association of women with irony becomes even more surprising. For Hegel, irony is neither a neutral descriptive term nor a mere rhetorical figure; it is the peak of finite Spirit’s, of man’s, self-consciousness. But if self-consciousness is a potential that woman lacks, how can she be associated with irony? The answer lies in another represented woman. In his depiction of woman as irony Hegel left a remnant of his attempt to handle the provocation of the novel that bore her name: Friedrich Schlegel’s Lucinde.

16 Women (Weiber) do make a brief appearance in the Phenomenology’s discussion of the “living work of art.” Evoking the Bacchae, Hegel depicts a “crowd of frenzied [schwärmernder] females” who, by having consumed the fruit by which abstract Spirit has achieved objective existence, represent “the untamed revelry [Täumel] of Nature in self-conscious [i.e., human] form” (PG, p. 527; PS, par. 724). Although the women, as human beings, are by definition self-conscious forms, they have no self-consciousness during the act of communion; Hegel refers to the “stupor of consciousness” (PG, p. 528; PS, par. 726) and the “meaningless stammer of Bacchic frenzy” (PG, p. 529; PS, par. 726). In this section, he contrasts “the feminine principle of nourishment [with] the masculine principle, the self-impelling force of self-conscious existence” (PG, p. 526; PS, par. 721). Later, other representations who are presumably female appear, notably the “priestess” and the “sisters of Fate” in the discussion of the Religion of Art (PG, p. 537; PS, par. 737), but Hegel does not specifically remark upon the relationship between their purported gender and their character.
Schlegel’s work responded to the manifold contradictions besetting the German bourgeoisie. Schlegel and his countrymen were confronted by such antinomies as the ideal of rational humanity (Menschlichkeit) and the actuality of rational proprietorship, feeling and propriety, the subjective and the objective, the sensuous and the spiritual, the individual and the social, the male and the female. In turn, the composition and publication of Hegel’s Phenomenology was a later moment in this history of perception and reception. The pivotal role played in Hegel’s work by the family, sexual opposition, the representation of woman, and the depiction of the man as the father of himself is consonant with, perhaps even the culmination of, a series of social, cultural, and ideational trends that mark the contradiction-laden formation of his class.

While the conditions of the nascent bourgeoisie varied in the hundreds of petty principalities that made up the Holy Roman Empire during the eighteenth century, the formation of the German bourgeoisie generally followed the gradual breakup of the joint locus of work and kinship, the household. Bourgeois men began to leave the house to fill the rolls of the burgeoning civil bureaucracy of the German absolutist states, while the so-called nuclear family took up residence in the home where masters, wives, journeymen, apprentices, children, servants, and others had worked and lived together. But the male bourgeoisie now earned its livelihood within, and was both excluded and dominated by, absolutism’s symbolically determined network of social relationships and identities. Consequently, the construction of individual identity took place and collective support was found in the family, and literature, writing in the objective, public domain, became the stage for class awareness and development as well as the arena for class assertion.


The representation of women and their relationships with men in German classical drama was a premier site of the struggle for legitimation. In a series of plays, most notably Lessing's *Emilia Galotti* and *Miss Sara Sampson*, the title characters bore all the bourgeois virtues. Further, they reenacted the struggle between the rising class and the aristocracy. Drawing from within themselves, these women defied attempted seduction by the ignoble nobility and so asserted the propriety, honor, and legitimacy of the learned, internalized values. Like Hegel's Antigone, the women performed their duty, denied desire, and usually died virgins at the end. But they were not the only standard-bearers for the bourgeoisie.

By asserting the universality of a specific social framework rather than articulating itself in economic terms like the English or in political terms like the French, the German bourgeoisie defined itself over and against the aristocracy. It contested its opponents by disseminating more-prescriptive-than-descriptive representations of social forms; it professed the division of society into separate gender-coded spheres of activity, namely, the objective, public sphere of male productive labor and the subjective, private sphere of family intimacy. For example, the ideal of the family as a center for child raising and for the intensification of intimacy and emotional relationships was advanced by various “moral weeklies.” Issue after issue opposed the depth of feeling and the cultivation of inner personality epitomized by bourgeois companionate marriage to the superficiality and the social and economic endogamy of the nobility.

