Antisemitism, capitalism and the formation of sociological theory

MARCEL STOETZLER

ABSTRACT Starting out from the proposition that modern antisemitism is a grotesque form of social theory that provides in its notion of ‘Jewification’ a critique of processes of capitalist modernization, Stoetzler points to the shared ground between classical sociological theory and modern antisemitism, and examines how their conceptual overlap influenced the ways in which sociologists responded to antisemitism or to the phenomena to which antisemitism also spoke. His argument is built around analyses of ‘L’individualisme et les intellectuels’, Émile Durkheim’s intervention in the Dreyfus affair, and passages from Max Weber’s Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, which are placed in the context of ‘classical’ and ‘early’ sociology, including positivism, early French socialism and German Katheder-socialism (academic socialism). He argues that sociologists developed a discourse that aimed to defend liberal society and modernization and, at the same time, attack a caricature of ‘egotistical utilitarianism’, which they blamed for the dismal aspects of the emerging new form of society. In doing so they offered an alternative to the antisemites but also mimicked their discourse even when—as in the case of Durkheim—they explicitly opposed antisemitism. Stoetzler argues that this was an intrinsic characteristic of classical sociology that weakened its ability to oppose antisemitism and fascism.

KEYWORDS antisemitism, capitalism, Charles Maurras, classical sociology, Émile Durkheim, liberalism, Marxism, Max Weber, positivism, Saint-Simon, socialism, sociology

The Danish sociologist Svend Ranulf published an article in 1939 entitled ‘Scholarly Forerunners of Fascism’ that provided a highly critical reading of Auguste Comte’s Cours de philosophie positive (1830) and Émile Durkheim’s De la division du travail social (1893), arguing that both authors’ arguments relied on conceptions that were similar to what Ferdinand Tönnies in 1887

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(that is, six years before the first publication of Durkheim’s work and fifty-seven years after the first volume of the Cours) conceptualized as the dichotomy between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (community and society). While Tönnies’s pair of concepts could of course (not necessarily with his approval) be adopted by German political romantics and reactionaries of all stripes, Ranulf’s main point was far more original and provocative: if there was a structural family resemblance between Tönnies’s philosophical, as it were, old-fashioned sociology and the apparently ‘scientific’, positivistic and empirically grounded sociology of the two French authors, and if indeed this shared ground was compatible with Nazi social thought, then the discipline of sociology as a whole needed fundamental rethinking.1 Ranulf concluded that

both these groups of sociologists have—for the most part unintentionally and unconsciously—served to prepare the soil for fascism by their propagation of the view that the society in which they were living was headed for disaster because of its individualism and liberalism and that a new social solidarity was badly needed.2

‘If Comte could wake up and see the conditions now [i.e. 1939] prevailing in Germany, he would undoubtedly have to admit that the rule of positivism for which he was yearning has largely come true in the form of German

1 Svend Ranulf, ‘Scholarly forerunners of fascism’, *Ethics*, vol. 50, no. 1, 1939, 16–34 (33–4). Ranulf was primarily a sociologist of law; for his main works, see Jack Barbalet, ‘Moral indignation, class inequality and justice: an exploration and revision of Ranulf’, *Theoretical Criminology*, vol. 6, no. 3, 2002, 279–97. According to Barbalet, the failure of Ranulf’s work to have a significant impact on the sociological tradition may primarily be due to the lack of an institutional environment for sociology in Denmark before the 1980s.

2 Ranulf, ‘Scholarly forerunners of fascism’, 34. See also Stephen P. Turner, ‘Sociology and fascism in the interwar period, the myth and its frame’, in Stephen P. Turner and Dirk Käsler (eds), *Sociology Responds to Fascism* (London and New York: Routledge 1992). While Tönnies seems to have held (in private) antisemitic and anti-modernist views in his early twenties, an impulse that lived on in his main work (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, published in 1887 when he was thirty-two), he was also vehemently opposed to the anti-socialist laws, supported the labour movement and, finally, in 1930, actually joined the Social Democratic Party; Harry Liebersohn, *Fate and Utopia in German Sociology, 1870–1923* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1988), 16. While Tönnies integrated Hobbesian theory and utilitarianism into a postliberal dialectic (ibid., 21), the early formation of the concept of the Gemeinschaft was inspired by Nietzsche’s notion of ‘Dionysian oneness’, Hobbes’s and Schopenhauer’s emphasis on ‘the will’ and the historical research by Morgan, Bachofen and von Gierke. Liebersohn argues that Tönnies ‘spotted the subversive potential of their research (they were conservatives) but also presents Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft as ‘implicitly’ antisemitic (ibid., 24, 26, 33, 34). Tönnies’s actual politics were ‘restrained patriotism and support for social reform’ (ibid., 38).
naziism [sic] or, more generally, in the form of fascism.  

The aspects of Comte’s thinking that Ranulf quoted in support of this conclusion were the following: Comte saw European society devastated by ‘intellectual anarchy’ in which individuals were called upon to decide on fundamental political issues ‘without any guide’ or moral control, a state of affairs that was prolonged and exploited by the ‘class of publicists’.  

When every individual has the right to question the very foundations of society, mutual trust is thereby destroyed and with it the very possibility of social life. Government must therefore rein in unfettered intellectual freedom, the ‘demolition of public morals’, the dissolution of the family and the effacement of traditional class distinctions. ‘Responsible for this misery’ were, in Ranulf’s paraphrase of Comte, ‘all kinds of rebels against the Catholic church, from the early Protestants onwards to the contemporary deists and atheists’ (it wouldn’t take much to add the Jews to this list).  

‘The Catholic system of the Middle Ages is the most perfect political masterpiece that has been devised until

3 Ranulf, ‘Scholarly forerunners of fascism’, 26. Ranulf’s intervention is particularly interesting because he was not a Marxist; his work on the concept of ‘right’ was actually to a large extent Durkheimian. For a Marxist argument that links positivism to fascism, see Terence Ball, ‘Marxian science and positivist politics’, in Terence Ball and James Farr (eds.), After Marx (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press 1984), 235–60. In the 1930s, Ranulf was not the only one who indicted Durkheim as a ‘forerunner of fascism’. Alexandre Koyré, for example, made the same point in a 1936 review article on French sociology in the Frankfurt School’s Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung; see Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi, ‘A left sacred or a sacred left? The Collège de Sociologie, fascism, and political culture in interwar France’, South Central Review, vol. 23, no. 1, 2006, 40–54 (43). Adorno later wrote a critical but sympathetic introduction to the German edition of Durkheim’s Sociologie et Philosophie: Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Einleitung zu Emile Durkheim, Soziologie und Philosophie’, in Theodor W. Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 8, Soziologische Schriften (Frankfurt-on-Main: Suhrkamp 1996), 245–78. He challenges the authoritarian character of a theory that hypostatizes the ‘spirit’ of a society as its essence as it obstructs the possibility of distinguishing between right and wrong consciousness of that society itself, its self-reflection (which should be its ‘spirit’, but as social critique), but credits Durkheim for acknowledging, as a fact, the thingness of society as it stands opposed to individuals. Philippe Burrin, however, points to Durkheim’s influence on Marcel Déat, one of those socialists who ‘drifted’ towards fascism; Philippe Burrin, La Dérive fasciste, Dioriat, Déat, Bergery 1933–1945 (Paris: Editions du Seuil 1986), 41. The conception of socialism that allowed this ‘drift’ to take place was Durkheim’s, who continued in this respect ‘la pensée de Saint-Simon et de Proudhon, celle de tout le vieux socialisme français’ (ibid.). Burrin sums up Durkheim’s ambivalence succinctly: ‘Rationaliste et républicain, mais préoccupé par la désagrégation social produite par le capitalisme libéral, Durkheim avait vu dans les groupements professionels le moyen de donner moralité et solidarité à une société menacée d’anomie’ (ibid.).


5 Ibid., 20.

6 Ibid., 21.

7 In one particular Weber the Protestant would have agreed with Comte the ‘secular Catholic’: the especially harsh critique of ‘the plainly immoral doctrine of Luther that a man can be saved by faith irrespective of what his works may be’, in Ranulf’s paraphrase of Comte (ibid.).
now by the human mind’, as it succeeded in penetrating politics with morality. As Catholicism had become a stranger to modern societies, however, its place needed to be taken by science, in particular ‘social physics’ or else, indeed, ‘sociology’, which would effect the scientific (‘positive’) reorganization of modern societies.8 Ranulf continued that Durkheim, too, like Comte, believed he lived in an age of moral dissolution and that sociology was called upon to remedy this evil.9 He asked:

Is not the rise of fascism an event which, in due logic, Durkheim ought to have welcomed as that salvation from individualism for which he had been trying rather gropingly to prepare the way? In due logic, undoubtedly. But there are aspects of fascism which would probably have seemed unacceptable to Durkheim—as they do to at least some of his followers. . . . 10

Ranulf seemed to be on firmer ground with respect to Comte than to Durkheim, as Durkheim was ambivalent about individualism rather than hostile to it, and explicitly departed from Comte in this as in other respects. Still, this departure was only partial. (Ranulf could have added that Weber’s notion that only charismatic leadership could break through the grey routine of bureaucratized modernity also contributed to, as well as reflected, the rise of fascism.) Ranulf saw the main difference between Comte and Durkheim in Durkheim’s more genuine and methodical commitment to scientificity (although he saw the results of Durkheim’s more scientific work as equally flawed); against this assessment it should be asserted that Durkheim differed from Comte in substance as well as in methodology.

