Oddly enough, the Frankfurt School's relationship to Columbia University has been somewhat neglected by its many historians. It is not hard to understand why the Horkheimer circle would have desired to settle at Columbia, but it is peculiar that the Frankfurt School would have received an invitation from Columbia. After all, why would Columbia University's conservative president, Nicholas Murray Butler, and its sociology department extend an invitation to a group of predominantly German-speaking social philosophers with strong links to the Marxian left?

Regrettably, the one time that questions were raised about the Horkheimer circle's connection with Columbia University, a debate ensued in which the focus shifted away from Morningside Heights, and the only result was a Cold War polemic regarding the motives and political leanings of the university's Institute for Social Research. By 1980, when this controversy erupted, the Frankfurt School had become a popular topic for academic study within departments of philosophy, history, comparative literature, and German in the United States. It particularly appealed to younger scholars sympathetic with the then-defunct New Left. Consequently, when Lewis
Feuer’s article “The Frankfurt Marxists and the Columbia Liberals” appeared in *Survey* during the summer of 1980,¹ it caught the attention of many Frankfurt School analysts.

Feuer attacked not only the Institute for Social Research but also those who had written historical studies of the Horkheimer group and its thought. Martin Jay was the most prominent of these historians, and his account of the institute’s move to New York was rejected for its “pleasant naïveté.”² According to Feuer, the institute was far less politically or morally innocent. The move to Columbia was not a happy accident, he argued, but instead the result of a complex plot in which the faculty and administration were duped into offering space and an affiliation with the university. By focusing on the presidential papers from the Columbia Archives, Feuer attempted to disclose precisely how the institute approached the university, as well as Columbia’s reasons for extending an offer to the institute.

By uncovering the extent of Julian Gumperz’s involvement in the negotiations with Columbia, Feuer was able to raise the specter of nefarious motives. Although Gumperz’s connections to Communist organizations in Europe had been common knowledge among the Frankfurt School’s commentators, Feuer surprised many of his readers by proposing that Gumperz had followed the strategies of Willi Muenzenberg, an infamous Bolshevik spymaster, in his negotiations with Columbia University.³ By approaching politically sympathetic members of the sociology department, such as Robert Lynd, Gumperz was able to attract allies to the institute’s cause. According to Feuer, Lynd and virtually all of the other members of the institute’s advisory board were left-leaning liberals or fellow-travelers who were exploited by the Horkheimer circle in its attempt to cloak itself from political scrutiny. During its earliest years in Germany, the *Institut für Sozialforschung* maintained close relations with the Communist Party. By the time the group was run by Max Horkheimer and had become connected with Columbia, however, the Marxism of its members had become more muted—“a more amorphous variety of fellow-traveling.”⁴ The newer members “criticized bourgeois culture and society, while preserving at least a common denominator of silence with regard to all such phenomena as the purges, ‘trials,’ labour camps, and ‘liquidation’ of Old Bolsheviks and Trotskyists, geneticists, and the more productive peasants.”⁵

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While it’s true that the Horkheimer circle was often strangely quiet regarding Stalinism, Feuer lacked a credible motive and also developed some wild speculations from scant evidence and creative interpretations of existing documents. Even if the institute masked its political underpinnings and Gumperz appealed most directly to the institute’s natural allies on the Columbia faculty, Feuer failed to provide any compelling reason for developing a plan to infiltrate Columbia in the first place. By Feuer’s own admission, the institute did not lack money, thereby taking away a primary motive. Furthermore, as Feuer admitted, the Horkheimer group engaged in no form of political or ideological recruitment, which eliminated the only other potential motive. With so many holes in his argument, it would have seemed as though Jay and other historians of the Frankfurt School could easily dispense with Feuer’s charges. All they had to do was offer a more accurate account of the institute’s relationship to Columbia. The retort that was published in the next issue of Survey, however, left much of the mystery unsolved.

Instead of offering new evidence to defend the institute’s affiliation with Columbia University, Jay refuted the political substance of Feuer’s arguments. Clearly this represented the more damaging set of accusations and would have been a personal affront to former members of the Institute for Social Research, as well as to its friends and supporters. However, the strategy proved to be an ineffective way of dispensing with Feuer’s assertions. Although Jay set the record straight regarding the institute’s theoretical accomplishments and activities, his retort only opened the door for more outrageous accusations from Feuer. As Jay provided evidence that countered Feuer’s red-baiting attacks, Feuer, in turn, gathered more evidence for a counterstrike that suggested further Communist and fellow-traveling condemnations.

While Jay was able to defend the Frankfurt School, this controversy with Feuer illuminated little about the Horkheimer circle at Columbia. In its wake, many key questions remained unanswered. Crucial pieces of the story remained cloudy. For example: How did the institute approach Columbia University in the first place? Why did they wish to be on Morningside Heights? Why did Columbia want to become involved in a relationship with the Horkheimer group?
Columbia’s Faculty of Political Science

Columbia’s historic preeminence and its location in New York provided many unexpected benefits, and this relationship with the city frequently resulted in substantial changes in both the school’s structure and role. New York City and its governing bodies, in fact, may have had more to do with the birth of the social sciences at Columbia than the college’s own administration.

During the last decades of the nineteenth century, conditions in the city worsened, and choruses of urban reformers began calling for change. The budding metropolis was diagnosed with many ills—one of which was the increasing chaos of its intellectual and cultural life. Columbia was called upon to address this situation; the institution was expected provide cultural authority for a community that perceived itself to be fragmenting into incoherence. The result of this was that Columbia began to shift from an institution that was in New York to an institution that was of New York.

Columbia’s new civic duties led to the formal constitution of the social sciences, and the institution’s transformation from a college to a university. Under the guidance of John Burgess, a Faculty of Political Science took shape. Its goals were to fulfill Columbia’s newly emerging responsibilities and to train professionals in government and public administration. Burgess, who had been educated in Germany and had firsthand experience with European approaches to the study of society, did not mold his faculty to initially fit the European model. Like so many other American academic institutions, the social sciences at Columbia began as a kind of compromise. On the one hand, the new faculty functioned much like modern schools of social work preaching the American variant of the social gospel and engaging in the pursuit of social reform. On the other hand, it also sought to develop a disciplined science of society. Crusading against societal ills and tenement houses was simultaneously matched by theorizing about the functioning and structure of the social world.

The formation of a new faculty and set of scholarly disciplines, however, was not accepted without some controversy. Some trustees and faculty feared that an endorsement of the Faculty of Political Science might undermine the essential role of the humanities in the
education of Columbia men. Columbia was a college, not a university. Consequently, traditionalists felt that the professional, specialist thrust of the new political science program was inappropriate.

