Introduction

The Theory of Society Talks Back to Its Travesty

MARCEL STOEZLER

Without rancor or hatred, in the spirit of sociology and psychology, I seek to examine the debased condition into which France has fallen. . . . My mission as a sociologist is to show people as they are.

EDOUARD DRUMONT, 1886, addressing reactions to his antisemitic tract, La France juive

Thinking develops in the engagement with an object. However, although thinking is always about an issue, the concepts that are developed in the process do not necessarily name that object or issue.

One of the principal issues that served as the catalysts around which European (or “Western”) modern social and political thought evolved in the long nineteenth century was the question of Jewish emancipation, and after emancipation was achieved, the question of whether, how, or to what extent it ought to be revoked. These were the two incarnations of “the Jewish question” that centered in either form on discussing Jewish equality and difference. Modern social and political thought developed, consolidated, and translated itself from Enlightenment philosophy and critique into the modern, institutionalized discourses of disciplines such as sociology in the period when modern society itself materialized in the form of so many national societies; Enlightenment thought became thereby concerned—often explicitly, but always by implication—with the continuing creation and reproduction of societies as nations. The discourse of modern society was already there at the birth of that society and had to adapt itself to the requirements of the object whose fate it shared. The
“discourse” was always a practice, and as such part of that wider societal practice that we call society. Emancipation (of national, ethnic, religious, and other “minorities,” of the third and the fourth estate, of women, of the various groups of people with less than straight sexual preferences) was, and remains, crucial to that practice called “society,” or at least it is safe to say that the promise and hope of emancipation always were and still remain crucial to its legitimacy—as this hope and promise are among the things that make its constituents continue to “do” society.

Marx’s famous double essay “On the Jewish Question” exemplifies the way this “question” served as a field on which to develop modern thought: theoretical propositions of tremendous momentum and radicality were first formulated in a dispute on Jewish emancipation that had been triggered by some Prussian draft legislation that in the process was shelved and is since all but forgotten. Marx’s text, though, was then already part of a tradition that earlier included, for example, Christian Wilhelm Dohm’s “On the Civil Amelioration [bürgerliche Verbesserung] of the Jews” of 1781. This text too and the debate about it were about Jews, as announced by the title, but also about much more: they were about the emerging modern society and its historical dynamic, and “the Jewish question” was one of the fields on which these issues were discussed. It remained such a field for a long time, and perhaps still is today, to an extent.

Modern antisemitism and the discipline of sociology were two of the discourses that were part of the consolidation process of modern society in the nineteenth century, articulating, commenting on, and intervening in some of the problems that the constitution, or reconstitution, of modern society in the form of an ensemble of nation-states brought with itself. Beyond the obvious fact that they emerged in the same period, they also overlapped and complemented as much as struggled and competed with each other. This complicated relationship is the subject of the present volume: it explores and tests the hypothesis that the formation of sociology and that of antisemitism were related, partly cosubstantial, as much as competing, sometimes antagonistic phenomena.

This hypothesis is based on two observations: first, the discipline of sociology emerged out of the liberal response to crisis phenomena of modern society, aiming at that society’s consolidation, regeneration, and its defense; second, modern antisemitism is likewise best understood as the “travesty of a social theory” responding to the same type of
society, offering in its phantasmagorias of “the Jew” and “Jewification” an explanation of its deficiencies and crises. Both sociology and antisemitism also tended to be antagonistic to the social-democratic labor movement whose actual or anticipated successes both aimed to curb by proposing alternatives (and at times wooing sections of it). The volume thus deals with two fundamental questions: What did sociologists (or those who helped constitute the discipline) have to say on antisemitism and “the Jewish question”? How did what sociologists had to say about subjects such as money, usury, modernity, work and labor, individualism, community, society, social reform, socialism, state and culture, religion, the spirit of capitalism, and capitalist development resemble or differ from what antisemites said on the same issues? The volume asks whether, how, and to what extent the makers of sociology were responding to the antisemites (among others) who were busy building their parallel discourse in the same vicinity, as it were, and whether, how, and to what extent they also shared or came to reflect some of their competitors’ concerns. These questions have until now never been researched. The new perspective that this volume proposes and explores rests on the presupposition that antisemitism—in its various forms—was a more pervasive presence in the societies and in the period under discussion than is often acknowledged, including the milieus in which the liberals and socialists operated from whose ranks came the founders of sociology. This volume thereby takes what conventionally would be considered a small subfield within the field of sociological theory and its history—the sociology and theory of antisemitism—as the central perspective from where general emergence and development of the discipline itself can be illuminated and understood afresh. It contributes to a general trend to historicizing and recentering theoretical discourses of modernity and modern society.

I came to this subject in a somewhat indirect fashion. Some ten years ago I completed a PhD that was initially meant to be about liberal and socialist conceptions of the nation and critiques of the textbook distinction between “civic” and “ethnic” nationalisms. While reading around for suitable source materials that would allow me to articulate my unease with this distinction, I came across the “Berlin antisemitism dispute,” the Treitschke-Streit of 1879–81, which then became the sole topic of my thesis. I was fascinated by the ways Treitschke himself, but even more
so his critics and also some of his radical antisemitic supporters, mobilized whole conceptions of society, state and individual, complete with accounts of culture, religion, and economy and how they threw all into the battle on “the Jewish question.” A key figure in the Berlin antisemitism dispute on the side of the Jewish community was Moritz Lazarus, a social scientist of great importance (but known now mostly to specialists in this area of intellectual history), who was a teacher of Georg Simmel and of great influence on Franz Boas. Max Weber’s father, Max Weber Sr., was involved in organizing a declaration of notables of German liberalism who found Treitschke’s sympathies for antisemitism unhelpful. I decided to work on this material, a defining episode in the development of late nineteenth-century German liberalism, because it resonated strongly with concerns from contemporary social and sociological theory. In the process, I began to see what would subsequently become (in Germany) the discipline of sociology emerge out of the context of (national) liberalism—which explains the resemblance. My hunch was that the dispute on antisemitism must have had an impact on the thinking of the founders of “classical sociology,” many of whom (such as Weber and Simmel, but also visiting students like William Edward Burghardt Du Bois) sat in Treitschke’s lectures. (The influence of the antisemitism dispute on the young Max Weber was pointed out by Gary Abrahams in his 1992 monograph *Max Weber and the Jewish Question.* Also Durkheim, at a crucial stage in his early career, had visited German universities and tapped into just this intellectual milieu. These initial observations led me to the question that is explored in the present volume.

In the introduction to the volume *Sociology Responds to Fascism,* Stephen P. Turner wrote in 1992 that “reformers of various political persuasions” felt ambivalent about fascism, as they saw it “as a potential catalyst for the changes they advocated.” He wrote, “There are many very direct connections between fascist ideas and early sociology. . . . The romantic notion of reweaving a social order destroyed by impersonality, shared by Tönnies, Durkheim, and many others, such as Othmar Spann, contributed, however indirectly, to the climate of opinion in which fascism took hold. So did the elitism of Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca.” The contributions to the present volume focus with sociology and antisemitism on a dimension of this topic that is both narrower and wider than the con-
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Introduction 5

ection of sociology and fascism: narrower, as antisemitism is not the
only and not even the most defining characteristic of fascism (arguably,
with the exception of German National Socialism), and wider, because
it occurs in all political traditions and functions universally as a bridge-
head or gateway that allows, in specific historical situations, members,
or whole sections of those traditions to support, join, or at least tolerate
fascist movements and regimes. This marks the significance of the topic.6

The perspective taken by Turner was expressed earlier by the Danish
sociologist Svend Ranulf in his 1939 article “Scholarly Forerunners of Fascism.” Ranulf provides a highly critical reading of Auguste Comte’s
Cours de philosophie positive and Émile Durkheim’s De la division du tra-
vail social, arguing that both authors’ arguments rely on conceptions that
are similar to what Ferdinand Tönnies in 1887 (i.e., six years before Durkheim’s On the Social Division of Labor, fifty-seven years after the pub-
cation of the first volume of the Cours) conceptualized as the dichotomy
of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (community and society). While Tön-
nies’s pair of concepts has been adopted by German political romantics
and reactionaries of all stripes (not necessarily with his approval), Ran-
ulfs main point is that if there is a shared ground between Tönnies’s
philosophical sociology and the “scientific” and positivistic sociology of
Comte and especially Durkheim, and if indeed this was compatible with
fascist social thought, then the discipline of sociology as a whole needs
fundamental rethinking.7 (To put it with Tönnies, this point could be ex-
pressed by saying that being complicit with fascism was against the Kür-
wille, the deliberate willing and wishing, but in line with the Wesenwille,
the “essential will” or the intrinsic and not always conscious logic, of the
sociological project, including Tönnies’s own.) Ranulf concluded that
“both these groups of sociologists have—for the most part unintention-
ally and unconsciously—served to prepare the soil for fascism by their
propagation of the view that the society in which they were living was
headed for disaster because of its individualism and liberalism and that
a new social solidarity was badly needed.”8 Concerning Comte, Ranulf
wrote, “If Comte could wake up and see the conditions now [i.e., 1939]
prevailing in Germany, he would undoubtedly have to admit that the
rule of positivism for which he was yearning has largely come true in the
form of German nazism or, more generally, in the form of fascism.”