The model of freely chosen spiritual companionship inculcated in the bourgeoisie during its rise in the eighteenth century was often contrasted in other literature with the not exclusively aristocratic conception of marriage as a site for instinctual satisfaction and the production of children. The privileging of feeling in the writing of the latter half of the century, however, forged a union of the spiritual and the sensuous. It gave a role to passion in love and to love in the creation of marriage. But the contradictions within the social and ideational devel-

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19 And yet another front: the propounding of the bourgeois moral utopia of rational humanity as exemplified by Lessing's *Nathan the Wise* and Hippel's *On the Civic Improvement of Women*. In Lessing's work the ideal appears not so much in the depiction of the Jew Nathan as a good man as in that of Nathan raising his adopted daughter to rationality; Hippel develops the consequences of the ideal by proposing that women can attain full civil rights.

opment of the bourgeoisie prevented the realization of this ideal of partnership. For example, while in popular literature love was the pre-requisite for marriage, most bourgeois marriages presupposed that the man had already attained a certain degree of financial security. The separation of livelihood from home life also changed the character of partnership. In the space where he worked, man acquired new legitimation for his authority by possessing property, embodying the bourgeois values of talent and achievement, and having familiarity with the world. He also created a space for the disposition of women: the domestic hearth. Hence, the supervaluation of man’s work coincided with a great increase in the value of woman’s domesticity. Woman’s work correspondingly was devalued, or rather, the arduousness of her activity was effaced as it was rendered idyllic and reduced to a labor of love.

Contradictions between bourgeois practices and their representations were not the only factors that made it increasingly difficult to reconcile the ideals that suffused bourgeois polemical literature with the actuality of rational proprietorship and propriety. For bourgeois thinkers, theological law no longer legitimated either state or family; yet contract theory, which had determined relationships within the moral utopia of rational humanity, put in question the indissolubility of marriage and by implication also what was taken to be the natural sexual division of labor. An intrinsic structural flaw complicated the attempt to provide a principle to undergird bourgeois society: the bourgeoisie conflated the familial and the sexual such that the rules of kinship no longer determined the positions of the mother and her child.

By 1807, when the *Phenomenology* appeared, the conditions for the self-representation of the male bourgeoisie and its necessary other, women within the sexual division of labor, had altered. In the absence of absolute authority, the gender-coded separation of the public and private realms needed to be maintained. The ideal of rational humanity disappeared, and the triumph of bourgeois values (*Bürgerlichkeit*)

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like proprietorship and propriety was marked by two particular developments in the representations of the sexual division of labor: the emergence of the law of paternity and the doctrine of sexual stereotypes (*Geschlechtscharakter* [cf. Hausen, p. 20]).

Paternity, whereby man authorizes his products (including himself), conjoined the spheres of the bifurcated society. It allowed the reproduction of the public sphere by providing legitimate citizens, and it maintained the male presence in the private by fathering heirs. The second development, the sexual stereotype, masked the contradictions within bourgeois consciousness and society by determining gender identity and opposition at the border between the public and the private. On the one hand, sexual stereotypes legitimated as they naturalized the polarization of gender roles; on the other, polarization paralleled the dissociation of work and family life. The active, rational, intellectual male was opposed to the passive, emotional, intuitive female. The promise of partnership became submerged beneath these idealizations of character, as well as beneath the structural transformations that endeavored to make them actual.

The doctrine of sexual stereotypes also helped sustain the law of paternity against an inherent obstacle: woman was the stumbling block to the German bourgeois man's autonomous production of himself. He could determine himself as autonomous only by differentiation from the female; the public domain, the site of his self-determination, required the existence of the private, female domain. Yet acknowledging the interdependence of the sexes would recognize woman's right to assert her own identity and would cost man his productive autonomy. In order to efface his dependence, the production of a representation substituted for the necessary relationship with the female other and was then placed in the public realm. Once public, the representation becomes by definition objective; that is, it is acknowledged by all (men) as true. Since the now-objective product bears the producer's signature, its objectivity reflects back upon him; his legitimate existence as a subject is acknowledged by all. Although the producer is dependent on his product, as producer of the representation he has produced himself. By representing woman, man represented himself as a subject.

