

The Frankfurt School and Fascism

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On 9 May 1945, one day after VE Day, Theodor W. Adorno, who was in Los Angeles, wrote to Max Horkheimer, who was in New York. ‘I feel the need’, he explained,

to send you a few lines today, even though I have no ‘pragmatic’ reason to do so, simply because it is a pity that we have not experienced the demise of the Nazis together. Hitler’s regime has, after all, been the immediate cause of all the external developments in our lives for the last twelve years, and the expectation that things might change has been one of the decisive forces that have kept us alive. Conversely, the fact that our two lives have become conjoined is inextricably linked to fascism. Due to this phase good fortune and misfortune have become indissolubly entangled for us.¹

The centrality of fascism in general and National Socialism in particular to the Frankfurt School’s evolution that Adorno stressed so clearly in this letter is obvious enough. It needs to be historicized in an appropriate manner, though. The dealings of the Frankfurt School with National Socialism were indeed immediate and they were, in the

first instance, of an empirical and practical nature. Much as the members of the Frankfurt School and their associates sought to develop a conceptual understanding of fascism in general and National Socialism in particular – as significant political movements and regimes whose policies and crimes they witnessed – this was a rather different undertaking from subsequent (and current) attempts to develop some sort of definitive, succinct and yet all-encompassing definition of fascism and/or National Socialism. To be sure, their concept of fascism doubtless became rather too inclusive in the course of the war. Even so, at the time, the task of identifying who or what was fascist was, for the most part, not one of the principal challenges faced by Horkheimer, Adorno, and their colleagues and associates because they lived in a world in which fascists and their supporters for the most part proudly professed their own fascism in all too inescapable a way. For all that fascism was generally rather more hesitant to speak its name after 1945, evidence

for the ‘afterlife’ of National Socialism in post-war Germany too was so palpable and abundant that it could be identified without any great finesse. The critical theorists’ assessments of fascism were heavily conceptual because they assumed that all descriptive work needed to be inherently conceptual to be of any genuine use, not because they assumed they were in the process of analytically isolating some unique category called fascism. They, in any case, focused most of their descriptive and conceptual work on fascism on German National Socialism, occasional cross-references to Italy or to ‘international fascism’ notwithstanding.²

The discussion of fascism among the members and associates of the Frankfurt School comprised a variety of positions and although Horkheimer and Adorno sided with Friedrich Pollock’s concept of state capitalism, no one ‘official’ stance ever emerged – I will discuss the one (rather improbable) text that arguably comes closest to formulating an ‘official’ position on the topic in some detail later. Indeed, at least in terms of their prognoses, even Horkheimer and Adorno did not see entirely eye to eye, as the latter noted in his letter of 9 May 1945:

As usual when we disagree it has turned out that we were both right. My bourgeois thesis that Hitler could not last has come true, albeit with a delay that makes it ironic. In other words: the forces of production of the economically more advanced countries proved stronger than the technological and terrorist spearhead of the late-comer: The war, following the overall historical trend, has been won by industry against the military. Yet your thesis about the historical force of fascism is also true, except that this force, like the embourgeoisement of Europe following Napoleon’s fall, has moved its abode.... Technically speaking, the [German] attempt to come to an understanding with the West at Russia’s expense has failed but it was inspired by the world spirit.³ The conflict between the two absolute tickets from which there will no longer be any escape is clearly looming.⁴

I will return to Horkheimer and Adorno’s notion of ‘ticket mentality’ and their take on

the fate of fascism after 1945 towards the end of this chapter.

What all the contributions to the debates among the members and associates of the Frankfurt School had in common, however, was the fact that they were meant to serve one purpose before all others: to facilitate the most effective possible opposition to Nazi Germany and its fascist allies. This desire was to varying degrees complicated by the fact that for all those involved, the distinction between fascism in particular and capitalism in general was ultimately one not of kind but of degree – ‘Fascism has only revealed what was already inherent in liberalism’.⁵ Yet this by no means prevented most of the members of the Frankfurt School from actively supporting the US war effort with their expertise – and with Horkheimer’s unreserved encouragement. To be sure, given the Institute’s dwindling finances, he was also relieved that some of its members were able to secure employment elsewhere, but it is quite clear that Horkheimer whole-heartedly endorsed their activities anyway. As is now well documented,⁶ from 1942 onwards, Franz Neumann, Herbert Marcuse, Otto Kirchheimer, Leo Löwenthal and Arkadij Gurland worked in various capacities for the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Pollock acted as a consultant for the Justice Department and participated in discussions about post-war European reconstruction under the auspices of Eleanor Roosevelt; and Adorno too co-authored at least two memoranda with Marcuse for circulation in Washington.⁷ Neumann rose to deputy head and eventually acting head of the R&A Central European Section. Marcuse joined him there and was widely respected as ‘the leading analyst on Germany’.⁸

Raffaele Laudani has argued that the R&A Central European Section produced ‘a cohesive interpretation of the Nazi “enemy” with a clear Frankfurt imprint’, though he also concedes that Neumann and his colleagues

'nearly always lost' the 'political "battles"' they provoked 'inside the American administration'.⁹ As the war drew to a close, they played a crucial role in putting together a *Handbook on Nazi Germany and Civil Affairs Guides* for the War Department's Civil Affairs Division,¹⁰ and Marcuse drew up a list of entrepreneurs and economic officials who, despite not being members of the Nazi party or apparatus, had played an essential role in Nazi Germany.¹¹ Neumann eventually travelled to London, where he headed up a special research group on war crimes and worked with Robert H. Jackson, the US chief prosecutor at Nuremberg. In this capacity he evidently pushed his 'spearhead' theory of antisemitism so successfully that it was adopted by Jackson, which helps explain why the Shoah played such a relatively subordinate role at Nuremberg.¹² In other respects, his suggestions were repeatedly ignored, however, and Neumann resigned only days after the main trial opened.

There is a certain irony to Neumann's 'career' in the OSS, given that he had initially warned against undue identification with the United States. In his preface to the State Socialism issue of the *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* (on which more later), Horkheimer wrote: 'The unprecedented governmental power necessarily associated with state capitalism is now in the hands of a democratic and humanitarian administration'.¹³ He then went on to stress the importance of ensuring it stayed there and the difficulties this was likely to entail. Commenting on a draft version of the preface, Neumann wrote: 'It goes without saying that I disagree with your positive assessment of American democracy but I am happy to drop my objection, given the political situation'.¹⁴ It is indicative of the complications that arose from the contention that fascism in particular and capitalism in general differed not in kind but by degree that Adorno took issue with the same passage, albeit precisely with the opposite motivation: given Horkheimer's evident scepticism about the viability of a democratic

form of state capitalism, the statement that the current 'democratic and humanitarian administration' already held the 'unprecedented governmental power necessarily associated with state capitalism' in its hands might well be understood as a 'veiled attack on the Roosevelt administration'.¹⁵

Ambiguities of this kind were also reflected in the terminology deployed by Horkheimer and his colleagues and associates in their grappling with fascism. The terms fascism, National Socialism, state capitalism, authoritarianism and totalitarianism were occasionally contrasted but most of the time they were used more or less interchangeably. State capitalism, to some extent, was the odd one out insofar as we do find the occasional vague hint at the possibility – more precisely perhaps: at the desperate hope – that it might also be able to exist in a democratic, non-totalitarian guise.