It would seem that Ranulf’s intervention of 1939 was widely ignored and, if not ignored, then safely forgotten. Sociologists and intellectual historians might have chosen to do so because post-Second World War sociology, especially due to the influence of Talcott Parsons who successfully amalgamated its main traditions—including Weber and Durkheim—into liberal, progressivist modernization theory, could not but appear to be firmly of the side of western democracy and anti-fascism.11

If Ranulf’s thesis is now taken as an inspiration to dig deeper into the matter, his account must necessarily be made more complicated, especially with

8 Ibid., 22.
9 Ibid., 26.
10 Ibid., 31.
11 See Uta Gerhardt (ed.), Talcott Parsons on National Socialism (New York: Aldine de Gruyter 1993). It is not surprising that liberals and democrats are scandalized by the suggestion that Parsonian democratic, anti-fascist modernization theory could share, through Comtean positivism, some of its roots with its hot and cold war enemy ‘totalitarianism’; after all, it was developed, complete with its notion of western ‘political’, i.e. allegedly non-‘ethnic’ nationalism, first against Hitlerism and then further deployed as an alternative to Leninist-Stalinist modernization theory and praxis.
respect to Durkheim. Furthermore, it is notable that Ranulf’s discussion seems to treat fascism and Nazism as synonyms and does not mention antisemitism; as antisemitism has over the last decades been recognized as central at least to the German Nazi variety of fascism, the exploration of antisemitism seems a good place from which to reopen the discussion. This is especially so as antisemitism tends to become relevant at the points where fascists construct their idea of Gemeinschaft. The perspective taken in this essay, however, is somewhat different from Ranulf’s: while Ranulf decided to exclude Comte and Durkheim, along with Tönnies, from the anti-fascist camp—a move that still today unfailingly scandalizes sociologists as it implicitly also delegit- mizes positivist sociology in its entirety—the present essay proposes to focus on their ambiguities and to treat them—and, by implication, the discipline of sociology tout court—as another instance of the dialectic of enlightenment (to be precise, the dialectic of the enlightenment of the post-Enlightenment period, the nineteenth century). The idea that liberals, democrats and socialists who opposed fascism and antisemitism might themselves be implicated in the evil done is still today unlikely to become a popular opinion; but when the spirit of the anti-Hitler coalition still dominated the world-view of most people in ‘the West’ it surely was nothing less than unthinkable. When a few celebrated but ipso facto isolated theorists including Horkheimer, Adorno and Sartre suggested it, their propositions were, if not simply ignored, then neutralized and shuffled off into the parallel world of high social theory; they were, in other words, considered too difficult, brilliant or esoteric to be actually pertinent to the daily workings of scholarly or political discourse.

The present essay aims to complicate and develop Ranulf’s thesis by stepping back in time at several removes. As for Durkheim, the principal ground on which Ranulf’s claim has to be contested is the interpretation of the former’s direct and public engagement in the Dreyfus affair as a leading Dreyfussard. In this context I would like to point to the paradox that positivist sociology was crucial to the intellectual conception that Durkheim threw into the battle against antisemitism in the Dreyfus affair (see ‘Durkheim and the religion of individuality’ below), while it was also in at least partial agreement with the antisemitic world-view itself. This ambiguity is the principal observation around which the different parts of the following essay are arranged.12

12 The argument that the formation of classical sociology and modern antisemitism were interrelated processes can also be made the other way round: antisemites were fully aware, and also part, of the emerging new way of talking and thinking about the new society, as Edouard Drumont testifies in the following statement, taken from a text of 1886 that dealt with reactions to his La France juive (published in the same year): ‘Without rancor or hatred, in the spirit of sociology and psychology, I seek to examine the debased condition into which France has fallen. . . . My mission as a sociologist is to show people as they are’; quoted in Pierre Birnbaum, Jewish Destinies, Citizenship, State, and Community in Modern France, trans. from the French by Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Hill and Wang 2000), 106.
Modern antisemitism and the modern discipline of sociology developed in France and Germany in parallel and in close interplay, both between each other and between the respective traditions and developments in these two countries. Different strands of modern antisemitism as well as different schools of sociology emerged in late nineteenth-century Germany simultaneously, and within what might loosely be called a discourse of social reform or regeneration. The same is true of France in the second third of the nineteenth century: sociology emerged there and then out of ‘positive philosophy’ and ‘positive politics’, while modern radical antisemitism emerged out of what Marxists call ‘early’ or ‘utopian’ socialism. The context of these developments in France is that of the disintegrating school of Saint-Simonianism, from which Saint-Simon’s disciple and one-time collaborator Auguste Comte had been excluded in 1829 because, or perhaps under the excuse that, he had failed to follow the late Saint-Simon’s turn towards a discourse stressing religion and the emotions.13 (Comte made good on this failure later on, as did Durkheim.)

13 Comte was Saint-Simon’s secretary and collaborator from 1817 to 1824 when he was fired in a bitter argument over the authorship of a seminal essay; Mary Pickering, ‘Auguste Comte and the Saint-Simonians’, French Historical Studies, vol. 18, 1, 1993, 211–36 (213). After Saint-Simon’s death in 1825, Comte began publishing in a new journal founded by Saint-Simon’s disciples, including Olinde Rodrigues and Prosper Enfantin, called Le Producteur that was not, however, advertised as following Saint-Simon’s ideas, and indeed did not reflect the increased interest in religion of Saint-Simon’s last book Nouveau Christianisme. In this formative period of Saint-Simonianism Comte’s influence on the group (of which he had no high opinion) was paramount (ibid., 216). From 1826 to 1828 Comte suffered from a mental illness (apparently triggered by his wife’s affair with the editor of Le Producteur who was then fired), during which period the journal also went bankrupt. By the time Comte re-emerged, the Saint-Simonians (chiefly Eugène and Olinde Rodrigues, Enfantin and Saint-Amand Bazard) were in the process of changing direction, emphasizing that philosophy, science and industry were to serve the new religion of love, following the late Saint-Simon. Pickering suggests that this change of direction was deliberately devised in order to exclude Comte who remained aloof from what was now effectively a sect or ‘church’ (ibid., 218). Comte was excluded on the basis of Saint-Simon’s earlier denunciation of him as indifferent to the emotions and religion. By 1829, and quite unfairly, Comte’s thinking was represented by the Saint-Simonians as ‘the “glacial” scientism’ they now rejected (ibid., 220). Out of this process of distancing themselves from Saint-Simon’s most famous disciple, the group developed the 1829 manifesto of Saint-Simonianism, Doctrine de Saint-Simon, which was also a critique of positivism (ibid., 222) and a crucial inspiration for subsequent socialist and communist traditions. The sect was briefly—around the time of the revolution of 1830—very successful before it split and disintegrated in 1831, partly over the question of the emancipation and the role of women (ibid., 228). Pickering argues that the Cours de philosophie positive (1830–42) constituted Comte’s ongoing ‘discourse with the Saint-Simonians, who remained unnamed’, emphasizing the necessary priority of science. Ironically, from 1838, when he started work on volume four, which introduced sociology, ‘Comte began to absorb different aspects of the Saint-Simonians’ philosophy’, on the emotions, the arts,
These events occurred against the more general background of the formation of modern liberalism, the centrist ideology that sought to preserve those results of the revolution that benefitted bourgeois progress while preventing any future revolutions.14

As for the development of radical modern antisemitism, the decisive moment seems to have been when, after an organizational collapse of their movement in 1831, many former Saint-Simonians joined the Fourierists, and at the same time took on an increasingly Catholic character.15 To the extent that Saint-Simonianism assimilated itself to Fourierism as well as to Catholicism, its adherents also lost their relative immunity against antisemitism, as illustrated by the case of Pierre Leroux, a former Saint-Simonian who is nowadays usually referred to as a ‘Christian socialist’.16 In 1846, one year after

imagination, religion, i.e. aspects also of Saint-Simon’s and his own earliest work that he had suppressed in the preceding nearly two decades. From the failure of the 1848 revolution to usher in the kind of transformation he considered necessary, he concluded that positivism ought to enter the battle of doctrines in a more robust manner, and henceforth presented it with the Saint-Simonian term ‘Religion of Humanity’ (ibid., 233), detailed in the Système de politique positive (1851–4), increasingly mimicking the doctrine of the Saint-Simonians. The irony was that just as he lost interest in the sciences and opened himself up to ridicule because of his outlandish religion ... former Saint-Simonians who had turned their back on their religion became important in the development of industrial capitalism in France’ (ibid., 236). See also Frank Edward Manuel, The Prophets of Paris (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1962), and Keith Michael Baker, ‘Closing the French Revolution: Saint-Simon and Comte’, in François Furet and Mona Ozouf (eds), The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture. Vol. 3: The Transformation of Political Culture 1789–1848 (Oxford: Pergamon 1989).

the Fourierist Alphonse Toussenel published *Les Juifs, rois de l’époque*, one of the most important radical antisemitic texts of the nineteenth century, Leroux published an antisemitic tract with exactly the same title.\(^{17}\)

Crucial to the Fourierist critique of modern society was the notion of industrial, commercial or financial feudalism (used more or less interchangeably), which suggested a fundamental critique of the French Revolution: the revolution had not actually abolished feudalism but merely changed its form and exchanged some of the actors. The new feudal lords were the *financial* aristocracy, and the anti-feudal revolution was still to come. Arguably this type of critique was more than an acknowledgement that the revolution was incomplete or needed to be driven further, a point of view that would have been shared by any democrat or socialist; it seemed to imply, rather, that the whole affair was window-dressing and not merely incomplete. While for Saint-Simon, for example, the revolution certainly opened the door to the rule of the *industriels* (the productive Third Estate), whose domination and transformation of society now merely needed to be followed through, the same exact process was seen by Fourier as the continuation of feudalism in a different guise and as the obstacle to the petit-bourgeois (that is, based on small-scale commodity production) collectivist transformation he wished to see. The more radical Leroux was critical of Saint-Simon because he understood that ‘industry’ could not unite bourgeoisie and proletariat into a *classe industrielle* that would be united and opposed to the class of the unproductive and the parasitic, as Saint-Simon anticipated.\(^{18}\) Leroux also pointed out that Saint-Simon’s notion of organization was elitist, hierarchical and anti-democratic: Saint-Simon rejected general franchise, for example. It is in this context that Leroux adopted the Fourierist notion that the allegedly new industrial society was actually financial feudalism. The merger of Fourierism and Saint-Simonianism was thus based on a recognition of actual weaknesses in the Saint-Simonian

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18 Kuhn, *Pierre Leroux*, 204.
doctrine and is therefore of the highest significance for the history of socialism. It is even more crucial to note the fact that it was exactly at this point of synthesis and radicalization that antisemitism also became virulent and has remained so, especially in those socialist traditions committed to elitist, conspiratorial and populist tactics.  

Half a century later, the antisemite Charles Maurras—the founder of Action Française, the theorist of what he termed ‘integral nationalism’, a form of modern nationalism that he referred to as ‘socialist’ (he often quoted Toussenel), an important if indirect influence on the early development of fascism, a Bonapartist and Boulangist turned monarchist and a declared agnostic who supported and admired the Catholic Church—was a declared follower of Comte. Maurras wrote, for example, in 1904: ‘It is clear from the philosophy of Comte that the Jewish race is a race whose evolution has been stunted.’ This was of course an opinion also shared by perfectly mainstream liberals such as Ernest Renan; the idea seems to have been widespread in all post-revolutionary traditions that inherited elements of the Enlightenment, including liberalism and

19 A precise analysis of how and why antisemitism entered the equation at this crucial point still needs to be done. The Fourierist school seems to have been able to absorb a large number of dispersed former Saint-Simonians; there must have been a significant element of continuity between the two doctrines that allowed the antisemitism of the new doctrine to connect to the older doctrine. This connection seems to be the concept of productivity (see below). The concept of exploitation, as formulated by the Saint-Simonians, was also potentially a bridge between the two, as it implied the idea of the ‘parasite’. The wage contract was considered ‘exploitative’ because it ‘violated the principle of remuneration according to work’: ‘owners were remunerated without working by not fully remunerating those who did’; John Cunliffe and Andrew Reeve, ‘Exploitation: the original Saint Simonian account’, Capital and Class, vol. 59, 1996, 61–80 (71). The critique of capitalist exploitation properly speaking begins only with Marx’s introduction of the concept of surplus value, which makes obsolete the ideas of the parasite and of remuneration as incomplete and fraudulent. On the transformation of Fourierism after 1830, see Pamela Pilbeam, ‘Fourier and the Fourierists: a case of mistaken identity?’, French History and Civilization: Papers from the George Rudé Seminar, vol. 1, 2005, 186–96. Many of the former Saint-Simonians were ‘practical men, government engineers and doctors, looking for achievable social reform’, under whose influence Fourierism ‘became state-orientated reformism’ (ibid., 193). Later, Louis-Napoleon enlisted ‘former Fourierists/Saint-Simonians in his economic policies’ (ibid., 195). As a rule of thumb, it seems that forms of socialism become more antisemitic the more they resemble authoritarian, elitist, positivist blueprints for the top-down, (nation–)state-centric, productivist reorganization of society.