Only in taking up the pen, that is, only in the poeisis by which the

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male subject founded himself, could men produce the literary substitutes for woman that contained her threat.\textsuperscript{24} In the exchange of such representations the male bourgeoisie preserved the legitimacy of the law of paternity; by authoring these texts, they authorized themselves. Further, as virtually the only participants in this public transaction, they affirmed the naturalness of the norm, namely, the sexual division of stereotyped labor. But the appearance of Schlegel's \textit{Lucinde} confused matters.

\textit{BOURGEOIS SPIRITS}

Schlegel, the scion of a distinguished Hanoverian bourgeois family, a salon attendee, the author of several works on classical literature, and the founding editor of \textit{Atheneum}, the journal of criticism and touchstone of German early Romanticism, was caught up in many of the historical developments just described. As a student of the philosophy, politics, and literature of his time, he was, moreover, acutely aware of the efforts to overcome the feeling of being torn or divided in two by reconciling perceived contradictions in bourgeois experience. Like others of his generation, he strove to create a moral public sphere, which he believed might be realized through art placed before the public.\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Lucinde} represented the desire to recognize and to reunite the fundamental self-contradictoriness of experience and the world through the love relationship between Julius and the title character. \textit{Lucinde} celebrated sexual union as an emblem of the union of mortal and immortal, body and mind, male and female. In the "true marriage" between Julius and Lucinde, Schlegel proposed both an allegory of and a paradigm for proper relationships within the projected moral public realm.\textsuperscript{26} And in the character Lucinde, sensuousness supple-


mented the spiritual qualities of an Antigone, in whom, according to an earlier essay by Schlegel, "all [human] strengths are united and perfected; her character is divinity itself."^27

However, rather than providing a critical alternative to bourgeois values and structures through the creation of a new public sphere, *Lucinde* sustained them.^28 Beneath the egalitarian and/or anarchic-erotic guise of its imagined public sphere—a world peopled by the paradigmatic pairing of Julius and Lucinde—is the mantle of the family. The distribution of gender roles within this represented social form penetrates to the core of bifurcated bourgeois society.

Although the substance of *Lucinde* reproduced the position of the German bourgeois reading public, its readers ironically received Schlegel's allegory as the immoral expression of its sensual images, if not its social and spiritual pretensions. Many felt that the novel was little more than a thinly veiled account of Schlegel's scandalous extramarital affair with Dorothea Veit, the wife of a banker and the daughter of Moses Mendelssohn. Even more ironically, by transgressing the public realm through its representation of the public sphere as the metamorphosed private one, *Lucinde* partially fulfilled Schlegel's intention of creating a new public. The chorus of braying voices directed at the novel not only echoed bourgeois values but led to the articulation and assertion of bifurcated society as well.^29

Even though *Lucinde*’s reception helped differentiate the public from the private, the novel’s representation of the private—Lucinde and her relationship with Julius—remained in the public. *Lucinde* became a surd in the self-articulation of bourgeois society; its publication brought heterogeneity into a sphere maintained by the exclusion of (female) otherness. It created an ongoing crisis constantly fueled by the few scenes and details that deviated from accepted public practice. Paradigmatic of these scenes was the obscurely drawn “role exchange” (*Rollentausch*), where Julius assumes the passive and Lucinde the active


role in lovemaking. Since in the public realm the individual portends the universal, *Lucinde* became the Angelus of the universal role exchange: the subversion of the gender-coded bifurcations of bourgeois society.

*Lucinde* was still taking its toll in Jena when, in November 1800, Hegel was preparing to commence his career in academic philosophy at the university there. During his tenure he addressed an array of problems that would culminate in the *Phenomenology*. Hegel's agenda in that work in many ways pointed and counterpointed the problems both addressed in *Lucinde* and provoked by its publication. Like Schlegel, he experienced his time as one of social and epistemological crisis. He realized that the Kantian limits of cognition constituted not only an outer boundary but an inner law, whereby the difference between the knowing self and the unknowable other was a relationship that conditioned the actuality of the knower. The other, implied by these limits, denied the autonomy of the self; it both defined and negated the self. The presence of the limits and the implied other led to an "essential disquietude." Here in idealistic guise Hegel confronted the contradictions of gender-bifurcated society that unsettled the German male bourgeoisie. He sought to resolve the predicament of being divided in two and to restore that imagined original "harmony that has been rent"; as he states, "Dichotomy is the source of the need for philosophy." In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel endeavored to satisfy this need on individual, social, and historical levels.