Despite this formidable opposition, Burgess and his allies in the school's administration defeated the protectors of the liberal arts. Columbia became a university with three faculties. The traditional School of Arts became the Faculty of Philosophy, the natural sciences became the Faculty of Pure Sciences, and the victorious upstarts from the social sciences became the Faculty of Political Science. Although the formal change officially was set into motion in 1880, the actual transition from college to university took decades to accomplish. Originally the dream of President Barnard, the evolution also required the nurturing of presidents Seth Low and Nicholas Murray Butler. By the time of the Horkheimer circle's arrival in 1934, President Butler presided over a true university on Morningside Heights. At this juncture, fifty-four years after the trustees' official ruling in favor of a university, all three faculties were functioning on equal footing. Nevertheless, significant tensions persisted between the groups. Most notable was the quiet animosity between the Faculty of Philosophy and the Faculty of Political Science. In essence, it boiled down to a feud between genteel "mandarins" and utilitarian empiricists. For scholars firmly entrenched within the university's structure, these feelings of ill will had few repercussions. For a mysterious group of German-Jewish scholars straddling the traditional boundaries between the social sciences and humanities, however, Columbia's past and its shaping of the school's contemporary atmosphere posed major challenges.

**Columbia's Sociology Department**

The field of sociology was not initially represented among the disciplinary divisions within the original Faculty of Political Science at Columbia. This resulted partly from the perceptions and lack of knowledge regarding sociology during these years. Burgess divided the Faculty of Political Science into four parts: history, political science, constitutional and international law, and political economy and social science. At this early point in the faculty's history, sociol-
ogy was subsumed within the field of social science. Its methodologies remained poorly defined and understood in America, causing many Columbia trustees and administrators to balk when a chair of sociology was proposed in 1891.14 Were it not for the efforts of President Seth Low, who offered to fund the new position personally, the establishment of Columbia’s first chair in sociology may have taken years longer to achieve. Low was a true public intellectual who loved New York as much as he adored his university. In his eyes, sociology was a much needed addition to the Faculty of Political Science. He believed that sociology’s insights would result in the most tangible contributions to the university’s surrounding community.

Low’s appointee, Franklin Giddings, was the ideal candidate for forming a lasting department of sociology at Columbia. Although it took several years to break away from Burgess’s arbitrary departmental coupling with political economy, Giddings managed to satisfy the dual aims of his sponsors. He directed the University Settlement in New York, thus proving his commitments to social reform and the scholar’s civic duties, while he simultaneously made some of the most significant contributions to the academic establishment of sociology in the United States.15 Giddings was a positivist and was strongly inclined toward establishing sociology as a scientific discipline; however, he was also an astute social theorist. His own scholarly output helped define the field of sociology in America during the turn of the century, and his prominence helped place Columbia’s emerging department at the forefront of the discipline.

Excited by his early success, Giddings became increasingly concerned with laying the academic foundations of American sociology. He remained committed to social reform, but he strongly supported separating the training of social workers from his department of sociology. By 1900, after years of nudging, his goal was accomplished. Social work moved to the New York School of Philanthropy, enabling Giddings and his colleagues in social economics, Samuel Lindsay and Edward Devine, to concentrate on the scientific study of society. Collectively, the trio continued to maintain Columbia’s reputation on the cutting-edge of American sociological study, and all three strongly supported efforts to incorporate the use of statistics and empirical research into the field. At Columbia, the department’s drift toward empiricism was signaled by the appointment of a statis-
The Frankfurt School’s Invitation from Columbia University

tician, Robert Chaddock.16 By the 1920s, the entire field of sociology in America had made the leap from social work to scientific discipline, and Columbia had helped blaze the trail. Now that the entire subject matter had begun to model itself on the natural sciences and their methodologies, Giddings and the Columbia sociologists struggled to distinguish themselves and to maintain their lofty status.17

Intense competition for top students and outside funding from the newly formed social science foundations distinguished American sociology in the 1920s. Money became available to researchers on an unprecedented level. Giddings and his colleagues must have viewed the development with mixed feelings. On the one hand, their discipline was gaining notoriety, making new and important work more feasible; however, on the other hand, these same conditions made it harder for Columbia to maintain its status in the discipline. Fears about the department’s future prospects increased as the decade drew to a close. By 1928, Giddings was too old to continue leading the department, and the importance of locating a successor was magnified by the perception that sociology at Columbia had been surpassed by the University of Chicago. Bolstered by huge Rockefeller grants and directed under the careful scrutiny of Robert Park, the University of Chicago took American sociology into a new and fruitful direction—into the study of local communities. These community studies captivated the imaginations of social scientists throughout the country who saw endless possibilities for local applications of Park’s work.

It took nearly a year to find a suitable replacement for Franklin Giddings, and it was clear that these would be almost impossible shoes to fill. In retrospect, this makes the university’s choice peculiar. At a time when the entire discipline was pursuing empirical applications, Columbia selected a new department chair who was firmly committed to social theorizing. Gidding’s replacement, Robert MacIver, originally came from Scotland. His specialty was political theory, but his Oxford education had provided him with a broad knowledge of the European sociological tradition. After teaching briefly in Europe, MacIver joined the faculty of the University of Toronto, where he taught for twelve years. Instead of focusing his attention on societal maladies, as did so many sociologists in America, MacIver was more interested in theorizing about social processes

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and cohesion. This orientation, however, did not preclude him from serving on important governmental projects—most notably Canada’s War Labor Committee during World War I. After publishing a series of important theoretical texts following the war, MacIver arrived on Morningside Heights in 1927. He had been offered the chairmanship of Barnard’s Department of Economics and Sociology, as well as an appointment to Columbia’s Department of Public Law and Government. After teaching sociology to Barnard undergraduates and political theory to Columbia graduate students for only a year, MacIver came to the attention of the sociology department’s search committee. In the winter of 1928, he was hired to lead the new phase of sociology at Columbia.

Columbia’s Motives for Affiliating Itself with the Institute for Social Research

As prestigious as Columbia’s sociology program was, the department was lucky to hire Robert MacIver. By 1928, its very existence had come into question. As MacIver recalled, members of the Columbia community had many reasons to shake their heads. Some were still hesitant to support a field that aspired to do the work of all the other social sciences combined, while others lamented the woeful state of the department following Giddings’s departure. Were it not for support from respected scholars such as John Dewey, President Butler might have followed his initial instincts and abolished sociology at Columbia. Instead, the department survived under MacIver’s direction and developed a long-range plan for the future with the help of the entire Faculty of Political Science. In an internal memorandum, members of the Faculty of Political Science agreed that the pursuit of empiricism was of the utmost importance. Columbia’s social scientists agreed that the quantitative method was the best way of positioning the social sciences on the same firm footing as the natural sciences; however, they went on to recognize:

But the rise of the quantitative method means, from the administrative and budgetary point of view of the universities, revolutionizing the concept of research. The quantitative method is expensive, and must, distinctly, be seen on this plane. It is a big idea and needs to be
treated in a big way. Just as the laboratory in the physical sciences was a big idea and meant large appropriations for equipment, materials, care, assistants, etc. If the universities do not meet this need in a proper way, they must inevitably become insignificant in a function which is properly their own. The achievement and prestige will pass to government such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Department of Commerce, or to private bureaus such as the National Bureau of Economic Research and the National Industrial Conference Board, or to private industries such as the banks and the large corporations.21

A minimum budget of $50,000 was required from Columbia University to create the kind of social research bureau that the faculty aspired to create. Such an institution would not need a great deal of technical equipment, but a large sum of money was needed to pay for calculators, travel and field research costs, and salaries to pay graduate students and to enable faculty members to leave their normal teaching assignments. To underscore the great task ahead of them, the Faculty of Political Science concluded their memorandum with the warning:

The situation with reference to research through quantitative measurement may really be described as a crisis. If this crisis is not met in a large way, achievement on the part of universities cannot be expected. Research of a truly scientific nature in the social sciences in America is far from being what it should be expected to be. The recent recognition of realizable possibilities in quantitative measurement puts the issue squarely up to the universities.22

The proposal was daring for an academic department of social science. Chicago’s great achievements had largely been made possible through private funding from John D. Rockefeller. The Faculty of Political Science was proposing something entirely different. By liberating itself from the government and private interests, Columbia obviously believed that it could pursue unique studies that would provide value in both their findings and pedagogic merits. It is impossible to say how this proposal would have fared on its own, because the 1929 stock market crash made such an ambitious program out of the question.