Ranulf quotes the following aspects of Comte’s thinking in support of

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his argument: Comte saw European society devastated by "intellectual anarchy," where individuals were called upon to decide on fundamental political issues "without any guide" or moral control. This state of things was prolonged and exploited by "the class of publicists." (It is perhaps worth noting that polemics against "the press" have been one of the staples also of nineteenth-century antisemites and remain today a key concern of popular critiques of modern culture.) When every individual has the right to question the very foundations of society, the very possibility of social life is destroyed. Government must therefore rein in unfettered intellectual freedom, the "demolition of public morals," the dissolution of the family, and the effacement of traditional class distinctions. "Responsible for this misery" are, in Ranulf's paraphrase of Comte, "all kinds of rebels against the Catholic church, from the early Protestants onwards to the contemporary deists and atheists." (Jews are missing from this list, but when in the decades after Comte it became a common perception that Protestantism was inspired by Judaism it was but a small step to add them.) According to Comte, "the Catholic system of the Middle Ages" that integrated politics and morality is "the most perfect political masterpiece that has been devised until now by the human mind." As Catholicism, though, has become a stranger to modern societies, its place needs to be taken by science, in particular "social physics" or else, indeed, "sociology" that will effect the scientific ("positive") reorganization of modern societies. Ranulf argues that Durkheim too, like Comte, believed he lived in an age of moral dissolution and that sociology was called upon to remedy this evil. He asks, "Is not the rise of fascism an event which, in due logic, Durkheim ought to have welcomed as that salvation from individualism for which he had been trying rather gropingly to prepare the way? In due logic, undoubtedly. But there are aspects of fascism which would probably have seemed unacceptable to Durkheim." Ranulf seems on firmer ground with respect to Comte than to Durkheim, as Durkheim was ambivalent about individualism rather than hostile to it and explicitly departed from Comte in this as in other respects; after all, Durkheim diagnosed as a symptom of moral dissolution the Dreyfus affair, during which he defended individualism against antisemitic nationalists. Still, even in Durkheim the kind of ambivalence can be found that is explored throughout this volume; Ranulf could have added, for example, that Weber's notion that only charismatic leadership
can break through the gray routine of bureaucratized modernity contributed to, as well as reflected, the rise of a societal atmosphere that facilitated the fascist takeover.\textsuperscript{17}

It would seem that Ranulf’s intervention of 1939 has not enjoyed any lasting influence. One reason for this might be that post-World War II (U.S.) sociology, especially due to the influence of Talcott Parsons, who successfully amalgamated its main traditions—including Weber and Durkheim—into liberal, progressivist modernization theory, stood on the side of Western democracy and against fascism.\textsuperscript{18} Liberals and democrats cannot but be scandalized by the suggestion that Parsonian democratic, antifascist modernization theory could share, via Durkheimian and Comtean positivism, some of its roots with its hot and cold war enemies; after all, it was developed (along with the notion of Western “political,” allegedly non-“ethnic” nationalism) first against Hitlerism and then further deployed as an alternative to Leninist-Stalinist modernization theory and praxis. If (as does critical theory) one counts structural-functionalism as a form of positivism, then it still needs to be acknowledged that it represents the human face of liberal-democratic positivism that is positioned against crude, totalitarian positivism that drives the social-engineering and -gardening projects of Stalinists, fascists, and all kinds of more ordinary dictators.\textsuperscript{19}

If Ranulf’s thesis is now taken as an inspiration to dig deeper into the matter, his account must necessarily be made more complicated, especially with respect to Durkheim. Furthermore it is notable that Ranulf’s discussion seems to treat fascism and “naziism” as synonyms and does not mention antisemitism; as antisemitism has over the past decades been recognized as central at least to the German Nazi variety of fascism, the exploration of antisemitism seems a good vantage point to reopen the discussion. This is especially so as antisemitism tends to become relevant at the points where fascists construct their idea of Gemeinschaft. The perspective taken here is, however, different from Ranulf’s also in another aspect: while Ranulf decided to align Comte and Durkheim, along with Tönnies, with fascism as its “forerunners,” the present volume proposes instead to focus on their ambiguities, treating these as another instance of the internal dialectic of the enlightenment (to be precise, the dialectic of the enlightenment of the post-Enlightenment period, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries). The idea that liberals, democrats, and socialists
who opposed fascism and antisemitism might themselves be implicated in what they oppose is unlikely ever to become a hugely popular proposition. When a few isolated theorists, including Horkheimer, Adorno, and Sartre, suggested it in the aftermath of World War II when the spirit of the anti-Hitler coalition still dominated the worldview of most people in “the West,” their propositions, although celebrated in the world of “social theory,” hardly managed to revolutionize the daily workings of scholarly or political discourse. 20 In the present period, though, after postmodernism popularized some of the claims critical theory had formulated earlier, the concern with the ways the liberal, democratic, and socialist manifestations of the “Enlightenment project” are implicated in what the latter was up against should seem less outlandish. 21

The present volume aims to complicate and develop Ranulf’s thesis. As for Durkheim, the principal ground on which Ranulf’s claim has to be contested is the interpretation of Durkheim’s direct and public engagement as a leading Dreyfusard. Crucial here is the paradox that positivist sociology was elementary to the intellectual conception that Durkheim threw into the battle against antisemitism in the Dreyfus affair, but it was also in partial agreement with the antisemitic worldview itself. It is perhaps not too far-fetched to say that the present volume is in its entirety an exploration of this ambiguity. (Another volume could be written to make the argument the other way around: that antisemites were fully aware and also part of the emerging new way of talking and thinking about the new society, as Edouard Drumont testifies in the statement that serves as the epigraph to this introduction.)

A case that could be quoted in support of Ranulf’s argument on Comte is that of Charles Maurras, an important (though then still young) player in the Dreyfus affair and, in that context, the founder of the right-wing Action Française. Maurras was the theorist of what he termed “integral nationalism,” which he understood to be “socialist,” and as such an important if indirect influence on the early development of fascism. Although a declared agnostic, he supported and admired the Catholic Church and, perhaps more than anything else, was a follower of Comte. 22 Maurras wrote, for example, in 1904, “It is clear from the philosophy of Comte that the Jewish race is a race whose evolution has been stunted.” 23 Likewise in a text from 1898 Maurras wrote that the Jews were a material force of societal degeneration, while there was also “a Protestant spirit...
[which] threatens not only the French spirit, but ... every spirit, every nation, every State, and reason itself. ... It dissolves societies; it constitutes, according to Auguste Comte’s fine definition, a sedition of the individual against the [human] species. 

Although in this quote Maurras seems to find Protestants even worse than Jews, it also points to the close relation between anti-Protestantism and antisemitism within Catholic reactionary discourse. (Inversely it also indicates that Weber’s work on the “Protestant spirit” might have been written against anti-Protestant/antisemitic critiques of modern society, including, within the sociological tradition, Comte’s anti-Protestantism.)

Maurras, who was obsessively driven to combat individualism in what he saw as its two prevalent forms, (German) romanticism and the revolutionary tradition of 1789, had nurtured since the Dreyfus affair the idea of an alliance of positivists and Catholics (incidentally, with little practical success). 

His hero was Comte, as explained in an essay bearing Comte’s name as its title (1902): “Some amongst us were living examples of anarchy. To those of us who were, he restored order or, its equivalent, the hope of order; he revealed the beauty of Unity smiling out of a heaven that did not appear too far away.” Maurras repeatedly quoted Comte’s aphorism “Submission is the basis of perfection” and lauded his awareness of the vanity of rationalism and “revolutionary sophism.”

Following Comte, Maurras saw the root of these evils in monotheism, as it led the believer to prioritize individual spiritual welfare and a personal relationship with deity over positive societal ties. This is expressed, for example, in an appendix to his book *Trois idées politiques* of 1898: “The idea of this invisible and distant master will quickly undermine the respect that the conscience owes to its visible and near masters. Such a conscience will invoke the eternal and unwritten laws so as to extract itself from laws that have the most immediate pertinence, ... on each and every pretext. ... This mystical exchange [with God] leads to scepticism in the field of theory and to revolt in that of practice. ... Every egoism is justified in the name of God.”

Monotheism is what makes Protestantism antisocial. The monotheistic spirit of Christianity brought down Rome; subsequently it also destroyed Catholic civilization in the sixteenth century, and it did so again, in its Rousseauan incarnation, in 1789. This argument hinges on the idea that in Catholicism the element of monotheism (the Christian spirit) was rigorously circumscribed and
attenuated by polytheistic elements as well as organic and hierarchical institutional structures, an argument that Maurras takes from Comte, supported with ample references to the *Cours* and the *Système*. Maurras concludes that in Catholicism, “the stupid and the vile, bound by the chains of dogma, are not free to choose a master as they please and in their own image. . . . Catholicism proposes the only idea of God that is tolerable in a well-organized State.” Likewise “morality in the Comtian State tends, in effect, towards a sort of moral socialism; but, with good logic, it excludes the leading articles of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of liberal doctrine. By contrast, morality in the Kantian State leads to a form of mystical isolation, where everyone considers himself as a sort of god.” Only on the issue of nationalism does Maurras flag his divergence from Comte: while he applauds Comte’s notion that the dignity of the individual results only from its “subordination to some compound existence,” he does not follow Comte’s notion that this “compound existence” is humanity. Maurras notes that “Humanity does not exist—at least not yet” and replaces the nation for it: “He who defends his Country, his nationality and his State is engaged in the defence of all that is real and all that is concrete in the idea of Humanity.” In this sense, the nation is the positive reality of humanity, which is a not inconsistent development of the positivist position in a historical period—the late nineteenth century—in which nation-states are indeed concrete, positive realities, while humanity (which Comte had expected would become a positive reality soon enough) is not (yet).

It seems to have been in the context of the Dreyfus affair that Maurras came clear on what is the essence behind Protestant individualism, for he began to argue that justice, pity, and compassion are Jewish ideas: “All individualist theory is of Jewish making.” In *Trois idées politiques* he declares, “The Protestant originates entirely from the Jew.” It is from this point that Maurras was explicitly and radically antisemitic. As Michael Sutton notes, it is “ironic” that Maurras’s antisemitism, or, to be precise, its “modern philosophical sub-structure,” was derived from Comte, who was then widely regarded as the greatest French philosopher of the nineteenth century, including by Dreyfusards like Durkheim.