The *Phenomenology*’s attempted resolution of the crises of bourgeois...
individual gender and class identity is the site of Hegel’s reception of Schlegel and Lucinde. Through the production of substitutionary representations like Antigone and woman as irony, Hegel’s text confronted the bourgeois problematic that the critic and his creation personified. Earlier attempts to situate Schlegel and his novel in the Phenomenology delimited Hegel’s treatment to just another moment of his general supersession of philosophical predecessors and competitors. Those studies employed Hegel’s epistemological goal of achieving Absolute Knowledge and his philosophical-historical goal of recuperating the history of philosophy as base points in their critical triangulation of Schlegel’s location. Some attribute Hegel’s trivialization (PG, pp. 63–64; PS, par. 68) and moral condemnation (PG, pp. 485–90; PS, pars. 660–66) of Schlegel and his work to personal animosity; others accept Hegel’s dismissal as the legitimate analysis of a minor and immoral work. But neither group exploits the social-ontological dimension of Hegel’s general endeavor or treats concretely Lucinde’s reception: the feared societal consequences of inserting the private into the public sphere and subverting marriage through emphasis upon sexual union and alleged validation of an adulterous affair. While these studies assumed that in his depiction of the evil conscience Hegel associated subjectivity with Lucinde, they did not educe the implications and ironies of the conjunction of the self-consciousness’s apotheosis with woman’s representation. That conjunction, epitomized by Hegel’s characterization of woman as “the everlasting irony [in the life] of the community,” signals that his response to Lucinde and the historical crisis in which it was embedded is located in the Ethical Order. Consequently, since Hegel’s depiction of Antigone neither explicitly contrasts her with other represented women nor makes any manifest reference to Lucinde, both their common function as gender paradigms and Hegel’s strategy of substitution are overlooked.

That Hegel’s attempted effacement of both novel and character left a remainder in the generalized representation of woman as irony indicates that suppressing the presence of Lucinde behind another representation did not eliminate its threat. Woman is no less necessary to

the community (that is, the universal individual or Spirit) than self-conscious subjectivity is to the individual consciousness (that is, finite spirit); yet, for either woman or irony, rather than man, to determine itself as absolute unleashes the force of the negative against the objective truth. Two additional anomalous associations of woman with self-consciousness further confirm that Hegel's countering representations of woman are less an implicit moral condemnation of Schlegel's novel than they are a symptomatic expression of the endeavor to repress Lucinde's effects and resolve the contradictions endemic to bourgeois society. These occasions, which tie women in similarly strange ways with the processes and products of desire, occur in the domain usually designated as woman's: religion.

**The Two Holy Families**

Within the *Phenomenology* Hegel's supersession of irony is mediated by religion. At the end of the stage of Morality, Religion dialectically answers the yearning of the Fichtean "I = I" both for the objective and for the freedom of ethical activity. Religion is "the reconciling Yea" (*PG*, p. 494; *PS*, par. 671) between the ironized identification of the "I" of the Schlegelian evil conscience (absolute individuality) and the "I" of the evil conscience's "hard-hearted" judge (universal essence). And Revealed Religion arises out of the absolute subjectivity of comedic irony in which the Religion of Art culminates. With the appearance of Revealed Religion, woman and self-consciousness explicitly meet.

This transition between the anguished cry of the Unhappy (Ironic) Consciousness, "God is dead," (*PG*, p. 547; *PS*, par. 752), and the yearned-for revelation of the "emergence . . . of Spirit as it becomes self-consciousness" (*PG*, p. 549; *PS*, par. 754) is itself mediated by Hegel's curious creation: "the girl [das Mädchen]" with "the gleam of her self-conscious eye" (*PG*, pp. 547–48; *PS*, par. 753). Following the recollection of the desolation both within and outside the Unhappy Consciousness, of a self and a world that are empty of significance, the narrative perspective radically shifts. The chronicling of Spirit's past development is interrupted by a return to the collective present ("for us"). Here Spirit proffers a homily on the depths to which it descended as the Unhappy Consciousness. In this intercalation, Spirit compares the evisceration of the substance of the works of the Religion of Art by the ironist with what they "have become . . . for us now—beautiful
fruit already picked from the tree, which a friendly fate has offered us, as a girl [i.e., the one with ‘the gleam of her self-conscious eye’] might set the fruit before us. It cannot give us the actual life in which they existed" (PG, pp. 547–48; PS, par. 753).