20 Hawthorn called Comte a ‘Catholic atheist’, which is also what Maurras was; Geoffrey Hawthorn, Enlightenment and Despair: A History of Social Theory (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press 1987), 85.

socialism as well as positivism. Likewise, in a text from 1898, Maurras wrote that, while the Jews were a material force for societal degeneration, there was also

a Protestant spirit . . . [that] threatens not only the French spirit, but . . . every spirit, every nation, every State, and reason itself . . . It dissolves societies; it constitutes, according to Auguste Comte’s fine definition, a sedition of the individual against the [human] species.

Although Maurras seems in this quotation to find Protestants even worse than Jews, it also points to the close relation between anti-Protestantism and antisemitism within Catholic reactionary discourse. (Inversely, it also indicates that Weber’s work on the ‘Protestant spirit’, at least to an extent, might have been written against anti-Protestant critiques of modern society, including, within the sociological tradition, Comte’s quasi-Catholicism.)

Maurras, who was obsessively driven to combat individualism in what he saw as its two prevalent forms, (German) romanticism and the revolutionary tradition of 1789, nurtured since the Dreyfus affair the idea of an alliance of positivists and Catholics (incidentally, with little practical success). While he abhorred Luther, Rousseau and Kant, he admired Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle who was, according to Maurras, ‘the first of the Positivists’. His hero, though, was Auguste Comte, as he explained in a 1902 essay with Comte’s name as its title: ‘Some amongst us were living examples of anarchy. To those of us who were, he restored order or, its equivalent, the hope of order; he revealed the beauty of Unity smiling out of a heaven that did not appear too far away.’ Maurras particularly cherished and repeatedly quoted Comte’s aphorism, ‘submission is the basis of perfection’, and praised his awareness of the vanity of rationalism and ‘revolutionary sophism’. Maurras, following Comte, saw the root of the malady in monotheism, which led the believer to prioritize individual spiritual welfare and a personal relationship with the deity over positive societal ties. This is expressed for example in an appendix to his book *Trois Idées politiques* of 1898:

25 Ibid., 4–5, Maurras quoted 29.
26 Quoted in ibid., 13–14.
Positivists point out correctly that this idea [the idea of God] can also lead to anarchy. The individual, too often in revolt against the general interests of the humankind and its sub-groupings (Country, caste, State, family) is in many cases submissive only out of necessity, horror of solitude and fear of deprivation. . . . the idea of this invisible and distant master will quickly undermine the respect that the conscience owes to its visible and near masters. Such a conscience . . . will invoke the eternal and unwritten laws so as to extract itself from laws that have the most immediate pertinence, not just once, as did Antigone very legitimately, but on each and every pretext. . . . This mystical exchange [with God] leads to scepticism in the field of theory and to revolt in that of practice . . . every egoism is justified in the name of God . . .

Monotheism is what makes Protestantism anti-social. The Christian spirit corrupted the social ideas of ancient Rome (where, it seems, people acted against the law only in very exceptional cases and after serious soul-searching, following the model of Antigone) and, after it brought down Rome, it also destroyed Catholic civilization in the sixteenth century, and did it again, in its Rousseauian incarnation, in 1789. This argument hinges on the idea that in Catholicism the element of monotheism (the Christian spirit) is rigorously circumscribed and attenuated by polytheistic elements as well as organic and hierarchical institutional structures, an argument that Maurras took straight from Comte, supported with ample references to the *Cours de philosophie positive* and the *Système de politique positive.* Maurras concluded that, in Catholicism, ‘the stupid and the vile, bound by the chains of dogma, are not free to choose a master as they please and in their own image. . . . Catholicism proposes the only idea of God that is tolerable in a well organized State.’

Likewise:

27 Quoted in ibid., 18–19. It would be perfectly possible, of course, to construct—in keeping with Luther and Kant, though probably less so with Rousseau—exactly the opposite argument, namely, that monotheism strengthens ‘the respect that the conscience owes to its visible and near masters’; this would be the line of reasoning to be expected in a romantic-nationalist context, which Maurras rejected in theory, although, in practice, romantic and integral, classicist nationalism were allied and intertwined. Moreover, this second line of argument would also be compatible with Durkheim’s republican, anti-antisemitic nationalism, which indeed invokes both Comte and Kant, the French revolutionary tradition, the positivist, the post-revolutionary, and the German idealist and romantic traditions.

28 Andrew Wernick’s account confirms that Comte indeed held this view. He writes that Comte described monotheism, via the idea of ‘personal salvation’, as the fount of egoism. Comte detected a contradiction in Catholicism between an egoistic and abstract theology, and a love-engendering cultic practice and organizational structure. Positivism would replace the former and thereby salvage the latter; Andrew Wernick, *Auguste Comte and the Religion of Humanity: The Post-Theistic Program of French Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001), 110–11.

Morality in the Comtian State tends, in effect, towards a sort of moral socialism; but, with good logic, it excludes the leading articles of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of liberal doctrine. Morality in the Kantian State leads to a form of mystical isolation, where everyone considers himself as a sort of god, as more or less proud, courageous and steadfast.\footnote{Quoted in ibid., 23.}

Maurras does, however, flag up an important divergence from Comte: while he applauds Comte’s notion that the dignity of the individual results only from its ‘subordination to some compound existence’, he does not follow Comte’s notion that this ‘compound existence’ is humanity.\footnote{Ibid., 24, 26.} Maurras notes that ‘Humanity does not exist—at least not yet’, and replaces it with the nation: ‘He who defends his Country, his nationality and his State is engaged in the defence of all that is real and all that is concrete in the idea of Humanity.’\footnote{Quoted in ibid., 26.} In this sense, the nation is the positive reality of humanity, a not inconsistent development of the positivist position in a historical period in which nation-states are indeed concrete, positive realities, while humanity is not (yet).\footnote{This very fact, the positivity of ‘the wrong state of things’ (Adorno), is of course the main reason that one should not be a positivist. Maurras accuses Comte of being slightly utopian in other respects as well (his prophetic-millenarian tendencies, dedication to progress, femininity, love and tenderness) (ibid., 34). Against all this (i.e. against all that is interesting in Comte, despite himself), Maurras asserts that ‘from Aristotle and Xenophon to Dante as well as to Thomas of Aquinas... there is a positive politics that the classical spirit encourages and teaches faithfully over the centuries’ (quoted in ibid., 33). In other words, Maurras’s classicist proto-fascism equals positivism minus its (few) transcendental, as it were feminine, aspects. Likewise, for Maurras, romantic love is just narcissism and wreaks havoc on social and family life; pity is individualistic, hence barbaric (ibid., 36).}

It seems to have been in the context of the Dreyfus affair that Maurras made clear what is the essence behind Protestant individualism: in an article responding to a text by Bernard Lazare, Maurras argued that justice, pity and compassion were Jewish ideas: ‘all individualist theory is of Jewish making.’\footnote{Quoted in ibid., 37.} In \textit{Trois Idées politiques} he declares: ‘The Protestant originates entirely from the Jew.’\footnote{Quoted in ibid., 38.} It is from this point onward that Maurras was explicitly and radically antisemitic. As Michael Sutton points out, it is ‘ironic’ that Maurras’s antisemitism or, to be precise, its ‘modern philosophical sub-structure’ was derived from Comte who was then widely regarded as the greatest French philosopher of the nineteenth century, including by Dreyfussards like Durkheim.\footnote{Ibid., 45. The technical term borrowed by Maurras from Comte is ‘subjective synthesis’, denoting the idea that ‘thought and action can be made properly coherent through their being ordered in the service of a collective “Great Being” in which the subject incorporates himself through sentimental (or existential) choice’ (ibid., 241). This conception vouches for the modernity of Maurras’s nationalism.}
Antisemites and sociologists competed for hegemony over the definition of who or what caused ‘societal degeneration’. Maurras’s case seems to provide some evidence in support of Ranulf’s thesis.37

**Weber and Protestant-inspired capitalism**

Max Weber’s *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* (1904/5) is fundamentally a book about how capitalism turned from a good thing into a bad one, providing some hesitant pointers as to how this metamorphosis might at least partially be reversed.38 From the history and actual workings of capitalism Weber constructs a conceptual dichotomy between what, according to him, is essential and specific to modern, western, bourgeois capitalism, and what is not: authentic, modern capitalism is contrasted with not specifically modern, or non-western, forms of capitalism, including the ‘pariah capitalism’ of ‘the Jews’.39 Among the characteristics of the former (the ‘ideal-type’ capitalism), the most prominent is the drive for accumulation for its own sake, that is, neither for utility nor for enjoyment. Famously, Weber credited Puritan Christian sects in the context of the English Revolution with having invented the ‘spirit of capitalism’ in its specific, genuine form, while suggesting that, once it was ‘invented’ and out there, it gained its own uncontrollable momentum, turned into an objective culture, became

37 Marion Mitchell argued in 1931 that Durkheim partially ‘foreshadowed’ Maurras’s nationalism. She wrote that Durkheim ‘sought to reconcile the cosmopolitan ideal in a spiritualized patriotism’; while ‘retaining humanity as a god, he recognized the divinity of the nation’, ‘the most exalted “collective being” in actual existence’. Aiming to achieve ‘the closer integration of France by means of national professional groups, meetings and symbols, and a national system of education’, securing the continued existence of ‘national personality’, ‘Durkheim foreshadowed what Charles Maurras has been pleased to call “integral nationalism”’. It is not a far step from a conception of the nation as the supreme reality, and humanity as the highest ideal, to one in which the nation fulfils the requirements of both. Where Durkheim clung to the vestiges of humanitarian pacifism and abhorred violent upheaval, his successors openly discarded the Positivist religion and replaced it by the religion of nationalism; Marion Mitchell, ‘Emile Durkheim and the philosophy of nationalism’, *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 46, no. 1, 1931, 87–106 (106).


independent of its Puritan roots, lost its ‘spirit’, and the concern with material goods turned from a ‘light cloak’ into a ‘casing hard as steel’.