In part, this relatively loose use of terminology reflected a genuine double bind that invariably arises if one insists, as one should, that fascism in general and National Socialism in particular were ultimately not fundamental aberrations from the course of Western history but a logical consequence of certain potentially problematic elements integral to that history. Fascism and non-fascism, far from being radically distinct entities, are thus placed on a continuum and the crucial question then concerns the transition, the qualitative leap, from a non-fascist state of affairs in which the potential for fascism nevertheless inheres to a fascist state of affairs in which, in turn, many of the characteristics of the non-fascist state of affairs are still present and yet take on a radically different meaning.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is evident that the relatively loose use of terminology also reflected erroneous assumptions on the part of the Frankfurt School about the overarching socio-economic processes they were encountering and which they saw, at the time, as leading inexorably to only one possible outcome, which they identified fundamentally with fascism. Yet the critical theorists'

concepts need to be judged not against current insight but against the backdrop of the convulsions of the first half of the twentieth century. That capitalism underwent massive changes and experienced a profound crisis at the time is obviously undeniable. Across the board, be it in the United States, in Europe or the Soviet Union, industrial production was subject to a previously unimaginable degree of centralization, streamlining and state intervention, leading to an equally unprecedented regimentation and functionalization of labour. From the perspective of the 1930s and 1940s, this economic regimentation was largely matched by ever more crass forms of political and cultural regimentation, which eventually played out against the backdrop of a previously unimaginable measure of destruction and barbarism. The apocalyptic account of an inexorable descent into a fascist/National Socialist/authoritarian/totalitarian hell on earth, which the Frankfurt School offered in the 1940s, may seem too teleological, mono-directional and all-encompassing with the benefit of hindsight. And yet, to want to accuse the Frankfurt School of undue alarmism seems an odd conceit against the backdrop of increasing repression and terror, the danger and then reality of the Second World War and, especially, the Shoah – not yet in its capacity as conceptual putty but as an ongoing, unfolding, seemingly interminable genocide.

When all is said and done, however, the Frankfurt School's relatively loose use of terminology was also just that – loose. Or, to be more precise, it was indicative of the overlap of a number of conceptual concerns that, certainly for Horkheimer and Adorno, were ultimately complementary yet competed with one another as they sought to work them out. I repeat: it is important to remember that many of the questions that continue to preoccupy scholars of fascism to this day were, for Horkheimer, Adorno, and their colleagues and associates of immediate practical import. That fascism differed in possibly decisive ways from what went

before was inescapable, yet neither could one reasonably claim that it had nothing in common with the order it replaced. Was fascism, then, ultimately, more of the same in a more extreme form or was it a qualitatively distinct phenomenon? Was fascism ultimately created and determined by economic necessity or had fascism submitted the economy to its own political ends (or was it in the process of doing so)? Given its extreme, violent and rapacious nature, was fascism inherently unstable and set to implode of its own accord in a relatively prompt fashion or did it represent a new order that could be sustained indefinitely or at least for the foreseeable future? As we will see, the question of fascism's potential to remain stable in the long run was a major preoccupation for the critical theorists. The explanation for this is simple enough: any suggestion of its acute instability might have been taken to mean that fascism was a problem that would resolve itself in fairly short order and/or whose implosion might yet precipitate a successful (proletarian) revolution in Central Europe. Assuming fascism was indicative of a new developmental phase of capitalism, was this new form of capitalism inevitable and/or irrevocable? If fascism was a form of state capitalism and state capitalism was the newest form of capitalism, could this new form of capitalism also take on a democratic guise or was fascism the only mode of sociation that it allowed for, and what exactly did that mode of sociation entail? And if fascism did represent the newest developmental phase of capitalism, would it be possible to defeat fascism without also overcoming capitalism?

In response to these and a host of attendant questions, the critical theorists deployed a range of conceptual approaches including the state capitalism concept, the racket theory,¹⁶ the evolving conceptual frameworks of the integrative force of the culture industry, the dialectic of enlightenment and the administered world – and, far from least and closely connected to all of these, the core contention Adorno formulated in 1940 as follows: 'if it

is true that one can understand antisemitism only if one understands National Socialism, then it must be equally true that one can understand National Socialism only if one understands antisemitism'.¹⁷ As we will see, contrary to the widely accepted narrative, Horkheimer and Adorno were in fact quite selective in their endorsement of Pollock's concept of state capitalism. Clearly, though, Pollock's emphasis on the elimination of the sphere of circulation in state capitalism resonated strongly with them and it is hard to resist the impression that this was so because it allowed them to hang their conceptualization of antisemitism rather neatly (to their minds) on a materialist and 'empirical' hook. As Adorno had written to his parents in February 1940, 'fascism in Germany, which is inextricably linked to antisemitism ... represents a universal tendency with an economic foundation, which you yourself, Dear WK [i.e., Adorno's father, Oscar Wiesengrund], recognized fairly early on, namely, the demise of the sphere of circulation'.¹⁸ The ongoing attachment to this notion is indicated not least by the prominent role this particular 'element of antisemitism' continued to play in their discussions, even as their much more broadly contextualized work on *Dialectic of Enlightenment* progressed apace.¹⁹

The Frankfurt School's grappling with fascism per se, then, was, for the most part, pragmatic in nature, on the one hand, and ultimately subsumed under more wide-ranging conceptual concerns, on the other. This was also reflected in Adorno's letter to Horkheimer of 9 May 1945. Having just emphasized how central a role fascism had played in their lives, Adorno promptly added:

It is remarkable that life nevertheless takes on so much momentum of its own that one becomes quite oblivious to this reason, much as the bet on which his fortunes hinged is forgotten in the course of Faust's long existence. Only Mephistopheles perfunctorily and hastily thinks of it again at the end, yet it no longer bears any genuine meaning for the life, which has become autonomous.²⁰

TEXTS

The final two issues of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, now *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* – volume 9, numbers 2 and 3 – formed the crucial focal point of the Frankfurt School's contemporaneous grappling with fascism. Adorno expressly referred to the first of these as 'the State Socialism issue' [*Staatskapitalismusheft*].²¹ It contained the following essays:

Frederick Pollock, 'State Capitalism';
A. R. L. Gurland, 'Technological Trends and Economic Structure under National Socialism';
Otto Kirchheimer, 'Changes in the Structure of Political Compromise';
Max Horkheimer, 'Art and Mass Culture';
T. W. Adorno, 'Spengler Today'.

The journal's final issue drew in part on a lecture series delivered by Institute colleagues at Columbia University in November and December 1941. The lectures were:²²

Herbert Marcuse, 'State and Individual under National Socialism';
A. R. L. Gurland, 'Private Property under National Socialism';
Franz Neumann, 'The New Rulers in Germany';
Otto Kirchheimer, 'The Legal Order under National Socialism';
Frederick Pollock, 'Is National Socialism a New Order?'

The line up of the issue, which came out towards the end of May 1942,²³ was as follows:

Max Horkheimer, 'The End of Reason';
T. W. Adorno, 'Veblen's Attack on Culture';
Herbert Marcuse, 'Some Social Implications of Modern Technology';
Frederick Pollock, 'Is National Socialism a New Order?';
Otto Kirchheimer, 'The Legal Order of National Socialism'.