There is no apparent logical necessity internal to the unfolding development of Spirit for the maiden’s tempting apparition. Her extensive representation is, however, intricately connected to the Unhappy Consciousness. Like the Unhappy Consciousness, she does not, cannot, reproduce the “actual world”; unlike that consciousness, she provides a “veiled recollection” of it (PG, p. 548; PS, par. 753). In offering the plucked fruit, she duplicates the ironist’s act of negation, but she redirects negation to the needs of Spirit. The maiden thus supplements the Unhappy Consciousness both by substituting for it in the course of the narrative and by completing its work. She gives meaning to the process by which irony emptied its world of significance, and she serves Spirit.36 The “girl who offers us the plucked fruits is more than the Nature which directly provides them . . . because she sums all this up in a higher mode” (PG, p. 548; PS, par. 753). Although emptied of their actuality, both the Religion of Art and its products can be seen in their relation to the unfolding of Spirit. Because of the maiden, the Spirit of these artworks, which was only “outwardly manifested [veräußerten],” is now internalized (Er-Innerung [PG, p. 548; PS, par. 753]) by those who receive it. The maiden’s act of negation, unlike that of irony, does not result in yearning for what is beyond; instead, her act integrates within all that was outside. It gathers all into “the Spirit that is itself conscious of itself as Spirit” (PG, p. 548; PS, par. 753). Ironically, the irony of the community, a woman, has by her supplementation subverted the negating principle of irony.

This interruptive mediation serves a number of functions. First, it anticipates the discussion of the relationship between the empirical and its representation. As the embodiment of “inwardizing,” moreover, the depiction of the girl both demonstrates the process of supersession and provides the interpretive key for the discussion of Revealed Religion that follows. Having a woman who is also not yet a woman—das Mädchen, “the girl,” both grammatically and semantically preexists sexual identity—accomplish these tasks apparently accomplishes several other important tasks as well. In the Phenomenology, only a woman who has not actualized her sexuality and who is associated with self-con-

36 Mädchen derives from Magd, “maid” or “female servant.”
sciousness, in part if not in essence, can serve Spirit. Likewise, Antigone is free of desire and is placed at the limits of self-consciousness by her immediate identification with the truth of the divine law.

Woman's break with her sexual identity is imaged by the girl offering fruits. While the maiden on the verge of sexual maturity signals the continuity of potential, her complement, the beautiful fruit, marks the discontinuity implicit in full, natural actuality. In Nature discontinuity and continuity cannot be reconciled; when fruit ripens, it either is plucked or falls off the tree. Any reproduction, natural like the fruit or artificial like the artworks to which they are compared, is stillborn, that is, without actuality. Reproduction cannot restore the truth of its actual source. Furthermore, since truth lies in the recognition of the relation and difference between product and source, the truth of the source is at best only a partial truth—until Absolute Knowledge, the goal of the Phenomenology and mankind, is achieved, and Spirit is recognized as both the source and the truth.

By offering up the fruit, the maiden also offers up a sacrifice; by denying the value for Spirit of all reproduction, she also self-consciously repudiates the womanness that Hegel associates with reproduction and desire, and she affirms the truth of male principle.37 Thereby, she reconfirms Hegel's exclusion of women from pursuing the life of Spirit.