Throughout the text Weber describes the process by which capitalism lost what should be—ideal-typically—its spirit, its being bounded, framed and directed by a religious (Christian, Protestant, Calvinist) ethic, as a degeneration or regression into ‘pure utilitarianism’. Utilitarianism (or rather, a caricature of it) was of course also one of the principal targets of the antisemites and also, as will become clear below, of Durkheim’s specific effort to defend individualism against its detractors.

Weber gives few hints to the general discourse from which and into which his analysis of genuine as opposed to utilitarian capitalism was feeding, but it is clear enough. On one of the opening pages of the first chapter he invokes Thomas Carlyle, probably the most important author of a ‘cultural’ or ‘ethical’ critique of capitalism: Weber (mis)quotes Carlyle’s formulation, in the introduction to the latter’s 1845 edition of the letters and speeches of Cromwell, that Puritanism was ‘the last of all our heroisms’ (Weber quotes the original English but leaves out the word ‘all’). He refers


41 ‘The religious roots died out slowly, giving way to utilitarian worldliness’ (Weber, The Protestant Ethic, 176). A similar formulation can be found on p. 177.

42 Weber, The Protestant Ethic, 37; Weber, Die protestantische Ethik, 27. I am not aware of evidence that Weber was influenced by Carlyle beyond using some of his works as sources for his research on the English Revolution, but there are strong parallels that make Weber seem rather akin to Carlyle. Carlyle, a Scottish Puritan, had hoped, indeed like Weber, to infuse an unheroic present with some of the spirit of the English Revolution by, among other things, editing Cromwell’s writings; Brian W. Young, The Victorian Eighteenth Century: An Intellectual History (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007), 22. There he praised English Puritanism as ‘a practical world based on belief in God’ (quoted ibid.). In his last work (six volumes on the history of Frederick the Great, 1858–65), Carlyle found in Prussian history praiseworthy virtues such as (Puritan-inspired) thrift (ibid., 18) and ‘Reformation sobriety’ (ibid., 37). Carlyle’s crucial suggestion in ‘Signs of the Times’ (1829) that the modern world is an age of machinery, ‘in every outward and inward sense of that word’, in which the individual cannot anymore accomplish anything individually but only as a part of various ‘machineries’ and institutions and with the help of mechanical aids, comes very close to Weber’s view (as well as Georg Simmel’s); quoted in Ella M. Murphy, ‘Carlyle and the Saint-Simonians’, Studies in Philology, vol. 33, 1936, 93–118 (101). Furthermore, the contrast between Carlyle and Saint-Simon (especially on the issue of the latter’s enthusiasm for modernization, and the deliberate inventing of a new religion) and in spite of some overlap (recognition of the ‘social question’, the need for the ‘organization of labour’) seems to anticipate aspects of the contrast between Weber and Durkheim, with Simmel and Tönnies perhaps in between.
a few times to Matthew Arnold, and his famous description of the personality-type produced by decadent (post-Puritan) capitalism seems to have been an amalgamation or paraphrase of bits of Goethe, Nietzsche, George and other German turn-of-the century Kulturkritiker (critics of civilization): ‘specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart’. Most prominently, however, Weber uses Ferdinand Kürnberger’s 1855 novel Der Amerikamüde (the one who got tired of America) as a sounding board for his own project.

In the second chapter of Die protestantische Ethik (the first substantial chunk of the argument), Weber develops his ‘ideal-typical’ concept of the ‘spirit of capitalism’ out of a reading of two texts by Benjamin Franklin (of 1736 and 1748) that Weber quotes from Kürnberger’s novel. (Weber notes that he corrected Kürnberger’s translation according to the English original.) In the novel by the Austrian writer—one of the cohort of ‘disappointed’ 1848 democrats that included many key nineteenth-century National Liberals but also radical antisemites like Richard Wagner—Franklin’s texts represent the spirit of America and act as a foil for the development of the ‘German’, humanistic values of the novel’s protagonist Dr Moorfeld. Newly arrived in the United States, full of idealism and high expectations, the German emigrant Dr Moorfeld is treated to a reading of Franklin’s texts in the first chapter of the novel, the starting point of the process that leaves him increasingly disillusioned with and indeed ‘tired of America’. The gist of what in Franklin’s texts represents the ‘spirit of America’ for Kürnberger and the ‘capitalist spirit’ for Weber is, in Weber’s words, the celebration of ‘the honest man of recognized credit’ (literally: ‘the credit-worthy man’), and the ‘duty of the individual to the increase of his capital which is assumed as an end in itself’. Weber correctly describes Kürnberger’s novel as a document of the (now long since blurred-over) differences between the German and the American outlook (Empfinden), one may even say of the type of spiritual life, which, in spite of everything, has remained common to all Germans, Catholic

44 Although this seems to be Weber’s own formulation he put it in inverted commas as if it was an unreferenced quotation; it might also be an actual quotation that he assumed contemporaries would recognize. Weber, The Protestant Ethic, 182; Weber, Die protestantische Ethik, 161.
46 The passage Weber uses is in Book I, chap. 1 of the novel.
47 Dr Moorfeld soon flees New York’s appalling Mammonism and goes to Pennsylvania. However, the backwoods also disappoint him: they turn out to be neither pleasant nor romantic, i.e. quite different from German forests. Dr Moorfeld finds that the farmers are dependent on bankers and speculators in New York, Baltimore and Philadelphia.
Künnebger’s text was a contribution to the debate that aimed after 1848 to redefine German nationalism under conditions of capitalist modernization processes, processes that did not wait for the German political-cultural system to adapt itself to Whig liberalism’s ideal-typical prescriptions for historical development. Weber (who wrote Die protestantische Ethik just after returning from a visit to the United States that he seems to have much enjoyed) locates his argument about the difference between the genuine capitalist spirit and its impoverished utilitarian version within the field of competing conceptions of German nationality as it had developed in German post-1848 liberalism. Künnebger’s ‘America’ is a vision of how Germany might but ought not to develop.

Nonetheless, what Weber found in the United States he also found at home, although, regretfully, overshadowed by the more powerful cultures (‘spirits’) of Lutheranism and Catholicism. Die protestantische Ethik is in this sense a polemic against the German nationalist denunciation of the (American) capitalist spirit as mere utilitarianism while nevertheless

49 Weber, The Protestant Ethic, 192n3; Weber, Die protestantische Ethik, 170n31. The main thrust of Weber’s argument is indeed not a defence of Protestant against, as one might have expected, Catholic ‘spirits’ but Anglo-Saxon Calvinist v. German-Lutheran and Catholic ‘spirits’. Weber surely saw the Calvinist spirit alive in Germany, and strengthening it for the better of the German nation was the whole point of the book. Weber’s mother Helene was a Calvinist of (on the maternal line) Huguenot background; Liebersohn, Fate and Utopia in German Sociology, 83.

50 Weber’s point of departure for his exploration of the ‘Protestant ethic’ was his observation made during a 1904 visit to the United States that in certain Puritan sects ‘in the midst of modern capitalism the personal ethic of individual responsibility . . . had survived and was the basis for social action’, and he contrasted the American sects with ‘the bureaucratic structure of the European “church”, which offered no hope for the future’; Colin Loader, ‘Puritans and Jews: Weber, Sombart and the transvaluators of modern society’, Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie, vol. 26, no. 4, 2001, 635–53 (639).


52 Barbalet suggests that Weber aimed to answer in Die protestantische Ethik questions that he had raised in his 1895 inaugural lecture about the German middle class’s ability to satisfy national aspirations; Jack Barbalet, Weber, Passion and Profits: The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008), 19. Die protestantische Ethik was in this sense ‘an instrument of political education’ (ibid., 25). Weber complained in the 1895 lecture about ‘the hackneyed yelping of the ever-growing chorus of amateur politicians . . . [who] believe it is possible to replace “political” with “ethical” ideas’ (ibid., 27), and subsequently fail to do what needs to be done in terms of Realpolitik; Die protestantische Ethik seems to suggest a type of ethics that makes amateurish, hackneyed, moralistic yelping unnecessary.
preserving intact its rejection of utilitarianism.\footnote{Weber grants that Franklin’s discourse is indeed ‘already’ over-determined by utilitarianism; the ideal-type has to be constructed by mindful exegesis out of a less than ideal-typical empirical reality (the actual Franklin who, though still a carrier of the genuine Puritan spirit, had already been affected by its degeneration); Weber, \textit{The Protestant Ethic}, 52; Weber, \textit{Die protestantische Ethik}, 40.}

Weber, who inherits the legacy of the German nineteenth-century National Liberal Party (of which Max Weber, Sr had been a functionary), continues its characteristic struggle to negotiate a place within German nationalism for ‘the capitalist spirit’ or, to be precise, a politically and ethically attractive version of it that would be compatible with what German National Liberals considered to be the specific values of the German nation. This ongoing renegotiation, the necessity to square capitalism with national culture, the search for culturally mediated and therefore benign, not-so-utilitarian, not-so-American and sometimes not-so-Jewish capitalism, of which Kürnberger’s novel itself was a classic expression, is the general foundation of the ambivalence characteristic of nationalist liberalism. It was this ambivalence that made some National Liberals receptive also to antisemitism (Heinrich von Treitschke is the best known example), and prevented others from consistently opposing it.\footnote{I have developed this problem in my \textit{The State, the Nation and the Jews: Liberalism and the Antisemitism Dispute in Bismarck’s Germany} (Lincoln and London: Nebraska University Press 2008), and in ‘Cultural difference in the national state: from trouser-selling Jews to unbridled multiculturalism’, \textit{Patterns of Prejudice}, vol. 42, no. 3, 2008, 245–79. Kürnberger’s ‘anti-Yankeeism’ does not seem to contain any explicitly antisemitic elements (at least not judging from a quick look through its 600 rather dull pages), but its general conception is in line with, for example, Gustav Freytag’s novel \textit{Soll und Haben} (Debit and Credit), also published in 1855; see Christine Achinger, \textit{Gespaltene Moderne. Gustav Freytags Soll und Haben: Nation, Geschlecht und Judenbild} (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann 2007). German-Christian moral values and, indeed, German ways of doing business could provide a socially sustainable form of capitalism that is contrasted to its rapacious and pathological (American, English, Jewish) forms. This liberal anti-capitalism is quite different from, for example, Richard Wagner’s antisemitism but both discourses bear a family resemblance.}