When Maurras described his own nationalism as “socialist,” he had in mind and often referred to Alphonse Toussenel, a Fourierist and the au-
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thor of one of the key texts of mid-nineteenth-century antisemitism in France, "The Jews, Kings of the Epoch." It was first published in 1845 by a Fourierist publishing house with a three-page preface that alerted readers that this was not to be seen as an official statement of the school's doctrine. The book was republished slightly extended and significantly more violent in its antisemitic language by another publisher in 1847 and went through several more editions. Significantly only these later editions contained the chapter "Saint-Simon et Juda," an antisemitic polemic that denounces the Saint-Simonians as being "Jewish."

Crucial to the Fourierist critique of modern society is the notion of the "financial feudalism," which implies a fundamental critique of the French Revolution: the Revolution has not actually abolished feudalism but merely changed its form and exchanged some of the actors. The new feudal lords are the financial aristocracy; the antifeudal revolution is still to come. Arguably this type of critique is more than an acknowledgment that the Revolution is incomplete or needs to be driven further, which would have been shared by any democrat or socialist; it seems to be implied that the entire Revolution was fake. While for Saint-Simon, for example, the Revolution certainly opened the door to the rule of the industriels (the productive Third Estate), whose domination and transformation of society now merely needed to be followed through, exactly this process is seen by Fourier as the continuation of feudalism in a different guise: it is the obstacle to the petit-bourgeois (i.e., based on small-scale commodity production) collectivist transformation he wishes to see.

It is easy to see how Toussenel's position might dovetail with a protofascist's idea of "socialism" (as in Maurras's case), while his denunciation as "Jewish" of Saint-Simonian's embrace of modernization, industrialization, and the modern banking required by the former fits a familiar antisemitic pattern. However, things were more complicated. Rather bizarrely, another important antisemitic tract of exactly the same title was published one year after Toussenel's by an author of Saint-Simonian background, Pierre Leroux, who is nowadays usually referred to as a "Christian socialist." In "The Jews, Kings of the Epoch," Leroux is critical of Saint-Simon because he understands that "industry" cannot unite bourgeoisie and proletariat into a "classe industrielle" that would be united and opposed to the class of the unproductive and the parasites, as Saint-Simon had expected. Leroux also points out (correctly)
that Saint-Simon's notion of organization is elitist, hierarchical, and antidemocratic; Saint-Simon rejected general franchise, for example. It is in this context that Leroux adopts the Fourierist notion that the allegedly new industrial society actually is a "féodalité industrielle." He2 Leroux's text seems to result from the gradual merger of the Saint-Simonist and the Fourierist movements in the 1830s and 1840s, which seems to have overcome some theoretical dead-ends of Saint-Simonism but was also part of the context of the development of radical modern antisemitism.

The milieux and intellectual traditions out of which in France in the second third of the nineteenth century antisemitism and positivism, and out of the latter, sociology, emerged, are closely related. When sociology emerged out of "positive philosophy" and "positive politics," modern radical antisemitism emerged out of what Marxists call "early" or "utopian" socialism. Henri de Saint-Simon was a crucial figure for both developments: Comte, the inventor of the word sociology, had been Saint-Simon's disciple, collaborator, and secretary. After Saint-Simon's death in 1825, Comte became an important member of the milieu of followers of Saint-Simon out of which the "school" of Saint-Simonianism emerged.

Comte was Saint-Simon's secretary and collaborator from 1817 to 1824, when he was fired in a bitter argument over the authorship of a seminal essay. Comte was excluded from the Saint-Simonian "school" in 1829 on the basis of Saint-Simon's earlier denunciation of him as too indifferent to the emotions and to religion. The Saint-Simonians represented Comte's thinking as "the 'glacial' scientism" they rejected. Out of this process of distancing themselves from Saint-Simon's most famous disciple, the group developed the 1829 manifesto of Saint-Simonianism, The Doctrine of Saint-Simon, which was also a critique of (Comtean) positivism and a crucial inspiration for subsequent socialist and communist traditions. The Saint-Simonian school was very influential around the time of the Revolution of 1830 before it disintegrated in 1831, partly over the question of the emancipation and the role of women. Mary Pickering argues that Comte's Cours de philosophie positive (1830-42) constituted his ongoing "discourse with the Saint-Simonians, who remained unnamed," emphasizing the necessary priority of science. From 1838, though, when he started work on volume 4 of the Cours that first introduced "sociology," Comte increasingly included reflections on the emotions, the arts, imagination and religion, that is, aspects of Saint-Simon's and his own
earliest work that he had suppressed in the preceding decade and a half. When the 1848 Revolution failed to usher in the kind of transformation he considered necessary, he concluded that positivism ought to enter the battle of doctrines in a more robust manner and henceforth presented it with the Saint-Simonian term “Religion of Humanity,” detailed in the *Système de politique positive* (1851–4). These details illustrate how close the emergence of Comtean positivism and sociology in France was interrelated with the development of “early socialism,” which in turn provided the context for the emergence of some of the most momentous variants of modern antisemitism, and how much both traditions responded and reacted to one another.

In the last decade of his life (he died in 1857) Comte developed an ethic centered on the idea that “the dictatorship of the proletariat would purify economic life of the commercial spirit by exercising a new moral hegemony,” a conception he formed in his “Positivist Society” that stood in opposition to liberals as well as communists. The proletariat would usher in the final, positive state of society, wherein parliamentary representation would be replaced by scientifically organized political forms. (The proletariat would of course first have to be converted to positivism, but would then, through its dictatorship, help install the new hierarchy led by the positivist “spiritual priesthood.”) Although nothing suggests that Comte himself was antisemitic, the basic pattern of the positivist blueprint—under this name or another—dovetailed with the drive of (pro-modernization) antisemites for ethical, purified, noncommercial capitalism. In fact outside the very small world of “early industrialized,” liberal societies (i.e., Britain and those who were in the position to copy her early on), positivism’s commitment to “order and progress” carried much more weight and blended together with “state-socialist” and “economic-nationalist” doctrines like those that were formulated in nineteenth-century Germany into developmental regimes of varying brutality. (The positivist-influenced founders of the republican Brazilian state, for example, inscribed Comte’s motto “Order and Progress” onto their national flag of 1889: “Ordem e Progresso.”) Such regimes are of course not in themselves antisemitic, but elements of antisemitism occur time and again—depending on historical, cultural, political, and economic circumstances—in the context of regimes that attempt to
create “ethical economies” on the basis of robust assertion of national culture. The reason for this is arguably that the discourses that state and economy promote as “morality” can be more than abstract, normative claims only if they are backed up by positive (which usually means national) culture, fortified, more often than not, by a strong shot of religion. It is hardly surprising, at least in the Christian-influenced world, that discourses that construct a conflict between money-economy and morality invite musings on “the Jews”; after all, the figure of that mild-mannered man who, in the name of love, drove the money changers out of the temple is central to the Christian religion. In modernity’s formative period, Shakespeare gave this conflict a first monumental formulation: in *The Merchant of Venice* Shylock “the usurer” gives the brilliant antiracist speeches and points out that modern society and economy depend on contracts that are legally binding, while Antonio the “Christian merchant” and most others in the play wax lyrical about the power of mercy and cosmic harmony. Shakespeare himself—a thoroughly modern man who was both a successful entrepreneur and a political thinker who would have accepted the need for some kind of religion as the glue holding society together—does not seem to be taking sides. The cultural pattern that Shakespeare exploited for his play is still today so firmly in place that, every now and then, advocacies of the moral reform of the capitalist economy come adorned with mostly perfumed forms of antisemitism. (In the period since the late nineteenth century, such antisemitic undertones tend to stem from democratic populism’s struggle for benign small-scale commodity production, uncorrupted by giant monsters of the Wall Street family of evils.)

Orderly progress was also the concern of those right-wing liberals, “socialists of the chair,” and state socialists in Imperial Germany within whose milieu the Verein für Sozialpolitik (Association for Social Policy) was founded in 1872 and out of which in turn, in Germany, the discipline of sociology slowly emancipated itself. The Verein was committed to “bürgerliche Sozialreform,” bourgeois social reform; overt antisemitism was not the dominant tone in the Verein für Sozialpolitik, but neither was it entirely absent. The central, moderate figure, Gustav Schmoller, was only mildly antisemitic by the standards of time and context and apparently made explicitly antisemitic statements in public only late in his career, but the equally central economist Adolph Wagner was at the same
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time a close ally of the populist-clerical antisemite, Adolf Stoecker. Wagner was a founding member and vice chairman of Stoecker’s Christian Social Party and contributed crucial passages to its program. Wagner was thus a key player in radical, political antisemitism, in the history of modern economics, and in the wider field from which the discipline of sociology emerged. The need to respond to, but also the inevitability of reflecting some of the concerns of contemporary antisemites have had their impact on the shape of “classical” just as on “early” sociology. The liberals who would become sociologists (such as Tönnies, Weber, and Sombart) and the liberals who would become antisemites (such as Heinrich von Treitschke, a teacher of Weber and the person whom Weber’s father helped to challenge in the Berlin antisemitism dispute of 1879) worked on alternative conceptions of what kind of national culture, or societal religion, is necessary for modern society to continue to exist, and what kinds of degenerations and anomalies this culture should be entrusted to avert. Contemporary antisemites had already attacked Saint-Simonianism as a Jewish enterprise, partly because several of its leading members were indeed Jewish, partly because it embraced and celebrated modernization and central institutions linked with it such as money and banking. (An equivalent phenomenon in the early nineteenth-century German context was that German antisemitic patriots accused Hegelianism and even Hegel himself of being Jewish, at least in spirit.) These antisemitic slurs against bodies of thought that embraced crucial aspects of modernity set the pattern for later similar attacks on sociology itself and, much more violently so, on Marxism. (The Nazis, though, did not summarily dismiss sociology but instead developed “non-Jewish sociology,” which amounted, in some aspects at least, to a kind of technocratic modernization of sociology.) Durkheim, Tönnies, Weber, and Sombart considered social reform crucial and looked for ways to draw the right wing of the labor movement, that is, the labor movement minus its Marxist, antinationalist elements, into projects of bürgerliche Sozialreform. Also Simmel in his early career was associated with Gustav Schmoller’s attempts at formulating an ethical, institutionalist version of political economy, reconnecting to Adam Smith the moral philosopher (as opposed to the Adam Smith imagined later by the economists), and was thus part of the same general tendency to formulate a social scientific basis for social
reform. Simmel departed from this milieu by insisting in *Philosophy of Money* boldly and provocatively that money and all the bad—according to the antisemites, the Jewish—things it stood for were also very good things: emancipation and indeed individualism itself owed themselves largely to the abstraction and alienation that comes with what he called "the money economy." Simmel, quite like Durkheim, rehabilitated therewith some of the "degenerations" of liberal society, contra its more wholesale rejection by antimodern antisemites.