Presumably Neumann's lecture was omitted due to its overlap with the relevant discussion in his *Behemoth*, the first edition of which came out just before the final issue of the journal.²⁴

In addition to these two journal issues and Neumann's *Behemoth*, further key texts were:

Horkheimer's 'Die Juden und Europa' ['The Jews and Europe'] (1939);²⁵

Horkheimer's 'Autoritärer Staat' ['Authoritarian State'], originally written in 1940 with what would become the State Socialism issue of the *Studies* in mind.²⁶ In the event, it appeared in the mimeographed memorial publication for Walter Benjamin published by the Institute in 1942;²⁷

Horkheimer's text on 'The Sociology of Class Relations' (1943);²⁸ and Adorno's corresponding 'Reflexionen zur Klassentheorie' ['Reflections on Class Theory'] of 1942,²⁹ neither of which were published at the time.

All nine volumes of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung/Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* – and with them most of these texts – are now readily available online. Neumann's *Behemoth* has consistently been widely circulated and repeatedly reissued, and diehard scholars of critical theory can even access all five drafts of Horkheimer's 'Sociology of Class Relations' online among the digitized holdings of the Horkheimer Archive in Frankfurt. Consequently, the debates reflected in these texts can easily be reviewed by anyone whose interests go beyond the aspects I can reasonably discuss in this chapter.

Helmut Dubiel and Alfons Söllner published a German-language selection of these texts in 1981, focusing specifically on analyses of the National Socialist economy, law and state.³⁰ While a selection obviously needs to be selective, Horkheimer and Adorno would surely have been deeply resentful of this separation of the more obviously political and economic contributions from those that were, *prima facie*, more 'feuilletonistic' in character, insistent as they were that 'the analysis of a single work of art can lead more deeply into the inner structure of society than the most elaborate questionnaire with a giant apparatus for investigation and with tremendous statistical results'.³¹

STATE SOCIALISM

It is generally accepted that a fundamental divide ran through the Frankfurt School in the late 1930s and early 1940s in terms of their understanding of the nexus between fascism and capitalism. This controversy pitted Neumann, Gurland and Kirchheimer, on the one hand, against Pollock, Horkheimer and Adorno, on the other.³² On Pollock's account, fascism corresponded to a new, qualitatively distinct phase of capitalism, that of state capitalism in its totalitarian guise (though, as already indicated, he had relatively little to say about its potential non-totalitarian counterpart, democratic state capitalism). The chief feature of state capitalism was the redundancy of the market whose functions had been resumed by the political sphere. That political sphere, in turn, now consisted of a range of competing rackets. While Pollock thus insisted on the primacy of politics in state capitalism, and Horkheimer and Adorno endorsed his position, Neumann, Gurland and Kirchheimer continued to insist on the primacy of economic factors in understanding the dynamics at work in Nazi Germany.³³ It is no coincidence that this disagreement mapped neatly onto the assessment of the significance of antisemitism. While Adorno and Horkheimer insisted on the centrality of antisemitism to National Socialism and linked it to the ostensible demise of the sphere of circulation supposedly characteristic of state capitalism, Neumann maintained that 'one can offer an account of National Socialism without attributing a central role to the Jewish problem'.³⁴

Yet while all this is certainly the truth and nothing but the truth, it is anything but the whole truth. To what extent Horkheimer and Adorno genuinely subscribed to Pollock's conceptualization of state capitalism is, as already indicated, a rather moot point.³⁵ While generally full of praise, Horkheimer had already expressed certain reservations about Pollock's outline for the essay that was going to open the State Capitalism issue of

the *Studies*. He had two principal reservations. Firstly, he feared that the portrayal of state capitalism, including its totalitarian variant, i.e., fascism, as the logical and ultimately inevitable contemporary guise of capitalism could be understood as an expression of partisanship for totalitarian state capitalism, a concern he reiterated on reading a draft of the essay itself.³⁶ That this was an ongoing issue for Horkheimer is demonstrated by the fact that he also raised it in the context of his harsh critique of Henryk Grossmann. Grossmann, Horkheimer suggested, was being Hegelian in that he subscribed to ‘Hegel’s crucial mistake’, which had lain ‘in his confusing theory and justification ... Do you really think’, he asked Grossmann rhetorically, ‘that the objective necessity of fascism, which draws all the currents of late capitalism into itself like a vortex, cannot be demonstrated just as easily as that of all the previous phases – perhaps even more so?’³⁷

A second, more general worry was that Pollock’s account was, by Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s standards, insufficiently dialectical. In his outline, under the final heading, ‘End of the Economic Era’, Pollock had suggested a scheme of thesis (feudalism), antithesis (private capitalism), and synthesis (state capitalism).³⁸ To Horkheimer’s mind, the conceptualization underlying this scheme was ‘still extremely shaky’. After all, it was ‘certain aspects of Imperial Germany’, not fascism, that ‘seemed like a sort of synthesis between feudalism and private capitalism’.³⁹ He also expressed his unease at Pollock’s contention that, in the new (state capitalist) state, ‘the seemingly independent institutions namely party and economy are only its specialized arms’.⁴⁰

Party and economy (their coordination with ‘and’ is presumably just an oversight) are not just slaves but just as much masters, or rather: the means shape those who deploy them – and by economy I don’t mean just the laws of the market under liberalism and by party not just the hierarchical form but also the interests that assert themselves within it.⁴¹

Having been asked by Pollock to comment on a draft of the article itself, Adorno was highly alarmed. As he explained to Horkheimer, the ‘critical suggestions’ he had made to Pollock

could deal only with details and questions of presentation and it would have been simply impossible to alert him to the actual extent of my concerns. Impossible, first, because as a non-economist I do not have the authority required to present those concerns but also, second, because it would have been psychologically irresponsible of me to articulate a critique genuinely reflecting my point of view. I can best summarize my concerns about this essay by saying that it represents an inversion of Kafka. Kafka presented the hierarchy of the office as hell. Here hell turns into a hierarchy of the office. Moreover, the whole thing is so thetical and it is written to such an extent, in the Husserlian sense, ‘from above’ [*von oben her*] that it lacks all conviction [*Eindringlichkeit*], not to mention the undialectical assumption that a non-antagonistic economy can exist within an antagonistic society. I anticipate a genuinely aporetic situation. If the essay comes out in this or a similar form it will only harm the reputation of the Institute and, above all, Fritz’s own reputation, and unleash sardonic howls of triumph from the Lowes,⁴² Neumanns *e tutti quanti*. On the other hand, it would be a grave setback for the State Socialism issue if it were not published.⁴³

His own essay on Spengler ‘only works as a philosophical link to the problem of state capitalism’, Adorno added – clearly demonstrating the integral connection Horkheimer and Adorno envisaged between the ‘political’ and ‘feuilletonistic’ contributions in the journal – but it was ‘far too modest to carry such an aspirational issue’. The only solution, Adorno suggested, would be for Horkheimer to rewrite Pollock’s essay in a manner combining it with the motifs ‘in your “State Capitalism”’. After all, the central motifs in Pollock’s text

obviously originate in your essay but they have been simplified and de-dialecticized [*entdialektisiert*] to such an extent that they have been turned into their opposite. I am pretty certain that, if one could convince Fritz that this offers an opportunity to publish your theory in connection

with his work and merge the two pieces, he would go along with anything, and you would be able to turn it into the essay we envisaged. Perhaps the essay could appear under both your names, which would surely be a matter of great satisfaction for Fritz.⁴⁴

Adorno did admit, though, that it was hard to dismiss ‘the argument that it would be a shame and uneconomical simply to omit your essay on state capitalism in such an issue’.⁴⁵ By ‘your “State Socialism”’, Adorno meant Horkheimer’s aforementioned essay on the ‘Authoritarian State’ (eventually published in the commemorative publication for Benjamin), which had originally borne the title ‘Staatskapitalismus’. This surely means that Horkheimer’s essay on the authoritarian state is a much better source for the understanding of Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s approach to state capitalism than Pollock’s flagship article on state capitalism in the *Studies*.