The Depression had mixed consequences for Columbia’s department of sociology. Columbia, like all other institutions in America, was vulnerable to the economic dislocations of the 1930s. This led to the acceptance of new fiscal realities and limitations. Maclver had to regularly remind the department of the economic restraints imposed
by the university. He emphasized the need for economy within the department.\textsuperscript{23} During some years the fiscal crisis was so severe that Maclver and members of the department were forced to shift regular course offerings to the extension program in an effort to expand the teaching day so that all of the necessary courses could be offered without expanding the number of instructors.\textsuperscript{24} At the same time, however, the Depression raised new questions about society, thus enhancing the role and prominence of social science.\textsuperscript{25} The combination of these factors, the scaling back of activities matched with the growing demands for scientifically-based social interventions and economic planning, must have caused tremendous frustrations for Columbia’s sociologists throughout the 1930s. New York was an ideal vantage point for the study of America’s new social challenges during the Depression, but the Columbia sociologists were limited in their capabilities.

Despite these budgetary restraints, Columbia did enable the department of social science to make one stride toward their goal of achieving a bureau for quantitative social research. Robert Lynd, the famous sociologist who had tarnished the image of the Rockefellers in Wyoming and who had co-authored the bestselling \textit{Middletown}, was appointed to a professorship of sociology. Although MacIver recognized the importance of offering empirical social research at Columbia, he was personally opposed to the positivist trends in US sociology that sought to model the discipline on the natural sciences.\textsuperscript{26} Someone else would be needed to accomplish the task at Columbia. It was hoped that Lynd might lay the foundations for such work on Morningside Heights by initiating community studies similar to \textit{Middletown}. At the time of his appointment in 1931, this may have been a reasonable expectation. Lynd’s interests, however, began to shift after his arrival. As MacIver recalled, “I hoped he [Lynd] would initiate a program on the sociology of the metropolis, but he turned his interest in other directions.”\textsuperscript{27} By the time of the Horkheimer circle’s arrival in New York, pressing needs still remained for the sociology department of Columbia University.

Three essential conditions in place at Columbia played a role in the negotiations with the \textit{Institut für Sozialforschung}. First, Columbia’s social sciences were in a state of decline after a legacy of dominance. The complete abolition of the department had been narrowly
averted, but the threat still hung in the air. Second, the entire Faculty of Political Science agreed that the most promising strategy for strengthening social science at Columbia was the formation of a bureau for quantitative methods in sociology. Such a plan held the promise of scientific certainty, as well as the facilities for the proper training of social researchers. Third, the Depression made the faculty’s proposal impossible. Robert Lynd was hired in an attempt to move in the direction of quantitative studies, but he was both disinterested and overwhelmed by the task that lay ahead. If only an existing bureau that employed quantitative research methods and was economically self-sufficient were willing to place its services at Columbia’s disposal. How could the university’s sociology department receive something for nothing?

The Institute for Social Research Introduces Itself to US Social Scientists

There was really only one motive behind Horkheimer’s desire to move the institute from Europe to America: the threat of fascism’s spread throughout the continent. As members of the Horkheimer circle surveyed the political situation from their new headquarters in Geneva, they could not avoid the realization that fascist organizations existed in nearly every European country. To Germany’s first wave of exiles, it appeared as though all of Europe could succumb to the psychological and political malady that had driven them from their homes. The entire group was unreservedly European in their tastes, attitudes, and mindsets. Consequently, America was not a place that they wished to inhabit. They foresaw the terrible isolation and homesickness that would inevitably lie ahead if they left the shores of the continent. Nevertheless, a second emigration seemed increasingly necessary as they monitored the swirling forces of reaction enveloping them.

The institute’s move to America might never have been possible were it not for the efforts of two figures within the Horkheimer circle. From start to finish, Erich Fromm and Julian Gumperz directed every step of the institute’s campaign for affiliation with an American social scientific institution. The job fell to these two men partly
as a result of their preexisting contacts with Americans, but also because of their ability with the English language.

Their first step was to develop contacts between the institute and American scholars. The Horkheimer circle realized that their work would not be familiar to the American academic community, and they set out to rectify the situation by introducing themselves and their work. The Frankfurt School put together a series of mailings. Enclosed with copies of the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung and with preliminary reports on their studies of authority and the family was an English letter written by Fromm and Gumperz introducing the institute and its work. Few packets were sent to America, and it appears that Fromm and Gumperz were highly selective about the individuals and institutions they approached. They tended to concentrate on US social scientists or departments of sociology with interests similar to those of the institute. Specifically, they sent mailings to scholars who were intrigued by topics such as authority, the family, social psychology, economics, and labor. Among the list of individuals receiving these materials were Lewis Lorwin of the Brookings Institution, Pitirim Sorokin of Harvard University, W.F. Ogburn of the University of Chicago, and Robert MacIver of Columbia University, as well as the departments of sociology at the University of Wisconsin, the University of North Carolina, the University of Michigan, UCLA, Yale University, and Bryn Mawr. As the mailings were sent out from Geneva, Fromm and Gumperz traveled to America in order to meet in person with the interested recipients.

As one of Germany's prominent Freudians, Fromm had contacts with members of the psychoanalytic network that circled the globe. Consequently, most of Fromm's American contacts were analysts. His closest associates in the United States were Karen Horney and Franz Alexander of the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute. Before Horkheimer had even begun to seriously consider a move America, Fromm was invited to the Chicago Institute by Horney. He traveled to the United States in 1932 with plans of being affiliated with Horney and Alexander for a semester or two; however, he left after an abbreviated stay in Chicago. The hasty departure was partly due to serious illness (Fromm suffered a serious bout of tuberculosis at this time, forcing him to enter a sanitarium) and partly the result of major disagreements with his hosts about Freudian orthodoxy.
Nevertheless, Fromm did have time to develop contacts with social scientists and social psychologists at the University of Chicago. By the fall of 1933 and the spring of 1934, when Horkheimer was pursuing the establishment of an American bureau for the Institute for Social Research, Fromm returned to Chicago to approach his old friends about a possible affiliation with the Horkheimer circle. The primary contacts at Chicago were Karen Horney, Harold Lasswell, W.F. Ogburn, and Donald Slessinger, all of whom were particularly interested in the Horkheimer circle’s use of social psychology in their studies of authority and the family. While Fromm may have privately hoped that Horkheimer would select Chicago as a base of operations, he quickly backed down when he learned that his counterpart, Julian Gumperz, had negotiated an extremely desirable relationship with Columbia University.