The book is in three parts: part 1 contains chapters that survey how contemporary debates on antisemitism were reflected in works that contributed to the formation of classical sociological theory in France and Germany; part 2 contains chapters on sociological responses to antisemitism in different national contexts (Imperial Germany, the United States) and in the cases of several individual sociologists and social theorists who directly addressed antisemitism in their work, and/or whose work was significantly shaped by the experience of antisemitism (Marx, Boas, Simmel, Ruppin); part 3 contains chapters that look at how sociological treatments of antisemitism were rearticulated during and immediately after the challenge of fascist antisemitism and the Holocaust, that is, after sociology's "classical" period.

The first part begins with Chad Alan Goldberg's chapter "Durkheim's Sociology and French Antisemitism." He begins by delineating the two principal forms of nineteenth-century antisemitism: the reactionary form accused the Jews of having ushered in modernity, being responsible for the Revolution, and having destroyed the old regime's political and social order; conversely the "radical" form, in Goldberg's terminology, accused the Jews of conspiring against and corrupting the new order that the Revolution established. Goldberg discusses aspects of Durkheim's work that respond either explicitly or implicitly to either of these two forms of antisemitism: against "reactionary antisemitism" Durkheim argued that the French Jews were actually a rather traditionalistic and backward group, "far from constituting the advance guard of a dangerous and disruptive modernity." He also produced sociological arguments against racial antisemitism (and, by implication, race thinking in general). Central to Durkheim's stance against both forms of antisemitism (as well as to his sociology in general) was his specific interpretation of the French
Revolution itself: he embraced the Revolution as not an event destructive of social order but, to the contrary, as its indeed very productive reconstitution. Likewise he advocated a constructive brand of socialism, which, in Goldberg's view, set him apart from antisemitic socialists who tried to destroy in "the Jews" a neo-feudal ruling elite. Rather than elimination of a (supposed or real) ruling elite, moral regeneration of society was the task at hand. Goldberg correlates Durkheim's embrace of the Revolution, including the realization that it did not destroy religion but, to the contrary, is the origin of the new "religion of the individual" central to the social imaginary of the new form of society, his invocations of Saint-Simon, and his opposition to antisemitism: it is this constellation rather than, for example, Durkheim's Jewishness that can explain his stance on antisemitism.

My chapter "Sociology's Case for a Well-tempered Modernity: Individualism, Capitalism, and the Antisemitic Challenge" offers a different perspective on the same question. My argument is chiefly built around analyses of Durkheim's intervention in the Dreyfus affair, "Individualism and the Intellectuals," and passages from Weber's Protestant Ethic. I argue that both sociologists developed a discourse that aimed at defending liberal society and modernization while at the same time attacking a caricature of "egotistical utilitarianism" on which they blamed the dismal sides of the emerging new form of society. By doing so they formulated an alternative to but also mimicked the discourse of the antisemites, even when—as in the case of Durkheim—explicitly opposing antisemitism. I argue that this is an intrinsic characteristic of classical sociology that weakened its ability to oppose antisemitism and fascism. In Protestant Ethic Weber develops the notion that once upon a time there was ethically driven, Calvinist capitalism when people (rather religiously, as it were) performed accumulation for its own sake and when concern with material goods was but a "light cloak." Along came utilitarianism and helped turn the light cloak into a "casing hard as steel." Jews are bracketed out of this account because they represent a backward, premodern form of capitalism, pariah—capitalism, that is of little relevance. In this respect Weber—quite like Durkheim in Goldberg's account—plays down the connection between Jews and modernity that is central to reactionary antisemitism. Weber's friend and colleague Werner Sombart, though, was able to take Weber's basic narrative of "good capitalism turning bad" but
changed some of the value judgments: for Sombart good, early capitalism is robust, military, and heroic, while things went downhill (turned “utilitarian”) when the Jews started commercializing everything and turned heroic into parasitic capitalism. He moved the “pariah” version of capitalism from the distant past, where Weber had exiled it, to the present. My argument is that the two narratives—both based on rumors about the Jews more than historical fact—are structurally related in spite of having been formulated as competing accounts. I conclude that as long as sociology remains committed—like its contemporary and competitor, antisemitism—to the notion that the creation of a reformed, benign form of capitalism combined with some form of communal, “re-binding” (religious) morality will halt the perceived dissolution of society by capitalism and individualism, images of “the Jews” (or, depending on context, some equivalent) as incongruent with this difficult and precarious effort are bound to retain their discursive power.

Irmela Gorges discusses in her chapter “Fairness as an Impetus for Objective, Scientific Social Research Methods: The Reports about Jewish Traders in the 1887 Usury Enquête of the Verein für Socialpolitik” a dispute that was of great importance for the development of empirical research in German sociology. This dispute of 1887–88 dealt with prejudices toward Jews and induced social researchers to take steps to develop objective methods of empirical social research; it may well have lingered in the back of the minds of members of the Verein, including Weber, when they subsequently returned repeatedly to the question of objectivity in social research.

Since the mid-1860s national liberal academics, especially those associated with the “historical school of national economics,” addressed “the social question,” the situation of the working class under the conditions of the Industrial Revolution. In 1872, the Verein für Socialpolitik (VfS) was founded from among these circles. One of the principal activities of the VfS was to conduct policy-relevant enquêtes (surveys). In the 1880s (the period of the Bismarckian antisocialist legislation), the VfS concentrated on research concerning “the rural question” rather than industrial problems. Usury was then generally considered a problem of crucial importance to the rural question, although the definition of usury was ambiguous. The enquête attracted enormous interest, as it highlighted a kind of usury that aroused particular resentment: usury not as a mere matter
of “too high” interest rates but of cheating and outwitting poor peasants not well-versed in business matters. Furthermore the reports provoked outrage also because in most reports those accused of committing usury were said to be Jews; it seemed that for many authors Jew and usurer were nearly synonyms. One of the main critics was the statistician Gottlieb Schnapper-Arndt, who pointed to “a whole anthology of insulting comments on Jews.” He criticized the survey for having been based on questionnaires that contained suggestive questions, such as questions about the consequences of a social fact before it was clear that the social fact was indeed existent. Schnapper-Arndt claimed that generalizations from single cases were made in an admissible manner and criticized the fact that reporters reproduced only “the Jewish jargon,” although all reports were based on data collected among rural populations, all of whom obviously spoke a variety of dialects.

Michal Bodemann argues in his chapter “Coldly Admiring the Jews: Werner Sombart and Classical German Sociology on Nationalism and Race” that German sociology in its “classical” period by and large avoided dealing with “the Jewish question,” let alone antisemitism, but discussed issues that can be understood as “displacements” of the former, whereas Sombart, in spite of formally rejecting racial categories, in fact put forward a racial, if not racist, account of “the Jews” based on the notion of a Jewish essence outside history and society.

Tellingly the first meeting of the German Sociological Society in 1910 featured a paper by the “racial biologist” Alfred Ploetz, indicating that the organizers of the meeting found positioning the emerging discipline of sociology in relation to “racial biology” a matter of urgency. Ploetz saw social problems as effects of racial impurities and perceived a dichotomy between society, altruistically committed to support and preserve the weak, and race, aiming to preserve itself by exterminating the weak. He implied that this conflict ought to be resolved in favor of race. Apart from the fact that Sombart leaned toward this perspective, one might be surprised by the terms in which the more progressive sociologists Tönnies and Weber criticized it; the former argued that preserving cripples, for example, might benefit the nation, as they might be “great minds” (he pointed to Moses Mendelssohn as an example), while Weber defended against Ploetz the concept of social policy as it might help people cope who have perfectly good genes but simply fell on hard times.
Weber dismissed the concept of racial instincts because scientific evidence was "so far" still wanting. Some issues, writes Bodemann, were studiously not discussed, such as the widely perceived (in these circles) decline of German national culture and the related issue of the "Jewish question." Bodemann argues that they were displaced by discussions on the decline of classical Greece and the "Negro question in America." It seems as if the sociologists felt they ought to bracket them out as their discussion might spin out of control and threaten the carefully guarded scientificity of the whole project of sociology.