Immediately following the representation of the maiden, the narrative returns to the recollected unfolding of Spirit. The Phenomenology's dialectic demands that the theoclasm and absolute subjectivity represented by the ironic Subject's usurping the place of Substance be superseded by an immanent incarnational religion in which the Substance becomes Subject. However, Hegel, a Lutheran, substitutes the particular case of Christianity, signaled by the Holy Family, for the general case of the divine-human unity of incarnation:

Of this Spirit, which has abandoned the form of Substance and enters existence in the shape of self-consciousness, it may therefore be said—if we wish to employ relationships derived from natural generation—that it has an actual mother but an implicit [ansichseienden] father. For actuality or self-consciousness, and the

37 The supersession of the feminine by the masculine is closely correlated with the truth value of cognitive claims. The contingency of empirical accounts (i.e., the testimony of the mother) lacks the truth value of the law that sustains the male’s claim to nine-month memories (Erinnerungen).
in-itself as substance, are its two moments through whose reciprocal externalization, each becoming the other, Spirit comes into existence as this their unity. (PG, p. 550; PS, par. 755)

To effect the substitution of the particular for the general Hegel inserts another anomalous association of woman with self-consciousness.

At this point in the *Phenomenology* biological metaphor interweaves with dialectical explanation. Comprising an actual mother and an implicit father, the first of Hegel’s two representations of the Holy Family functions as both historical allusion and philosophical allegory. His divine Man can be said to have appeared in history insofar as he appeared in a community, that is, in a family. The superimposition of historical particularity, the union of human mother and divine father, upon logical necessity, the synthesis of actual self-consciousness and implicit substance, produces this unnatural family, the self-conscious mother and substantial father who find their unity in the divine Man.

Superimposition is just as necessary as the logic of the dialectic to the attainment of Absolute Knowledge, in part because history is the activity and self-consciousness of Spirit unfolding, and in part because Hegel insists that the truth of man can become the truth for man only if it acquires the certainty provided by an empirical phenomenon. Man needs a sensuous perception in order to rise beyond the empirical (PG, pp. 551–52; PS, par. 758). But Hegel’s postulated historical necessity also has its source in what for him is the nature and function of religion and of Christianity in particular: the recognition of the truth of Spirit. The content of Revealed Religion is absolutely adequate to the truth of Spirit; Spirit is the self-differentiation of substance and the reconciliation of substance with itself as self-consciousness: “For Spirit is the knowledge of oneself in the externalization of oneself; the being that is the movement of retaining its self-identity in its otherness” (PG, p. 552; PS, par. 759). However, when the truth of Spirit is perceived as separate from that of the Subject, it is abstract. Religion becomes “the basis, and the condition of the possibility, of [Hegel’s] system in its entirety” only when it reveals through a “speculative re-enactment” that the knowledge of the universal is, essentially, in the individual.38 Consequently, there must be a concrete individual who reconciles universality and subjectivity, infinity and the finite, and there must be only

one such individual. Plurality (particularity) devolves into the abstraction of a category and entails the loss of the universal significance of individuality. There is one such historical instantiation: Jesus the Christ.

Although Hegel requires the historical allusion to ensure the efficacy of his presentation, he endeavors to diffuse its reliance on an empirical phenomenon. He wants to maintain the logical truth of his argument while still suggesting its historical truth by specifically indicating the figurative status of the Holy Family with the qualification "if we wish to employ relationships derived from natural generation." This proviso serves to undercut the emphasis upon the empirical character of the event. By means of this stipulation Hegel is able to reassert that neither kinship nor maternal reproduction but Spirit is the source and sanction of the continuity underlying the differentiating moments that constitute the Phenomenology.

The assertion of the primacy of principle and consequent devaluation of the feminine empirico-sensual takes another turn later in this section when Hegel describes how the religious community pictures to itself the movement of Spirit in terms of the "natural relationships of father and son" (PG, p. 560; PS, par. 771). This "natural" paternal relationship replaces the maternal one: "The eternal Being begets [erzeuget] for itself an 'other'" (PG, p. 559; PS, par. 769). Unlike matrilineal natural generation, which unleashes the unending dissipation of bad infinity, the representation of father and son already anticipates its own necessary transcendence to achieve pure self-consciousness: "The form of picture-thinking and of those relationships derived from Nature must be transcended" (PG, p. 560; PS, par. 771).

Hegel must also undercut the empirical referent because the divine Man cannot be a product of contingency, nature, or the amoral principle of life. The divine Man must be self-realizing and not diverted to the universal only later by the cunning of Reason and for the purposes of Spirit. Hence the anomalous representation of Hegel's first Holy Family with its maternal self-consciousness is more than the accidental product of overdetermination by Hegel's historical and philosophical interpretive codes.