Horkheimer thereupon tried to impress on Pollock once again, this time in somewhat clearer language, though to little effect, the need to place greater emphasis on the ‘entanglement and ambiguity of the phenomena . . . , the crossover between the concepts etc’. He urged Pollock to revise the text so that ‘it might all come across in a slightly less rigidly administrative manner’.⁴⁶ Adorno seems to have been slightly more successful in suggesting to Pollock, as he reported to Horkheimer, that he revise ‘the final part of the essay on democratic state socialism’ by giving it ‘the guise of questions and issues for future research. The intercalation of this protective device seems to me to be the only way to avoid embarrassing ourselves in the eyes of our friends by giving the impression that we endorse theses, which simply cannot be endorsed. What do you think? In terms of the content’, he continued,

the crucial problem is: does the tendency towards a crisis-free command economy presented in the text really express the objective tendency of reality or does the current antagonistic state of affairs continue to preclude the notional purity of this

construct in future too? I feel in no position genuinely to answer this question. My instinct is as follows: the truth of the concept lies in its pessimism, i.e., the view that the chances of domination in its immediately political guise being perpetuated are greater than those of getting out [from under it]. Wrong is the optimism, even for others. What is being perpetuated is not so much a stable and in some way rational state of affairs but rather, for the foreseeable future, a relentless succession of catastrophes, chaos, and terror – but with that, conversely, also a renewed chance of escape.⁴⁷

Eventually, Horkheimer wrote a rather longer preface than usual for the *State Socialism* issue to place Pollock’s article in the ‘right’ context. Adorno certainly felt that Horkheimer had done an excellent job of solving ‘the tactical challenge of ruling out the misunderstanding that Fritz’s essay actually acknowledges the possibility of a non-antagonistic form of state capitalism [on the one hand] without making the slightest concession to the official Marxist optimism [on the other]’.⁴⁸

Responding to the draft of the preface, Neumann wrote to Horkheimer:

you interpret Pollock’s essay in a manner that renders it entirely harmless so that it [the essay] entirely contradicts your interpretation [of it]. Anyone who reads Pollock’s essay and your preface must conclude that you have misunderstood each other. I appreciate entirely why you have undertaken this reinterpretation [*Uminterpretierung*]. You want to avoid distancing yourself from Pollock. I think it would be much better to let the disagreements become apparent, rather than hiding them and suggesting to the uninitiated that the two directors of the institute are talking past each other.⁴⁹

In his response, Horkheimer assured Neumann that,

since my trust in your study of the economic processes in Germany is unlimited, I take your word for it that Germany in its current state comes nowhere close to being a form of state capitalism. On the other hand, I cannot shrug off Engels’s opinion that society is heading towards such a state of affairs. Consequently, I have to assume that it is in all likelihood looming and, to my mind, this renders Pollock’s construction a valuable basis for discussion, all its flaws notwithstanding.

He added that he could only agree with everything that Neumann had to say about the 'profound identity' between the fascist state of affairs and its predecessors.⁵⁰

Nor does the story end there. Rolf Wiggershaus has pointed to Neumann's essay on 'Approaches to the Study of Political Power', published in 1950.⁵¹ There Neumann explained that 'the Soviet Union presents a clear-cut marginal case where political power not only has made itself supreme but has become the fount of whatever economic power positions exist', adding that, 'had there been no war or had the Nazis been victorious, the Soviet pattern would have prevailed' in Nazi Germany too.⁵² In short, he conceded that a primacy of politics was conceivable and that the momentum in Nazi Germany was indeed headed in that direction. Adorno, conversely, felt no compunction about praising Neumann's *Behemoth* to his students in 1968 as 'the most congruous socio-economic account of fascism to date',⁵³ though admittedly this praise hinged principally on Neumann's implicit appropriation of the racket theory. Neumann, Adorno emphasized, had demonstrated that the ostensible integration of society under National Socialism had been superficial at best. In fact, 'under the mantle, the very thin mantle of the total state, an almost archaic and anarchic struggle between the various social groups' had raged.⁵⁴

HORKHEIMER'S 'PREFACE' IN THE FINAL ISSUE OF THE *STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE*

One might well argue, then, that Horkheimer's preface to the State Socialism issue of the *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* is the closest there is to an 'official' contemporaneous statement on fascism by 'the Frankfurt School', especially since, Horkheimer's re-interpretation of Pollock's article aside, Neumann too – who had characterized

Pollock's essay on state socialism as 'contradicting the Institute's theory from beginning to end' and signalling a 'departure from Marxism'⁵⁵ – expressly confirmed that 'I find the formulations excellent and fully agree with the first 4¾ pages ... The formulations are exemplary and I would not want to change them in any way'.⁵⁶

Given my earlier remarks about the critical theorists' preoccupation with the transition or qualitative leap between non-fascism and fascism it will hardly come as a surprise that Horkheimer began his preface by explaining that 'the articles in this issue deal with some problems implied in the transition from liberalism to authoritarianism in continental Europe'.⁵⁷ Note also the reference to authoritarianism rather than fascism. He then went on to develop a typological juxtaposition of pre-modern society (implicitly), 'classical' liberal capitalism (or, as Adorno called it, 'competitive capitalism' [*Konkurrenzkapitalismus*]),⁵⁸ monopoly capitalism and state capitalism. Initially, he explained,

private industry consisted of numerous independent entrepreneurs who in each country competed with likewise independent traders and bankers for social power. The outcome of this struggle expressed itself in the relative size of the capital controlled by each of them. Dominion over men and things was distributed among the members of this diversified social group according to the rules of exchange.

In contrast to the early modern absolute state that had gone before,

power had become decentralized; it had been transferred from relatively well-organized privileged bodies to the multitude of proprietors who possessed no other title than their wealth and their resolve to use it. The course of social production was the resultant of their respective business policies.

The 'seigneurial ordinances' of pre-modern society had been 'replaced by anonymous laws and autonomous institutions, by economic, legal, and political mechanisms

which reflected the size and composition of the nation's industry'. In the next phase,

[c]ompetition among independent entrepreneurs eventually culminated in the giant concerns of monopolist industry. Under their hegemony competition assumed a different form. Their urge to compete with equals within the nation declined, and with it the motive for increased investment and full employment. The great leaders of business and other avenues of social life found their peers only across the various national borders. Rivalry among equal powers shifted more and more to the international scene alone.