Bodemann then compares three discourses on "the stranger" by Simmel, Sombart, and Tönnies. For Simmel, the stranger (of whom "the Jew" is only a prominent example) is the product of increasing division of labor. The "social type" of the stranger is socially constituted ("constructed," as "social constructionists" would say). Sombart described strangers in similar ways a few years later but "essentialized" them: the Jews remain Jews, products of the nomadic life in the desert that "they" once led. Sombart has no time for Simmel's sophisticated play with the idea that the stranger is both distant and close, indifferent and involved, which for Simmel makes the Jew/stranger but a slightly more extreme version of what any modern individual is anyway (a pattern of thought that bears comparison with Marx's argument from half a century earlier: that Christian society can emancipate the Jews because—even if the image of "the Jew" as drawn by the anti-emancipation discourse was accurate—they merely play back to it its own melody). Bodemann then draws our attention to an essay by Tönnies from whose analysis he concludes that both writers, coming from the same reform-oriented, national liberal milieu, had not hugely differing things to say about the Jews, although Tönnies soon was to join the Social Democrats (in 1930), while Sombart, at least temporarily, leaned toward the National Socialists.

Part 2 begins with Robert Fine's chapter "Rereading Marx on the 'Jewish Question': Marx as a Critic of Antisemitism?" With those who diagnose the existence of a Marxist form of antisemitism Fine agrees that among Marx's followers there were many who were—to say the least—ill-disposed toward either Jews or Judaism, but he finds no entirely convincing grounds for such a judgment in the case of Marx himself. More important, though, he argues that his texts on Bruno Bauer and "the Jewish question" should be appreciated as key texts in the (small enough)
canon of texts that offer a basis for sophisticated interpretations and refutations of antisemitism.

Fine contextualizes Marx's position first within the Enlightenment tradition, which he describes as generally pro-emancipation, even though sometimes the abandonment of Judaism in assimilation was demanded, and second within the Hegelian tradition. Like the eighteenth-century enlighteners, Hegel (in spite of being likewise not incapable of unfriendly words about Judaism) strongly advocated Jewish emancipation against the propaganda of the nationalist populist antisemites of the time. So did Marx, who understood Bauer's opposition to Jewish emancipation as an aspect of his opposition to modern political life. Marx took up Bauer's argument that political emancipation (including freedom of religion) did not mean human emancipation (including freedom from religion), but he drew the opposite conclusion to that drawn by Bauer: given political emancipation was just that, there was no reason to demand of the Jews first to abandon their religion and then to be emancipated.

Fine demonstrates that the second essay against Bauer, which contains the notorious formulations about, for instance, money being the "jealous God of Israel," is difficult to interpret and admits that no final reading can be offered as we are not able to pick Marx's brain; the reading Fine suggests, though, sees Marx using a particular strategy of turning the anti-Jewish stereotypes on their head. Marx's strategy here was "not to challenge the veracity of antisemitic representations of Jews but to reveal their irrelevance." Different from other critics who had already pointed out that Bauer's characterization of the Jews had no basis in reality, Marx did not waste time on such blatantly obvious points and put forward instead the argument that all the things of which the Jews were accused were in fact general characteristics of modern society; the question whether these things also characterized the Jews—as they did everybody else—was therefore irrelevant. Fine concludes that in this reading, Marx's second essay on "the Jewish question" continued the first essay's argument for the detachment of the right of emancipation of Jews from all prior qualifications demanded by liberals and nationalists.

Amos Morris-Reich explores in "From Assimilationist Antiracism to Zionist Anti-antisemitism: Georg Simmel, Franz Boas, and Arthur Ruppin" how antisemitism shaped, in different ways, different layers in the arguments of these three social scientists (all of whom were born in what
was then the German Empire). He attempts to distinguish but correlate their direct references to antisemitism and Jewish social issues and their more general theoretical frameworks. Morris-Reich emphasizes the “generational dimension”: Simmel and Boas were both born in 1858 (incidentally, the same year as Durkheim), Boas, who never converted, to an assimilated Jewish family, Simmel, who was baptized a Protestant, to parents who had converted. Ruppin, by contrast, was born in 1876, which means that he grew up after the assimilationist ideal held by many Jews of the previous generation had been blown to pieces by the intensified antisemitism of the early 1880s. Morris-Reich identifies a delicate paradox: while the commitment to assimilation made many Jews hesitate to respond too directly to antisemitism but contributed, for example, in Boas’s and Simmel’s work, to the development of nonracial, (in today’s terminology) anti-essentialist and culturally relativist conceptions, the breakdown of the assimilationist perspective resulted in Ruppin in a more robust reaction to antisemitism, but one that was itself colored by the racialism that characterized the intellectual environment in which Ruppin was educated.

Simmel never directly engaged in a critique of antisemitism, but the sociological categories he developed can be understood as an implicit critique, or deconstruction, of the category of race from within sociological theory. Morris-Reich argues that Simmel displaced any notion of “substance” by conceiving of “social form” and “social type”—his central categories—as constituted by individual “interaction.” While “social form” is a more general term, “social types” are such forms constituted by “the specifiable reactions and expectations of others.” Interestingly Simmel rules out that an actual individual could ever be grasped by the “types” that fellow members of society create: individuality is ultimately impossible to subsume under any categories, forms, or types (a position that points back to Kant and forward to Adorno). In this framework “racial difference” can be theorized only as a “social construct” (which does not mean, though, that, e.g., “Jewish difference” does not exist). Morris-Reich concludes that Simmel’s radical epistemological and ontological individualism meant a “circumvention,” a way of dealing with antisemitism while not dealing with it.

While resembling Simmel in some ways, Boas was less adverse to entering immediate battle with the enemy (he published at least two im-
important texts against racism and antisemitism, in 1923 and 1934), but he also much less consistently excluded the category of race from his work, at least in his earlier period. Boas’s strategy was to destabilize and transform the category of race, not to bury it. The real contrast, in Morris-Reich’s chapter, is with Ruppin, who wrote extensively on antisemitism. Prompted perhaps by persistent experience and observation of antisemitism, Ruppin postulated an extrahistorical and irrational “group instinct” that made members of “groups” (or societies) force “aliens” to assimilate. Unlike Simmel and Boas, however, Ruppin, who was a leading functionary of the Zionist movement, opposed assimilation as being no less dangerous to Jewish existence than antisemitism, which he saw as a natural and inevitable reaction to actual Jewish difference. All three authors developed differing strategies to engage antisemitism.

Richard H. King looks at how sociology in the United States related to different aspects of “the Jewish question” in his chapter “The Rise of Sociology, Antisemitism, and the Jewish Question: The American Case.” For the period preceding World War II, he observes a general avoidance of the subjects of Jews, Jewishness, and “the Jewish question” in favor of theorizations of (color-coded) “race.” King argues that Thorstein Veblen’s *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899) “could easily have picked out American Jews as symbols of the rampant materialism of the time” but did not do so. It seems that American sociology in that period tended to see Jews as carriers of a welcome modernization process that was in essence, though, coded as American rather than Jewish; by and large, they appeared at that point in time neither as too modern nor as obstacles to modernity, as was the case with antisemitism in Europe in its two main dimensions. King writes that “American sociology was historically more preoccupied with . . . alleged obstacles to modernity presented by African Americans than the dangers presented by the carriers of the modern spirit, the Jews of America.” Arguably, in order to keep it that way, though, Jewish sociologists avoided working on “Jewish topics.”

This situation changed after World War II. King writes that three factors—the Holocaust (and having escaped it), having gained unprecedented affluence as well as access to universities, and the foundation of the state of Israel—resulted in a newly configured, specifically American Jewish consciousness that was manifested in a more open concern with things Jewish also in academia. King discerns four areas in which
“the Jewish question” was addressed, directly or indirectly, in that period: studies of the Holocaust (whereby comparisons with black slavery were formulated already in the late 1950s), studies of prejudice where antisemitism and color-coded racism were often treated in parallel, studies of contemporary Jewish life that included revisiting the old metaphor of the “melting pot,” and the sociology of modernity and the self. King mentions in this context Benjamin Nelson’s *The Idea of Usury* of 1949, which presented Jews as neither particularly traditional nor the sole inventors of capitalism; he argues that the distinction in Deuteronomy between those who might and those who might not be charged interest anticipated a modern but traditional duality of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft.

Roland Robertson’s chapter “Civilization(s), Ethnoracism, Antisemitism, Sociology” bridges the second and the third parts. His principal proposition is that the most appropriate framework for discussions of race and antisemitism is what arguably is the widest framework one can think of: the concept of civilization. Touching upon a variety of differing uses of that concept, including by Norbert Elias and Shmuel Eisenstadt, he explores the relevance of the Jewishness of the proponents of these differing concepts of civilization and suggests that whether one understands civilization as process, as territorialized “entity” (“a society” as “a civilization”), or as project—the last especially in the context of catch-up development and postcolonial situations—cannot but affect the ways one also understands race, including the “Jewish question.” He suggests that German theorists in particular, including those of the Frankfurt School, failed to examine the meeting and mixing of civilizations, implying that this has limited their interpreting of antisemitism. Especially in the context of globalization—again a topic Robertson implies is ill understood by theories framed in traditions prevalent in German sociology—when the meeting and mixing of civilizations becomes a dominant phenomenon, lack of a differentiated conception of civilization will limit the understanding of race and antisemitism too. Paralleling some of King’s explorations, Robertson argues that the discourse on multiculturalism (or, better, multiculturality) has been a central concern for writers of Jewish background—in the United States, to be sure—because the civilizing process, as well as the project of civilization, and the problem of the meeting and mixing of distinct civilizations are cen-
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for those whose social identity is informed by the experience (or at least the "collective memory") of antisemitism.