The association of woman with self-consciousness in the first Holy Family itself serves several additional functions. By situating self-consciousness in the place of the mother, the Phenomenology ensures that the trace of woman-associated sensuality necessary for the representation of the divine Man does not adhere to him; Hegel confirms that
the divine Man is free from Original Sin, the taint of being born of and
dependent upon woman. Another consequence of woman’s associa-
tion with self-consciousness is to deny the significance of her otherness
and to situate the divine Man in her place; the divine Man incarnates
the otherness that Spirit necessarily situates within itself.\(^{39}\) Thus the
representation of the anomalous self-conscious woman is the means to
overcome woman in her desire, her otherness, and her irony. Further,
it displaces and expropriates the general threat of otherness. This repre-
sentation also ensures that the divine Man mediates the truth of
Spirit for the Self and so serves as a paradigm for the life of the Spirit
and for the life of man.

The attempt to understand the association of woman with irony has
come full circle. The anomalous figure of the self-conscious mother
binds woman to the self-consciousness of irony at the same time that
irony is itself superseded by the union of self-consciousness ("actual
mother") and substance ("implicit father"). In the process Hegel has
constructed a paradigmatic male to replace Antigone’s brother, who in
his immediacy was no longer an adequate model. In other words, the
ethical world could no longer serve as the ideal. Despite the appear-
ance of the divine Man, however, woman has retained her ironic role in
this new community. As the stage of Revealed Religion unfolds,
though, Hegel introduces a second, less anomalously manned Holy
Family.\(^{40}\)

At this highest moment of the religious consciousness a telling par-
allelism develops between the "individual divine Man" and the com-
munity that in this context is referred to as the "universal divine Man."
The Holy Family returns, but with the natural division of gender roles.
"Just as the individual divine Man has a father in principle and only
[\textit{nur}] an actual mother, so too the universal divine Man, the com-
unity, has for its father its own doing and knowing, but for its mother,

\(^{39}\) The divine Man is the "being-for-self which is the otherness of essence" (\textit{PG}, p. 559; \textit{PS},
par. 770). This being-for-self has replaced the being-within-itself or evil as the locus of other-

\(^{40}\) Hegel attempts thereby to counter the insidious effects of representation. He observes
that the community, which \textit{recollects} the divine incarnation (and death and resurrection),
intuitively apprehends that its truth is identical to the truth of Spirit. But it does not self-
consciously "grasp and truly comprehend" (\textit{PG}, p. 573; \textit{PS}, par. 787) the truth of its own rec-
conciliation of the individual and the universal. This recognition is prevented by the limita-
tions of picture thinking: it can only represent the community’s truth as a series of discrete
moments. The religious community’s "own reconciliation therefore enters its consciousness
as something distant, as something in the distant future [the Second Coming], just as the rec-
conciliation which the other Self [the individual divine Man] achieved appears as something
in the distant past" (\textit{PG}, p. 574; \textit{PS}, par. 787).
eternal love which it only \( \text{noch} \) feels, but does not behold in its consciousness as an actual immediate object" (PG, p. 574; PS, par. 787).

The failure of the religious consciousness and community to achieve Absolute Knowledge is specifically ascribed to maternal insufficiency.\(^{41}\) That the mother of the universal divine Man “only feels” and, like every (real) woman, lacks the self-consciousness to “grasp and truly comprehend” prevents the religious community from recognizing itself in another Self. As a consequence of this incapacity, the religious community is not adequate to the form of Spirit. Since the child gives objective reality to the substance (the implicit truth) of the parents (cf. PG, p. 336; PS, par. 456), the community, occupying the position of the child within the second Holy Family, is the truth of its parents: sexual opposition with its division of labor. And like the child—or, more specifically, the son—the truth of the community, Spirit, does not return to the conditions of its production but moves beyond to Absolute Knowledge. Family and sexual opposition are the condition for the ascension of man.