At this point Horkheimer moved beyond the predominantly economic line of argument, stressing that 'the transition affected culture as a whole'. He then moved straight on to 'the advent of fascism' – without offering any explanation as to how fascism related to monopoly capitalism.⁵⁹ 'Would it not be a good idea', Adorno had asked after reading the draft of the preface,

to say something explicit about the relationship between monopolism and fascism? I would be all the more in favor of a differentiation at this point because Kirchheimer's essay ['Changes in the Structure of Political Compromise'] is far too crude in equating the two. One could do this in a very Hegelian way and conceive of fascism as monopolism that has come into its own. Through its totalization, monopolism develops the new quality of fascism. The total domination of the monopolies transforms economy and society because it is identical with the elimination of the very market previously dominated by the monopolies.⁶⁰

Yet evidently Horkheimer was not convinced of the need to explain this transition. 'With the advent of fascism', then,

dualisms typical of the liberalistic era, such as individual and society, private and public life, law and morals, economy and politics, have not been transcended but obscured. Individuals have become less and less independent of society, while society has fallen to the mercy of mere individual interests. With the decline of the individual, moral feelings that stood against authoritarian law have lost their force, while authoritarian law has been entrusted to a perverted moral sense.⁶¹

Combining the state capitalism concept, racket theory and elements clearly prefiguring the notion of the 'administered world', Horkheimer continued by arguing that

[r]igid discipline such as ruled inside the factory has now spread throughout the hinterland, borne forward by élites who in their composition and function have combined economy and politics. The leaders of industry, administration, propaganda, and the military have become identical with the state in that they lay down the plan of the national economy as the entrepreneur before them had laid down policy for his factory.⁶²

The 'streamlined unconcern for material and ideal barriers' shared by the rackets that had usurped the state and their need to defend their status against the claims of the generality did not, however,

endow the ruling group with a real solidarity ... To counterbalance their antagonism, no common faith exists, as among the medieval clergy, no belief in chivalry and princely blood, as among the seigneurs of absolutism ... The unity of fascist leaders is cemented merely by their common fear of the people they tyrannize, by their dread of ultimate doom.

In fact, 'the big industrialists attack the fuehrers for their expensive political apparatus; the fuehrers blood purge the underfuehrers because of their radical claims; the generals would like to get rid of all of them'. The ruling 'clique', in short, 'does not become the dupe of its own ideologies; it shuffles them about freely and cynically according to the changing situation, thus finally translating into open action what modern political theory from Machiavelli and Hobbes to Pareto has professed'.

The next two sentences then read:

These are the basic features of authoritarian society as it took shape after the debacle of European liberalism, and most typically in Germany. Under National Socialism the distribution of goods is carried on by private means, though competition has become even more one-sided than in the era of the 200 families.

Evidently, then, fascism, authoritarianism and National Socialism could all be equated.

This alone makes it very difficult to discern what Horkheimer assumed the dialectic of continuity and discontinuity to be in these developments. Did ‘the debacle of European liberalism’, for instance, mark a caesura or simply a stage in the logical progression of capitalism? That Horkheimer and his colleagues should not have been troubled by this lack of clarity, I would argue, only bears out my contention that the Frankfurt School did not see itself as engaging in the purist distillation of an essentialist concept of fascism but was putting up a desperate fight to take on, both in conceptual and practical terms and in the most pragmatic way they knew how, a host of evidently interrelated and deeply troubling developments.

‘Intra-national competition’, Horkheimer continued, ‘turns into oppression.... As long as its power had been decentralized’, he explained,

industry, propelled by its self-interest, had to cater to the needs of the population and, willy-nilly, promoted technical, political, and social progress, at least to a certain degree. But under its totalitarian set-up big industry is in a position not only to impose its plan upon its former competitors, but to order the masses to work instead of having to deal with them as free parties to a contract. Popular needs determine production far less than they did through the market, and industry converges on the production of instruments of destruction.

Having reiterated the notion of the elimination of the market that was crucial to the state capitalism concept, Horkheimer now moved squarely into dialectic of enlightenment territory. ‘Planned waste of intelligence, happiness, and life’,⁶³ he continued,

succeeds the planless waste caused by the frictions and crises of the market system. The more efficiently authoritarian planning functions and the more smoothly nature and men are exploited, – the more are subjects and objects of the plan dominated by dead matter and the more senseless, exorbitant, and destructive becomes the whole social apparatus which is maintained for the perpetuation of power exclusively.⁶⁴

All the rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, ‘the blind calculative rationality of business life, so bitterly denounced by fascism, has carried over to the authoritarian society’. In it, the previous ‘irrational rationality’ of liberal capitalism had been replaced by ‘madness with method’. While genuine socialism would be characterized by a humankind that is ‘conscious of its common good and solidarity’ and ‘guides its own destiny’, under ‘this so-called socialism ... the natural conditions, the pressures of the masses, the rivalries of cliques play themselves off against each other in the sinister hearts of the fuehrers and emerge as the blind laws of fascist economy’. To be sure, ‘during the earlier periods of private industry’, too, ‘the achievements of men turned increasingly against them; no masterpiece of engineering, no gigantic factory, no ladies paradise arose without enhancing the power of society as well as its misery’. Now, however,

in authoritarian society, technical, social, military advances are the handmaids of doom and disaster. Every frontier torn down by fascism only strengthens the walls separating men from each other, every means of communication it improves only places them farther apart, every scientific invention only blinds them the more to nature.⁶⁵ Progress in the abstract triumphs. The world belongs to the clever, and the devil take the hindmost, –

he continued, and then added: ‘this is true more than it ever was’, a formulation that surely epitomizes the intimate entanglement of continuity and discontinuity in Horkheimer’s account. ‘The soul of fascism’, he went on, was ‘the principle of letting nothing lie still, of stirring everyone to action, of tolerating nothing that has no utility, in a word, dynamism ... Moral taboos and ideals are abolished; true is that which has proved serviceable’.⁶⁶ What Horkheimer described in this instance as ‘the soul of fascism’ would, of course, resurface in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* as Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of the Enlightenment that had yet to develop a sense of its true purpose and power

and thus transcend its own limitations. 'Can anyone dare question the serviceability of the secret police, of concentration camps, blood purges against the insane, anti-Semitism, relentless activation of the people?' Horkheimer continued.⁶⁷ 'Fascists have learned something from pragmatism. Even their sentences no longer have meaning, only a purpose'.⁶⁸

Fascism, he suggested,

feels itself the son, nay the savior, of the world that bore it. That world collapsed, as Marx had prophesied, because after it had reached a certain point in its development, it was unable to fulfill human needs. Technological unemployment has evidenced the crisis which cannot be alleviated by returning to the market system.

This would suggest that there was indeed no way back.

'National Socialism attempts to maintain and strengthen the hegemony of privileged groups by abolishing economic liberties for the rest of society', he went on. Turning finally to 'the German people' in general, Horkheimer suggested that 'in tolerating Hitler', they 'went along with the facts; given the prevailing inequality and injustice it was politic to profit from the weakness of the old world powers and to supplant them. With the world as it was, Hitler seemed more practical than Stresemann. National Socialism became the die-hard competitor on an international scale. And now', he concluded the general section of his preface, in a perhaps somewhat surprising twist, 'the question is whether the long established houses can remodel their enterprises fast enough to get rid of it'. Evidently, then, fascism need not have the last word after all.