The contributions in the third section discuss developments under the changed conditions of Nazi antisemitism and the Holocaust and their aftermath. Jonathan Judaken's chapter "Talcott Parsons's 'The Sociology of Modern Anti-Semitism': Anti-antisemitism, Ambivalent Liberalism, and the Sociological Imagination" discusses Parsons's wartime antifascist writings and the liberal ambiguities they reveal, connecting back not only to King's chapter on the earlier stages of American work on antisemitism but also to Morris-Reich's, mine, and others' accounts of the attempts of liberals to get to grips with antisemitism. The focus is on Parsons's essay "The Sociology of Modern Antisemitism" that was published in 1942 in the volume edited by Isaacse Graeber and Steuart Henderson Britt, Jews in a Gentile World, one of the key publications in the history of the social sciences' engagement with antisemitism. Judaken argues that the wartime period brought about a shift in the discourse on antisemitism, from arguments about how Jews could change to avoid antisemitism—ranging from the rabbinic attempt to explain antisemitism with reference to what Jacob did to Esau, through the liberal and socialist attempts at the Jews' "amelioration" and the Zionist hope that antisemitism would disappear once the Jews will have become a "normal" nation—to explaining why antisemites hated Jews. Judaken argues that Parsons's essay was "caught in this shift," as if inhabiting both sides of it at the same time. Parsons's argument hinges on what he saw as the clash between the values and characteristics of Jewishness and modernity: antisemites project free-floating aggression resulting from the anomie typical of badly integrated modern society onto the Jews, who offer a particularly appropriate target due to their particular characteristics. Parsons's understanding of what this Jewish character is, is entirely derived from Max Weber's account in Ancient Judaism and The Sociology of Religion; short of actually using the word, Parsons describes the Jewish character as that of the self-ghettoizing "pariah-people" (a conception he later criticized in Weber). The friction between the Gentiles and the Jewish "pariah-people" is for the Parsons of 1942 "natural."

Eva-Maria Ziege discusses in her chapter "The Irrationality of the Rational: The Frankfurt School and Its Theory of Society in the 1940s" the Institute of Social Research's study Antisemitism among American Labor of
1944–45, which, although it remained unpublished, constituted a crucial step in the evolution of this particular sociological tradition. She frames her discussion of the Institute’s work in the period of exile in the United States as an example of “scientific innovation through forced migration,” whereby “marginal persons” (according to Paul Lazarsfeld) who are part of two different cultures become “institution men,” the dynamic forces behind the formation of new institutions or, more generally speaking, of the institutionalization of an emerging practice, such as that of empirical social research informed by critical theory. She argues that the core members of the Institute were linked by “a discreet orthodoxy,” namely adherence to Marx’s critique of political economy and Freud’s psychoanalysis, which they maintained throughout their careers as crucial to the “esoteric” side of their communication and production, while they de-emphasized the theoretical core of their work in their “exoteric” communications. Ziege writes that this split between what one says explicitly and what one only hints at had been important to critical thinkers since the Enlightenment, and, in the case of the Frankfurt theorists, it enabled them to cooperate with scholars who did not share their theoretical core conception to immensely productive and innovative effect.

Antisemitism among American Labor (the Labor Study) is the “missing link” between the Dialectic of Enlightenment and the most famous but least typical work of the School, The Authoritarian Personality. It is based on hundreds of semi-structured interviews conducted by American workers (who got involved through the strategic involvement of the trade unions) with their peers and examines attitudes toward Jews in the context of World War II at a point when the Holocaust was a well-publicized fact in the United States. Ziege describes it as “not only the blue-collar but also the multicultural complement to The Authoritarian Personality” “the Labor Study conceptualized manifold ‘fine distinctions,’” including those between men and women, blue and white collar, religious affiliations, ethnic and generational differences, ethnic and national belonging, and age cohort. It established as the “type” most susceptible to antisemitism “white male workers with neither vocational training nor education,” and as the least susceptible, African American workers. For those inclined toward antisemitism, “the Jew” mainly represented “the bourgeois.” Perhaps most shockingly it was found that not antisemitic agitation but rather the news about the Holocaust exacerbated antisemitic attitudes;
while the most atrocious aspects tended to be disbelieved, interviewees tended to assume, drawing on their own life experience, that one does not get “punished” without at least some guilt, an argumentative pattern that the theorists of the Institute termed the “guilty victim” pattern.

Daniel Levy’s chapter “Gino Germani, Argentine Sociology, and the Study of Antisemitism” discusses the work of Germani, who immigrated—as an antifascist—to Argentina from fascist Italy in 1934, studied economics and philosophy in Buenos Aires, and became a key figure in the modernization of Argentine sociology, especially in the period from 1955, when he became director of both the School of Sociology and the Institute for Sociological Research at the University of Buenos Aires, to 1966, when he moved to Harvard. This process chiefly consisted of the transformation of a more old-fashioned, philosophically based sociology into a modern, institutionalized discipline driven by empirical research. As part of this process, Germani also pioneered sociological research on antisemitism in Argentina. The theoretical base of this work was broad; its influences included Parsons as well as the Frankfurt School. On a more practical level, the chief influence on Germani’s sociology must have been his having lived under Mussolini as well as Perón.

Beginning in 1957 Germani headed a research project on “ethnocentrism and authoritarian attitudes” that included research on antisemitism in Argentina. The results of this research were published in 1963. Germani suggested distinguishing two levels of antisemitism: the antisemitism of the “general public,” consisting of “certain adverse verbally expressed stereotypes,” and political antisemitism, expressed through movements “‘similar to the European totalitarian right-wing movements’ known in Argentina as nacionalistas.” These groups consisted of upper- and middle-class individuals with close connections to the Catholic Church and the armed forces. Following Germani’s analysis, their societal power rested on their ability to exploit the nationalism of the Argentine working classes as well as “certain psychosocial elements liable to promote authoritarian political attitudes.” (Concerning Peronism, though, Germani emphasized its important “democratic” aspects, as well as the relative absence of antisemitism.) The large empirical study on antisemitism Germani conducted in 1961, partly modeled on The Authoritarian Personality, showed that among the lower classes “traditional antisemitism” was more pertinent than “ideological antisemitism,” and interestingly “traditional antisemi-
tism" was not correlated with authoritarianism. Among the middle and upper classes the antisemitism tended to be "ideological antisemitism," which was correlated strongly with authoritarianism.

Werner Bonefeld's chapter "Antisemitism and the Power of Abstraction: From Political Economy to Critical Theory" completes the third part of the volume and points forward to Detlev Claussen's concluding comments. Presenting his argument in a style more reminiscent of political theory than of the intellectual history that is the predominant tone of the volume, Bonefeld weaves together theorems from Horkheimer and Adorno, Sartre, and Moishe Postone (as well as Hegel and Marx) and puts them to work in the context of the rise, or reemergence, of elements of antisemitism in contemporary "anti-imperialist" and (supposedly) "anticapitalist" movements. Bonefeld's chief suggestion is that antisemitism is not, as some on the Left seem to believe, essentially an expression of "resistance to capitalism" but is an expression of a form of resentment of selected aspects of capitalism (whose incarnation is deemed to be 'the Jews') that is in itself supportive of and indeed elementary to capitalism itself. Bonefeld challenges primarily the "anti-imperialist Left," especially those who recently have demanded solidarity with Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood while downplaying and rationalizing their antisemitism. It is significant that while in the past Leninists had argued for cooperation between communist parties and national liberation and anticolonial movements primarily (and quite overtly) for geopolitical and strategic reasons (especially the economic and power-political interests of the USSR), more recently anticapitalists have shifted to the argument that anticolonial movements as such are anticapitalist; in this context moral discourses against, for instance, "westoxification" (to use Khomeini's word)—liberalism, democracy, socialism, feminism, communism, all represented in "the Jew" and enjoying an imperialist bridgehead with Israel—are mistaken as progressive (or at least tolerated as harmless idiosyncrasies that need to be forgiven those who are most oppressed). Bonefeld sees as central to antisemitic anti-imperialism the underlying naturalization of the nation as an egalitarian community of honest, industrious, soil-bound Volksgenossen that is under siege by "society," representing evil and abstract forces of rootlessness, the "invisible hand" of the market, intellectualism, and finance capital. By destroying society, personified in the Jews, the community "liberates itself" and
dle and antisemitism,”

Abstracting the third element of political and social movements of traditional antisemitism is the “antisemitism of the Enlightenment” to be referred to as the “antisemitism of the Left,” and it is Islamists and those who have been influenced by Islamic fundamentalism. For instance, the shift from an intellectual, rationalistic, and secular perspective to a more mystical and mystical perspective is most likely the responsibility of the idea of “social antizvivemj of the individual” and the idea of “social more or less the same conflicts, processes, and problems, then the two are inevitably competing discourses fighting over the same ground, trying to win over and mobilize the hearts and minds of the perplexed individual members of this society. If this is granted, it is unsurprising that the one will adopt characteristics of the other when their thought patterns (reasoning, ideology, imaginings, rhetoric) are seen to succeed: antisemites will become quasi-sociologists (see the quote from Drumont that opens this introduction), and sociologists—even if and when opposing antisemitism—will parallel, be ambivalent about, or partly resemble antisemites, or even join them to varying degrees. Their convergence will likely be stronger if the individuals in question originate from the same political, cultural, or social milieu, such as (in Germany) the late nineteenth-century national liberal milieu that produced most sociologists and some antisemites. But that is a minor point; the real is-

Detlev Claussen’s “The Dialectic of Social Science and Worldview: On Antisemitism in Sociology” draws together some of the main lines of argument represented in this volume in light of his own perspective, which takes its cue from Max Horkheimer’s comment that “the Jewish Question is the question of contemporary society.” Central to Claussen’s argument is that a sociology that tries to find rationalist explanations of an irrational phenomenon cannot but fail; instead, by leaving unexamined the irrationalism that dwells at the heart of rationalism, sociology becomes complicit in the larger irrationality of which antisemitism is an extreme expression. Anything less than the self-critique of the Enlightenment will not suffice for the task of understanding antisemitism. This must involve a rational (in the sense of “guided by reason and reasoning”) critique of rationalism itself in its irrational dimensions that stem from its inevitably being enmeshed in the structures of the modern society that produced it.