It would appear that \textit{Die protestantische Ethik}, a foundational text of the discipline of sociology, is part of that same general discourse: although it comes out \textit{against} romantic nationalism and for the capitalist spirit, ambivalence remains.\footnote{The connection to antisemitic ‘anti-capitalism’ is hinted at when Weber notes that asceticism condemned ‘covetousness, Mammonism, etc.;’ Weber, \textit{The Protestant Ethic}, 172. Weber also mentions Dutch synods that excluded usurers (ibid., 260n7). Simmel, who was friends with Weber, likewise legitimated attacks on ‘Mammonism’ as obsessive and single-minded money-making; Georg Simmel, ‘Mammonismus’, a section from his speech ‘Deutschland’s innere Wandlung’ (1914), in \textit{Georg Simmels Philosophie des Geldes: Aufsätze und Materialien}, ed. Othein Rammstedt, Christian Papilloud, Natália Cantó i Milà and Cécile Rol (Frankfurt-on-Main: Suhrkamp 2003), 312–13. Weber also finds support for his own agenda when he discovers that ‘Calvinism opposed organic social organization in the fiscal-monopolistic form which it assumed in Anglicanism under the Stuarts’; Weber, \textit{The Protestant Ethic}, 179. Weber also finds support for his own agenda when he discovers that ‘Calvinism opposed organic social organization in the fiscal-monopolistic form which it assumed in Anglicanism under the Stuarts’; Weber, \textit{The Protestant Ethic}, 179. Weber also finds support for his own agenda when he discovers that ‘Calvinism opposed organic social organization in the fiscal-monopolistic form which it assumed in Anglicanism under the Stuarts’; Weber, \textit{The Protestant Ethic}, 179.}
Durkheim and the religion of individuality

One of the fundamental questions of the discipline of sociology concerns whether modern society produces its cohesion spontaneously through the division of labour, formulated as the invisible hand of the market (Adam Smith) or ‘the law of differentiation and integration’ (Herbert Spencer), or whether there is a need for robust moral, cultural, religious framing by intentionally created institutions and consensus. While Saint-Simon, Durkheim and Simmel, for example, adhered to the former view at least on sunnier days, most sociologists tend towards the latter view when the outlook is cloudier. The historical background for this ambivalence is that the version of liberalism that believes social harmony emerges spontaneously and naturally if only no one interferes with the market learned to doubt its own wisdom the hard way, in the 1848

Similarly opposed the state-centric schemes of the Katheder-socialist conceptions of leading members of the Verein für Sozialpolitik, such as Gustav Schmoller and Adolph Wagner. Durkheim too thought society rather than the state should bring about benign capitalism, although with the help of the state. Arguments about whether the state or society ought to be the principal agent of reform, capitalist development and modernization still continue today in the framework of ‘institutionalist economics’ that originates in this context.

56 Giddens suggests that Durkheim synthesizes what appear to be the opposing positions of Saint-Simon and Comte: according to Durkheim, according to Giddens, ‘Comte was mistaken in supposing that the condition of unity in traditional societies, the existence of a strongly formed conscience collective, is necessary to the modern type of society’, while Saint-Simon went too far when he suggested authority in modern society merely needed to be the ‘administration of things’; Anthony Giddens, Studies in Social and Political Theory (London: Hutchinson 1977), 239. However, Durkheim did not need to synthesize such a dichotomy as neither Saint-Simon nor Comte held the respective views in such a one-sided form. Andrew Wernick also writes that Comte ‘had no confidence whatever in the possibility that the cross-national and even intranational social ties necessary to cement the highly differentiated and specialized activity of industrial society would spontaneously emerge’: ‘The “social humanity” or “voluntary cooperation” that would spring forth once industrial society had been properly reorganized has to be reproduced at every moment... because it rests on an (unnatural) preponderance of “sociability over personality” and on a subjective consensus of mind, heart and body which likewise requires a reproductive—in Comte’s terminology, “rebinding”, i.e. religious—practice’; Wernick, Auguste Comte and the Religion of Humanity, 215. Only in De la division du travail social did Durkheim argue against and beyond Comte and Spencer that the developed, modern division of labour gave rise to strong (‘organic’) solidarity that made remaining elements of ‘mechanical solidarity’, based on likeness, less relevant and necessary. As Wernick points out, though, Durkheim never came back to this rather optimistic position and reverted to the less ‘confident’ position taken by Comte (ibid., 215–16). Jack Barbalet (in the context of his critical discussion of Weber) points to a much stronger alternative: Adam Smith indeed based the capitalist spirit in ‘social processes rather than religious doctrinal subscription’, which makes Smith more look like a sociologist than the ‘classical’ sociologists; Barbalet, Weber, Passion and Profits, 12.
The market economy itself produced a dissonant working class, that is, fragmentation rather than harmony, that needed to be attended to by (national) culture and the state. The paradox that the totality of economy, society, state and culture under the dominance of capital produces unity only by way of producing fragmentation is one of the fundamental contradictions that sociology, and perhaps any branch of the social sciences, grapples with.

What all practitioners of the discipline of sociology in its classical period seemed to share was the view that a moral, cultural, religious code, if needed at all, must reflect and accommodate modern society as it presented itself, based on individualism, rational-choice market exchanges and the division of labour. Therefore one could not simply reimpose old-time religion: modern times called for the creation of new religions, such as the ‘religion of humanity’ (Comte), or the ‘cult of the individual’ (Durkheim), or charismatic political leadership cum ethically driven capitalism (Weber), not to mention the celebration of ‘effervescence’ by hyper-Durkheimians like Georges Bataille and Roger Cailliois. (The latter, incidentally, by actually embracing fascism, or at least seeming to temporarily, indirectly confirmed Ranulf’s claim that there was a proto-fascist element in Durkheim’s sociology.) It is significant that Durkheim’s famous 1898 intervention into the Dreyfus affair, ‘L’individualisme et les intellectuels’—a reply to an attack by the literary historian Ferdinand Brunetière on the intellectuals who defended Dreyfus—centres on his suggestion that modern society could not but consider challenges to the rights of the individual as sacrileges. And

57 Stoetzler, The State, the Nation and the Jews, ch. 9; Dieter Langewiesche, Liberalism in Germany, trans. from the German by Christiane Banerji (Basingstoke: Macmillan 2000).
59 On Bataille and Cailliois, see Falasca-Zamponi, ‘A left sacred or a sacred left?’; Dan Stone, ‘Georges Bataille and the interpretation of the Holocaust’, in Dan Stone (ed.), Theoretical Interpretations of the Holocaust (Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Rodopi 2001), 79–101; Michael Weingrad, ‘The College of Sociology and the Institute of Social Research’, New German Critique, vol. 84, 2001, 129–61; and Richard Wolin, The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2004). Bataille and Cailliois also started out on their exploration of ‘the sacred’ as constitutive of politics as part of an effort to understand and fight fascism, but the solutions they came to recommend were so vehemently and undialectically opposed to ‘utilitarianism’ and democracy that they ended up in the vicinity of the left wing of fascism (at least temporarily and without ever thereafter having been able to take account of the problem satisfactorily). The fact that radical but undialectical rejections of democracy and ‘utilitarianism’ remain the principal inroad for fascism into left-wing anti-hegemonic movements is what lends urgency and contemporary relevance to the otherwise ‘academic’ discussion of whether it was wise for Durkheim and his students to join in the reactionaries’ polemics against ‘Spencer and the economists’. What is at stake here is the old question of whether ‘the left’ can afford even the slightest ambiguity in its stance towards ‘the right’ while struggling against liberalism. I think it cannot.
Durkheim was using ‘sacrilege’ literally, as he saw individualism not only as the new religion but as the only religion modern society produced. In his article, Durkheim strengthened his notion that the cult of the individual was now the religion that held society together with a polemic against Spencer, utilitarianism and egotistical individualism: he called utilitarian individualism ‘a ferment of moral dissolution’ and contrasted it with ‘eighteenth-century liberalism’, which he claimed had penetrated French institutions and ‘our whole moral organization’. He argued that the ‘idealists’ (including Rousseau, Kant, Fichte and Hegel) fought against the utilitarian ethic because ‘it appeared to them incompatible with social necessities’ (an unfair claim: utilitarianism could certainly accommodate the notion of social utility). The ‘utilitarian egoism of Spencer and the economists’ equals ‘crass commercialism which reduces society to nothing more than a vast apparatus of production and exchange’, while Kant bases his ethics on ‘faith and submission’. Durkheim agrees with his opponents that ‘religion alone’ can produce ‘the moral unity of the country’, but also holds, against them, that ‘we know today that a religion does not necessarily imply symbols and rites, properly speaking, or temples and priests’. ‘Essentially, [religion] is nothing other than a body of collective beliefs and practices endowed with a certain authority.’ Against Durkheim, it could be said that, if religion is defined in such a generic way, most people would probably consider nationalism as the strongest candidate for being the religion of contemporary society; yet Durkheim argues that the ‘religion of humanity, of which the individualistic ethic is the rational expression, is the only one possible’.


61 Ibid., 47.

62 Ibid., 48.

63 Ibid., 45, 47. For the present context, the point in, as it were, ‘rehabilitating’ Spencer—whose thought occupies the grey area between liberalism and positivism that is also, for example, Durkheim’s—is that Durkheim, like many other liberal reformists, seems to have been driven to misread and demonize Spencer by the same impulse that drove the antisemites to do the same, if differently. A recent, revisionist work on Spencer is Mark Francis, _Herbert Spencer and the Invention of Modern Life_ (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2007). For a reliable restatement of utilitarianism from within sociology, see Charles Camic, ‘The utilitarians revisited’, _American Journal of Sociology_, vol. 85, no. 3, 1979, 516–50.