Horkheimer then turned to Pollock's essay on state capitalism. Its topic was

an authoritarian society that might embrace the earth, or one that is at least autarchic. Its challenging thesis is that such a society can endure for a long and terrifying period. Basing itself on the most recent economic experience, it comes to the conclusion that all technical economic problems

that worried the business world can be handled through authoritarian devices. The article attempts to destroy the wishful ideas that fascism must eventually disintegrate through disharmonies of supply and demand, budget deficiencies, or unemployment.

That said, he clarified, 'the study is not confined to authoritarian society alone but conceives the latter as a sub-species of state capitalism, thus raising the question whether state capitalism might not be workable within the framework of democracy rather than terror'.⁶⁹ Then followed the aforementioned 'positive' remarks about US democracy that had worried both Neumann and Adorno. In the final short paragraph, Horkheimer relativized the significance of Pollock's essay by noting that it 'outlines the economic structure of state capitalism' and emphasizing that the remaining articles in the issue 'study the links between authoritarian society and the past, as well as the disharmonies that dominate its existing forms'.⁷⁰

AUSCHWITZ

Within about a fortnight (at most) of the publication of the final issue of the *Studies* and the Institute's commemorative volume for Benjamin, the BBC broke the news of the German genocide against European Jewry to the wider public (though it seems unlikely that somebody who was as well informed and connected and as heavily involved in trying to rescue Jewish relatives and associates from Europe as Horkheimer would not already have had a fairly good idea of what was going on). The impact of the Shoah on Horkheimer and Adorno is well documented. None too surprisingly, it led them to take an even bleaker view of the direction in which the world seemed to be heading. They also became rather less forgiving in their assessment of the role of the German population.⁷¹ They now reasoned that the still very young history of fascism (or state capitalism) on its

own could not possibly account for the 'endless series of inconceivably horrible deeds, the most fiendish acts of organized murder and destruction ever accomplished by any people since the beginning of history' that were now being perpetrated by 'the German nation'.⁷²

This explicit reference to 'the German nation' is indicative of a tension, which, from the final years of the war onwards, characterized their assessment of fascism/National Socialism for a while. Confronted with the Shoah, the critical theorists became increasingly preoccupied, even more so and – especially – more explicitly than before, specifically with German National Socialism, on the one hand, while the universalizing tendencies of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* project also led them to worry very seriously about the possibility that fascism, after the defeat of Nazi Germany, would come to dominate the West in its entirety, not least given the forces it would need to mobilize to fend off Soviet Communism. This is what Adorno meant when he wrote, in his letter to Horkheimer of 9 May 1945, that 'the historical force of fascism ... has moved its abode', and that 'the conflict between the two absolute tickets from which there will no longer be any escape is clearly looming'.⁷³

'Ticket thinking' featured prominently in the seventh of the 'Elements of Antisemitism' Horkheimer and Adorno added to the version of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* published in Amsterdam in 1947. They argued that there was a tendency for people no longer to make actual judgements and ideological choices. Instead, they increasingly bought into comprehensive ideological package deals in an effectively automated manner that corresponded to the developmental phase of state capitalism.⁷⁴ While many of their observations are compelling, the implication seemed to be that this new mode of 'ticket thinking' marked the universalization of antisemitism and hence of fascism, though it arguably makes much more sense in the context of the administered world. Ultimately, what clearly

emerged from *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, *Eclipse of Reason* and the concept of the administered world was the enormous destruction constantly wrought on human life by modern society even when its potential for fascism was not realized.

AFTER 1945

Once it became clear, not only that fascism was not in fact taking over the West, but also that the development in many of the Western countries might well be characterized by a previously unprecedented measure of liberal-democratic governance and social redistribution, Horkheimer and Adorno, as far as I can see, conceptualized National Socialism as both an extreme case and as the dysfunctional other of the administered world. Take Adorno's suggestion of 1959 that National Socialism had 'anticipated the current mode of crisis management in a violent form'; it had been 'a barbaric experiment in state control over industrial society'.⁷⁵ In an interview published posthumously, nine days after his death, in West Germany's foremost weekly news magazine, *Der Spiegel*, Horkheimer made the same argument.

Fascism ... was the violent anticipation of the universally administered society ... National Socialism was unable to function seamlessly because the instruments for the domination of nature had not yet been perfected. Yet in principle National Socialism had already contrived a fully automated society, as it were – a society without morality and spirit.⁷⁶

As long as the West remained more prosperous than 'the East' (i.e., the countries in the Soviet sphere of influence), 'the fascist variant is more likely to appeal to the masses than the eastern propaganda while, on the other hand, one does not feel pressed to resort to the fascist *ultima ratio*', Adorno wrote in 1959.⁷⁷

Their formulations reflect the complex and potentially paradoxical dialectic they

were trying to address. Strictly speaking, if fascism was the extreme case of the administered world then the evolution of the administered world needed to be stopped in its tracks before it could unfold its potential for fascism again. If, on the other hand, fascism was the dysfunctional other of the administered world then the administered world needed to be defended against anything that might subvert it sufficiently to necessitate a return to fascism. Adorno's frequently (mis-) quoted statement that 'I consider the after-life of National Socialism *within* democracy potentially more dangerous than the afterlife of fascist tendencies *against* democracy'⁷⁸ might suggest that, on balance, he was more worried about fascism as the extreme case of the administered world.

On the other hand, remarks he made in the lecture theatre in 1968 seem to point in the opposite direction. In the same lecture in which he praised Neumann's *Behemoth* to his students as 'the most congruous socio-economic account of fascism to date',⁷⁹ he explained to them that he saw a fundamental dialectic at work in the ever more comprehensive integration of society. Adorno suggested to his students that

increasing social integration as a visible phenomenon is generally accompanied by a tendency towards disintegration in the sense that the various social processes that are melded together but for the most part stem from diverging sets of interests, instead of maintaining the measure of neutrality, of relative indifference towards one another that was characteristic of earlier phases of social development, become more and more antagonistic towards one another.

'It seems to me that this is particularly evident', he added, 'in extreme situations in late bourgeois society like fascism'. What, then, Adorno continued, of the current situation, i.e., 1968? One of the potentially counter-intuitive implications of the racket theory is that not ever increasing all-encompassing social conformity and uniformity and state control is the precursor of fascism, but precisely its opposite: the fundamental

disintegration of society and the appropriation of state functions by competing rackets. Adorno therefore argued that the tendency he had previously described as coming to a head in fascism probably did not pertain to the 'more peaceful late bourgeois society' of 1968 because the current 'pluralism we are constantly being told about' was not so much a reality as an ideological claim and 'the various parallel forces are in fact encaptured and integrally determined by the all-dominating social system under which we live'.⁸⁰ Put very bluntly indeed one might say: fascism was characterized by great disunity and thus talked all the more about unity; 'more peaceful late bourgeois society', by contrast, talked a great deal about pluralism and diversity but was in fact profoundly integrated and streamlined. In short, it was the continued functionality of what Horkheimer, as we saw, described as a 'fully automated society ... without morality and spirit' that vouched for the fact that society was not threatened by the sort of disintegration to which fascism might be seen as the solution.⁸¹ This account of fascism as both the extreme case and the dysfunctional other of the administered world renders no obvious way out and clearly points towards the continued need for metaphysics and 'theology or whatever one wants to call it'.⁸²

The legacy of the Frankfurt School's grappling with fascism/National Socialism, then, is the commitment to dealing with this apparent paradox. We are tasked with pinpointing the potential for fascism wherever it shows itself while at the same time adhering to the principle of *determinate* negation and thus insisting on the very real differences between the potential for fascism and its actual realization. Adorno's new categorical imperative depends not only on a keen awareness of the fact that 'the objective social prerequisites that precipitated fascism continue to exist',⁸³ but also on the appreciation of what Auschwitz actually was, in other words, of what was so unprecedented and singular about Auschwitz that the need to prevent its recurrence merits a new categorical imperative in the

first place. The facile lumping together of distinct phenomena or their *indeterminate* negation across the board amounts not to a realization of this categorical imperative but demans it and obstructs its implementation.