**Julian Gumperz and the Negotiations with Columbia University**

It is surprising how little is known about Julian Gumperz, especially when one considers that he enabled the *Institut für Sozialforschung* to move to America. The histories of the Horkheimer circle typically mention him briefly with regard to the group’s Atlantic crossing, but little else is ever reported. He played a prominent role in Feuer’s accusations about the Frankfurt School’s Communist connections and fellow-traveling, but only a narrow picture of the man’s political life was uncovered. Who was Julian Gumperz, and how did he make the Horkheimer circle’s affiliation with Columbia possible?

Sociologically, Gumperz fit the profile that is so common among members of the Horkheimer circle. His family was Jewish, and he was raised as a member of the upper-middle class. The one distinguishing characteristic that set his childhood apart was the fact that he was born in America, while his father made his fortune as an industrialist. The family remained in the United States until after World War I, but Gumperz left for Germany fluent in the English language and maintaining his American citizenship. Like Horkheimer and the other institute members, Gumperz had been drawn as a student to Marx. Originally he was attracted to the Communist-
sponsored arts councils, eventually editing journals such as *Der Gegner* and *Rote Fahne*, but his travels in the USSR during the spring of 1923 stimulated a burning interest in economics and sociology.

His contacts with the *Institut für Sozialforschung* predate the institute’s formation. Gumperz and his wife attended the Marxist Study Week sponsored by Felix Weil and maintained cordial relations with the group while he studied for his PhD at the University of Heidelberg. After receiving his degree, Gumperz became a formal research associate of the institute and served as an assistant to Friedrich Pollock. When Horkheimer began the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, Gumperz supplied many of the reviews of American contributions to the social sciences, thus helping to add to the journal’s international orientation. By 1932, however, Gumperz began to drift out of the institute’s orbit. He had never been one of the central figures in the new Horkheimer directorship, and he was growing weary with his small role. He moved away from the institute to Berlin, where he began to formulate the basis for a monograph on the sociology of the American political party system. The proposed project did not interest the hierarchy of the *Institut für Sozialforschung*, and Gumperz became angry about his lack of financial support. Meanwhile, Horkheimer also began to grow weary of the estranged associate in Berlin. Horkheimer required the utmost loyalty and diligence from the members of his circle, and Gumperz’s increasingly erratic behavior troubled him. By the spring of 1932, Gumperz turned to other organizations in an effort to finance a research trip to the United States. Despite his apparent misgivings, Horkheimer did succumb to bullying from Gumperz and provided his former research associate with references. Gumperz’s most promising lead was a fellowship from the Brookings Institution. He mailed his application to Lewis Lorwin, a member of the faculty, and Horkheimer enclosed an accompanying letter of recommendation in which he wrote:

> Dr. Julian Gumperz is a scientific worker of the highest quality. He has a thorough knowledge of methods and economics and also has a very high opinion of the responsibility of scientific activity and a serious discipline of work. He combines those qualities with a real ability for independent analysis of different economic problems. I am convinced that the decision of the Fellowship Committee in favor of Dr. Gumperz would only bear the best results. Therefore I recommend Dr. Gumperz very heartily.
Despite Horkheimer’s succinct endorsement, Gumperz’s application was rejected, and he returned to writing book reviews for the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Gumperz now looked for an alternate means of going to America to pursue his study of its political party system.

When Horkheimer began to consider establishing a US branch of the institute to which to escape if the European political situation worsened, Gumperz recognized the possibility for pursuing his own ambitions. Horkheimer clearly wanted Gumperz’s assistance. Of all of the people connected with the institute, Gumperz was most familiar with the recent developments in American social science. Fromm knew many American psychoanalysts and social psychologists, but he did not yet know the important sociologists and economists in the United States. Gumperz knew these people’s work and was fluent in their language. As Horkheimer viewed it, his participation in any negotiations would be essential. In an attempt to guarantee Gumperz’s participation, Horkheimer and Pollock promised that he would be hired as the director of the resulting American bureau.38 What they failed to tell him was that Horkheimer would assume control if the headquarters of the institute was moved from Geneva to the United States. Gumperz, however, was likely more enticed by the possibility of having the Horkheimer circle pay for him to live in the United States. Negotiating a future home for the institute in America would enable him to carry out the research on the American party system.

There are few records of the Institute for Social Research’s contacts with Columbia University prior to the summer of 1934, when Horkheimer himself traveled to New York to negotiate the final arrangements with the school’s administration. We do know that by January of 1933 Robert Maclver received the group’s mailing and was intrigued by what he found.39 There are, however, no other records of activity or communication between the Horkheimer circle and Columbia after this point. We can assume that Gumperz must have visited with members of the Columbia sociology department during the winter of 1933/34, but no record of any contact exists. Further clouding the picture is the fact that those who knew them agree that neither Maclver nor Lynd read German well enough to have entirely grasped the institute’s work.40 If these assessments are true, it means that Columbia’s social scientists must have been influ-
enced largely by their contact with Gumperz, and they also must have sought an outside assessment of the institute. Based on the department’s precarious position within Columbia University, it is highly unlikely that MacIver and Lynd would have stuck their necks out for the Horkheimer circle without endorsements from other US scholars. But who could have been familiar with the institute’s work and also been a close ally of the social sciences at Columbia?

Many people could certainly fit the description. Members of the New School’s University in Exile would have been familiar with both groups, but there are no records of any such connections until after the Frankfurt School’s arrival in New York. Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting that when the faculty of the New School did share their opinions on the Horkheimer group, the assessments were extremely negative.41 The people from the University of Chicago might have served as intermediaries, but there is no evidence suggesting this, either, and it is highly unlikely that Chicago would have encouraged their Columbia rivals to host the Horkheimer circle. Paul Lazarsfeld is another possible candidate. He was visiting the United States on a research grant from the Rockefeller Foundation during the time that these negotiations were occurring. He was close friends with Robert Lynd during his first years in America and had recently completed his own study of the family in Vienna. He certainly knew the Frankfurt School’s work, and he may have even met Gumperz in New York during the winter of 1933/34. Again, however, there are no records of any such connections in either the institute’s extensive archives or among Lazarsfeld’s papers. The only name that does come up frequently in conjunction with both the Horkheimer group and Columbia’s sociology department is Lewis Lorwin.

Lewis Lorwin, formerly known as Lewis Levine, was a product of Columbia’s Faculty of Political Science. Born in Kiev in 1883, Lorwin’s family traveled throughout Europe, enabling the young boy to be educated in Russia, Switzerland, and France. Lorwin’s primary interest was sociology, and he enrolled in Columbia’s PhD program in the social sciences.42 He received a scholarship, and his advisor was none other than Franklin Giddings, the patriarch of Columbia sociology. When asked by his famous mentor about his projected thesis topic, Lorwin ambitiously disclosed vague plans about a pro-
ject on social evolution. Giddings steered him toward a dissertation on French Syndicalism in an effort to give focus and direction to the study. Lorwin acquiesced, and the shift in subject matter had significant consequences on the student’s subsequent career. Lorwin grew close to Edwin Seligman, one of the department’s early social economists, and he discovered his passions for the study of economics and the labor movement—two subjects that dominated his attention throughout a long and distinguished career in the social sciences.