64 Ibid., 47.

65 Ibid.
'To the extent that societies become more voluminous and expand over vaster territories' (an argument that sounds a lot like Spencer), situations become more diverse and circumstances more mobile, ‘traditions and practices’ need to ‘maintain themselves in a state of plasticity and inconstancy’. At the heart of Durkheim’s argument for the inevitability of individualism is a non sequitur: because of a ‘more developed division of labor’, the ‘contents of consciousness’ become increasingly differentiated from person to person.66 This leads to ‘a state, nearly achieved as of now, where the members of a single social group will have nothing in common among themselves except their humanity, except the constitutive attributes of the human person in general’: not a very sociological argument in that it omits the nation and all other structures of socialization.67 As Durkheim himself argues elsewhere, the division of labour itself creates interdependence, society and shared structures of consciousness, but it certainly does not produce, in and of itself, cosmopolitanism and selfless humanitarianism. He continues with the equally dubious claim that communion of spirits can no longer be based on definite rites and prejudices because rites and prejudices have been overcome by the course of events. Consequently, according to Durkheim, ‘nothing remains which men can love and honor in common if not man himself. That is how man has become god for man and why he can no longer create other gods without lying to himself.’ This whole chain of argumentation seems less than logically compelling. It is on these grounds, however, that Durkheim believes that individualism is a ‘necessary doctrine’ because ‘in order to halt its advance it would be necessary to prevent men from differentiating themselves more and more from each other’ and ‘to lead them back to the old conformism of former times’, that is, to contain the general evolutionary tendencies of ‘societies’ to become ever more extended, centralized and differentiated: a very Spencerian, teleological, deterministic conception indeed. ‘Such an enterprise’, namely, halting or containing the course of societal evolution, ‘whether desirable or not, infinitely exceeds all human capability’.68 History has shown meanwhile that halting or reversing the law of integration and differentiation does not exceed human capability, while there is no lack of ‘definite rites and prejudices’ in modern societies. The liberal (and socialist) belief in the irreversibility and linearity of progress,

66 Ibid.
67 Further down, Durkheim added, as if he wanted to reach out to his deluded Christian fellow citizens, that Christianity was already just another, somewhat disguised form of individualism anyway (ibid., 53).
68 Ibid., 52.
though, as paraded by Durkheim here, proved to be a major liability in the struggle against disaster.\footnote{69}

In the process of proposing non-egotistical individualism, Durkheim revoked the more dialectical conception of individual and society that he had posited in his first works, including De la division du travail social, written under the influence of, and in conversation with, Spencer, contemporary German moral philosophy and Katheder-socialism.\footnote{70} Weber’s and Durkheim’s discourses are similar in that both defend the modern spirit by distinguishing it from utilitarianism. Durkheim argues against Brunetière and the antisemites in this respect, very much like Weber argues against Künberger and German ‘romantic’ nationalists (who are more often than not also antisemites): the proper, modern national-liberal (Weber) or republican (Durkheim) spirit—Protestant-inspired capitalism, in Weber’s case; the religion of individuality, in Durkheim’s—must be kept strictly apart from the base thinking of ‘Spencer and the economists’. Both Weber and Durkheim are probably not aware that the antisemites—whom Durkheim aims to challenge head-on, Weber more between the lines—engage in a not entirely dissimilar project: trashing a straw-man called ‘Spencer’ or some equivalent and proposing a scheme of collective morality or quasi-religion (sometimes more, sometimes less openly national) by which the alleged dissolution of society in the modern age can be halted.\footnote{71}

\footnote{69} Perrin has written on Durkheim’s relation to Spencer: ‘While Durkheim misinterprets or misrenders much of Spencer’s theory, he appropriates, with little or no acknowledgement, many of its essential features’; Robert G. Perrin, ‘Emile Durkheim’s Division of Labor and the shadow of Herbert Spencer’, Sociological Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 4, 1995, 791–808 (793). What Spencer, perhaps unhelpfully, calls the ‘organic’ conception of society meant that society ‘naturally’ evolves towards a state of minimal government and maximal extent of communal life and voluntary cooperation, thereby performing ‘a change from an incoherent homogeneity to a coherent heterogeneity’, the latter denoting a synthesis of community and individuality; Richard P. Hiskes, ‘Spencer and the liberal idea of community’, Review of Politics, vol. 45, no. 4, 1983, 595–609 (600–1). All this is in a register of liberalism not far from Durkheim’s.


\footnote{71} My argument implies that Spencer and utilitarianism are to be defended against not any critique but certainly against the wrong kind of critique. The point is that nineteenth-century antisemites, but also liberal opponents of antisemitism like Durkheim, hardly give ‘Spencer and the economists’ a fair hearing; they attack a straw man, while at the same time reproducing many of the basic assumptions they pretend to challenge. The relentless critique of false critiques is, though, the precondition of serious, emancipatory critique. The latter must undertake to salvage and develop the Enlightenment elements of the doctrines of ‘Spencer and the economists’.
Antisemitism, social reform and the positive society

The relationships and antagonisms between Weber, Tönnies, Sombart, the Verein für Sozialpolitik (Social Policy Association, the principal organizational point of reference for many of the main protagonists of what became sociology), Katheder- and state-socialists, and antisemites are anything but unambiguous. Antisemitism and bürgerliche Sozialreform (bourgeois social reform), from which the emerging discipline of sociology slowly emancipated itself, are impossible to disentangle completely: although explicit antisemitism was not the dominant tone of the Verein für Sozialpolitik, neither was antisemitism absent. The central moderate figure in the Verein, Gustav Schmoller, was only mildly antisemitic by the standards of the time and the milieu, and apparently made explicitly antisemitic statements in public only late in his career; however, Adolph Wagner, a friend and close collaborator of the populist antisemite, the pastor Adolf Stöcker, remained a central figure even though he chose to concentrate his energies on more radical projects, like Stöcker’s Christian Social Party (of which he was a founding member, vice-chairman and to whose manifesto he contributed crucial passages). Wagner was thus a key player in radical, political antisemitism, in modern economics and in the wider field in which sociology emerged.75 Even as highly academic a dispute as the one on ‘value freedom’, central to the constitution of the discipline of sociology in Germany, reflected conflicts within the discourses of


74 Massimo Ferrari Zumbini, Die Wurzeln des Bösen: Gründerjahre des Antisemitismus: Von der Bismarckzeit zu Hitler, trans. from the Italian (Frankfurt-on-Main: Klostermann 2003), 157–8. Wagner seems to have become more distanced from party-political antisemitism in the course of the 1890s. For a comprehensive portrayal of Wagner, see Evelyn A. Clark, ‘Adolf Wagner: from national economist to National Socialist’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 55, no. 3, 1940, 378–411.

75 In his ‘La Science positive de la morale en Allemagne’, Durkheim reviewed Wagner’s work rather favourably and without mentioning his antisemitism.

76 The postulate of Wertfreiheit, Weber’s take on the problem of objectivity in the social sciences, means that true Wissenschaft ought to be free of ‘extra-scientific’ value judgements (Werturteile). This was Weber’s position in the Werturteilsstreit.
social reform, such as the one about the ‘objectivity’, or lack thereof, of the 1888 report by the Verein für Sozialpolitik on ‘usury on the countryside’; the report presented as factual evidence overblown accusations of Jews as usurers some made by explicit antisemites. The dispute itself was certainly highly ‘value-relevant’. The need to respond to contemporary antisemites, but also the inevitability of reflecting some of their concerns, have had their impact on the shape of ‘classical’ even more than that of ‘early’ sociology. The liberals who would become sociologists (such as Weber), and the liberals who would become antisemites (such as Treitschke, Weber’s teacher and antagonist of Max Weber, Sr during the ‘Berlin antisemitism dispute’), worked on alternative conceptions of the kind of national culture, or societal religion, that was necessary for modern society to continue to exist, and the kinds of degenerations and anomyes that this culture needed to guard against. Contemporary antisemites had already attacked Saint-Simonianism as a Jewish enterprise, partly because several of its leading members were indeed of Jewish descent, partly because it embraced and celebrated modernization and central institutions linked with it such as money and banking. (An equivalent phenomenon in the German context was that German antisemitic patriots accused Hegelianism and even Hegel himself of being Jewish, at least spiritually.) These antisemitic slurs against bodies of thought that embraced crucial aspects of modernity set the pattern for later similar attacks on sociology itself (and, even more violently so, on Marxism).

77 Lindenlaub, Richtungskämpfe im Verein für Sozialpolitik; Gorges, Sozialforschung in Deutschland 1872–1914, 177–82, discusses the debate on the 1888 report, especially the critique by the eminent statistician Gottlieb Schnapper-Arndt, Zur Methodologie sozialer Enquêtes (Frankfurt-on-Main: Auffarth 1888), in which the connection between debates on methodology and the debate about antisemitism becomes clear.


79 While Silberner (‘Pierre Leroux’s ideas on the Jewish people’, 375–6) states that Saint-Simon did not show any hostility to or contempt of Jews in his writings, Szajkowski (‘The Jewish Saint-Simonians and socialist antisemites in France’, 34) writes that Saint-Simon had an ‘unfavourable opinion of the Jews’, in spite of his doctrine’s ‘philosemitism’ that was based on his positive view of the role of banking. Fourierists and, later, Proudhonists considered Saint-Simonianism ‘a Jewish venture’ (ibid., 38); their antisemitism and their opposition to Saint-Simonianism seem to have reinforced each other. But ‘anti-Jewish feeling’ and expressions of antisemitism can also be found among the adherents of Saint-Simonianism apparently from the mid-1840s onwards (ibid., 41). Many also embraced Catholicism at the time, as Fourierists did, Toussenel being an example. ‘Under the July monarchy, the Fourierists had led French socialism into the antisemitic camp. In the period of the Second Empire Proudhon and his friends played this role’ (ibid., 55).


81 Far from actually dismissing sociology as such, the Nazis developed a ‘non-Jewish sociology’, an engagement that meant in some of its aspects a modernization of
Durkheim, Weber and Tönnies, but also Sombart before his descent into cultural despair and straightforward antisemitism, saw social reform as crucial, and looked for ways to draw the right wing of the labour movement, that is, the labour movement minus its Marxist, internationalist elements, into projects of bürgernliche Sozialreform.\(^\text{82}\) Georg Simmel—who was also, in his early career, associated with Gustav Schmoller’s attempts at formulating an ethical, institutionalist version of political economy, reconnecting to the moral philosophy side of Adam Smith’s work—was also part of the same general tendency to formulate a social-scientific basis for social reform. Simmel departed from this general discourse only by degree, that is, to the extent that, in Philosophie des Geldes, he boldly and provocatively insisted that money and all the bad, Jewish things it stood for were also very good things: emancipation and indeed individualism itself sprang largely from the abstraction and alienation that comes with what he called the money economy.\(^\text{83}\) Some of the ‘degenerations’ of liberal society were thereby rehabilitated, in Simmel, quite like in Durkheim, contra the antisemitic wholesale rejection of liberal society.

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\(^\text{82}\) On bürgernliche Sozialreform, see Rüdiger vom Bruch (ed.), Weder Kommunismus noch Kapitalismus: bürgernliche Sozialreform in Deutschland vom Vormärz bis zur Ära Adenauer (Munich: Beck 1985).