‘The black outlook notwithstanding – on which we were always in agreement’, Adorno wrote in his letter to Horkheimer on 9 May 1945,

there are grounds for joy all the same; on the one hand, because in a world that topples from one catastrophe to another even a short reprieve is a joy; on the other hand, because the utmost dread was still called Hitler and Himmler and while it could recur elsewhere it has not done so yet. Things turned out better than you thought this time and maybe they will also turn out better than both of us think in future.⁸⁴

Notes

- 1 Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, *Briefwechsel* vol. 3 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2005), 100; Max Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17 (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1996), 633.
- 2 Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 467; Herbert Marcuse, *Technology, War and Fascism* (London: Routledge, 1998), 245.
- 3 This was an ongoing concern of Adorno’s. As he wrote in 1959, the development of international relations was among the foremost ‘objective’ factors nurturing the ‘afterlife’ of National Socialism in post-war West Germany: ‘It seems to justify post facto Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union. Given that the Western world essentially defines its unity in terms of its resistance against the Russian threat, it looks as though it was sheer folly for the victors of 1945 to destroy the proven bulwark against Bolshevism [i.e., Germany] only to rebuild it again a few years later’ (Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit’, in *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 8 [Darmstadt: wbg, 1998], 560).
- 4 Adorno, Horkheimer, *Briefwechsel* vol. 3, 101; Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 634.
- 5 Max Horkheimer, ‘On the Sociology of Class Relations’, Max Horkheimer Archive [MHA], University Library Frankfurt, MHA: IX, 16, 4 (identical wording in all five versions).
- 6 Raffaele Laudani (ed.), Franz Neumann, Herbert Marcuse, Otto Kirchheimer, *Secret Reports on Nazi Germany. The Frankfurt School Contribution to the War Effort* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); Marcuse, *Technology, War and Fascism*.
- 7 Rolf Wiggershaus, *Die Frankfurter Schule* (Munich: dtv, 2008), 339. Theodor W. Adorno, *Briefe an die Eltern, 1939–1951* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2003), 196, 132, 151.
- 8 Quoted in Laudani (ed.), *Secret Reports*, 3.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 8.
- 10 *Ibid.*, 12.
- 11 *Ibid.*, 14.
- 12 *Ibid.*, 20–21. Neumann argued, even in full knowledge of the German genocide against European Jewry, that antisemitism was merely ‘the spearhead of terror’ because ‘the persecution of the Jews, as practiced by National Socialism, is only the prologue of more horrible things to come’. The Jews were just ‘used as guinea pigs in testing the method of repression’. ‘The extermination of the Jews’, he concluded, ‘is only the means to the attainment of the ultimate objective, namely the destruction of free institutions, beliefs, and groups. This may be called the spearhead theory of anti-semitism’ (Franz Neumann, *Behemoth* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1944], 550–1). See Lars Fischer, ‘Review: Jack Jacobs, The Frankfurt School, Jewish Lives, and Antisemitism’, in *German Quarterly* 89, 1 (2016), 93–7, here 93–6.
- 13 Max Horkheimer, ‘Preface’, in *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* 9, 2 (1941), 195–9, here 199.
- 14 Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 109.
- 15 *Ibid.*, 134; Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, *Briefwechsel* vol. 2 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2004), 196.
- 16 See Gerhard Scheit’s contribution to this *Handbook*.
- 17 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Nationalsozialismus und Antisemitismus’, in Adorno, Horkheimer, *Briefwechsel* vol. 2, 539–95, here 541. On the Frankfurt School’s grappling with antisemitism, see my contribution, ‘Antisemitism and the Critique of Capitalism’, in this Volume of the *Handbook*.
- 18 Adorno, *Briefe an die Eltern*, 65–6. I mention this not least in connection with John Abromeit’s interesting suggestion that the relatively positive evaluation of the ‘classical’ capitalist entrepreneur that formed the foil against which they threw the functioning of state capitalism into relief could be understood as evidence of a reconciliation between Horkheimer and his father (John Abromeit, *Max Horkheimer and the Foundations of the Frankfurt School* [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011], 419).
- 19 See, for example, Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 601–2. In *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, the question of the Jews’ association with