**Two Apotropaic Figures**

The interwoven themes of male and female, self-consciousness and desire, irony and evil, and religion as the substantial truth of the community and individuality as the form of Spirit circulate through the Phenomenology and converge upon two figures who reveal their truth in their deaths: the divine Man and Antigone. In his death and resurrection, the divine Man reconciles the infinite with the finite and realizes the truth of the individual in the community: “The non-being of this particular individual [becomes transfigured] into the universality of the Spirit who dwells in His community” (PG, p. 571; PS, par. 784). The (male) Self recognizes that “this particular being-for-self has become a universal self-consciousness. In turn, the universal has become self-consciousness . . . has become actual. . . . Substance becomes Subject” (PG, pp. 571–72; PS, par. 785). The death of Antigone also has lessons to teach. There is no resurrection for woman. She does not share in the communal actualization of self-consciousness that is coeval with the fatal fulfillment of her ethical duty. The paradigm Antigone presents is the absolute sacrifice of the woman to ensure the realization of man in

the life of the Spirit. Although not a domestic angel per se—domesticity has no explicit representation in the *Phenomenology*—she embodies the truth of the Family, and by her actions she articulates the truths of both spheres as well as their union in Spirit. These two figures, the divine Man and Antigone, both substitute for other forms of individuality, in particular the ironic conscience and woman as "the everlasting irony [in the life] of the community," and become new paradigms for the life of the gendered individual in community.

By revealing the universal behind the mask of the individual, the divine Man counters Schlegel, who, according to Hegel, mistakenly believed his individuality universal. Similarly, as the vehicle of the divine law, Antigone counters the evil, desire-driven woman as irony (*PG*, p. 352; *PS*, par. 475). She also counters another particular ironic creation: Schlegel's *Lucinde*. The actualization of Schlegel's manifest intent in the novel to transform the speculative distribution of gender roles would undermine the potential of the finite spirit, the male subject, to attain Absolute Knowledge. Therefore such actualization would undermine Spirit itself. The pathos of Hegel's Antigone may be considered in part as a response to the pudeur of Schlegel's *Lucinde*. Hegel's Antigone continues the tradition of representations of woman as tokens in polemical exchange. By asserting the partial truth of her womanly duty and by simultaneously calling forth the partial truth of the male, Antigone also testifies to the truth both of the family and of the speculative distribution of gender roles as intrinsic to the community. Ascribing exemplary status to Antigone and her ethical duty is an attempt to rectify the rupture, the rapture, of *Lucinde*. Hegel's representation of Antigone and her self-acknowledged guilt endeavors to counter apotropaically the ironic threat posed by women.

Hegel's characterization of Antigone is not just a substitute for the character Lucinde; it is also a supplement to the novel *Lucinde*, whose force is not the reproductive capacity of the title character but her being the product of a man's, the author's, conscience. Through a double move Hegel both repeats and reinforces Schlegel's gesture of creating a woman to create himself. First, he chooses Antigone to ensure the life of Spirit through its reproduction as another moment and to exemplify woman as outside all natural reproductive relations. Second, he displaces generativity from the woman onto the man.

But the threat of the general representation of animality, contingency, naturalness, and feeling alone does not provoke, in the instance of the first Holy Family, the figurative assertion of self-conscious woman
and, in that of Antigone, the woman outside of both desire and natural generative relationships. These two figurations demonstrate Hegel's need to construct apotropaic representations in order to maintain the structures and representations of sexual opposition such as the division of labor, role, and character. Further, the representations of Antigone and the divine Man preserve and justify the life of Spirit as source and sanction of continuity as well as the social structures and dispositions of power in Hegel's bourgeois Germany. They open up the social-ontological dimension of the Phenomenology, although the work offers neither an explicit theory of the state nor a tripartite structure of ethical life, as the Philosophy of Right later will. Yet like the early popular determinations of sexual stereotypes that do not explicitly relate gender traits to social role or to the polarization of public and private, the figures of the divine Man and Antigone anticipate their inscription within a social order that presupposes such exemplary gender types.\(^{42}\) In the Phenomenology Hegel is not so much reflecting his times as making a pointed intervention in the crises that accompanied the development of bourgeois society.

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\(^{42}\) As Heinz Kimmerle has remarked with regard to Hegel's philosophy of the family, "Hardly any section in Hegel's system more clearly shows that determinate historical (social) relations, as they exist at the beginning of the nineteenth century, have been, by means of his philosophy, rendered as absolute." "Umkehrung, Dekonstruktion, Pragmatisierung." Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 35 (1983): 420.