Another fundamental question arises from the same problem, namely, that of the role of the state. For Saint-Simon there had been no question: the enlightened state, based on and in co-operation with banks and large businesses that would concentrate society’s productive powers, would drive economic development, enlighten the people and govern benevolently in the name of ‘industrial’ progress. The separation of the state and the political from the economic sphere that is one of the principal characteristics (and ‘real’ fetishisms) of modern society is boldly ignored in this pragmatic utopianism, which was as enthusiastic about the most modern means of production and organization as about the alleged ‘wholeness’ of the Middle Ages. This conception developed into an authoritarian, or illiberal, liberalism under the name of ‘positivism’, and remained probably the most influential political ideology of the modern period. In the last third of the nineteenth century, though, for the Sozialreform of German state-socialists, liberal Katheder-socialists and the Verein für Sozialpolitik as well as for Durkheim, the point was not so much the need for state-driven development—capitalist development was securely under way by the end of the century—but rather the moral control of the economy that resulted from this development (a concern that is today known as ‘anti-globalization’, ‘fair trade’ and so on). A sense of this can indeed be got from Comte himself: as Mike Gane writes, in the last decade of his life (he died in 1857), Comte developed an ethic centred on the idea that ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat would purify economic life of the commercial spirit by exercising a new moral hegemony’. He formed this concept in the Positivist Society in opposition to liberals and communists. The proletariat would usher in the final, positive state of society in which parliamentary representation would be replaced by scientifically organized political forms. (The proletariat would of course first have to be

84 Although the Saint-Simonian movement led by Enfantin opposed Comte’s positivism for being too rationalistic, the use of the term ‘positive’ goes back to Saint-Simon himself. By ‘authoritarian’ or ‘illiberal liberalism’, I mean an ideology that embraces the basic social-economic programme of liberalism—modernization guided by bourgeois, anti-feudal values—but not all the finer points of its politics, such as the separation of powers, individual liberties, human rights, jusnaturalism, which positivism, not completely without reason, dismisses as metaphysical niceties. On the concept of liberalism, see Stoetzler, *The State, the Nation and the Jews*, ch. 9. The formulation ‘anti-liberal liberalism’ stems from Eleonore Sterling, *Judenhass: Die Anfänge des politischen Antisemitismus in Deutschland 1815–1850* [1956] (Frankfurt-on-Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt 1969).

85 True to the tradition of moral reform of the economy, every now and again these discourses come adorned with mostly perfumed forms of antisemitism. Such antisemitic undertones are, in a western context, usually retrieved from the cast-offs of democratic populism’s struggle for the phantom of benign ‘simple commodity production’, uncorrupted by ‘Wall Street’ etc. On populism, see David Peal, ‘The politics of populism: Germany and the American South in the 1890s’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 31, no. 2, 1989, 340–62.

converted to positivism, but would then, through its dictatorship, help to instal
the new hierarchy led by the positivist ‘spiritual priesthood’. The scientific
removal of the commercial spirit (guess who?) will result in ‘Community,
Identity, Stability’, as depicted in Huxley’s Brave (Positive) New World.

In spite of the shift of perspective from state-orchestrated development to
moral control of the already developed economy, there is clearly a continuity
that can, in the German context, be illustrated by looking at those who
mediated between Saint-Simonianism and post-Hegelian social thought in the
early and mid-nineteenth century, such as Lorenz von Stein, who was a major
influence on Karl Rodbertus, Gustav Schmoller and other Katheder-socialists
(who in turn influenced Durkheim).87 In contexts other than ‘early indus-
trialized’ liberal societies, that is, throughout most of the world, positivism’s
commitment to ‘order and progress’ (which the Brazilian state for example
literally inscribed on its national flag) and state socialism merged into
developmental regimes of varying brutality (mostly that of ‘primitive
accumulation’), some of which, rather ironically, in the course of the twentieth
century saw fit to adopt some form of Marxist-sounding (actually, state
socialist) rhetoric. Not a few radicalized positivist/Saint-Simonian regimes (in
particular of the Stalinist, Catholic and Muslim varieties) also employed (and
continue to employ, depending on circumstance) elements of antisemitism.88

Sombart and Weber on good v. bad capitalisms

Throughout the nineteenth century, antisemites with a liberal background
emphasized that Jews were backward elements unfit for integration in a
modern bourgeois society, whereas conservative antisemites blamed them for
ushering in capitalist, liberal modernity. The more radical antisemitism that

87 Hermann Beck, ‘Conservatives and the social question in nineteenth-century Prussia’,
in Larry Eugene Jones and James Retallack (eds), Between Reform, Reaction, and
Resistance: Studies in the History of German Conservatism from 1789 to 1945 (Providence,
Ethical Political Economy: ethics, politics and economics in the younger German
7, no. 4, 2000, 507–31; Heino Heinrich Nau and Philippe Steiner, ‘Schmoller,
Durkheim, and old European institutionalist economics’, Journal of Economic Issues,
vol. 36, no. 4, 2002, 1005–24. See also the references in note 70 above.

88 It is hardly surprising that those who, openly or secretly, advocate versions of quasi-
Stalinist regimes are in cahoots with those who advocate, for instance, some version of
Khomeinist populism (and, before this became a plausible option in the minds of
metropolitan anti-imperialists, defended, for example, the corporatist-nationalist
socialism of Saddam Hussein, who admired more than Stalin’s moustache). On
Stalinism and Comte, see Régis Debray, Critique of Political Reason, trans. from the
French by David Macey (London: New Left Books 1983), 228–33; on Khomeinism, see
Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley: University
emerged as an increasingly coherent, though marginal, ideology towards the end of that century combined and synthesized these two aspects in varying ways.  

In their views of ‘the Jews’, Sombart and Weber reflect these two complementary lines of nineteenth-century antisemitism, where Sombart presents the Jews as too modern, and therefore malignant, and Weber as representatives of an outmoded, pre-modern economic mentality and therefore anachronistic but harmless. Sombart had hoped in the earlier stages of his career that socialism, brought about by the working class, would rescue civilization from the teeth of capitalism. Around 1900 his optimism faded, and he moved gradually towards cultural pessimism. In 1903, in *Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft im neunzehnten Jahrhundert* (German National Economy in the Nineteenth Century), he suggested that *Deutschtum* (‘Germandom’) was responsible for the rise of capitalism, but, as his nationalism grew in proportion to his despair about capitalism, he came to believe that the Jews and not the Germans had been responsible. This culminated in the publication in 1911 of *Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben*, published in English as *The Jews and Modern Capitalism*. One station along the way was *Das Proletariat* of 1906 in which he characterized the proletariat as ‘remote from nature and fantasy . . . abstract, rational and utilitarian’, that is, almost Jewish but much more numerous. Subsequently he divided capitalists into ‘entrepreneurs and traders’, and found the former to be a heroic, creative, progressive force in history, and opposed the latter whom he came to identify with ‘the Jews’. The notion that Jews were the commercial people *par excellence* was at the time not only common in explicitly antisemitic discourses but had already been established in the academic literature in the context of the historical school of economics, such as in the writings of Wilhelm Roscher. 

Sombart and Weber, who emerged from the third generation of German ‘national economists’, most of whom were Katheder-socialists of sorts, wrote their respective texts on what was the spirit of capitalism, who was responsible for it and what was bad and what was good about it, in a sort of protracted dialogue. Their positions differed primarily in where exactly they located the dismal side of capitalism that endangered western civilization, individualism, personality and societal cohesion. For Sombart, trading and monetarization, summed up in the Jewish spirit, were to blame, while Weber was much more original and pertinent in pointing at rationalization processes in the organization of labour and, perhaps following Simmel’s

89 Stoetzler, *The State, the Nation and the Jews*, ch. 8.


91 Quoted in ibid.

analysis at this point, the wider social sphere. The clichéd Jewish ‘commercial people’ appeared in this context as a group that was relevant only at an early stage of the modernization process. In this sense, in Weber’s account, the Jews were excused: the firing line was moved away from them. While Sombart’s critique of capitalism became more and more vulgar and ideological, separating good, heroic, productive, martial capitalism from bad, money-minded, narrowly utilitarian, pacifist, parasitical Jewish capitalism, Weber arrived at a more dialectical view in which the same historical force was responsible for the fantastic wealth and potential liberation produced by the modern economy, but also for the ‘casing hard as steel’ that suffocated individuality, personality and Kultur (a dialectic that, again, was similar to Simmel’s account and also, to an extent, Marx’s). Weber’s disagreement with Sombart’s emerging vulgar antisemitism did not translate, though, into a defence of Jewishness (one of the last things liberals and socialists in the period wanted to be suspected of was being ‘philosemitic’). This can be illustrated with a footnote added to the text of the 1920 edition of Die protestantische Ethik, claiming that, in the opinion of English Puritans, ‘Jewish capitalism was speculative, pariah-capitalism, Puritan capitalism the bourgeois organization of labour’. According to this myth (Weber perhaps would have called it an ‘ideal-type’), Jewish capitalism ‘looked to war, supplies from the state, state monopolies, commercial speculations, and the financial and construction projects of princes’, all apparently bad pre-modern habits that capitalism, so Weber seemed to imply, had since overcome. Puritan-driven, proper modern capitalism, on the other hand, came, according to the mature Weber, with the peace-bringing doux commerce as sketched out (in anticipation, as a hope and a project) by Hume, Smith and Kant.

93 Simmel and Weber addressed what Marx implied by the concept of ‘real subsumption’; Moishe Postone, Time. Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx’s Critical Theory (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press 1996), 182. This is the ground on which some in the Marxist tradition, such as Derek Sayer, Capitalism and Modernity: An Excursus on Marx and Weber (London and New York: Routledge 1991), have aligned Marx and Weber. Sayer’s very inspiring discourse on how Weber (and Simmel, Durkheim and Tönnies) fleshed out aspects of Marx’s account of ‘capitalism and modernity’ presupposes, however, his completely bracketing out Weber’s politics.