- the sphere of circulation featured prominently in the third of the seven 'Elements of Antisemitism'.
- 20 Adorno, Horkheimer, *Briefwechsel* vol. 3, 100–1.
 - 21 *Ibid.*, 139; Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 54.
 - 22 See Friedrich Pollock, 'Is National Socialism a New Order?' in *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* 9, 3 (1941/42), 440–55, here 440, n1.
 - 23 Adorno wrote to his parents on 15 May that the issue would now come out in a matter of days, and on 5 June he inquired whether they had received both the journal and the Institute's commemorative publication for Walter Benjamin (Adorno, *Briefe an die Eltern*, 144, 146).
 - 24 Neumann, *Behemoth*. The preface is dated 23 December 1941. On 19 April 1942, Adorno suggested to his father that he should obtain a copy of Neumann's book from Leo Löwenthal (Adorno, *Briefe an die Eltern*, 138).
 - 25 Max Horkheimer, 'Die Juden und Europa', in *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* 8 (1939/40), 115–36; 'The Jews and Europe', in Stephen Bronner, Douglas Kellner (eds.), *Critical Theory and Society* (New York: Routledge, 1989), 77–94. On this text, see my contribution to this Volume of the *Handbook*, 'Antisemitism and the Critique of Capitalism'.
 - 26 See MHA: IX, 12, 1–7.
 - 27 Max Horkheimer, 'Autoritärer Staat', in Institut für Sozialforschung (ed.), *Walter Benjamin zum Gedächtnis* ([New York Los Angeles], n.p., 1942), 123–61; also in Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 5 (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1987), 293–319; 'The Authoritarian State', in Andrew Arato, Eike Gebhardt (eds.), *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader* (New York: Continuum, 1985), 95–117.
 - 28 Horkheimer, 'Class Relations'. This text, parts of which were included in *The Eclipse of Reason*, has had a somewhat unfortunate editorial history. The editors of Horkheimer's *Gesammelte Schriften* have published a specially commissioned German translation of the final version (Max Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 12 [Frankfurt: Fischer, 1985], 75–104) without, however, taking into account the hand-written comments on that version because, on their understanding, these were only meant to correct the 'clumsy' English. Conversely, Todd Cronan has recently published what he claims is the 'original essay in full and in its original English-language format' online (<http://nonsite.org/the-tank/max-horkheimer-and-the-sociology-of-class-relations>). As far as I can see, he has reproduced the longest of the versions preserved among Horkheimer's papers, which is almost certainly *not* the final version.
 - 29 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Reflexionen zur Klassentheorie', in *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 8 (Darmstadt: wbg, 1998), 373–91; 'Reflections on Class Theory', in *Can One Live After Auschwitz?* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 93–110.
 - 30 Helmut Dubiel, Alfons Söllner (ed.), *Wirtschaft, Recht und Staat im Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt: EVA, 1981).
 - 31 [Idea, Activities and Program of the Institute of Social Research], second English-language draft, 22 June 1938, MHA: IX 55, 1, 19.
 - 32 See Eva-Maria Ziege, *Antisemitismus und Gesellschaftstheorie* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2009), 104–8; Moishe Postone, Barbara Brick, 'Critical Theory and Political Economy', in Seyla Benhabib, Wolfgang Bonß, John McCole (eds.), *On Marx Horkheimer* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 215–56, here 215–25.
 - 33 Without wanting in any way to feed into the bizarrely decontextualized canard that Horkheimer and Adorno somehow abused Sohn-Rethel or willfully withheld assistance they easily could have provided him with, I would suggest that they certainly did miss a beat in allowing their philosophical differences to outweigh their initial enthusiasm for Sohn-Rethel's extremely interesting analyses of the economy and class structure in Nazi Germany. See Carl Freytag, Oliver Schlaudt (eds.), Alfred Sohn-Rethel, *Die deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik im Übergang zum Nazifaschismus* (Freiburg: ça ira, 2016); Johannes Agnoli, Bernhard Blanke, Niels Kadritzke (eds.), Alfred Sohn-Rethel, *Ökonomie und Klassenstruktur des deutschen Faschismus* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973); Christoph Gödde (ed.), *Theodor Adorno und Alfred Sohn-Rethel. Briefwechsel 1936–1969* (Munich: etk, 1991).
 - 34 Franz Neumann, copy of letter to Theodor W. Adorno, 14 August 1940, MHA VI 1a, 21–3. See also Jack Jacobs, *The Frankfurt School, Jewish Lives, and Antisemitism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 59.
 - 35 Indeed, in John Abromeit's recent account of Horkheimer's 'turn' to state capitalism, Pollock plays only a rather subordinate role (Abromeit, *Max Horkheimer*, chapter 9).
 - 36 Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 46, 91.
 - 37 *Ibid.*, 411.
 - 38 MHA: VI, 31, 333–5, 3.
 - 39 Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 47.
 - 40 MHA: VI, 31, 333–5, 2.
 - 41 Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 47.
 - 42 This was a reference to the sociologist Adolph Löwe who had recently moved from Manchester to the New School.
 - 43 Adorno, Horkheimer, *Briefwechsel* vol. 2, 139; Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 54.

- 44 Adorno, Horkheimer, *Briefwechsel* vol. 2, 140; Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 55.
- 45 Adorno, Horkheimer, *Briefwechsel* vol. 2, 140–1; Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 55.
- 46 Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 91.
- 47 Adorno, Horkheimer, *Briefwechsel* vol. 2, 160–1; Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 96.
- 48 Adorno, Horkheimer, *Briefwechsel* vol. 2, 194; Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 132.
- 49 Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 110.
- 50 *Ibid.*, 116.
- 51 Wiggershaus, *Frankfurter Schule*, 324.
- 52 Franz L. Neumann, 'Approaches to the Study of Political Power', in *Political Science Quarterly* 65, 2 (1950), 161–80, here 176.
- 53 Theodor W. Adorno, *Einleitung in die Soziologie* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1993), 79.
- 54 *Ibid.*, 79–80.
- 55 Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 103, 107. Neumann argued that Pollock's position was simply a reformulation of Mannheimian sociology, adding that 'I have put Pollock forward as an honorary citizen of Mannheim but note to my great satisfaction that the English are gradually bombing Mannheim to pieces'. In his response, Horkheimer explained that 'your pathos against the Mannheimian renegade Pollock strikes me as being theoretically no less far-fetched than many of the things I do not like about his essay' (*ibid.*, 119).
- 56 Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 109.
- 57 Horkheimer, 'Preface', 195.
- 58 Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 133; Adorno, Horkheimer, *Briefwechsel* vol. 2, 195.
- 59 Horkheimer, 'Preface', 195.
- 60 Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 133; Adorno, Horkheimer, *Briefwechsel* vol. 2, 195.
- 61 Horkheimer, 'Preface', 195.
- 62 *Ibid.*, 195–6.
- 63 *Ibid.*, 196.
- 64 *Ibid.*, 196–7.
- 65 *Ibid.*, 197. Responding to the draft of the preface, Adorno had written: 'I would only want to note that it may be that not only alienation but its opposite too increases under fascism' (Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 134; Adorno, Horkheimer, *Briefwechsel* vol. 2, 196).
- 66 Horkheimer, 'Preface', 197.
- 67 *Ibid.*, 197–8.
- 68 This notion, which is obviously one of the precursors of the 'ticket mentality' idea, also played a crucial role in Adorno's analyses of fascist propaganda – which one might consequently, without all too much exaggeration, classify as studies of propagandists who happen to be fascists, rather than studies specifically of fascist propaganda. See Theodor W. Adorno, 'Anti-Semitism and Fascist Propaganda', in Ernst Simmel (ed.), *Anti-Semitism. A Social Disease* (New York: International Universities Press), 125–37; 'The Psychological Technique of Martin Luther Thomas' Radio Addresses', in *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 9.1 (Darmstadt: wbg, 1998), 7–141.
- 69 Horkheimer, 'Preface', 198.
- 70 *Ibid.*, 199.
- 71 See, for example, Max Horkheimer, 'Program for an Inter European Academy', MHA: IX, 39, 1, 12.
- 72 *Ibid.*
- 73 Adorno, Horkheimer, *Briefwechsel* vol. 3, 101; Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 634.
- 74 For a slightly more detailed discussion see my contribution on Antisemitism in this Volume. See also Eva-Maria Ziege, 'Elemente des Antisemitismus', in Gunnar Hindrichs (ed.), *Max Horkheimer/Theodor W. Adorno: Dialektik der Aufklärung* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017), 81–95, here 92–4.
- 75 Adorno, 'Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit', 562.
- 76 Max Horkheimer, 'Es geht um die Moral der Deutschen', [interview] in *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 7 (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1985), 480–5, here 483.
- 77 Adorno, 'Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit', 561.
- 78 *Ibid.*, 556.
- 79 Adorno, *Einleitung in die Soziologie*, 79.
- 80 *Ibid.*, 80.
- 81 Horkheimer, 'Es geht um die Moral der Deutschen', 483.
- 82 Adorno, Horkheimer, *Briefwechsel* vol. 2, 222; Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 163. On this issue see the chapter by Julia Jopp and Ansgar Martins in this *Handbook*.
- 83 Adorno, 'Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit', 566.
- 84 Adorno, Horkheimer, *Briefwechsel* vol. 3, 101–2; Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 17, 634.