Lorwin’s early professional life was extremely varied. He briefly taught at Wellesley and Columbia and then moved to a more permanent position at the University of Montana. The move west fascinated Lorwin, and it also transformed the man of science into a public intellectual. Lorwin became outraged when he discovered the unfair tax practices being exploited by Montana mining companies. Due to various loopholes in the laws, wealthy mining companies paid lower taxes than poverty-stricken farmers. Much to the horror of the university’s president, Edward Elliot, Lorwin joined the political fracas, helping the state’s legislature draft two tax reform bills, and publicized the case in newspapers throughout America. The controversy became quite famous; it resembled Robert Lynd’s early battle over mining with the Rockefeller’s in Wyoming. The major difference in Montana was that Lorwin lost his war with the mining industry. The bills failed to be passed, and Lorwin was suspended from his teaching duties. He took the University of Montana to court, but eventually decided to leave after only teaching for three years.

After these adventures out west, Lorwin experimented with a number of different careers before returning to academia. His first new job was as a journalist. He began as a reporter in the field of economics with The New York World and later embarked on one of the great adventures of his life—a trip to the Soviet Union as a writer for The Chicago Daily News during 1921 and 1922. The trip to Russia enabled Lorwin to witness firsthand the country’s social and economic conditions. Although Lorwin remained a man of the left, with strong sympathies for the labor movement, his travels in the Soviet Union led to a complete and thorough rejection of Russian Communism. He returned to New York’s Greenwich Village after the death of his wife’s father in 1923 and found a job that led him back into the world of academia. He was hired by the International League of Garment
Workers’ Unions to write the history of the organization for its twenty-fifth anniversary. Since there were no precedents for such a project, Lorwin completed a tremendous amount of research, producing a study that made him a highly visible figure in the field of labor history.

The fame led to Lorwin’s appointment with the Brookings Institution. During the fall of 1924, Harold Moulton, the head of the Brookings Institution, hired Lorwin as a specialist in its labor division. Back in these early days, the Brookings was quite different from its current manifestation. It was an organization on the cutting edge of American Progressivism. As Lorwin recalled,

But the Brookings got the idea that even war and peace depended on two things: an accumulation of knowledge about our economic and social life and our international relations, and we should be able to present and disseminate the knowledge to people. So he set up this foundation and put several million dollars into it.44

His first major project for the Brookings Institution was a study of the international labor movement entitled Labor and Internationalism. He began his research in 1926, and it brought him to every major European nation. His first task was to study the labor movements in all European countries, particularly looking for international connections between the various organizations. He then looked at the handful of international labor groups and examined the obstacles facing them. During these years, it is extremely likely that Lorwin first met many of the people connected with both the Horkheimer circle and the International Labor Organization, which hosted the Institut für Sozialforschung years later in Geneva. Although enthusiastic about the promise of an international labor movement, Lorwin was critical of the efforts he witnessed. He found that European labor was poorly organized and that the international institutions were too small to be effective at that time. When he returned to the United States to write his monograph, Lorwin had to resort to his own imagination in order to conceptualize the kind of effective labor movement that he one day hoped to see.45 The resulting book received international acclaim, and Julian Gumperz was among its many European reviewers. During an interview some years later, Lorwin showed the interviewer a news clipping and recalled:

This appeared in Leipzig, Germany, by a man called Julian Gumperz, now an investment consultant in New York City and making lots of
money. At the time he was a left-wing Socialist and editor of a Marxist magazine. I saw him a year or two ago at a luncheon, and he’s sort of forgotten the old days but still it’s in his blood. He says: “Louis [sic.] Lorwin, as a result of his two books on Syndicalism in France and the women’s garment workers, is already well-known to large circles as a writer who combines wide knowledge of history and theory of the labor movement with a scientific objectivity quite unusual in this field of study.” I’ve always prided myself that people have recognized that I was objective. Then he says, the importance of this book and so on, which I won’t read on.46

Gumperz’s high regard for Lorwin may explain why the latter’s name topped the Frankfurt School’s mailing list. It is also clear, however, that Gumperz left an equally lasting impression on the Brookings Institution’s young star.

_Labor and Internationalism_ represented a turning point in Lorwin’s career that led to closer affiliations with the International Labor Organization in Geneva.47 The book alerted him to the importance of monitoring international economics, and he felt the need to focus on international history and international relations. It also signaled the beginning of Lorwin’s interest in economic planning.48 The International Labor Organization became an important resource for Lorwin because of its similar focuses. Although his plan to pursue these new concerns by taking up residency in Geneva with the International Labor organizations was put on hold until 1935, due to deadlines for his second Brookings monograph on the American Federation of Labor (AFL), Lorwin kept close contact with colleagues in Geneva and probably visited during trips to Europe throughout the early 1930s. This is the only way to explain the numerous contacts between Lorwin and the Horkheimer circle.

Evidence suggests that both parties were extremely familiar with one another during the early 1930s. We already know about Lorwin being one of the first recipients of the institute’s mailing; we are aware of Gumperz’s review of Lorwin’s book on labor and internationalism; and we also have noted that Gumperz applied for his Brookings fellowship through Lewis Lorwin. In addition, the Horkheimer circle seriously considered translating and then publishing Lorwin’s book on the American Federation of Labor. After the success of _Labor and Internationalism_, Lorwin felt that his new book also needed a worldwide audience. He evidently contacted Pollock
in the fall of 1932 while the institute was still based in Frankfurt and suggested that the two become acquainted during the German phase of Lorwin’s research for the labor book.\textsuperscript{49} Apparently feeling that the AFL book had merit, Pollock wrote to the institute’s best translator of English, Julian Gumperz, and asked whether he wanted to translate it. Gumperz, who was clearly still wounded by his rejection from the Brookings, refused the project on the grounds that it would take up too much of his time and would cut into his own work, which he incidentally viewed as being remarkably similar to Lorwin’s.\textsuperscript{50} Pollock renewed the offer by sending Gumperz an overview of the book and its table of contents. However, the assignment was again rejected due to concerns about the manuscript’s length; Gumperz suggested cutting it by more than a third.\textsuperscript{51} Although the collaboration between the Institute for Social Research and Lewis Lorwin did not bear fruit in terms of a translated edition of the AFL book, it may have served as the basis for a relationship between the two parties. The institute tried to come to Lorwin’s aid, and it may be the case that Lorwin attempted to return the favor by helping the institute settle in America.