This volume is based on the following premise: If, first, antisemitism can be understood as a discourse that speaks to a set of actual or perceived conflicts, processes, and problems inherent in modern society—none of which of course have anything causally to do with Jews, except in the minds of the antisemites—and if, second, sociology is also a discourse that speaks to more or less the same conflicts, processes, and problems, then the two are inevitably competing discourses fighting over the same ground, trying to win over and mobilize the hearts and minds of the perplexed individual members of this society. If this is granted, it is unsurprising that the one will adopt characteristics of the other when their thought patterns (reasoning, ideology, imaginings, rhetoric) are seen to succeed: antisemites will become quasi-sociologists (see the quote from Drumont that opens this introduction), and sociologists—even if and when opposing antisemitism—will parallel, be ambivalent about, or partly resemble antisemites, or even join them to varying degrees. Their convergence will likely be stronger if the individuals in question originate from the same political, cultural, or social milieu, such as (in Germany) the late nineteenth-century national liberal milieu that produced most sociologists and some antisemites. But that is a minor point; the real is-
sue is what one has to say (think, feel, imagine) on that tremendous and encompassing revolution: the emergence of modern capitalist, industrial, individualistic, national, liberal society.

Most of the chapters collected in this volume have been developed from presentations at a conference that took place at Manchester University in November 2008. I would like to thank the School of Arts, Histories and Cultures, the Centre for Jewish Studies, and the Department of Religions and Theologies at Manchester University and the British Sociological Association Theory Study Group for financing this conference, and those who, in addition to the contributors to this volume, made it such a pleasant and inspiring event: Bill Williams, Hae-Yung Song, David Seymour, Gary A. Abraham, Barbara Rosenbaum, Jean-Marc Dreyfus, Moishe Postone, Susie Jacobs, Christine Achinger, Kati Vörös, Rainer Niklaus Egloff, Philip Spencer, Lars Fischer, Ewa Morawska, Mathias Berek, Sebastien Mosbahi-Natanson, and Malgorzata Mazurek. The present volume still reflects the spirit and the atmosphere of this conference that brought together scholars from critical theory, Weberian and Durkheimian backgrounds—with more than enough to disagree on—in a friendly but combative discussion of what is probably one of the most divisive and charged issues around. Most participants seemed to agree that it was one of those rare academic gatherings that are unmistakably “about something”; there are now probably not many conferences where a discussion of Talcott Parsons makes pulses race and produces silences of the kind wherein one could hear a pin drop. The more electric moments are of course neutralized when ink meets acid-free paper and controversies are exiled into endnotes, but the reader might still sense some of the excitement of finding quite differing perspectives on some famously thorny issues.65

Notes

Some sections of this introduction were previously published in “Antisemitism, Capitalism and the Formation of Sociological Theory,” Patterns of Prejudice 44.2 (2010): 161–94.

1. Drumont is quoted in Birnbaum, Jewish Destinies, 106.
3. This perspective also aims to displace the approach that has been taken by some in the past looking for intrinsic affinities between sociology and "Jew-

ishness" (see, for example, Wiehn, *Juden in der Soziologie*; Käsler, *Judentum*). If sociology is about the search for a modern society healed from or recon-
ciled with its contradictions, then it is less than surprising that many of those who suffer from antisemitism as one of the latter's foremost expressions would dedicate themselves to it.

4. This became Stoetzler, *The State, the Nation and the Jews*.


6. On the response of sociology to the Holocaust, see Stoetzler, "Sociology."

7. Ranulf, "Scholarly Forerunners of Fascism," 33-34. Svend Ranulf (1894-1953) was primarily a sociologist of law; his main works are discussed in Barbalet, "Moral Indignation, Class Inequality and Justice." According to Barbalet, the failure of Ranulf's work to have had a significant impact on the sociological tradition may primarily be due to the lack of an institutional environment for sociology in Denmark before the 1980s.

8. See also Turner, "Sociology and Fascism in the Interwar Period." While Tönnies seems to have held (in private) antisemitic and antimodernist views in his early twenties, an impulse that lived on in his main work, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (published in 1887 when he was just thirty-two), he was also vehemently opposed to the antisocialist laws, supported activities of the labor movement and, in 1930, actually joined the Social Democratic Party (Liebersohn, *Fate and Utopia in German Sociology*, 12). While "Tönnies integrated Hobbesian theory and utilitarianism into a postliberal dialectic" (21), the early formation of the concept of the Gemeinschaft was inspired by Nietzsche's concept of "Dionysian oneness," Hobbes's and Schopenhauer's emphasis on "the will," and the historical research by Lewis Morgan, Johann Bachofen, and Otto von Gierke. Liebersohn argues that Tönnies "spotted the subversive po-
tential of their research" (they were conservatives) but also considers *Gemein-
schaft und Gesellschaft* "implicitly" antisemitic (24, 26, 33, 34). Tönnies's actual politics were "restrained patriotism and support for social reform" (38).

9. Ranulf, "Scholarly Forerunners of Fascism," 26. Ranulf's intervention is particu-
larly interesting because he was not a Marxist; his work on the concept of right was actually to a large extent Durkheimian. For a Marxist argument that links positivism to fascism, see Ball, *Marxian Science and Positivist Politics." In the 1930s Ranulf was not the only one who indicted Durkheim as a "forerunner of fascism"; Alexandre Koyré, for example, made the same point in a 1936 review article on French sociology in the Frankfurt School's *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* (Falasca-Zamponi, "A Left Sacred," 43). In his introduction to the German edition of Durkheim's *Sociology and Philosophy* (Adorno, "Einleitung zu Emile Durkheim") Adorno later challenged the au-
thoritarian character of a theory that hypothesizes the "spirit" of a society as its essence because this obstructs the possibility of distinguishing between
right and wrong consciousness of that society itself, but he credits Durkheim for acknowledging as a fact the thingness of society as it stands opposed to the individuals. Philippe Burrrin, La dérive fasciste, 41, however, points to Durkheim’s influence on Marcel Déat, one of those socialists who “drifted” toward fascism. The conception of socialism that allowed this “drift” to take place was Durkheim’s, who continued in this respect “la pensée de Saint-Simon et de Proudhon, celle de tout le vieux socialisme français.” Burrrin sums up Durkheim’s ambivalence succinctly: “Rationaliste et républicain, mais préoccupé par la désagrégation social produite par le capitalisme libéral, Durkheim avait vu dans les groupements professionnels le moyen de donner moralité et solidarité à une société menacée d’anomie” (41).

13. In one point also Weber the Protestant would have agreed with Comte the “secular Catholic”: the particularly harsh critique of “the plainly immoral doctrine of Luther that a man can be saved by faith irrespective of what his works may be,” in Ranulf’s paraphrase of Comte (“Scholarly Forerunners of Fascism,” 21).
17. Some readers will object that Durkheim’s corporations are not the corporations proposed by the fascists—that Durkheim intended a different meaning—and that Weber did not exactly dream of Hitler as his charismatic leader; it will be objected that the meaning of ideas depends on context, that is, that the same idea means something different in different contexts. Although this is undeniably true (I am tempted to say banal, certainly for a sociologist), I would hold against such objections that the liber-historicizing type of intellectual historian is in danger of contextualizing the idea under consideration so much that nothing is left of the idea. The more completely historiography moves away from the social and political philosophy whose concern with the validity of ideas and arguments in and for the battles of the present drove us to the study of history in the first place, the less interesting it becomes. There is much more to the story than whatever Durkheim and Weber might have intended to say; part of what they actually said is also what others, at the time and later, thought they said. The mediating instance that makes the various intended and unintended meanings cohere is society, in critical theory conceived as “the totality” of social relations, in post-structuralism as discourse, episteme, and so on (which can be understood as amounting to the same thing): a structural dimension of society (the Durkheimian “thing”; it) that expresses itself in the utterances of the speakers and gives them meaning and resonance beyond their specific contexts as
long as the general context (the "type" of society; the "mode of production"; "civilization" in the sense developed by Robertson in this volume) remains the same. Studying ideas in this perspective opens up the possibility for the thinker to reflect on what it is in society that "thinks" and "speaks" through him or her and to take at least some degree of responsibility for how he or she functions as a mouthpiece for it.

18. On Parsons, compare Gerhardt, *Talcott Parsons on National Socialism*.

19. The argument that, in spite of the obvious differences, there is a fundamental identity between Western democratic liberalism and Eastern "real socialism" was made by Immanuel Wallerstein, who in *After Liberalism* used the concept "lower case liberalism" as "the ideology of the modern world system" in this context. Wallerstein's concept of "lower case liberalism" bears some similarity to that of "positivism" as used here.


22. Hawthorn, *Enlightenment and Despair*, 85, called Comte a "Catholic atheist," which is also what Maurras was.

23. Quoted in Wilson, *Ideology and Experience*, 461. This was an opinion also shared by perfectly establishmentarian liberals such as Ernest Renan; the idea seems to have been common in all postrevolutionary traditions that inherited elements of the Enlightenment, including liberalism and socialism as well as positivism. On Renan's antisemitism, see Almog, "The Racial Motif in Renan's Attitude to Jews and Judaism."

24. Wilson, *Ideology and Experience*, 422. The same quote (from Maurras's article "La guerre religieuse"), in a slightly different translation, is in Sutton, *Nationalism, Positivism and Catholicism*, 18. I have not been able to verify this quote in Comte.