95 Jack Barbalet points to the ambiguity in Weber’s attitude towards ‘the Jews’ and antisemitism in these terms: ‘Weber’s failure to contribute to a sociology of anti-Semitism is a significant omission . . . because he was aware of anti-Semitism and opposed to it when it touched him.’ Weber was aware of antisemitism’s ‘consequences on Jewish opportunities and aspirations. However, in his sociological treatment of the Jews he regards the pariah concept and its corollaries as not only necessary but sufficient in explaining Jewish economic marginalization. That is to say, in Weber’s view, the conditions of the Jews are to be explained only by reference to the particulars and peculiarities of their religious beliefs’; Barbalet, Weber, Passion and Profits, 196. Weber constructs his ideal-types of Jews, Puritans and others out of his ‘philosophical
For Sombart, the commercialization of economic life was the problem; trading was necessary but should not dominate and suffocate the creativity of heroic entrepreneurism. Sombart’s hero, the entrepreneur, shared ‘the freebooting, martial element that Weber had dismissed as a traditional form of capitalism’, that is, as irrelevant and alien to modern capitalism.\textsuperscript{96} Weber, in turn, tarred the Jews with the brush of what Sombart would have considered the heroic, un-Jewified, martial means of building the modern world while making a healthy profit. Weber was sufficiently familiar with the reality of modern capitalist society to let the Jews off the hook in that respect, but this did not mean he was any fonder of them than Sombart was. The necessities involved in creating a coherent national culture that could rescue capitalist modernity both from its enemies and from itself remained the overriding value that would always trump sympathy for ‘minority cultures’, just as it made the National Liberals of Weber’s father’s generation dislike the good old Jewish stubbornness, the refusal to shed that annoying anachronistic cultural difference. On the other hand, though, a surviving trace of enthusiasm for the humanistic education of the old-fashioned \textit{bourgeoisie}, of which he declared himself so proudly a member, made Weber also claim that the Puritan ethic that he expected would inspire the salvation of capitalist society owed a lot to the spirit of the ancient Hebrews (a ‘philosemitic’ but historically dubious claim).\textsuperscript{97}

Tönnies, in a letter of 1881, made a strangely ambivalent comment on antisemitism that can perhaps exemplify the attitude of all the men under discussion here:

\begin{quote}
I attended a student anti-Semitic meeting. There were probably a few people there who feel a dark yearning; but the ones who spoke (I heard a jurist and three theologians, all found enormous applause, each intoxicated the others in the most repulsive way), what a low sort of man has been produced by our Gymnasium and newspaper culture, that noble pair. Talk went abundantly on about materialism, mammonism, Jewry, the ‘awakening German youth’ was extolled, jokes were cracked about the old beat-up (rummelige) synagogue in New Stettin . . . Truly, the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{96} Loader, ‘Puritans and Jews’, 644.

\textsuperscript{97} Weber might have adopted this idea from the Jewish historian Heinrich Graetz; Ghosh, ‘The place of Judaism in Max Weber’s Protestant Ethic’, 242. Weber’s argument reflects here, as in many other contexts, nineteenth-century National Liberalism, which tended to defend Jews only when it could be instrumentalized for the apologetics of market capitalism. This is what prompted socialists like Franz Mehring to equate all forms of defence of Jewish emancipation—what Mehring calls ‘philosemitism’—with the defence of capitalism and liberalism. In reality, of course, neither most Jews nor all defenders of Jews were particularly pro-capitalist. On Mehring, see Lars Fischer, \textit{The Socialist Response to Antisemitism in Imperial Germany} (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press 2007).
people with whom I attended the university, it is not many years ago, but they were more honorable men.98

It is not quite clear from the quotation what exactly it was that disappointed Tönnies; his observation of a lack of ‘dark yearning’ might imply that he hoped to find a ‘deeper’ sort of yearning for community, but found the young people corrupted by society’s flawed institutions, education and the media. Their antisemitism would in this sense have appeared as an effect of Gesellschaft and expressive of a lack of Gemeinschaft; even those who (seemed to) yearn for Gemeinschaft did so in a shallow, Gesellschaft sort of way. Antisemitism was interpreted here, it seems, as itself a symptom of what the antisemites aimed to challenge.

Modernization—Jewification: Producers of the World, Emancipate Yourselves from Parasites!

The formation of sociological theory and that of (modern) antisemitism are related, or even consubstantial, and at the same time competing, or even antagonistic, phenomena, as sociology responded to, but in responding also followed, antisemitism or, more generally, followed some of the same impulses. Sociological theory emerged as a liberal response to crisis phenomena at several points in the nineteenth century, while modern antisemitism is likewise a ‘travesty of a social theory’ (Zerrbild einer Gesellschaftstheorie),99 one that offers, in its phantasmagorias of ‘the Jew’ and ‘Jewification’, an explanation of the same society’s deficiencies and crises. Modern sociology and modern antisemitism assumed definite shapes in the last quarter of the nineteenth century when both responded to phenomena (in Germany and France, to be sure) that can be described as a mixture of the denouement of traditional society under regimes of intense modernization, and early manifestations of a crisis of modern, capitalist, liberal society itself (overlapping but distinct phenomena). Several of the most influential antisemitic texts in the nineteenth century were written in France by writers who came from ‘early socialism’, in particular the conflict-laden field that was the result in France of the disintegration of the Saint-Simonian movement led by Enfantin (whose actual basis in Saint-Simon, however, is rather dubious) and its merger with the Fourierist school in the 1830s; in Germany such texts emerged out of the young-Hegelian school (which likewise was only to an extent based on Hegel’s philosophy).100 Both these traditions were significant

100 Central to this process in Germany was the positivist reformulation of the concept of the Volksgeist, which thereby became a positive entity, such as in Herbart or Lazarus.
parts of the wider liberal, democratic and socialist currents of the time; they inherited elements of the Enlightenment and were products of the era of bourgeois revolution. As such they are also fully part of the intellectual background of the formation of the discipline of sociology. One implication of this historical genealogy is that the allegedly Jewish science of sociology, like the also allegedly Jewish traditions of liberalism, individualism and rationalism, share some of their roots and lineages with their declared mortal enemy: modern antisemitism.101

Durkheim and Weber, to be sure, were aware of antisemitism as a problem and reacted against it. The specific content of their reactions shows, however, that they acknowledged, at least implicitly, that antisemitism was responding to actual social problems, and that these significantly overlapped with what were their own concerns as sociologists: on the one hand, the atomization and disintegration of society and, on the other, the suffocation of individual freedom and personality by that same society. The sociological concepts of the ‘thingness’ of society, its ‘anomies’, the ‘casing hard as steel’ and, more abstractly, the predominance of structure over agency, society over community, commerce over sheer life, are also at the basis of what antisemites saw (and still see) as the ‘Jewification’ of society. This allows us to ask to what extent sociologists proposed, consciously or not, sociology as an alternative, liberal competitor to antisemitism (as well as to revolutionary Marxism).

Saint-Simon and, at least initially, his followers thought of Judaism as a crucial ingredient of the religion of the future, and also esteemed bankers highly as organizers of modern credit and thereby essential for the industrialization and pacification of the world. According to Enfantin, the Jews in the past ‘exploited, by usurious money-lending, not the peasant—that was the privilege of the nobles—but the nobles themselves, a work of great social usefulness’.102 In the present, however, Jewish bankers, like all other bankers, promoted peace. Likewise, a text by Auguste Colin (a Fourierist) stated that God had not dispersed the Jews but ‘God sent them everywhere to be apostles of peace and industry. They are the industrial and political tie between the nations; they are the bankers of the kings, and hold in their hands peace or war.’103 Sweet commerce, promoted by God-sent

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101 The enmity is only relative as the Nazis successfully developed a ‘de-Jewified’ positivist sociology; see Klingemann, ‘Social-scientific experts—no ideologues’.

102 Enfantin in 1832, quoted in Silberner, ‘Pierre Leroux’s ideas on the Jewish people’, 378.

103 Ibid. Apparently the same text is translated differently in Szajkowski, ‘The Jewish Saint-Simonians’, 41; here the Jews are the ‘bankers of the angels’.
Jews. These ‘philosemitic’, ‘utopian-socialist’ appraisals of the beneficial effects of, as it were, the Jewification of society from the first half of the nineteenth century found, at the end of the century, an echo in some passages by Simmel; 104 furthermore, the emerging tradition of modern antisemitism also reflected these judgements but e contrario, and turned praise into warrants for genocide. The argument most crucial for this shift was perhaps Fourier’s notion that post-revolutionary society was still the same old feudalism, only the banks (read: Jews) had replaced the nobility. In short, the revolution had been a scam. Such notions gained currency when bourgeois thought lost the optimism characteristic of Saint-Simonianism and early, post-French Revolution liberalism, after one was forced to take account of the unbridgeable contradictions at the basis of liberal society. Saint-Simon had seen human history as ‘marked by the constant decline of “parasitism” and the rise of peaceful industry’, governed by ‘the producers’ under the leadership of the most important merchants and manufacturers. 105 It was easy to see that something was wrong with this account: its teleological, progressivist optimism was wrong, as the history of the nineteenth century (not to mention the twentieth) made abundantly clear. The enmity against ‘parasites’, though, stuck.

An antagonism to unproductive parasites and those unable to ‘improve’ the productive forces (in the first place, the warrior-nobility and other savages) has, since John Locke and Abbé Sieyès, remained at the heart of bourgeois thought, and tends to provide it with its revolutionary impulses. 106 Since the structure of liberal thought was so profoundly imbued with this notion, it is reasonable to assume that liberals would be receptive to any argument that targets ‘the Jews’, or indeed anyone else, as unproductive parasites or as endangering the productive power of society. To the extent that sociology (and, likewise, socialism) is an off-shoot of the (lower-case) liberal tradition, it is also implicated in this problem. The $64,000 question remains: who are the parasites? the nobility? traders and bankers? the Jews? the bourgeoisie? the capitalists? international finance capital? Wall Street? Freemasonry? The question of which box (or boxes) one will tick depends on which political alliance one supports, and who or what this alliance is supposed to be fighting. The bottom line is: the parasites are those who do not create and reproduce society according to one’s own specific understanding of what that society is, or ought to be. As formulating such an understanding is the professional task of sociologists, they are

104 See note 83 above.
106 The notion that the nobility are a warrior caste, i.e. savages (as in Sieyès, who wanted to send them back into the Frankish forests), is mirrored by the complementary idea that savages are noble (as in Herder).
crucially implicated in this process.\textsuperscript{107} A social theory that would be a reliable tool in the struggle against antisemitism, or at least immune to it, would need to sever radically the link between a person’s worth, or right to live, belong and reproduce,\textsuperscript{108} from that person’s contribution to the production and reproduction of society, let alone her or his compatibility with the cultural and political forms (such as ‘nation’ and ‘state’) of that society.

\textbf{Marcel Stoetzler} is a Visiting Fellow of the Centre for the Study of Jewish-Christian Relations in Cambridge, and Honorary Research Fellow at the School of Arts, Histories and Cultures, University of Manchester. He is the author of \textit{The State, the Nation and the Jews: Liberalism and the Antisemitism Dispute in Bismarck’s Germany} (Nebraska University Press 2008), and of ‘Cultural difference in the national state: from trouser-selling Jews to unbridled multiculturalism’ (\textit{Patterns of Prejudice}, vol. 42, no. 3, 2008).

\textsuperscript{107} The discussion of the dialectic between sociology and antisemitism may help explain why sociology throughout the last century has had so little to say on the subject of antisemitism: perhaps sociologists have been reluctant to address antisemitism (like fascism) directly for fear of finding distorted mirror images of their own discipline. (This notion was raised by Nicole Asquith, University of Tasmania, in the discussion of a version of this paper at the European Sociological Association conference in Glasgow, 2007.)

\textsuperscript{108} Strictly speaking, it would not be necessary to ‘have’ such a ‘right’ if no one ever considered taking it away. The concept of an ‘inalienable right’ is only meaningful (as a demand) in a society that denies that right. That is, it is not a positive right; it exists only in its negation.