Of greatest significance is evidence suggesting that a face-to-face meeting took place between Lewis Lorwin and Friedrich Pollock.\textsuperscript{52} Pollock sought Lorwin’s advice about possibly moving the \textit{Institut für Sozialforschung} to the United States. Since Pollock did not arrive in the United States before August 1934, and Lorwin wrote to Horkheimer about meeting Pollock in a letter dated 3 July 1934, we must assume that the conference took place in Europe. We can further narrow the date and location of the rendezvous by considering the agenda. Since Horkheimer did not even consider moving the institute to America until the group had resettled in Geneva, we must assume that the meeting took place in Geneva during one of Lorwin’s visits to the International Labor Organization. But did Lorwin act as the intermediary between Columbia’s social scientists and the Frankfurt School?

Lorwin’s new focus on internationalism put him in touch with one of the future key figures of Columbia’s sociology department. James Shotwell, the chair of the Social Science Research Council’s international relations committee, sought to involve Lorwin in the group’s activities. In particular, he sought Lorwin’s expertise in arranging an
SSRC trip to the Soviet Union. Lorwin, who was planning a second visit to the USSR in preparation for *Labor and Internationalism*, was evidently a valued expert on Russian affairs. During the time of this collaboration with the SSRC, Lorwin became friends with the organization’s permanent secretary, Robert Lynd. Lynd, who after the completion of *Middletown* was offered the job by friends within the SSRC, first worked with Lorwin on the Russian expedition, as well as a number of other projects. The two later renewed their friendship during the Great Depression. Lorwin, who became a well-known proponent of economic planning while serving on LaFollette’s Committee on Manufacturing, attracted Lynd’s interest. Lynd, who in 1931 was appointed to a professorship of sociology at Columbia, invited Lorwin frequently to New York, where the two discussed the merits of planned economies.

An examination of Columbia’s administrative files on the Institute for Social Research suggests that Lewis Feuer was correct in noting the central role played by Robert Lynd in the negotiations between the Horkheimer circle and the university. There is, however, no evidence that his involvement was motivated by fellow-traveling zeal. In fact, one finds strong evidence suggesting that Lynd was a staunch opponent of Russian Communism. As Lewis Corey reported to Lynd in a letter of 12 December 1950,

[S.M.] Lipsett told me you were not a fellow-traveler; that for two years you had been outspokenly anti-communist and opposed communists as professors on the ground that they could not teach with integrity.

Clearly, Lynd’s close friends and colleagues realized the true nature of his political convictions, but this was lost on those relying on political litmus tests. Lynd became a suspected fellow-traveler after signing up as a sponsor of the Cultural and Scientific Congress for World Peace in 1949, then publishing an article for *The Nation* entitled “Our Racket Society.” For Cold War anti-Communists like Lewis Feuer, such acts were clear causes for suspicion. In the hysterical environment of Cold War America, Lynd, like many other American intellectuals, was unfairly scrutinized and attacked on the grounds of his moral and intellectual positions. By focusing only on possible political motives for Lynd’s involvement with the Frankfurt School, Feuer ignored the more compelling reasons for Lynd’s inter-
est in the Horkheimer circle. One must carefully consider Robert Lynd’s sociological interests during the time of the Institute for Social Research’s negotiations with Columbia.

During the late 1920s and early 1930s, when Lynd and Lorwin met to discuss SSRC business and planned economies, the former was involved with a number of inquiries that he viewed as some of the most urgent tasks facing American social science. It is striking how many of these projects overlap with the interests and orientation of the Horkheimer circle during the early years of Horkheimer’s directorship.

During an SSRC conference at the Brookings Institution held during February 1931, Lynd gave a talk entitled Possibilities of Cooperation among Research Institutions. Lynd stood before his colleagues (and Lorwin is likely to have been one of them, since the meeting was at his institutional home) and surveyed the social sciences in America. His central message was that increasingly complex studies must be encouraged; however, lone researchers were losing the ability to carry out such research. The only solution was to foster cooperation between researchers and even between research teams. While exploring the various possibilities for cooperative work, Lynd reserved his greatest admiration for the form of collaboration practiced by the Horkheimer circle. As if having the Institut für Sozialforschung in mind, Lynd said:

There are different patterns of cooperation in research, some of them amounting only to a kind of pseudo-cooperation. At its simplest, cooperative research may consist in giving the expert a corps of pick-and-shovel junior assistants to speed along his labors. A more complicated pattern involves the association of a group of specialists in a single discipline for mutual inter-stimulation and, in some cases, joint attack upon a common problem. Still a third pattern, the most complicated of all, is the association of men from radically diverse disciplines for joint action upon some problem sprawled across all their fields. The first two of these patterns are fairly common and the third as yet largely a matter of occasional experimental forays.

As if echoing Horkheimer’s own inaugural address, given during his appointment as the new director of the Institut für Sozialforschung, Lynd emphasized the importance of gathering experts across different disciplines and working together in the singular goal of producing a unified theory of society. When Horkheimer had outlined the new design for his institute, he proclaimed that
the question today is to organize investigations stimulated by contemporary philosophical problems in which philosophers, sociologists, economists, historians, and psychologists are brought together in permanent collection to undertake in common that which can be carried out individually in the laboratory in other fields. In short the task is to do what all true researchers have always done: namely, to pursue their larger philosophical questions on the basis of the most precise scientific methods, to revise and refine their questions in the course of their substantive work, and to develop new methods without losing sight of the larger context.61

Intellectually, Robert Lynd was a kindred spirit who would have been highly attracted to the institute’s brand of social research. If his German was good enough to understand the Horkheimer circle’s writings, he must have realized this while he read through the packet sent to Robert MacIver. If, however, he could not read German, Julian Gumperz, and quite probably Lewis Lorwin, made him aware of the institute and its program.

In addition to sharing similar methodological attitudes regarding the practice and structure of effective sociological institutions, Lynd also shared specific research interests with the Horkheimer group during the time that an affiliation with Columbia was being considered. Like the research teams led by Erich Fromm, Lynd was also studying the effects of the Depression on families. As MacIver had noted, Columbia expected Lynd to continue his work in community studies, but his interests had shifted to a new subject – the family. Instead of studying other “Middletowns,” Lynd had become intrigued by the smaller institutional units that formed the basis of communities. This fascination was stimulated further by the Depression. Like Fromm, Lynd saw the family as a crucial social site from which to view the effects of economic dislocation, because the family was the institution mediating the relationship between individuals and society.

On 14 March 1933, Lynd submitted a memorandum to the SSRC and Columbia University’s Research Council outlining his program for studying the family during the Depression.62 According to Lynd, the timing was perfect for his research plans. As he explained,

The unusual opportunity which the depression affords for the study of the interaction of personality and culture in this fundamental institution derives from three things: (1) The extraordinary catholicity of the current financial depression which is touching directly or indirectly all
classes, including the well-to-do who are ordinarily cushioned against most sorts of sudden cultural pressure; (2) the fact that we can as a result study families of all types and incomes simultaneously placed under single centrally-derived sources of strain, almost as if by design in a laboratory; (3) the testimony of investigators in many fields touching the family that it is actually notably easier not to get intimate family data from “normal” families than it was prior to the depression.63

The research plan called for three synchronized approaches: first, a statistical study of the internal and external functions of families and their members derived from data regarding participation in public organizations (e.g., recreations, schools, and churches), delinquency rates, marriage and child-birth rates, and trends in wage earning; second, the use of questionnaires and oral interviews to survey the broad effects of the depression; and third, the use of case studies.64 Consequently, the program entailed the kind of close collaboration between sociologists and psychologists that the Horkheimer circle’s own studies of the family involved.