27. Quoted in Sutton, *Nationalism, Positivism and Catholicism*, 18–19. It would be perfectly possible, of course, to construct—in keeping with Luther and Kant, though probably less so with Rousseau—exactly the opposite argument, namely that monotheism strengthens "the respect that the conscience owes to its visible and near masters"; this would be the line of reasoning to be expected in a romantic-nationalist context, which Maurras rejected in theory, although in practice romantic and integral, classicist nationalism are not easily kept apart. Moreover this second line of argument would also be compatible with Durkheim's republican, anti-antisemitic nationalism, which indeed invokes both Comte and Kant: the French revolutionary and positivist, post-revolutionary traditions, and the German idealist tradition.

egoistic and abstract theology and love-engendering cultic practice and organizational structure. Positivism would replace the former and thereby salvage the latter.

29. Sutton, Nationalism, Positivism and Catholicism, 21. Maurras borrows from Comte the concept of "subjective synthesis," denoting the idea that "thought and action can be made properly coherent through their being ordered in the service of a collective 'Great Being' in which the subject incorporates himself through sentimental (or existential) choice" (24). This conception, a Comtean element that anticipates an aspect of "structural functionalism," vouches for the modernity of Maurras's "integral nationalism."

30. Sutton, Nationalism, Positivism and Catholicism, 23.


32. The fact of the positivity of the wrong state of things, or else the nonpositivity of the humane state of things that the Enlightenment still aims for, is of course the main reason why critical theory (as defined by Horkheimer in 1937 in "Traditional and Critical Theory") defines itself in opposition to positivism, both the encompassing original Comtean conception and the "neopositivist" version whose focus is narrowed onto concerns of the philosophy of science. Maurras accuses Comte of being slightly utopian also in other respects (his prophetic millenarian tendencies, dedication to progress, femininity, love and tenderness; Sutton, Nationalism, Positivism and Catholicism, 34). Against all this (i.e., against all that is interesting in Comte in spite of his "system"), Maurras asserts that "from Aristotle and Xenophon to Dante as well as to Thomas of Aquinas . . . there is a positive politics that the classical spirit encourages and teaches faithfully over the centuries." In other words, Maurras's classicist proto-fascism equals positivism minus its transcendental, as it were, feminine aspects. In a similar vein, for Maurras romantic love is just narcissism and wreaks havoc on social and family life; pity is individualistic, hence barbaric (36).

33. Sutton, Nationalism, Positivism and Catholicism, 37.

34. Sutton, Nationalism, Positivism and Catholicism, 45. Marion Mitchell developed a similar argument in an article from 1931: she argued that Durkheim "sought to reconcile the cosmopolitan ideal in a spiritualized patriotism"; while "retaining humanity as a god, he recognized the divinity of the nation," "the most exalted "collective being" in actual existence." Aiming to achieve "the closer integration of France by means of national professional groups, meetings and symbols, and a national system of education," securing the continued existence of "national personality," Durkheim foreshadowed what Charles Maurras has been pleased to call "integral nationalism." It is not a far step from a conception of the nation as the supreme reality, and humanity as the highest ideal, to one in which the nation fulfills the requirements of both. Where Durkheim clung to the vestiges of humanitarian pacifism and abhorred violent upheaval, his successors openly discarded the Positivist re-
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developmentism; chie of groups, the ned; It is not humanents of n andivist re-

ligion and replaced it by the religion of nationalism” (“Emile Durkheim and the Philosophy of Nationalism,” 106).


36. “Le titre de l’ouvrage, qui consacre une signification fâcheuse donnée au nom de tout un grand peuple, suffirait à lui seul pour motiver une réserve de notre parti” (Toussenel, Les Juifs, vii).

37. The 1847 edition was in two volumes, while the 1845 edition was in one. A German edition appeared already in 1851.

38. It should perhaps be added that there is a lot in Fourier—some of what he has to say on labor and on sex and gender—that is of great importance, in spite of his general political program and its antisemitism.

39. The antisemitic socialists’ fixation on the Jews as an unproductive, exploitative, and corrosive “financial aristocracy” derived from a simple reversal of Saint-Simon’s celebration of the struggle of the productive against the parasitical classes (whereby Saint-Simon and the Saint-Simonians themselves saw bankers and Jews in the camp of the productive).


41. Kuhn, Pierre Leroux, 204.

42. Leroux’s blending of Fourierism and Saint-Simonianism is thus based on the recognition of actual weaknesses in the Saint-Simonian doctrine—chiefly its authoritarian and antidemocratic character—and is therefore highly significant for the history of socialism: the more crucial it is to pay attention to the fact that exactly at this point of synthesis and radicalization, antisemitism also becomes virulent. A precise analysis of how and why antisemitism entered the equation at this crucial point still needs to be done. The Fourierist school seems to have been able to absorb a large number of dispersed former Saint-Simonians. There must have been a significant element of continuity between the two doctrines that allowed the antisemitism of the new doctrine to connect into the older doctrine; this connection seems to be the concept of productivity. Also the concept of exploitation as proposed by the Saint-Simonians is a weakness as it implies the idea of the “parasite”; the wage contract was considered “exploitative” because it “violated the principle of remuneration according to work”: “owners were remunerated without working by not fully remunerating those who did” (Cantiliffe and Reeve, “Exploitation,” 71). The critique of capitalist exploitation properly speaking begins only with Marx’s introduction of the concept of surplus-value and the distinction between the exchange-value of labor power and its use-value for the employer, which allows for the argument that the capitalist can appropriate surplus-value while paying a “fair wage,” if “fair” means receiving the price equivalent to the labor power’s exchange-value. This makes obsolete the ideas of the parasite and of remuneration being fraudulent. On the transformation of Fourierism after 1830, see Pamela Pilbeam, “Fourier and the Fourierists.”
48. Pickering, "Auguste Comte and the Saint-Simonians," 233. "The irony was that just as he lost interest in the sciences and opened himself up to ridicule because of his outlandish religion, ... former Saint-Simonians who had turned their back on their religion became important in the development of industrial capitalism in France." (236). See as well Manuel, The Prophets of Paris; Baker, "Closing the French Revolution."
49. I have discussed the dialectic between conservative and progressive antisemitisms in chapter 8 in The State, the Nation, and the Jews. See on this also the chapter by Goldberg in the present volume. For an examination of fascism in terms of the intellectual history of its active protagonists, nineteenth-century socialist antisemitism seems to me the most important element, whereas the "real," or political history of fascism’s success depended more on the persistence of the "ordinary," widespread conservative antisemitism that continued to exist as a "cultural code" and undermined any resistance to the former.
50. Gane, Auguste Comte, 5.
51. The Second Reich was universally admired as the original catch-up economy; see Szporluk, Communism and Nationalism; Love, Crafting the Third World.
52. Even the Bolshevik state had to submit to this historical law and imposed itself as the new "religion of humanity." Likewise some of those associated with quasi-Leninist groupings (see Bonefeld in this volume for examples) are in cahoots with those who advocate, for example, some version of Khomineist populism (and, before this came to look like a desirable option to metropolitan anti-imperialists, defended, for example, the corporatist-nationalist socialism of Saddam Hussein, who admired not only Stalin’s moustache). On the Comtean roots of Stalinism, see Debray, Critique of Political Reason, 228-33; on Khomineism, see Abrahamian, Khomineism.
53. On populism, see Peal, "The Politics of Populism."
54. See, for example, Repp, Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity; Loader, "Puritans and Jews"; Gorges, Sozialforschung in Deutschland; Bruch, Graf, and Hübinger, Kultur und Kulturwissenschaften um 1900; Lindenlaub, Richtungskämpfe im Verein für Sozialpolitik; Grimmer-Solem, The Rise of Historical Economics and Social Reform.
55. In the last third of the century, for the Sozialreform of German state socialists and the Verein für Sozialpolitik as well as for Durkheim, the point was not so much the need for state-driven development but rather the moral control of the economy that resulted from this development.
56. Grimmer-Solem, ""Every True Friend of the Fatherland.""
57. Zumbini, *Die Wurzeln des Bösen*, 357–58. Wagner seems to have become more
distanced from party political antisemitism in the course of the 1890s. For a
comprehensive portrayal of Wagner, see Clark, "Adolf Wagner."

58. In his early but crucial survey of German debates, "La science positive de la
morale en Allemagne," Durkheim reviewed Wagner’s work rather favorably
and without mentioning his antisemitism.


60. While Silberman ("Pierre Leroux’s Ideas," 375–76) states that Saint-
Simon did not show any hostility to or contempt of the Jews in his writings,
Szajkowski ("The Jewish Saint-Simoniands," 34) writes that Saint-Simon had
an "unfavourable opinion of the Jews," in spite of his doctrine’s "philosophi-
tism" that was based on his positive view of the role of banking. Fourier-
ists and, later, Proudhonists considered Saint-Simoniandsm "a Jewish ven-
ture" (38); their antisemitism and their opposition to Saint-Simoniandsm
seem to have reinforced each other. But also among the adherents of Saint-
Simoniandsm "anti-Jewish feeling" and expressions of antisemitism can be
found apparently from the mid-1840s onward (41). Many also embraced Ca-
tholicism at the time, as Fourierists did, Toussenel being an example. "Under
the July monarchy, the Fourierists had led French socialism into the anti-se-
mitic camp. In the period of the Second Empire Proudhon and his friends
played this role" (55).


63. On "bürgerliche Sozialreform," see Bruch, *Weder Kommunismus noch Kapi-
talismus.*

64. Simmel, *The Philosophy of Money,* Simmel, "Money in Modern Culture."
See Levine, "Simmel as Educator."

65. The conference itself, the research for my own contribution, and the first
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References


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