There is no record of the SSRC’s initial response to Lynd’s proposal, but the evidence does suggest that Lynd’s colleagues at Columbia disapproved of the project. In a memorandum dated 1 May 1933, attached to the original research proposal, Lynd pleaded with the members of the university’s subcommittee on Sociological and Anthropological projects (comprised by Robert MacIver, Samuel Lindsay, and Franz Boas).65 All three apparently disapproved of Lynd’s cross-disciplinary approach. Particularly, his planned reliance on psychology troubled them. Lynd protested that the subcommittee “condemned out of hand an entire discipline and made no effort to inquire into the capacity of the specific psychiatrist involved.”66 He alerted his opponents to the fact that both the SSRC and the Social Science Division of the Rockefeller Foundation had been promoting cooperation between psychology and the other social sciences for several years. Sensing the uselessness of his pleas and counterarguments, Lynd concluded by suggesting that the Columbia Council only fund $5,000 for the sociological portion of the project. Meanwhile, he would seek the additional $1,400 necessary for the psychiatric portion of the study from less hostile sources. By supporting an affiliation with the Horkheimer circle, Lynd might have sensed that he was striking back at the opponents of his proposal. By supporting the institute, he could expect to have new allies
on Morningside Heights that shared his sociological orientation and research interests. Additionally, he could finally complete the task that Maclver had set for him. Perhaps through cooperation with the institute, he could fulfill the expectations that had been placed on his shoulders at the time of his hiring—the achievement of a social research bureau.

The institute had a natural ally in Robert Lynd. In order to appeal to the rest of the sociology department, they would need to convince the other faculty members of the Horkheimer circle’s commitment to quantitative methods. We cannot be certain about whether Lorwin and/or Lynd ever made this known to the institute. Perhaps chance played a role. Whatever the case, Gumperz and the institute convinced Columbia. There are no records or notes from Gumperz’s meetings with members of the university faculty and administration; however, we do know how the Horkheimer circle represented itself in legal documents drafted only months before the move to America. In the Constitution for the International Society of Social Research, drawn up by the New York law firm of Mitchell, Taylor, Capron and Marsh, the institute’s US legal team proclaimed:

The sole object of the corporation shall be to render social service. It will study problems of international welfare, and will endeavor to solve the same by means of social research, the application of scientific knowledge, and by assembling necessary data and other appropriate means.67

However, this only represents a small part of the picture that must have been presented to Columbia. Although we cannot be entirely sure of the other pieces of this image, we can be reasonably certain about how the institute introduced itself to the American public just after their arrival in New York during the summer of 1934. By the fall of that year, Julian Gumperz had been assigned the task of fundraising. For this purpose, a speech was prepared.68 The presence of editorial markings in the handwritings of both Pollock and Horkheimer suggests that the leaders of the institute had been closely involved in the writing of this talk. Since it is unlikely that the Horkheimer circle would have had much time to prepare an entirely new strategy for appealing to American social scientists, it seems reasonable that the speech is a good representation of the way in which the group approached Columbia. If the text of Gumperz’s talk is any
indication of the content for his negotiations with Columbia, the Institute for Social Research must have appeared to be the answer to the sociology department’s prayers.

Gumperz’s fund-raising speech emphasized the role of science in the institute’s agenda. Appealing to the orientation of American sociologists in the audiences, Gumperz concluded his introductory paragraph with the promise, “I intend to start with an analysis of the scientific aims of this organization [the Institute for Social Research], and the methods by which we hope to achieve them.” What was new and significant about the institute’s approach was that its members promised to go beyond the mere gathering of social facts that typified so much of American social research. Instead, they proclaimed their determination not to lose sight of the relationship of social data to the social totality. Gumperz insisted that too many American social scientists were guilty of surrendering the whole to its component parts. As Gumperz explained,

But as soon as you approach the problem as a whole,—as soon as you try to interrelate the accumulations of social facts stored away in the safe-deposit boxes of the different specialized social science disciplines,—as soon as you attempt to deal with the problems of society as a whole,—you find that the social sciences have no answer to your problems on hand.70

The Institute for Social Research, Gumperz insisted, had been conceived with the goal of circumventing this flaw. It would accomplish this task by formulating a common set of theoretical assumptions about social structures and their development over time. Gumperz failed to elaborate on any of this. Instead, he attempted to set the institute’s work apart from other research organizations in the most general fashion. As he explained to the Horkheimer circle’s potential patrons,

So when, in the beginning of the 20s, a group of German scholars set themselves the task of organizing a new enterprise in their field—the Institute for Social Research—(then at the University of Frankfurt)—the ideas they had in mind were to further with their efforts a theory of present society as an integrated and moving body, and to conduct the research work proposed in light of a unifying principle that would differentiate the work done from a mere description and enumeration of facts, and would guard it at the same time from the danger that threatens every abstract theory,—namely, of failing when put to the test of practical application.71
The Frankfurt School’s Invitation from Columbia University

Of course, political critics of the Frankfurt School, such as Lewis Feuer, would see the institute’s hesitancy in only the worst light. They did not elaborate their abstract theory, because it was Marxist in orientation. The refusal to describe their theory of society is one of their many acts of treachery. The text of Gumperz’s speech, however, does not bear this out. While the theory is left undeveloped, Gumperz did signal the group’s political sympathies. Gumperz stated,

The present period in which we live is not only a period of extremely unsettled economic, social and political conditions the world over, but appears to me to be characterized also by a deep and fundamental crisis that has affected the scientific activities of mankind in their broader aspects. While there are in the world today more elements of material wealth available than ever before in history, there seems to exist, on the other hand, insuperable barriers to utilizing them correspondingly for the benefit of the large masses of humanity.22

As this suggests, there was nothing ambiguous about the group’s basic attitude toward the modern industrial society of the 1930s. They abhorred the inequitable distribution of wealth in the world, especially when juxtaposed against the vast material prosperity of bourgeois elites.

Although the group’s ideas were generally presented as left-of-center, Gumperz did insist on the institute’s respectability as a social research organization. He made a great point of emphasizing the Horkheimer circle’s ties with the International Labor Office in Geneva, as well as the small bureaus established by the Sorbonne and the Institute of Sociology in London. Clearly, the implication being made was that the institute did have cordial and close relations with a number of prestigious sociological institutions in Europe. If it were good enough for the likes of the Sorbonne, it certainly would be able to meet the needs of an institution in turmoil like Columbia.

In his conclusion, Gumperz emphasized the main selling points of the institute. He divided its projects into four basic categories. First, he briefly outlined the individual research projects being pursued by members of the Horkheimer circle. In particular, he mentioned the economic studies of planning in the Soviet Union, Horkheimer’s sociological analysis of the history of philosophy, Kirchheimer’s study of criminal justice, and Wittfogel’s analysis of Chinese society. Second, he called attention to the institute’s collaborative effort to study authority and the family. This was perhaps the institute’s great-
est asset from the perspective of Columbia’s needs. Gumperz, as if fully aware of this fact, stated that

there is an effort to organize on a cooperative basis the scientific work of students working in the different fields of the social sciences—economics, history, psychology, social philosophy, and so on,—and to coordinate the work of these different scientists in tackling a special problem. At present, the problem of the family in present day society has been selected for this purpose, because the family, as one of the basic units of the social organization, lends itself to that type of scientific approach that I have been trying to outline.73

Lynd, in particular, must not have believed his ears when he heard that a group of German sociologists were carrying out not only the style of collaborative research that he valued so highly, but also were studying the same subject matter. Third, Gumperz briefly outlined the program for a second cooperative study of economic planning. He admitted that the study was indefinitely on hold due to a lack of sufficient funds. Even though this proposal never moved beyond the early stages, it would have attracted tremendous interest from Lorwin, Lynd, and many other American social scientists. It was one of the most hotly debated topics in America and was sure to have caught Columbia’s attention. Fourth, Gumperz concluded by mentioning the Zeitschrift. The magazine provided a constant outlet for institute publications. Collectively, this represented an enormous set of research projects and writings.

If Columbia was presented with all of this information, it is no wonder that they gave up the building at 428 West 117th Street so quickly. This was an arrangement that could not be passed up under any circumstances. The potential benefits were enormous, and there were almost no downsides for Columbia University.
Notes


2. Ibid., 156.

3. Ibid., 166.

4. Ibid., 169.

5. Ibid., 169.

6. Ibid., 169-70.


8. Ibid., 150-70.


10. Ibid., 274-77.


12. Ibid., 18-19.

13. Ibid., 21.


15. Ibid., 286-87.

16. Ibid., 290.

17. Ibid., 290-92.


21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. “Minutes, Department of Social Science Faculty Meeting,” 14 November 1932, Samuel McCune Lindsay Papers, Box 46. MacIver appealed to the university administration throughout the 1930s in an effort to alleviate the personnel restraints imposed on the department. In a series of memoranda written during 1936, MacIver warned that the staff was inadequate to uphold Columbia’s reputation in the social sciences – see Robert MacIver, “Memoranda from the Department of Social Science,” 13 June 1936 and 21 November 1936, Columbia University Archives (formerly known as the Columbiana Collection), file folder 351/18.

24. Ibid.

25. Robert MacIver, As a Tale that Is Told, 106-7.

26. Ibid., 110.

27. Ibid., 115.

29. This list was compiled from a series of correspondences between Leo Lowenthal and Julian Gumperz during the final six months of 1933 and the first five months of 1934, *Leo Lowenthal Archiv*, folder 332, documents 36-48, Stadt und Universitätssbibliothek, Frankfurt-am-Main.


33. “Memorandum for Dr. Kurt Rosenfeld,” *Erich Fromm Papers*, Microfilm reel 2 (originally indexed as box 2, folder 4), New York Public Library, Manuscripts and Archives Division.

34. Fromm’s travel itinerary for the winter of 1933/34 included visits to these individuals in Chicago, as well as meetings with Benjamin Stolberg (a German-speaking journalist in New York), Florence Cook (an acquaintance of Fromm’s from Philadelphia), Betsy Libbey (a contact that Fromm labeled a “liberal” who was connected with the Family Society), Lloyd Warner (a Boston friend of Libbey’s who was also connected with Harvard’s Peabody Museum), and Conrad Hilton (a freelance writer from Boston who Fromm dubbed a “radical liberal”). The itinerary was found in the *Max Horkheimer Archiv*, box VI, folder 8, documents 332-36, Stadt und Universitätssbibliothek, Frankfurt-am-Main.

35. Letter from Erich Fromm to Donald Slessinger, 26 October 1934, *Erich Fromm Papers*, Microfilm reel 2 (originally indexed as box 2, folder 5), New York Public Library.


38. Letter from Pollock to Gumperz, 30 June 1933, from the *Leo Lowenthal Archiv*, folder 332, document 244.


40. Feuer made this accusation about Robert MacIver’s ability with German in his article “The Frankfurt Marxists and the Columbia Liberals,” 157; and the same claim was asserted by Lewis Coser regarding Robert Lynd during an interview at Coser’s Cambridge, Mass., home on 6 May 1999. Both interviewees were students of the two men and would have known them quite well.

41. Many of the scholars that eventually made up the New School were bitter rivals of the Horkheimer circle. Finding the institute’s Hegelian Marxism too esoteric, they preferred SPD reformism. See the letter from Horkheimer to Joachim Radkau, 9 June 1969, from *Max Horkheimer Gesammelte Schriften, Band 18*, Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, ed. (Frankfurt, 1996), letter 1134, 735-36.

42. Much of Lorwin’s biographical material comes from an undated, untitled autobiography and numerous curriculum vitae. See the *Lewis Lorwin Papers*, box 15 labeled “Manuscripts: Reports and articles (1929-1936),” Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Butler Library.


44. Ibid., 80.
The Frankfurt School's Invitation from Columbia University

45. Ibid., 106.
46. Ibid., 157.
47. Ibid., 159-65
48. Ibid., 168-69.
49. Letter from Pollock to Gumperz, 28 November 1932, from the Leo Lowenthal Archiv, box 332, document 199.
50. Letter from Gumperz to Pollock, 1 December 1932, from the Leo Lowenthal Archiv, box 332, document 200.
51. Letter from Gumperz to Pollock, 8 February 1933, from the Leo Lowenthal Archiv, box 332, document 214.
54. Ibid., 206-7.
55. See Lewis Feuer, “The Frankfurt Marxists and the Columbia Liberals,” 157-64.
57. Robert Lynd, “Our Racket Society,” The Nation, vol. 173, no. 8 (25 August 1951). Lynd’s article, while an attack on his emerging notions of power in American society, was also Lynd’s attempt to assimilate the Frankfurt School’s writings on the “theory of rackets” from the 1940s. Lynd had continued to read and think about these writings throughout the early 1950s with Franz L. Neumann.
59. Ibid.
60. Lynd re-emphasized and elaborated on many of these same points in a faculty seminar within Columbia’s sociology department. This presentation, which was given at the home of Robert Maclver on 15 May 1932, was entitled “Sociology as Social Research” and is found among the Robert Lynd Papers, Microfilm reel 1. The format of the notes does not readily permit quotation; however, the most significant points of correlation between Lynd’s conception of social research and the Frankfurt School’s can be summarized as follows: the recognition of sociology’s close alliance with social reform and problem solving, the realization that the most serious social problems have no simple answers, a clear comprehension of the dangers arising from theoretical and methodological researcher biases, and perhaps most importantly a disinclination to privilege “pure science” or quantitative methods over the theoretical and philosophical process of generalization.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
Thomas Wheatland

66. Ibid.
68. “Notes for a Talk,” dated 1934 from the Max Horkheimer Archiv, box IX, folder 52, document b. Gumperz’s name is written at the top of the page in Horkheimer’s handwriting.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.